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PREFACE 
This book represents the main proceedings of a conference that was held at 
Lake Arrowhead, California, in March 1990. The conference brought 
together some eighty participants from all over the world to discuss 
theoretical, empirical, and policy problems generated by the current per-
plexing tum in actual patterns and processes of industrialization and regional 
development. This turn is often identified - somewhat ambiguously - as a 
shift in socioeconomic relations to a "post-Fordist" configuration. The 
present book is an attempt to construct a theoretical synthesis around this 
socioeconomic configuration (in its various national and regional variations) 
involving a combination of concepts dealing with social regulation of the 
economic order, flexible production organization, and industrial district 
formation. We believe that this synthesis is coherent and sustainable and is 
likely to set the terms of the debate on issues of industrialization and 
regional development for a number of years to come. We offer the book in 
the hope that it will not only stimulate further creative scientific work on 
these issues, but that it will also provide a much-needed antidote to the 
neoconservative point of view, which dominates current policymaking in 
many of the major capitalist countries at the present time, and which, we 
believe, cannot substitute for a reasoned and theoretically informed analysis 
of social and economic realities. 
The efforts of many individuals went into the organization of the Lake 
Arrowhead conference and into the production of this book. We should like 
to thank Dean Richard Weinstein and Associate Dean Edward Soja, of the 
Graduate School of Architecture and Urban Planning at UCLA for their 
support for the project from its inception, as well as Dan Mitchell, Director 
of the Institute of Industrial Relations at the same university. Mr. Alain 
d'Iribame of the PIRTI'EM program at the CNRS in Paris also graciously 
accorded us support, and Mr. Robert Salais of CNRS/IEPE took over 
responsibility for administration of the French side of the endeavor. At 
UCLA, the tireless efforts of Vanessa Dingley in organizing the conference, 
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and the diligence of Jane Pollard and Jan Lawrence were indispensable. The 
staffs of the Urban Planning Program and the Department of Geography at 
UCLA were always ready to help, and we thank them all as well. 
Michael Storper and Allen J. Scott 
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Allen ]. Scott and Michael Storper 
THEORIES OF INDUSTRIALIZATION AND REGIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT: REGULATION, INSTITUTIONS, AND 
EVOLUTION 
From the 1920s down to the 1960s, across the advanced capitalist world, 
many leading industrial sectors were converted to mass production methods. 
Over this same period, various institutions and practices were constructed 
to regulate the social and economic effects of mass production. These 
regulatory apparatuses consisted of rather similar basic elements throughout 
the advanced capitalist world. One such element was the strongly oligopo-
listic structure of industry, with its large-scale markets and rising barriers 
to entry. Labor relations and labor markets were everywhere ordered by 
institutions of collective bargaining, with a strong functional split between 
white-collar workers (responsible for industrial planning) and blue-collar 
workers (responsible for routine manual labor). Keynesian welfare-statist 
legislation helped to smooth out aggregate demand and to secure high levels 
of social stability. In regional terms, this form of industrialization was seen 
by theorists of the day as a system of core-periphery relationships, within 
which core regions tended to grow at the expense of underdeveloped 
peripheral regions which in tum provided raw materials or agricultural 
products for the core at unfavorable terms of trade. 
By the late 1970s, the processes of industrialization and regional develop-
ment based on this "Fordist" mass production system in the United States 
and Europe were in crisis, most importantly because of cheap foreign 
imports and the increasing difficulty of achieving high levels of productivity 
gain and the limits this imposed on the ability of the system to keep wages 
- hence consumption - moving upwards (see chapters by Altvater and Itoh). 
The mass production system began to undergo major restructuring as 
producers searched for new models of industrial technology, organization, 
labor relations, and location (Coriat, Standing). In the core regions of mass 
1 In this introductory chapter, references to subsequent chapters are designated by the names 
of the author or authors in parentheses. 
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production, the effects of the concomitant plant closures and layoffs were 
aggravated by the intensified efforts of producers to respond to the crisis 
by decentralizing branch plants to low-cost peripheral regions. At the same 
time, after the 1960s, a series of new industrial regions based on flexible 
production arose outside of the heartlands of mass production. 
Much of the theoretical reasoning of postwar social science portrayed the 
mass production system as the destiny of industrial society Oessop). Its 
technologies, markets, institutions, politics, and geographical forms were 
seen as expressions of irreversible and univeral tendencies of modernization. 
Very few social scientists in the postwar period foresaw the processes of 
deindustrialization and decline which were dramatically evident by the 
1970s in virtually all the major manufacturing regions of the United 
States and Western Europe, along with accompanying changes in politics, 
technologies, and markets. Even Marxian social theory, with its stress on 
the crisis tendencies of capitalist economies, proved largely inadequate to 
the task of understanding the historical changes that did take place Oessop, 
Hirst and Zeitlin). 
Social scientists in a variety of disciplines have now spent nearly two 
decades coming to grips with the effects of the breakdown of the mass 
production system, including the new processes of competition and global 
trade, profound redefinitions of occupational structures, the reshaping of 
labor markets and labor politics, and the rise of a series of new core regions. 
This book is evidence of the coalescence of an interdisciplinary project in 
the social sciences which is now generating powerful accounts of the decline 
of the Fordist mass production system, and the rise of a new flexible 
production order. More importantly, this book is in large degree focused 
on a new set of theoretical tools involving three interdependent dimensions 
of industrialization and regional development, i.e.: 
a) their necessary institutional contexts, 
b) their evolutionary dynamics, and 
c) their geographical foundations and territorial specificity. 
In particular, the book brings together work which draws on regulationist 
theory, institutionalist and evolutionary economics, and the new economic 
geography. 
Regulationist theory provides us with a view of economic history as a 
chain of distinctive periods, together with a concept of the multilayered and 
political character of capitalist accumulation. These periods are defined by 
specific economic practices consisting of dominant sets of production 
relations (embodied in ensembles of leading industries), complemented by 
different political and quasi-political arrangements which coordinate the 
economy. Such practices are institutionalized when an effective coalition, or 
historical bloc is constructed which is capable of putting together and 
maintaining a specific set of social compromises. Regulationist theory 
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identifies the specificity of the mass production system stretching from 
about the 1920s to the late 1960s as the marriage of a technological paradigm 
of production with Keynesian and Beveridgean institutions. Likewise, 
regulationist theory permits us now to pose the question of whether a new 
period of capitalist development based on the ascendance of the paradigm 
of flexible production and new forms of innovation-based competition is 
coming into existence; it also permits us to ask how production systems, 
institutions and markets are now different from those of the mass produc-
tion period Oessop, Altvater, Coriat, Leborgne and Lipietz, Dosi and 
Salvatore). 
Institutionalist economics yields insights about the organizational logic of 
production. It has reopened the question of the nature of the firm and shed 
light on the many different possible articulations of markets and hierarchies 
that can efficiently coordinate production systems and labor markets in 
industrial capitalism. In so doing, institutionalist economics has replaced the 
view that there is always one single "best practice" for a given production 
activity, and shown that markets, technologies, and production organization 
are mutually interdependent systems embedded in relatively durable institu-
tional contexts (Dosi and Salvatore). As a consequence, this body of theory 
indicates that sociopolitical organizations, far from constituting barriers to 
the operation of the market, are essential underpinnings of any efficient 
capitalist production system. The question is now what kinds of institutions 
will be built in the 1990s and how they will influence the organization of 
production, labor markets, and product markets in the early decades 
of the coming century (Hirst and Zeitlin, Saglio, Salais). In any case, 
empirical analyses of the advent of flexible production are proceeding with 
a sensitivity to the roles that institutions play in industrialization and 
regional development, and to the wide variety of institutional forms 
that may exist (Ganne, Saglio, Saxenian, Standing, Leborgne and Lipietz, 
Courault and Romani). 
Evolutionary economics conceives of the development of technologies, 
markets, and institutions as pathways whose historical trajectory is governed 
by the complex interplay between prevailing rules of social order, and the 
probing and experimental character of much economic behavior in the 
context of prior states of the system (see particularly Dosi and Salvatore). 
The constitution of economic order is not a static equilibrium, but 
a constantly unfolding structure with many possible branching points; 
different pathways may be selected by the interactions among small events 
or by the regulatory effects of institutional order (Piore). 
Economic geography deals with the territorial structures that flow from 
and sustain processes of industrialization and their regulation. It is through 
economic geography that the concrete synthesis of these other processes is 
realized as the question of regional development. Thus, each period 
of capitalist history tends to be marked by its own peculiar economic 
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geography; just as the Fordist mass production era was rooted in a 
distinctive set of core regions, so with the rise of modem flexible production 
in the 1960s and 1970s, some sectors broke away from the old core regions 
and established themselves in new locational domains. In these domains, 
processes of institution-building - and thus of the eventual construction of 
a regulatory mode for the flexible production economy- are now occurring. 
In the same places, new kinds of technologies and labor relations which are 
critical to the new strategic competition and the evolutionary trajectory of 
production are being generated. It is thus here that the pathway of 
development of the contemporary period is, at least in part, being defined 
(Ganne, Saglio, Courault and Romani, Lorenz). 
PERIODS OF CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT 
AND THEIR GEOGRAPHICAL ANATOMY 
Capitalism can be seen, in its most general form, as an arrangement in which 
commodity producers combine the physical means of production and labor 
in order to bring forth sellable outputs which generate profits. This general 
form, however, varies in its specific social configuration from time to time 
and from place to place; it emerges in practice as a series of historically 
and geographically specific technological-institutional systems. The latter 
involve: 
a) an evolving technological and organizational structure of production; 
b) labor markets and industrial relations, including industrial politics and 
mechanisms of the socialization of labor; 
c) managerial cultures and norms; 
d) market structures and forms of competition; 
e) regulatory institutions at sectoral, regional, national, and international 
levels. 
It is possible to identify relatively distinct periods of capitalist develop-
ment in terms of dominant technological-institutional systems as they are 
embodied in ensembles of leading industries and complemented by different 
political and quasi-political arrangements which steer and coordinate the 
economy. In this sense, technological-institutional systems are much like 
what regulationist theory refers to as regimes of accumulation and modes 
of social regulation Oessop, Hirst and Zeitlin, ltoh). Such episodes as the 
putting-out period of early capitalism, the classical mill-and-workshop 
economy of the mid-nineteenth century, the Fordist mass production era, 
and the currently emerging system of flexible production, all express 
distinctive historical and geographical tendencies of particular technological-
institutional systems. 
Even so, the detailed internal configurations of any given system - in 
matters of technology, industrial organization, labor markets, products, 
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regulatory institutions, and so on - will often vary over space and time. 
Thus, the Fordist mass production system showed considerable variation 
between the different leading capitalist economies, as did corresponding 
forms of Keynesian welfare-statist regulation. Above all, the employment 
relation and its legal underpinnings were marked by the peculiarities of each 
national case, and this has had important repercussions for the ways in 
which the crisis of Fordism has been played out across North America and 
Western Europe. 
If technological-institutional systems retain a sort of structural integrity 
over more or less long periods of time, they are nonetheless always 
susceptible to crisis and dissolution. Such a tum of events may occur for 
a variety of reasons, whether internal (saturation of markets, declining 
profitability, institutional failures, and so on), or external (intensified foreign 
competition, resource depletion, and so on), or a combination of both. At 
such times, the preexisting system of production relations and regulatory 
institutions can no longer absorb the tensions creating the crisis without 
significant restructuring. In the case of the recent crisis of Fordism, this was 
manifest in a prolonged drop of profitability in core mass production 
sectors, rising unemployment, the weakening of organized labor, and 
neoconservative onslaughts against the institutions of the Keynesian welfare 
state. 
The transition from one system to another - which may be abrupt or 
prolonged over time - will often be associated with and brought about by 
a reconstitution of the geography of production, especially in cases where 
the ascending leading sectors of the new system are free of any dependence 
on the immobile resources basic to the old. Every shift of technological-
institutional system hence opens up a period of restructuring and the 
possibility of a radical switch in the spatial bases of production from one 
set of core regions to another. In the new regions thus established, patterns 
of production and accumulation will proceed in markedly different ways 
from those that typified the old system. 
The typical organizational and locational model of mass production 
industry was the growth center focused on vertically integrated lead plants 
with many backward linkages. On this basis, a small number of core mass 
production regions emerged in the mid-twentieth century, such as the upper 
Midwest in the United States (and nearby areas of Ontario in Canada), and 
the area stretching from the English Midlands through northern France, 
Belgium and Holland to the Rhine-Ruhr area of Europe, with outliers in 
northwest Italy and southern Sweden. The system of mass production was 
also associated with large-scale urbanization, due to the massing of the work 
force of the lead plants and their dependent satellites. 
By contrast with mass production, flexible production systems are 
characterized by progressive vertical disintegration of production with 
numerous producers (of different sizes) caught up in tightly knit network 
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structures (Piore). In these networks, groups of industrial establishments 
with especially dense interrelations tend to locate close to one another to 
facilitate exchanges of goods and information, and to take advantage of 
external economies in labor markets and infrastructure. The emerging 
economy of flexible production has brought into existence a series of new 
core production regions, and these are typically quite different from those 
of the mass production system. Three groups of contemporary regions of 
flexible production can be recognized. 
First, craft-based, design-intensive industries such as clothing, textiles, 
furniture, jewelry, ceramics, sporting goods, as well as foci of precision 
metalworking and machine-building, may be found in two main types of 
location. One coincides with inner city areas in large metropolitan regions 
such as New York, Paris, Los Angeles, and London, with their large 
immigrant populations. The other coincides with old centers of craft 
production, as in Emilia-Romagna and Tuscany in Italy, parts of the Rhone-
Alps and Mediterranean regions of France, and certain parts of southern 
Germany and Scandinavia (Ganne, Saglio, Courault and Romani, Bianchi). 
Second, high technology industry has tended to locate above all at selected 
suburban locations close to major cities and in formerly non-industrialized 
areas such as Cambridge in the UK, or the French Midi, or especially the 
US Sunbelt with its major new high-technology growth centers in such 
places as Orange County, Silicon Valley, Chatsworth-Canoga Park, Dallas-
Forth Worth, and so on (Saxenian). 
Third, advanced producer and financial service agglomerations are found 
in or close to the central cores of large cities, such as Tokyo, New York, 
London, or La Defense in Paris. 
In all of these new flexible production areas it has been possible to 
reconstitute production processes so that they are insulated from labor 
forces marked by the historical experience of Fordism, with its traditions of 
unionization, collective bargaining, and finely-delineated task structures. 
FROM CORE AND PERIPHERY TO A GLOBAL MOSAIC 
OF REGIONS 
From the 1930s onwards, the rapid growth of the core zones of the 
mass production system provoked considerable political concern about the 
question of regional development. In both Western Europe and the United 
States, various interventions were made to assist those regions which seemed 
unable to recover from the Great Depression; and then in the postwar years, 
an expanding series of programs was implemented in an effort to redistribute 
growth from leading to lagging regions. After the 1950s, many Third World 
countries also devised ambitious regional development programs aimed at 
promoting and diffusing growth. 
These efforts at regional policymaking were all informed by a common 
8 
INDUSTRIALIZATION AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
intellectual perspective, namely, a conception of capitalist economic growth 
as a process which tends to create highly developed core regions on the one 
hand, and underdeveloped dependent peripheral regions on the other. To 
be sure, in regional development theory there are many different accounts 
of core-periphery relations. The traditional approach to this issue is built 
up around the investigation of comparative advantage (based on pregiven 
endowments), market exchange, and concomitant spatial flows of capital and 
labor. In this approach, the full liberation of factor markets is seen as the 
key to a developmental process in which regional income inequalities will 
become nothing more than temporary and self-correcting aberrations. For 
other theorists, the core regions and nations of the capitalist mass produc-
tion system grew at the expense of underdeveloped peripheries, by locking 
the latter into a system of unequal exchange. Yet a third set of theorists 
identified polarization and trickle-down effects of the production system as 
the main factors underlying core-periphery inequalities, intensified by the 
low-wage labor surplus trap, and accordingly they called for policies to 
accelerate transfers from core areas to peripheries. 
A more recent line of analysis revolves around the new spatial and 
international division of labor - mediated by the multiestablishment, 
multinational enterprise - in which the various phases of the production 
process are differentially allocated across space in relation to their varying 
technological and skill characteristics. In this view, advanced technical and 
managerial tasks are typically allocated to core regions, and routinized, low-
skill, labor-intensive activities are allocated to the periphery. Trade then 
occurs between different regions but within the large firm. 
Each of these theoretical advocacies has some validity, and indeed 
each (with suitable further qualification) captures something of current 
realities. That said, none of these viewpoints anticipated the processes of 
deindustrialization and decline which by the 1970s were dramatically 
evident in virtually all the core regions of the United States and Western 
Europe; none anticipated the perplexing rise of a series of new regions of 
flexible production; and by the same token, none had anything to say about 
the possibility that periodic shifts in the overall geographic configuration of 
the capitalist world could take place, including a redefinition of the structure 
of relationships between core and peripheral zones. The resurgence of 
flexible production organization in the modem world thus requires a 
reconsideration of the question of interregional trade, local economic 
specialization, and the broad configuration of the geography of production. 
Three points must now be made. 
First, in contradistinction to the traditional theory of trade, comparative 
advantage is only rarely a matter of pregiven (still less natural) endowments. 
Comparative advantage is more frequently humanly created in the very 
process of trade, and one of the important ways in which this occurs 
is through a trajectory of regional development in which industrial 
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agglomerations with their stocks of external economies are steadily brought 
into being. Striking examples of this process are cars in Detroit and aircraft 
in Los Angeles, where an early start and a series of technological break-
throughs hastened the domination of these regions in their particular 
sectoral specializations. This phenomenon of the "first mover" has recently 
been theorized in terms of evolutionary economics and the new strategic 
trade theory. 
Second, whereas many kinds of commodity chains are spread out across 
the globe, as described by the theory of the new spatial/international 
division of labor, the most rapidly growing industries today are often 
strongly associated with particular industrial agglomerations. In any one of 
these agglomerations, semimanufactured outputs, subassemblies, and other 
kinds of inputs are made within the local industrial network, and are then 
passed on to plants in other locations and other agglomerations. In most 
industries today, a combination of agglomeration of key activities coexists 
with dispersal of other elements of the commodity chain; in brief, the 
"roundaboutness" of the division of labor is both functional and spatial. 
Accordingly, there can be no absolute opposition between the theory of 
agglomeration and the theory of the new spatial/international division of 
labor. Rather, each of these theoretical perspectives captures a different and 
equally valid facet of a single economic reality. 
Third, in addition to established criticisms of the new spatial/international 
division of labor qua simple bipartite core-periphery structure, a further 
qualification must be put forward. Over the last couple of decades, there 
has been an increasing tendency for 
a) large numbers of Third World workers to move into the burgeoning 
low-paying, unskilled jobs generated by the sweatshops, subcontract 
establishments, and low-grade service activities in the flexible production 
agglomerations of the core countries, and 
b) high levels of technical competence and managerial control to develop in 
selected urban regions of the periphery, as in Brazil, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan. 
Indeed, two cities like Los Angeles and Hong Kong, despite their markedly 
divergent national backgrounds, probably have more in common with one 
another as centers of flexible production than do, say, Los Angeles and 
Detroit, which share a common national identity, but have their roots in 
different industrialization processes (cf. Leborgne and Lipietz, Standing). 
These remarks also point in the direction of a needed rethinking of some 
aspects of Third World development theory. Until quite recently, much 
theory suggested that the most effective pathway to development was by 
means of large growth pole industries, complemented by upstream suppliers 
attracted in to the local area by policies of import substitution. Over the 
1970s and 1980s, development strategies based on this theory ran into 
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severe internal constraints (related to low aggregate demand) and external 
constraints (related to increased indebtedness). Meanwhile, forms of 
industrialization based on more tabor-intensive and flexible production 
activities were proceeding apace in many of the Asian and some Latin 
American NICs and near-NICs. Production activities of these sorts 
characterize sectors such as textiles, clothing, shoes, plastics, metalworking 
and electronics. They are often sustained by super-exploitation of labor and 
state policies directed to export-oriented industrialization. In a few cases, 
especially in Asia, selected regions have been able to shift into relatively high 
value-added activities by means of product differentiation and technological 
upgrading. The experience of these regions, along with that of places such 
as the Third Italy, Jutland, or northern Greece in Europe, suggests that a 
flexible production base, combined with effective national and international 
marketing organizations, can generate significant rounds of economic 
growth, especially where producers are able to start climbing the price/ 
performance frontier (Piore). 
We propose a doubly faceted view of regional economic development in 
the new global context, and in contradistinction to the old core-periphery 
notion. On the one hand, the global economy is made up of a set of 
specialized regional production systems, each with its own dense system of 
intraregional transactional arrangements and local labor market activities. 
On the other hand, these individual regions are entwined in a worldwide 
web of interindustrial linkages, investment flows, and population migra-
tions. At the global level, a number of critical institutional arrangements -
the multinational enterprise, an emerging system of international sub-
contracting, interfirm strategic alliances, international agreements, and so on 
- play important mediating roles (Altvater). The nation-state remains a 
significant element in this structure of global production activities; however, 
the nation-state is also certainly less and less economically autarchic 
precisely because of the internationalization of structures of production 
(which puts increasingly severe constraints on national macroeconomic 
management) and the growth of international organizations (in which 
nations give up elements of their sovereignty in favor of coordination at 
higher territorial levels). It is in the light of these developments that we can 
see the economic geography of the contemporary world not so much as a 
core-periphery system, or even as an aggregation of nation-states, but as a 
global mosaic of regional economies. 
THE IMPORTANCE OF INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURE 
Capitalist relations of production and exchange are always embedded in 
wider sets of social relations and cultural norms. Indeed, in the absence 
of these, production and exchange could not occur as self-reproducing 
phenomena. We advance three reasons for this assertion: 
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1 At the level of individual decisionmaking and rationality, the economic 
system is rife with tendencies to market failure in the form of externalities, 
imperfect information, free-rider problems, and so on. 
2 Capitalism is beset with inherent predicaments at the level of collective 
action and the macroeconomy, e.g. labor-management collisions, the 
economic cycle, and foreign trade imbalances, all of which threaten 
orderly production and exchange. 
3 The domains of the social and the cultural (family life, education, forms 
of consciousness and ideology, and so on) underpin the economy but are 
not themselves subject to purely economic rules of order. 
To these three points we may add a fourth observation, i.e. that markets are 
grounded in an infrastructure of institutionalized rules and norms, which 
vary over space and time. 
The idea that successful reproduction of capitalist economic systems 
cannot proceed in the absence of institutionalized agencies and collective 
action holds not only at the level of the national economy but also at 
the level of the regional economy, where because of the specialization, 
agglomeration, and place-specific character of production, peculiar forms 
of institutional order often present themselves. We may illustrate this 
proposition by taking three examples of historical types of industrial 
agglomeration. 
First, nineteenth-century mill-and-workshop complexes flourished on 
the basis of large numbers of low-wage workers within a patriarchal 
factory system. The residences of these workers formed dense urban 
neighbourhoods in which both social order and physical health were 
difficult to maintain. Thus, despite the prevailing laisser faire ideology, these 
problems became the targets of early urban planning interventions and 
urban reform movements. Second, in twentieth-century mass production 
regions, management and organized labor, together with municipal govern-
ment, constituted an institutional framework within which workable 
compromises, agreements, and patterns of resource allocation were worked 
out at the regional level. Active urban planning, especially in matters of 
housing and transponation, was also pan of this framework. Third, 
in flexible production agglomerations today, especially high-technology 
industrial agglomerations, market failures in technological innovation and 
transfer, and in the training of labor, are frequently in evidence. In some of 
these agglomerations, institutionalized efforts to address these problems 
have been made by the provision of publicly funded research activities and 
educational/training establishments. 
We can analyze these institutional bases of regional economies by looking 
more systematically at their intersection with a series of major dimensions 
of place-bound economic and social life: i.e. interfirm transactions, techno-
logical innovation, local labor markets, and the organization of community. 
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Inter-firm transactions 
Agglomeration is a strategy whereby producers ease the tasks of transac-
tional interaction because proximity translates into lower costs and wider 
opportunities for matching needs and capabilities. But agglomeration alone 
does not necessarily lead to the formation of efficient transactional inter-
relations; indeed, there are powerful forces which, if not counterbalanced, 
may actively work against the formation of efficient transactions within 
agglomerations. We want to call attention in particular to three major issues. 
First, breakdowns of information exchange occur where one party holds 
privileged information that can be traded on opportunistically. If, for 
example, a subcontractor making subassemblies chooses to include a certain 
proportion of defective parts which can only be recognized when the final 
product has been in use for some time, then the subcontractor's information 
is asymmetric with that of the principal firm. Policing costs are particularly 
high in such cases and punitive monitoring is rarely fully effective. Second, 
failures of trust underpin and intensify this tendency; that is, in the absence 
of formal or informal means of ensuring that other parties to a transaction 
are likely to abide by a given set of standards, it becomes rational to be 
hesitant about doing so oneself (Lorenz). Third, where these problems 
prevail, fine-tuning of input-output flows is difficult to achieve and, in the 
absence of durable agreements at all levels of the production hierarchy, firms 
are encouraged to develop buffer stockpiles of critical inputs. All of these 
problems can be kept at bay by institutional infrastructures or social 
practices which increase information exchange and trust, and limit the 
probability that opportunistic behavior will benefit those who practice it. 
The Japanese kanban system and its associated practices of mutual aid 
represent one such type of institutional infrastructure; many other varieties 
can be found, in different industries and regions with their diverse historical 
trajectories and social structures (Lorenz, Bianchi, Saxenian). 
As we shall now see, the same sort of infrastructure facilitates exchange 
of technical information which aids firms in the continuous and gradual 
refinement of products and processes. 
Technological innovation 
In the area of technological innovation market failures abound; since 
knowledge is extremely leaky and difficult for innovators to appropriate 
exclusively, profit-seeking firms tend to underinvest in many forms of 
product and process development. In many critical sectors, the basic 
research inputs either come from the nonprofit sector or are induced by 
public subsidies, as illustrated by the cases of the early semiconductor 
industry, aerospace, and now, biotechnology. Strategic planning and co-
ordination, as with MITI in Japan, is an important way, too, of keeping 
industries focused on long-run developmental goals. 
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Technological innovations are frequently place-bound. That is, in 
industries characterized by rapidly changing products or processes, the 
stocks of knowledge and human capital upon which technological changes 
are based tend to be concentrated in the specialized labor forces which 
themselves are highly localized in a small number of places. In addition, in 
many innovative flexible production sectors, localized interfirm relations 
within the social division of labor are a critical means of developing and 
transmitting the information on which innovations are based, as when one 
firm identifies a need for specialized kinds of inputs or equipment which 
must be met by innovative activity on the part of a supplier firm within the 
network (Piore). In both of these localized dimensions of the innovation 
process, too, market failures can limit the industry's ability to carry out 
innovative activity, as when, for example, firms fail to invest in long-term 
research projects for fear that the workers involved in any project will use 
the knowledge thus developed in an opportunistic fashion, or when firms 
fail through lack of trust to communicate with each other their need for 
innovations. There is accumulating case study evidence that such failures are 
present in American high-technology agglomerations. Likewise, it appears 
that agglomeration-specific institutions are sometimes necessary to over-
come some of these types of market failure (Saxenian). 
Local labor markets 
An additional area in which active institution-building is an essential element 
of successful regional development is that of local labor markets. Local labor 
markets depend for their effective operation on the development and 
circulation of information. This is particularly true in local labor markets 
associated with flexible production systems, for here the rapidly changing 
employment opportunities and resulting intensity of business transactions 
make firms and workers dependent upon access to large but ever-changing 
bodies of information. While spatial propinquity facilitates the functioning 
of these networks and allows the development of a fund of knowledge that 
helps participants screen and evaluate the information they receive, it is 
nevertheless frequently the case that the transmission of information 
about job vacancies and demands is severely hindered in the absence 
of collectivized channels of information transmission. Accordingly, we 
typically observe in centers of employment, public agencies and other 
organizations ( employees' associations, labor unions, occupational guilds) 
devoted to the tasks of increasing the circulation of information. 
In the same way, institutional support is a sine qua non of socially rational 
levels of skill provision and retraining activity. This predicament exists in a 
world marked by a complex division of labor and considerable future 
uncertainty. In these circumstances, employers will limit their investments 
in the development of skills for which an uncertain future demand exists, or 
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in workers who may not be retainable once such investments have been 
made (whether due to voluntary quits or involuntary layoffs). Workers, for 
their part, will limit their own skill-building efforts in the absence of a 
reasonable degree of certainty that such efforts will be rewarded. Thus, in 
labor markets where training is not publicly subsidized it is probable that 
an undersupply of appropriate skills will occur. Moreover, in cases where 
an oversupply of skills occurs, e.g. because of a downturn in a particular 
sector, the social costs of retraining will often be less than the costs of long-
term unemployment. 
Community development and planning 
Housing and transport are deeply implicated in the supply of labor. 
This is because local labor markets consist not just of an aspatial set of 
supply, demand, and wage-setting mechanisms, but also of an interlocking 
locational-cum-transport system of origins, destinations, and channels of 
access. Such systems are marked by manifold market failures, in part related 
to the size and durability of the fixed investments needed to sustain 
them and in part related to bottlenecks in their locational adjustment that 
result from private landownership, preexisting land use developments and, 
especially in the USA, municipal fragmentation. The consequence is that we 
often observe in such systems serious imbalances in the spatial distribution 
of jobs and housing and malfunctions of transport networks. At the same 
time, the household and the community are important foci of the social 
reproduction of labour and here again serious breakdowns often occur in 
the absence of instruments of collective order. 
A politics of place 
On the basis of the above discussion, we would argue that the making of a 
regional economy involves not just the development of a productive 
apparatus on the basis of the atomized decisions of firms and workers, but 
also a "politics of place," or in other words, the social construction of those 
institutional-regulatory structures that must be present in order to secure 
economic order and continuity. Some of these structures are within the 
domain of the national state (Leborgne and Lipietz). Others belong more 
properly to the level of the region as such. The regionalization of coordina-
tion occurs not only because of the prior existence of local government 
units, but also because the tendency of many economic activities to 
agglomerate in specialized districts fosters the emergence of place-specific 
problems of system-guidance (Bianchi). At the same time, localized cultures 
make their historical appearance and in many different ways (via business 




REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT TODAY: ECONOMIC ORDER 
AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 
In the new global-local economic reality we are describing here, the ability 
of the nation-state to regulate its own economic affairs is diminished; on the 
one hand, intensified international competition and interdependence have 
reduced the workability of national macroeconomic regulation (Altvater); 
on the other hand, the proliferation of specialized regional production 
districts as flexible production organization advances means that much 
policymaking and institution-building today are likely to be most effective 
when aimed specifically at the level of the industrial district with its 
particular production logic (Bianchi). 
In the new flexible production regions that have emerged since the 1960s, 
we observe a wide variety of forms of institutions and market order, ranging 
from the intensely competitive economic relations that prevail in, say, the 
Los Angeles garment industry to the high levels of formalized coordination 
that exist in some regions in Germany (e.g. machine tools in Baden-
Wiimemburg) and Japan (e.g. Toyota City) (Leborgne and Lipietz, 
Standing). It appears that regions in which coordination is weakly devel-
oped, and in which unregulated competition prevails, face many problems 
and predicaments that compromise long-run viability (Bianchi). These range 
from impediments to information exchange and interfirm collaboration 
to inadequate supplies of appropriately trained and socialized workers 
(Saxenian, Lorenz). Such regions are all the more vulnerable because in a 
world of contested markets they find themselves faced with competitors 
based in regions that do provide effective regulatory and coordinating 
services (Courault and Romani). Given such competition, regions with low 
levels of collective order are likely to find themselves squeezed in such a 
way that either they begin to lose market shares, or - as exemplified by the 
sweatshop segments of southern Californian high- and low-technology 
industry- they enter into a spiral of declining wages and working conditions 
and lowered rates of profitability combined with rising instability for 
secondary suppliers and subcontractors (Leborgne and Lipietz). Thus, 
it would seem that the viability of contemporary flexible production 
agglomerations depends on effective institution-building and policymaking 
at the regional level (Bianchi). That said, even economically successful 
and institution-rich agglomerations may veer into politically regressive 
configurations and there remains, in many of the growing production 
regions of the world today, an open question about how to marry economic 
efficiency and social justice. 
There are, moreover, resurgent problems of uneven development on a 
world scale which cannot be resolved even by successful regulation within 
the growing nodes of the global mosaic of flexible production regions. The 
geographical distribution of high-wage, high value-added activity remains 
extremely uneven, and it is evident that the heightened interregional 
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competition which has been stimulated by the increasingly open system of 
global production and exchange relations has had strongly negative effects 
in many places. At the same time, successful forms of local regulation and 
the social compromises upon which they are based are often subject to great 
stress exerted by the underregulated global system of markets and finance 
capital (Altvater). 
We have only begun to confront the analytical and political challenges 
posed by the emerging new system of industrialization and regional 
development under flexible production. Probably the last time that a 
coherent overall social analysis and political program existed relevant to the 
then-current conjuncture was during the period of Fordist mass production 
and Keynesian welfare-statism in the late 1960s. The present book attempts 
to provide some of the conceptual underpinnings for addressing the new 
economic and regional realities in a systematic and analytically disciplined 
manner. This is essential if social science is to have a positive and progressive 
influence on the policies that will shape the pathways to industrialization 
and regional development in coming years. The task involves an insistent 
focus on the interactions between economic logic and political institutions 















Although there are general laws of capitalist development to be identified 
theoretically, an analysis of contemporary capitalism has to focus on the 
structure and the specific dynamics of the given historical reality of 
capitalism. "Fordism" is a descriptive category which summarizes such 
historical tendencies of capitalist accumulation in the last decades, in 
particular after World War II. Social and economic development take place 
within a given institutional, normative, and physical framework, which may 
be called a "regime" of accumulation: they are linked to the specificities of 
historical time and determined by the characteristics of geographical and 
social space. Thus, in order to understand capitalist dynamics it is not suf-
ficient to identify the "general laws of motion" of the mode of production; 
rather, it is necessary to uncover historical and geographical specificities 
and particularities of capitalist development. This perspective motivated 
Aglietta's (1979) analysis of the "US experience" as well as the efforts of 
Antonio Gramsci (1967) to understand the impact of "Americanism" and 
"Fordism" on the growth (and expansion) of capitalist hegemony in the US 
during the 1920s and its repercussions on the political system in Europe, in 
particular in Italy. 
The historical and spatial characteristics of capitalist development are not 
simply the expression of existing differences between national capitalisms -
the US-American, the Western European, the Japanese, or the Latin 
American one. Each of these "capitalisms" has its proper trajectory, but 
also shares certain characteristics, e.g. business cycles, such as phases of 
prosperity and of depression. Capitalist societies also tend to generate crises 
which cannot be interpreted as a cyclical downturn in the course of a "normal" 
business cycle, but as a rupture of the institutional and structural form of 
economic accumulation and social reproduction. If there is such a "form 
crisis" (Altvater 1983a) or a "great crisis" (Boyer/Mistral 1978), we have to 
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conclude that distinctive historical forms of capitalist reproduction, stages 
of development or distinctive modes of socialization do exist within the 
capitalist system in general. Marx himself made the distinction between the 
"manufacturing system" and "great industry," both forms of relative 
surplus production, but distinct in the mode of organizing the labor process 
and of moulding (national as well as global) capitalist reproduction 
structures. 
Since Marx, it has become quite common (not only in Marxist writings) 
to identify different stages of capitalist development (for an overview: 
Altvater 1983b): Capitalism develops from early to late, from immature to 
mature, from competitive to monopoly and to state monopoly capitalism, 
from colonialism to imperialism - a sequence of stages or phases of 
development, each of them emerging from and resulting in a "great crisis" 
of transformation. The methodological problem involved, of course, is that 
of the relationship between historical stages and general laws, and that of 
the theoretical status of the category "crisis." Is each crisis a unique 
historical event, or are there general functions carried out by the dynamics 
of (historical) crises? It is not possible to answer that question here; it 
suffices to note that the analysis of a historical stage requires prior 
methodological deliberations about the relationship between "the general" 
and the "historical." The notion of Fordism calls attention to the historical 
forms of capitalist dynamics, structures, functions, and resulting tendencies 
or cyclical movements. It attempts a deeper theoretical understanding of 
historical forms which the capitalist system realizes in the course of its 
accumulation dynamics and of the efforts of the bourgeoisie to preserve 
social and political hegemony. 
On the most abstract level, a form crisis is a double-sided process. It both 
destroys traditional social forms of social and economic regulation and it 
generates new forms of regulation. Whereas the process of destruction is 
more or less obvious and identifiable, it is much more difficult to deduce 
the generation of new social forms of regulation. Social stability can only 
be achieved by means of a complex set of complementary, compatible, and 
cohesive institutions. Since there is no single directing agent which defines 
and creates these institutions, complementarity, that is, a new mode of 
regulation or a new accumulation regime1 can emerge only as the outcome 
of conflicting tendencies of progressive acts and regressive setbacks. In sum, 
a cohesive accumulation regime or mode of regulation is none other than 
a "discovery" (Lipietz 1987), a social form resulting spontaneously and not 
consciously from conflicting social actions. 
Fordism was the outcome of just such a blind historical process, following 
a logic unknown to the participating actors, including governments as well 
as managers of big corporations or trade unions. In its very beginnings 
Fordism was merely the extension of Taylorist rationalization from the 
single labor process to the whole factory and via the mechanisms of 
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competition to national industry as a whole. It proved to be a power-
ful machine of productivity increases and, therefore, it was historically 
successful insofar as it created a set of social forms complementary to 
technological and organizational rationalization on the factory as well as on 
the societal level. The increase of production per worker requires an increase 
in effective demand. Otherwise, a "realization crisis" becomes inevitable due 
to the "scissors" of overproduction and underconsumption.2 Thus, one of 
the most important innovations in policy, politics and polity was the 
creation of the "Keynesian" interventionist state and of corporatist forms 
of bargaining and mediation of conflicting interests. 
The condition of complementarity in the case of general productivity 
increases requires a rather simple correspondence: that of a growth rate of 
the national income which equals productivity growth. On the supply side, 
full employment of all factors of production only can exist, and on the 
demand side the gap of effective demand is filled, so long as this general 
correspondence is maintained. However, this outcome does not result from 
a clearing process of interests of individual entrepreneurs dominated by 
microeconomic rationality. Instead, entrepreneurs have to exert pressure on 
real wage increases in order to minimize labor costs and to increase their 
profits. It is a general contradiction in capitalist societies that each individual 
capitalist tries to reduce the nominal wage bill of his workers, whereas he 
needs general wage increases of all the other workers employed by other 
capitalists as the source of effective demand for his production. This general 
contradiction between micro- and macroeconomic rationality has played a 
tremendous role since the very beginnings of Fordism. Henry Ford himself 
responded to the double character of wages as costs and as the source of 
demand exactly as would a rational individual capitalist: during the crisis of 
the 1930s he reduced wages, fired workers, and tried everything to fight 
unions and workers' unrest (see Dobb 1966, Foster 1988, or de Jouvenel 
1933 ). Only after a long period of "incubation" did the institutional 
complement to productivity increases come into existence by means of the 
politics of the New Deal in the United States and by means of the 
introduction of modern state interventionism of a Keynesian-Beveridgean 
type after World War II in nearly all developed Western capitalist countries. 
Therefore, only the period after World War II can truly be called the 
"Fordist" stage of capitalist development. 
THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF FORDISM AFTER WORLD 
WAR II 
Without repeating the details of a Fordist accumulation regime and mode 
of regulation (Lipietz 1986; Hiibner 1989) I stress the importance of the 
relationship between productivity (YIL) and labor costs (WIL). The one 
determines the growth of output per worker while the other defines the 
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expansion of effective demand (by the workers). When both develop in 
accordance with each other the accumulation process may be balanced. 
There is no demand gap or situation of "underconsumption" and there is 
no oversupply or overproduction, ceteris paribus. Since WI L and YI L 
express the portion of wages in national income WIY, this formula implies 
also - negatively - the share of profits in national income (PIY = 1 - WIY). 
In order to achieve this balance in the reproduction process, a set of 
institutions peculiar to and characteristic of Fordist social structures has 
to be established. Two important ingredients of that structure shall be 
discussed here: first, the labor and reproduction process and second, the 
components of the profit rate. 
The labor and reproduction process 
For our argument - which aims at identifying the relationship between the 
postwar international division of labor and the monetary regime - three 
facets of the labor process are important: 
1 the Taylorist rationalization and its impact on productivity increases; 
2 the importance of monetization (and commodification) of the reproduc-
tion of labor as well as of monetary compensation of (environmental) 
damages for human beings; and 
3 the regulation of labor by the state by means of "Keynesian" interven-
tions and the modern (social democratic) welfare state. 
First, the rationalization of the labor process has become an increasingly 
global project. Its realization is due to the expansion of methods of scientific 
management from the United States - where they first were invented and 
implemented - to all other parts of the world where modern capitalism ( or 
methods of rationalization like those used in the Soviet Union of the 1920s) 
has taken root. Yet, the diffusion of "scientific management" is an unequal 
and uneven process and it appears in very different forms in different parts 
of the world system. Therefore, "Fordism" does not describe an identical 
condition in all regions of the world. Whereas rationalization in developed 
countries is normally linked to the realization of a complete social process 
and with creation of complementary institutions in which productivity 
and wage increases are embedded, in less developed countries rationaliza-
tion is only partial, affecting only segments of the labor process. This 
partiality of rationalization (and of modernization) is inherent to the inter-
national division of labor. Under the global aim of maximum productivity 
increases those sections of the production process are dispersed which 
promise optimal contributions to an overall rationalization process steered 
by transnational corporations. This is the crucial reason why in Fordist 
regimes the international division of labor is not only the result of market 
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tendencies but of (micro)rational decisions of "scientific" managers with a 
global perspective. 
Second, the form of monetization of labor-power and the monetary 
compensations for the destruction of the natural environment are very 
important to the development of social forms of conflicts. It is not by 
accident that the trade unions as well as the so-called traditional social 
movements normally are accustomed to fighting for higher wages and 
monetary compensation for all damages produced by the capitalist labor and 
reproduction process. Monetary claims define the form of social conflicts, 
e.g. the possible scenarios of workers' unrest, but also the institutions and 
the means of absorbing resistance, of the bargaining process and the 
settlement of its results, etc. 
Third, the role of the Keynesian state fits into this institutional picture. 
The state supports rationalization via the increase of effective demand which 
helps to resolve the always threatening realization problem. The economic 
interventions of the state under the pressure of international competition 
are effective impulses for the dynamization and modernization of the 
system, for an increase of growth rates. And the welfare state is a very 
efficient vehicle for the mobilization of monetary funds for the com-
pensation of unemployment, health problems, environmental damages, etc. 
But even within this comprehensive structure the Keynesian state has limits. 
It has already been mentioned that the rationalizing dynamics of the 
capitalist labor process go far beyond national frontiers and have a global 
reach. The Keynesian state by its very definition is a national state and is 
therefore limited to the national space in the exercise of its regulatory 
functions. 
Components of the profit rate 
It is not sufficient to interpret the development of capitalist economies after 
World War II as a systemically intelligent process of establishing an 
institutional network for balancing the "Fordist" equation of wage and 
productivity increases, that is for the long-run stability of unit labor costs: 
WIL/y/L (and of functional income distribution). Unit labor costs are not the 
"leading control variable" of capitalist dynamics, it is the profit rate on 
which the accumulation rate and therefore economic growth are dependent. 
Of course, labor productivity and wages per worker are components of the 
profit rate. But as Marx (contrary to Ricardo) pointed out, the profit rate ir 
is also dependent on the development of the productivity of capital (i.e. the 
organic composition of capital): 
Y!L 
'tr = -(1-w) 
KIL 
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This interdependent structure of variables (YIL = labor productivity; KIL 
= capital intensity; w = unit labor costs W/Y; YIK = capital productivity) 
taken into account, the profit rate and therefore the trajectory of economic 
growth depend on the development of capital productivity, labor produc-
tivity, capital intensity and wages per worker; under the assumption that 
profits are entirely invested, they determine the pace of growth. Many 
studies have shown that for the development of the profit and accumulation 
rate, unit labor costs play a very imponant role, but equally imponant are 
the dynamics of capital productivity (Armstrong, Glyn, Harrison 1984; 
OECD 1985; Altvater, Hoffmann, Semmler 1979; Stanger 1988). Moreover, 
capital productivity is quite analogous to the Marxian organic composition 
of capital, since Y/K and v+mlc+v describe similar relationships in macro-
economic and in value terms. However, statistical tests by the OECD have 
shown that falling "rates of returns" may be caused more by a declining 
capital productivity than by an increase of unit labor costs: 
Overall, it appears that downward movements in capital productivity 
are the most important factor underlying falling rates of return; though 
declining profit shares also contribute to this outcome. This conclusion 
appears robust given the evidence of statistically significant time trends 
in almost all countries and sectors for which data are available. 
(Chan-Lee/Sutch 1985: 148) 
Therefore the "Fordist equation" between productivity growth and the 
growth of wages per worker is not sufficient to explain the dynamics of 
capitalist prosperity after World War II, especially because the growth of 
capital productivity in the postwar period in all developed countries since 
the beginning of the 1970s exhibits a negative trend. 
















The dynamics of accumulation after World War II had three principal 
causes: the first was the complementarity of productivity growth and 
demand growth, which impeded the emergence of a realization crisis. 
Second, high capital productivity enhanced average profit rates and the 
dynamics of accumulation. But the third, and main, factor of capitalist 
dynamics came from the composition and interlinkages of the different 
components of the profit rate in the capitalist core countries. The uneveness 
of development, on the one hand a factor of backwardness, proved to be a 
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driving force of the growth dynamics after World War II. Contrary to the 
assumption of Harrod-neutral technical progress, capital productivity in 
all countries of the Western world decreased ( or the capital coefficient 
increased, respectively). But this occurred at a different pace of growth, as 
Table 2.1 clearly shows. On the other hand, the negative effect of an increase 
of the capital coefficient (that is the decrease of capital productivity) on the 
profit rate may be compensated by comparably low unit wage costs, that is 
either by a high growth rate of labor productivity or low wage-per-worker 
increases. There are different possible constellations of labor productivity, 
labor costs, capital intensity, and capital productivity; this is why the 
national average rate of profit may remain at a high level, even though one 
or more components may have a negative impact on it. 
Positive effects on the average profit rate result from either high capital 
productivity due to high labor productivity or due to low capital intensity, 
or because labor costs are low. There are many possible constellations 
imaginable. 
These abstract possibilities also describe the real situation of different 
countries of the Western world from World War II to the 1960s. In the 
United States real wages were comparatively high, but labor productivity 
was also relatively high, with capital intensity not growing enough to 
increase significantly the capital coefficient. In Western Europe, labor 
productivity was comparatively low, but capital intensity, and labor costs 
were also low. The same was the case in Japan. Therefore, for different 
reasons, profit rates of capital in all parts of the developed capitalist world. 
were high in the first two decades after World War II. This constellation 
was the basis of high growth rates of GDP, of the spread of prosperity, and 
of the generalization of the institutional forms of this successful "growth 
machine." 
Moreover, the most productive economy (the USA) was able to realize 
superprofits on expanding world markets: The growth of foreign trade 
during the postwar period was higher than ever before in modern times of 
the capitalist world system. In the OECD area it was nearly five times higher 
1950-86 than 1900-50 (Maddision 1989: 26) and it exceeded the average 
growth rate of GDP in that period in six highly developed countries by 
more than 70 percent (Maddison 1987: 670). The rapid expansion of world 
markets facilitated the realization of permanently increased production of 
commodities and therefore of economies of scale. Compared to production 
costs in competing countries, the USA produced its export commodities at 
rather low costs. Sold at world market prices the difference between US 
costs and the international average cost level appeared as "windfall profits." 
However, this only could happen since the realization of extra profits by 
the most productive nation requires the expansion of the realization 
sphere, that is of the world market for commodities. The backward 
countries (Western Europe and Japan) on the other side experienced "the 
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opportunities of backwardness" (Maddison 1987: 669). There are two 
reasons for this. First, they increased their competitiveness through a double 
process of holding unit labor costs at a comparatively low level and of 
undervaluing their currencies. Under the regime of fixed exchange rates 
this tendency occurred almost automatically due to uneven productivity 
increases. This especially played a role in West Germany and later in Japan. 
Second, these countries were able to fill the productivity gap surprisingly 
quickly and thereby succeeded in increasing the national wage level. 
As a consequence of this constellation the United States had an inherent 
economic interest in promoting the world market and in establishing rules 
and institutions for the development of free trade after World War II. The 
accumulation model presupposed the institutionalization of world market 
structures which would facilitate international trade as well as international 
capital transfers. On the one hand, this was the framework in which the 
tendential convergence of productivity levels between the main trading 
partners took place. On the other hand, this was the precondition of the 
dominance of the leading country in the capitalist world market. 
Moreover, the leading country did its best to promote productivity 
convergence via the internationalization of productive capital through 
private direct investments. At the end of the 1940s nearly the same portion 
of US direct investments abroad was directed to Latin America and Western 
Europe: 24.0 percent and 23.8 percent respectively. In the 195~1 period 
Latin America only received 10 percent whereas Western Europe (EEC, 
EFT A, and Spain) got 46.2 percent of an amount of direct investments which 
was nearly nine times higher than ten years before ($4.54 billion compared 
to $621 million). Direct foreign investment in manufacturing (different from 
those in extractive industries, such as mining, which prevailed in Latin 
America) is a means of spreading technologies from one part of the world 
to another. In Western Europe, for instance, in 196~, discussion of the 
productivity gap vis-a-vis the United States was still predominant (Servan-
Schreiber 1968; Mandel 1968). But only a few years later, this productivity 
gap was greatly reduced in many industries (for recent data, see Cuomo 
Report 1988; US Department of Commerce 1990). The rapidity of the 
convergence was surprising. As Maddison (1987: 678) clearly shows, 
between 1950 and 1973 the "rate of productivity convergence" with the lead 
country in the dynamic competing countries was in West Germany 3.42 
percent, in France 2.59 percent, and in Japan 5.12 percent per year. Only 
in Great Britain was the convergence rate near zero, very likely due to the 
productivity decline in UK industries in this period (Glyn/Sutcliffe 1972). 
The catch-up effect explains more than 10 percent of the annual growth rate 
in West Germany, Japan and France ( computed on the basis of data supplied 
by Maddison 1987, Tables 19 and 20). No wonder, since the growth of 
overall GDP and GDP per hour in the United States was far below the pace 
in France, Germany and Japan. The growth performance of the United 
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Table 2.2 Phases of growth in industrialized countries 
USA France W. Gtr1114ny UK Japan 
1950-73 1973-84 1950-73 1973-84 1950-73 1973-84 1950-73 1973-84 1950-73 1973-84 
GDP 3.7 2.3 5.1 2.2 5.9 1.7 3.0 1.1 9.4 3.8 
GDP/ 
hour 2.5 1.0 5.1 3.4 6.0 3.0 3.2 2.4 7.7 3.2 
Y/C 0.34 -0.47 1.50 -1.82 0.57 -1.71 0.26 -1.45 1.39 -3.41 
Source: Maddison 1987: 685. 
Kingdom is an exception in this respect. The result of the converging 
development of productivity, of course, is the tendential equalization of 
productivity levels in the industrialized world, as Tables 2.2 and 2.3 clearly 
demonstrate. 
But this development has two consequences for the accumulation process 
on a worldwide scale. 
First, the catch-up process eliminated the extra ( or windfall) profits of 
those US corporations that were highly integrated into the world market. 
This tendency has an impact on the US economy, since the overall 
profitability of US capital is improved by the sources of superprofits. In the 
case of their disappearance the tendency of the profit and accumulation rate 
to fall is enforced. 
Second, the equalization of productivity levels is an economic and 
statistical expression of the propagation of "Fordist,, working conditions 
and wage levels within the world of developed capitalist countries. By 
the same token the extension of Fordist institutional structures is also 
responsible for the equalization of economic conditions in all capitalist 
countries - although differences remain, of course, - which result in 
declining profit rates, as shown by the OECD (Chan-Lee/Sutch 1985: 127 
passim). Therefore, we may conclude that the process of the international-
ization of Fordist reproduction structures is a crisis-ridden process. 
Further, the declining profit rates influence negatively growth rates of 
GDP as well as the performance of the labor market. Insofar as labor 
productivity increases more than GDP, unemployment is an inevitable 
consequence unless there is some outlet created for surplus labor, e.g. the 
reduction of working time. However, it is not possible to conclude that 
declining profit rates directly and immediately are causing an overall 
economic recession. Their effects are, rather, quite contrary: declining profit 
rates in the core countries may be an incentive for direct and portfolio 
investments in peripheral countries and by this mechanism stimulate the 
global accumulation process. Moreover, declining profit rates may also be 
an efficient stimulus for further investments by corporations in order to 
overcome a situation of increasing competition among capitalist corpora-
tions and countries. However, increased investment by the state and its 
financing by rising government debts vis-a-vis financial markets results in a 
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"crowding out" of private investment, though the state as an investor 
only reacts to conditions created by the performance of private capital 
accumulation. 
But there is one crucial and effective boundary to further accumulation 
when profitability tends to decline overall. That limit is defined by the 
interest rate on financial assets. Capitalists as any asset holder compare 
different rates of return to assets. If the interest rate exceeds the profit rate, 
financial assets are more attractive than productive investment. At this point 
it becomes clear that the monetary conditions of the accumulation process 
are of great importance. Therefore, we must examine the specific form of 
resolving monetary problems in the Fordist regime after World War II, 
before coming back to the consequences of the declining profit rate. 
THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY REGIME AFTER 
WORLD WAR II 
One of the complementary conditions of postwar Fordism was the 
monetization/ commodification of the labor-wage relationship as well as a 
mix of monetary and fiscal policy carried out by the state in order to fill the 
demand gap and to create full employment. The Keynesian solution to the 
problem of unemployment may be interpreted as a sophisticated social 
mechanism of monetization and (corporatist) class compromise. We have 
also stressed that the driving force of this system pushed it beyond 
national frontiers and created the postwar global capitalist system, which 
differs significantly from the preceding capitalist world system. Of course, 
capitalism since its very beginnings has been a world system (W allerstein 
1979; Amin 1975; Beaud 1987). But only after World War II did the 
capitalist tendency to transform the system into a world system become 
historical reality, as all functional forms of capital, i.e. commodity capital, 
productive capital, and interest bearing capital, were globalized. However, 
a basic and determining contradiction arose: although the economic 
reproduction process was globalized, the political forms of regulation 
remained national, due to the fact that the capitalist state is by its very origin 
a national state. The great achievement of the "Keynesian revolution" was 
the establishment of the "lender of last resort" and of "big government" on 
the level of the national economic system in order to avoid future crises 
of the 1929-type (Kindleberger 1986; Minsky 1986). But there was no 
equivalent institutional network capable of resolving this problem on the 
level of international economic relations. 
The answer to this question, which arose immediately after World 
War II, seems today very evident: the regulation of the international 
monetary system in a way that is complementary to the regulated national 
systems. The absence of an international regulatory institution of last 
resort was overcome by the role which the "superpower" USA assumed in 
30 
FORDIST AND POST-FORDIST INTERNATIONAL DIVISION OF LABOR 
international political as well as economic affairs. Only the USA had the 
economic, political, and military power to assume the economic leadership 
in that system of international regulation. Therefore, the international 
monetary regime was at the same time an outcome of US dominance and a 
guarantor of its continued hegemony. But in order to transform dominance 
into hegemony, it was necessary to establish an international institutional 
framework for all actors {states, corporations, organizations, etc.) which 
fulfills the conditions of hegemony. According to Gramsci, hegemony is the 
ambiguous ensemble of power and consent. Therefore, as regime theory 
later defined it, the participants of the international system have to acknow-
ledge or even to accept common explicit or implicit rules and habits, norms, 
and mutually established institutions (Keohane 1984; Cooper 1987). It is in 
their common interest to avoid free riders as well as to overcome the 
prisoners' dilemma and the frustration of "sour grapes." It is obvious that 
the consent required for an international regime must be normative and 
therefore prescriptive for the actions of participating actors. Any attempt at 
regime building is designed to achieve a coherent form of the mode of 
{international and global) economic reproduction and of (national) political 
organization on a world market level. 
The "cooperative activity" of national states, that is the historical struc-
ture of a regime, is not fixed and stable for all times. Competition in all 
spheres, in particular in the economic system, is a very powerful driving 
force of institutional change and of shifts in the power structure of the 
hegemonic system. Therefore, hegemony - hegemony as the characteristics 
of a system as well as the hegemony of one state within this system - assumes 
a cyclical form and follows "long waves" of emergence, delegitimation, 
erosion, challenge of hegemony, and possibly "hegemonic war" (Modelsky 
1981; Thompson 1983; Wallerstein 1979; Kennedy 1987). This statement 
becomes quite obvious when looking at the functions and means of 
hegemony, such as power, ideology, and in particular, money. Strange 
(1988) has devoted her analysis of "states and markets" to the different 
aspects of power (structural and relational power) and their means of 
exercise (military, economic, financial power, and disposal on knowledge), 
so that I will not deal with the emergence, decay, or - in general - the 
functions of power in the modern world system. 
Instead, let us take a closer look at the monetary regime. What does 
money have to do with hegemony? From the viewpoint of neoclassical 
theories, a regime of flexible exchange rates, regulated by market forces, 
should resolve the basic problem of open economies (which is another 
expression for that basic contradiction between the globalization of the 
economic reproduction process and the national character of the state). This 
problem takes the form of a long-term equilibrium of the balance of 
payment, the most important indicator of the performance of a national state 
in a global economic environment. In the long run, exchange rates follow 
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purchasing-power parities; in the short run, short-term capital flows, 
following interest rate differentials or expectations about exchange rates, 
may balance the payments of trading partners. Short-term capital flows serve 
as signal to the participating economies so that in the long run the balance 
of payments will be balanced: there are no losses and no gains in inter-
national reserves beyond their "natural" annual increases. 
The balance of payments is composed of the balance of trade plus the 
balance of services minus the balance of long-term capital. Deficits and 
surpluses result in changes of reserves and in compensating flows of short-
term capital. 
Ex - Im - (K1un - Kie,.) = Ksim - Kse,. + D 
where Ex indicates commodity exports, Im commodity imports, Kum and 
Kie,. long-term Capital imports and exports, respectively; and Ksim and Kse:,c 
short-term capital imports and exports. D indicates the change in inter-
national reserves, such as gold and hard tradable currencies. 
Neoclassical positions basically refer to the balance of trade, whereas 
Keynesians take into consideration all sub-balances of the overall balance 
of payments. Therefore, in the Keynesian discourse the exchange rate is not 
only dependent on purchasing power parities, but also on the elasticities of 
export and import prices, autonomous capital flows, the distribution of 
currency reserves, etc. In that case, flexible exchange rates in a multicurrency 
standard necessarily create economic instabilities via arbitrage speculation, 
attempts to promote the national currency by means of de- and revaluations, 
stabilization programs at the cost of employment etc., and due to the 
existence of free riders, who try to benefit from the system but do not want 
to pay for its costs. In order to prevent the success of free traders' attitudes, 
the monetary regime after World War II could not be based on flexible 
exchange rates and a multicurrency standard, but on the institutionalization 
of fixed exchange rates and one hegemonic currency as a means of 
regulation. 
Since, first, international money as well as national money will be 
accepted by economic agents only if it is secure and if it therefore guarantees 
the value of assets; since, second, international fiduciary currency needs 
some kind of a collateral, as the experience of the 1920s showed; since, third, 
gold as an "eternal value" is not viable in modem capitalist economies which 
expand at high speed; and since, finally, a truly international money cannot 
be created - because there is no international state - the international 
monetary regime can only be based on the national money of the hegemonic 
state. Therefore, it was not by accident that the plans of institutionalizing 
an international fiduciary money (the "Bancor") failed, and that all attempts 
~ re~tablish the British pound as a world money after World War II were 
m vam. 
The collateral of international money therefore is nothing but the 
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economic power of the hegemonic state: economic strength measured in 
price stability and the level of productivity, a strong creditor position vis-
a-vis the other partners of the system and political and military superiority. 
After World War II there was only one currency left which was - given 
these general conditions - able to exert the functions of a world money: the 
US dollar. But since the strength, i.e. the value, of world money depends 
on the performance of the hegemonic power, an erosion of the economic 
power of the leading nation immediately has repercussions on the func-
tioning of the international monetary system and vice versa: crisis tendencies 
in the international monetary system affect the national money and thereby 
the performance of the national economy of the hegemonic power. The 
functioning of the international system and the economic performance of 
the hegemonic nation are intimately linked together, via a beneficial link 
thanks to the seigniorial advantages of the hegemonic power (Cooper 1987: 
8), and via an unfavorable link due to the possible transfers of crisis 
tendencies from a national economy into the international system and vice 
versa. 
Though the Bretton Woods System cannot be explained here in detail, 
suffice it to say that the system worked well in terms of growth performance 
and proved capable of integrating nearly the whole Western world into that 
system, even the recently decolonized countries of the (since the 1950s) so-
called Third World. 
Table 2.3 Growth rates of GDP, GDP per capita, and volume of exports 
1913-50 1950-73 1973-87 
GDP 
16 OECD countries 2.0 4.9 2.4 
15 Developing countries 2.1 5.3 4.7 
32 Countries 2.1 5.1 3.4 
GDP per capita 
16 OECD countries 1.2 3.8 1.9 
15 Developing countries 0.7 2.7 2.5 
32 Countries 1.0 3.2 2.2 
Volume of exports 
16 OECD countries 1.0 8.6 4.2 
15 Developing countries 1.1 5.9 6.9 
32 Countries 1.1 7.4 5.5 
Source: Maddison 1989: 32. 
The growth rates of GDP, productivity, and world trade, not to mention 
other indicators in the first two decades after World War II, were far above 
the average performance in this century. The growth of exports was also 
much stronger than overall production and production per capita (from 1950 
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Figure 2.1 International configuration of national Fordisms in the "First" and 
"Third" Worlds 
until 1984 it was about 1.7 times faster). This set of conditions has already 
been pointed out as a favorable precondition for growth in the industrialized 
world. But it had also consequences for the less developed countries, for in 
the environment of a fast-growing world market, the strategies of import 
substitution which were implemented after the breakdown of world trade 
following 1929 no longer made economic sense. The developing world, 
including both the formally decolonized countries and the long-independent 
countries, switched in the 1950s to an export-oriented and outward-looking 
strategy of opening internal markets to foreign capital. Though such 
strategies appeared to be the only way to industrialization and moderniza-
tion, they also made the developing world dependent on the performance 
of the world market in general and on its leading economic powers (in the 
OECD-bloc) in particular. There was neither modernization nor just 
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dependency but some kind of dependent modernization or modernized 
dependency. In any case, the countries of the Third World became sub-
ordinate partners within the international division of labor. An international 
configuration of national Fordisms in the "First" and "Third" Worlds arose, 
which may be characterized by Figure 2.1. 
Since the dynamics of the production process in the industrialized world 
resulted in a slowdown of productivity increases (for the USA see Cuomo 
Commission Report 1988; Scherrer 1990 for an overview), on the one hand, 
and a palpable real wage increase per worker on the other hand, the "old" 
Fordist balance between productivity growth and demand growth eroded. 
The obvious expressions of this erosion were on the one hand growing 
inflation,3 and declining profit rates and accumulation rates on the other 
hand. But thanks to the "product cycle," it now became technologically 
feasible, organizationally possible, and economically profitable to establish 
an international division of labor which in the industrialized countries saved 
expensive labor and halted the productivity slowdown by introducing new 
technologies into the production process, while sections of the Fordist 
production process with low skilled labor were transferred to some of the 
developing countries. Of course, in the 1980s there were counter-tendencies 
and further evolution of the international division of labor as a response to 
the debt crisis of Third World countries. But, in the 1970s, it did appear as 
if a global dispersion of the Fordist model was taking place as a strategy of 
transnational corporations in search of ways to reduce labor costs and to 
expand markets beyond the traditional countries. 
Nonetheless, in both the core and the Third World, the "old" Fordist 
system has become incomplete. The necessity for the production and 
reproduction system to be complementary exists only on the level of the 
world market and no longer at the national level. The defects of Fordism 
are manifested in an uneven manner, and therefore present very different 
consequences in the industrialized an,d less developed worlds. Whereas in 
highly developed countries the first signs (technologies and social forms) of 
a new "post-Fordist" structure have already appeared, in the less developed 
countries, incomplete Fordism takes on a "bloody" (Lipietz 1987) and 
"bastardized" form. Most important for our argument, however, are the 
links between both sides of the coin: the "complete-Fordist"/"bloody-
Fordist" division of labor has been more and more transformed into a 
creditor-debtor relation, hence into the buildup of an international debt-
economy. The "debt regime" (Wood 1986) becomes regulated by the global 
process of interest rate formation on international financial markets. There-
fore, it is necessary once again to tum our attention to the functioning of 
the monetary regime. 
Its main characteristics - with regard to the question to be discussed here 
- may be summarized as a triangle (Figure 2.2): 
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Erosion (3) Unregulated Global 
------------ Credit System 
Figure 2.2 Monetary systems dynamics 
The first two angles and their links already have been described: the 
compatibility condition for a regulated national monetary system in the case 
of an international reproduction process is fulfilled only in the case of the 
establishment of a regulated international monetary system. However, 
money exists in different forms and performs different functions. It serves 
as a means of circulation in order to facilitate commodity exchange, that is, 
world trade. The rules of the international monetary system of Bretton 
Woods, above all, proved adequate for regulating money as a means of 
circulation. It was a regime organized for the avoidance of a transformation 
of buyer-seller relations into debtor-creditor relations by means of shon-
term instruments and means to force debtors to pay off their debts. But 
money has other functions beyond facilitating commodity circulation. 
Money functions as a means of payment and therefore it assumes the form 
of credit. In this function it is indispensable for capitalist accumulation 
since loans finance investment of different types. Put another way, with-
out money as a means of payment, the investment process would im-
mediately come to a halt. Insofar as the capital accumulation process is 
becoming globalized, money as a means of payment (credit) also expands 
beyond national frontiers. The globalization of production is thus accom-
plished through the globalization of finance. The emergence and growth of 
transnational corporations after World War II necessarily generated the 
transnational banking system, albeit with a cenain time lag. But the rules, 
norms, and institutions of the international monetary regime are only 
capable of controlling money as a means of circulation and not as the basis of 
international credit. The global credit system, therefore, emerged as an 
unregulated one, as a reality outside the regulatory competence of the 
international monetary regime. This deficiency of international regulation is 
not due to the absence of international political power, but to the inherent 
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functions of money. The international monetary system becomes a "non-
system" (Williamson 1988: 213) or - as Robert Triffin put it - an 
"international monetary scandal." 
The emergence of the international credit system is thus a product of the 
successful performance of the capitalist world itself over the last few 
decades. But this success has now become a main problem for the regime, 
for (see third angle of the triangle in Figure 2.2) unregulated global credit 
was a factor of erosion of the (political institutional) regulation of the whole 
Fordist system. The reason for this is quite simple. First, the quantity of 
private liquidity since the beginning of the 1960s increasingly overtook that 
of official liquidity. One aspect of that process was the shift from the 
so-called "dollar shortage" of the 1950s to the "dollar glut" of the 
1960s. Another expression was the growing difficulty of central banks in 
mobilizing official liquidity for the defense of fixed exchange rates against 
huge waves of private capital, which shifted without regulation from one 
currency to the other. Second, and more important than this quantitative 
aspect, is the "qualitative" logic behind these private capital movements; 
whereas official liquidity has been used to promote international trade and 
to support national (Keynesian/Beveridgean) policies of full employment, 
the flows of private liquidity followed the national differences of yields on 
capital. The consequence: a new "privatization of the world economy" 
(Czempiel 1989) in the form of transnational corporations and inter-
nationally operating private banks took place, undermining the regulatory 
capacities of nation-states and international institutions. The growing 
deficiencies of politically controlling international capital movements made 
room for the emergence of international capital markets. The formation of 
interest rates took place beyond the reach and influence of national 
monetary policies. Approaches like the Mundell-Fleming model (Mundell 
1968, 1971; Fleming 1962) tried to formulate policy responses on this new 
international environment for national economic policy, but without real 
success (Herr 1989). 
Transnational corporations have become the dramatis personae of the 
global economic system rather than governments and political institutions. 
On the level of the international credit system, the control of the interest 
rate as one of the most important target-variables of national economic 
policy has increasingly fallen into the realm of global financial markets. The 
underside of that development has been called the "loss of interest rate 
sovereignty" (Scharpf 1987). This tendency was one of the most important 
reasons for the breakdown of Keynesian economic policy and of the 
corresponding institutional structure of the class compromise on a national 
level. Moreover, as already mentioned the productivity lead of the United 
States has evaporated. In the course of this transformation process the USA 
has lost the advantage of unchallenged competitivity, and the dollar as the 
national money of the United States and as the world money of the global 
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system has in pan lost its collateral. The first consequence has been a 
remarkable devaluation of the dollar in the form of rising inflation rates; a 
deterioration of the exchange rate vis-a-vis other leading currencies (OM, 
SFR, yen, etc.) followed as well as a shift towards a multicurrency standard. 
In the second instance the devaluation of the dollar, due to its eroding 
collateral, took the shape of rising interest rates in order to compensate for 
the growing risks. Consequently, the hegemony of the United States in the 
global system has been challenged by competing countries. 
THE CONTRADICTIONS BETWEEN REAL AND 
MONETARY ACCUMULATION 
It has already been shown that the "Fordist equation" of balanced increases 
of productivity and wages per worker only partially reflects the dynamics 
of the capitalist accumulation process. In order to understand its contradic-
tions, the development of the productivity of capital (and therefore of the 
profit rate) has to be taken into consideration. First, there is overwhelming 
empirical evidence that in the long run the profit rate has a tendency to fall, 
even in the recent period of "Fordist" reproduction structures; this has 
already been described above. Second, this tendency is accompanied by the 
deregulated interest rate formation on international financial markets. A 
third tendency already mentioned is the erosion of US competitiveness, that 
is, of the country supplying international financial markets with the world 
money. It is to be expected that money as a means of payment (money in 
the form of credit) becomes more expensive (in terms of the interest rates) 
the less collateral is available for the backup of credit money. Thus, the 
decay of US hegemony in the global system is a very powerful driving force 
behind the (real) interest rate increases. 
But there are additional causes for interest rate increases: the loss of 
competitiveness of the US economy in general compared to other highly 
developed capitalist economies resulted in a trade balance deficit which had 
to be financed by capital imports. A cursory look at the development of the 
US balance of payment since 1950 shows clearly that, beginning in the 1970s, 
the United States was transformed from a creditor position into a debtor 
position in the world economy (Table 2.4). 
The USA was transformed from a (trade) surplus country to a deficit 
country and from a capital-exporting country into a capital-importing 
country. This shift would not be problematic were the USA not playing the 
role of the hegemon in the world economy. But in the long run the exertion 
of hegemony and permanent capital imports are not compatible. These 
factors therefore destabilize the monetary regime. The tendency of eroding 
hegemony also is reflected in interest rate differentials between the leading 
countries (Table 2.5). 
Beginning with the second half of the 1970s, interest rates for long-term 
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Table 2.4 The structure of the US balance of payment after World War II($ billions; 
aggregated balances) 
Period 1950-9 1960-9 1970-9 1980-9 
Trade balance 29.3 40.8 -103.8 -919.3 
Current account 6.0 33.3 -4.3 -808.3 
Capital balance -27.8 -35.4 363.6 
(long-term) 
Exchange and gold reserves (1952) (1962) (1982) (1987) 
( as % of world reserves) 50.0 27.4 8.3 6.7 
Sources: Economic Report of The President 1988; OECD 1988; Dau for 1988 and 1989 are 
preliminary: Dau for the capital balance comprise 1980 to 3rd quarter 1987. 
Table 2.5 Long-term interest rates 
Year Long-term interest rates Interest rate differentials 
FRG GB Switz. Japan USA USA/Japan USAIFRG Japan/FRG 
1970 9.41 9.22 5.72 7.19 6.58 -0.61 -2.83 -2.22 
1971 7.99 8.91 5.27 7.28 5.74 -1.54 -2.25 -0.71 
1972 7.88 8.91 4.96 6.7 5.64 -1.06 -2.24 -1.18 
1973 9.33 10.72 5.59 7.26 6.31 -0.95 -3.02 -2.07 
1974 10.38 14.77 7.13 9.26 6.98 -2.28 -3.4 -1.12 
1975 8.48 14.39 6.44 9.2 7 -2.2 -1.48 0.72 
1976 7.8 14.43 4.98 8.72 6.78 -1.94 -1.02 0.92 
1977 6.16 12.73 4.05 7.33 7.06 -0.27 0.9 1.17 
1978 5.73 12.47 3.33 6.09 7.89 1.8 2.16 0.36 
1979 7.43 12.99 3.45 7.69 8.74 1.05 1.31 0.26 
1980 8.5 13.79 4.76 9.22 10.81 1.59 2.31 0.72 
1981 10.38 14.74 5.57 8.66 12.87 4.21 2.49 -1.72 
1982 8.95 12.88 4.85 8.06 12.23 4.17 3.28 -0.89 
1983 7.89 10.81 4.51 7.42 10.84 3.42 2.95 -0.47 
1984 7.78 10.69 4.58 6.81 11.99 5.18 4.21 -0.97 
1985 6.87 10.62 4.7 6.34 10.75 4.41 3.88 -0.53 
1986 5.92 9.85 4.24 4.94 8.14 3.2 2.22 -0.98 
1987 5.84 9.5 4.03 4.21 8.63 4.42 2.79 -1.63 
1988 6.11 9.36 4.02 4.27 8.98 4.71 2.87 -1.84 
1989 6.77 9.25 4.75 4.55 9.19 4.64 2.42 -2.22 
Source: Sachverstindigenrat 1990; own estimations. 
capital in the United States have been considerably greater than interest rates 
for long-term capital in Japan or the Federal Republic of Germany. This 
tendency, of course, reflects the loss of trust of asset holders in the strength 
of the US dollar. The increase in interest rates as well as in the interest rate 
differentials have important repercussions on the global process of real 
accumulation. Should interest rates for long term (and short term) capital 
be tangibly above or near the expected rate of return on real capital (the 
profit rate on productive capital), the microeconomic units may prefer to 
hold financial assets instead of investing liquid funds into the widening or 
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deepening of real capital. The contradictory tendencies of profit rates 
(falling) and of interest rates (increasing) already have been described by 
Hilferding (1898) in his "Financial Capital," at that time he drew far-
reaching conclusions concerning the funher structure and development of 
capitalism from competitive to monopoly and "financial capitalism." 
Even if we do not hold to Hilferding's conclusions, we have to take into 
consideration that rising real interest rates (Atkinson/Chouraqui 1985: 7 
passim) in all countries and net interest payments which (over a considerable 
time period) grow faster than net operating surpluses (Chan-Lee/Sutch 
1985: 152 passim) reflect structural changes in the accumulation process. 
When the market value of firms grows less than the net capital stock 
(Tobin's q), the incentive to invest in real capital becomes less effective 
(Tobin 1969). In the case of Tobin's q declining to less than unity, financial 
investment is more lucrative than real investment. Historical data show that 
Tobin's q has been falling in all developed capitalist countries, although the 
data basis is rather limited (Chan-Lee 1986: 20S-32). 
This tendency toward the declining profitability of capital expressed by 
means of different indicators (profit rate; interest rate; Tobin's q), is 
affecting the mode of regulation of the international monetary regime. 
Internationally formed interest rates have to be explicitly integrated into 
micro- and macroeconomic processes of decision making, much more so 
than before. The "Fordist equation" between wages, productivity, and 
profits now must be complemented by a new factor: interest rates. In 
Keynesian economics the interest rate played always an imponant role, but 
Keynesianism employed an assumption which is no longer valid; i.e. that 
the national state is capable of controlling the movement of interest rates 
"to that point relatively to the schedule of the marginal efficiency of capital 
at which there is full employment" (Keynes 1936: 375), at least by means 
of the "euthanasia of the rentier, and, consequently, the euthanasia of the 
cumulative oppressive power of the capitalist to exploit the scarcity-value 
of capital" (Keynes 1936: 376). Today, a reduction of interest rates in order 
to correspond to lower schedules of the marginal efficiency of capital ( or of 
profit rates) seems to be impossible: either it has to take place on an 
international and not on a national level or the level of interest rates has to 
be taken as an exogeneously given variable for national economic policy and 
therefore also for decision making on the corporate level. The outcome of 
this change is that capital costs (reflected in the interest rate) become much 
more imponant for business decisions than labor costs. This is the reason 
for new management strategies, which are often viewed as exploring 
territories "beyond Fordism." 
Since each financial investment (loan owned by the creditor) is at the same 
time a process of indebtedness (debt due to the debtor) the delinking of 
monetary accumulation from real accumulation results in the build up of an 
international debt economy. This has taken place via financial innovations 
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and the spread of financial institutions all over the world. A financial 
network has been superimposed upon the already existing network of trade 
relations and direct investments of TNCs. Whereas the task of official 
institutions such as the IMF in the "old" monetary system of Bretton 
Woods was the financing of balance of payment deficits, in the reprivatized 
global economy this task has been fulfilled by private financial institutions 
in a world of tendentially growing current account imbalances (as a 
percentage of GDP; Atkinson/Chouraqui 1985: 32). 
Credits and debts even on an international level do not generate any 
economic or political problem so long as debtors are capable of paying 
interests (and amortization on the principal) so that they convert after a 
certain time into creditors - and vice versa: creditors into debtors. But some 
conditions have to be met, before the "debt cycle" (World Bank 1985, 
Chenery/Strout 1966) can function. In the first place we must remind 
ourselves of a distinction which Kindleberger made in order to explain the 
causes of the contemporary debt crisis of Third World countries. He 
distinguishes between development loans, consumption loans, recycling 
loans (Kindleberger 1981) and - we may add - capital flight loans. Only 
(foreign) loans used for the financing of development projects can be 
serviced out of the returns of the development project. In the case of all the 
other types of (foreign) loans the debt service burdens (and overburdens) 
the national revenue of the indebted country. If economic difficulties of 
servicing the debt arise, the interest rate immediately will rise for the 
compensation of increasing loan risks (e.g. country risks). Hyman Minsky 
has derived his thesis of "financial instabilities" in capitalist economies from 
the inherent difficulties of servicing debts due to rising interest rates which 
overburden the economic capacities of debtors, be they hedge finance units, 
speculators or Ponzi units (Minsky 1982). 
In response to this inherent mechanism of financial systems, the inter-
national banking community has invented "financial innovations" in order 
to respond to growing loan risks, especially in the international financial 
markets, via rollover techniques, the transformation of short-term deposits 
into long-term loans, the securitization of loans, and the transformation 
of interests into spreads and fees. But these financial innovations have 
extremely asymmetrical effects. They only serve as instruments for the 
international banking "community" to secure at least parts of their out-
standing loans and - much more important - of interest payments by 
debtors. But they have not relieved debtors of their debt burden. This 
tendency has been further aggravated by the failure of many development 
loans due to miscalculations by the project management or declining terms 
of trade on the world markets for agricultural and mineral primary goods. 
This event is also an outcome of the delinking of real and monetary 
accumulation. The reason is quite simple. Since development loans are only 
effectively used if development projects are profitable enough to cover 
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interest costs and amortization payments, any decline of their profitability 
has an immediate impact on the capacity of servicing foreign debts. 
The performance of development projects in countries which pursue a 
strategy of indebted industrialization depends on international markets 
while markets themselves are dependent on the economic stance and 
economic policy of OECD countries (Balassa 1984). Therefore, the success 
of development loans became questionable because of the accumulation 
crises in the industrialized world, which transferred the negative growth 
effects via market mechanisms ( on product markets as well as on financial 
markets) into the developing countries. But these countries were, compared 
to the industrialized countries much worse off, not because of their 
comparably low levels of private and public welfare, but because of their 
indebtedness. The mechanism of the "debt cycle" did not work at all, 
because debtors did not succeed in decreasing the debt overhang and - the 
mirror-image - creditor countries did their best in order to remain creditors 
vis-a-vis the Third World. The IMF, originally an institution of regulating 
money as a means of commodity-circulation (fixed exchange rates), has 
increasingly been transformed into an institution in support of the inter-
national credit system: by enforcing debtors to undertake adjustment 
measures and by impeding the efforts of single financial institutions to 
behave as free riders via a bailing out. 
A bitter conclusion has to be drawn. The same cause - declining profit 
rates and rising interest rates - transformed the world economy into 
a "casino capitalism" (Strange 1986), a worldwide debt economy. The 
decoupling of monetary from real accumulation created for developing 
countries a kind of a cul-de-sac and for the industrialized countries an outlet 
for liquid funds into risky financial assets (Altvater/Hubner 1989). The 
original international monetary regime - ruled by fixed exchange rates, the 
dollar as the world money and the USA as the hegemonic power, and last 
but not least by equilibrating mechanisms in order to avoid fundamental 
imbalance - is over. 
THE FORDIST STALEMATE 
We now come back to the argument depicted in Figure 2.1. In the 
industrialized "Fordist" countries, the increasing importance of monetary 
flows as compared to categories of real accumulation, provoked a change 
in management strategies. I will not discuss the spread of speculative 
centralization battles, hostile takeovers, etc. (Report on Leveraged Buyouts 
1987 and 1989; Altvater/Hubner 1989), but rather stress the growing role of 
capital costs (interest rates) for decision making on the national as well as 
on the corporate level. For the nation-state, increasing real interest rates have 
resulted in the already mentioned "loss of interest-sovereignty," and 
consequently in the impossibility of continuing traditional Keynesian/ 
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Beveridgean policies of demand management for full employment, and have 
thus provoked the growing influence and attractiveness of monetarist policy 
recommendations and of supply-side economics for the formulation of 
economic policy. At the corporate level, the increased importance of interest 
rates compared to the profit rate is reflected not only in a declining Tobin's 
q and, therefore, a growing attractiveness of financial investment; insofar as 
real, productive investments are undertaken, their character and strategic 
targets are changing: in the direction of relocating industries, of imple-
menting just-in-time strategies, of flexibilizing the whole production process 
and the administration of corporations. All these methods basically serve 
one objective, that is to decrease capital costs and to reduce all other costs 
in order to increase profit rates on a level comparable to interest rates. The 
driving force of capitalist modernization, therefore, is the dynamics of 
monetary markets more than that of real accumulation and the distributional 
conflict between capital and labor. The traditional "Fordist equation" 
between growth rates of productivity and wages has been substituted by a 
more complex relation between interest rates and profit rates on the one 
hand, and the reduction of labor costs in order to increase profits on the 
other hand. Where does the effective demand come from? With the declining 
importance of industry in national income, mass consumption of workers 
as the decisive component of effective demand in "Fordist times" is 
increasingly going to be replaced by the consumption of employees of the 
service sector and by those who spend their interest income: not only 
financial capitalists but also the growing number of employees of the 
financial industry. In Germany, for instance, the share of the wage bill paid 
in manufacture declined from 43.3 percent in 1960 to 38.0 percent in 1988, 
whereas the share of wages paid in the service sector increased from 7.1 
percent to 12.9 percent and the share of wages in the public sector grew 
from 14.3 percent to 19.3 percent (Sachverstandigenrat 1989: 252). In the 
US the trend was quite similar: the contribution of the manufacturing sector 
to the national product declined from 28.0 percent in 1960 to 19.7 percent 
in 1985, whereas the contribution of the financial and insurance sector 
increased from 14.1 percent to 15.9 percent, and that of other services from 
10.0 percent to 16.1 percent (Economic Report of the President 1990: 306). 
Of course, these indicators only show a tendency on the demand side 
from the Fordist form of generating mass consumption to a new regime 
compatible with the new conditions of profit production under the pressure 
of international financial markets. 
The result is a deep change of the international economic system: the 
decline of the rate of real investment and the shift from widening to 
deepening strategies has caused the well-known problem of structural 
unemployment in the developed countries. The impact of the growing 
weight of capital costs and the reduced importance of labor costs for modem 
corporate planning on the international division of labor is quite obvious: 
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the management of large corporations is more concerned with keeping 
capital costs low than looking for favorable production sites where labor is 
comparably cheap. Therefore, for many industries it makes no more sense 
to follow the strategy of the "new international division of labor" (Gordon 
1988), i.e. a strategy which was based on use of a combination of skilled and 
unskilled labor in different parts of the world in order to minimize labor 
costs. For, compared with capital costs labor costs play a minor role in 
corporate calculations. 
Even more important is the fact that due to the privatization of monetary 
and financial markets the steering capacity of nation-states and international 
institutions has been significantly reduced. The strategic options are there-
fore determined by market processes more than by political forces as 
embodied in institutions and rules. The consequence on the plant and 
enterprise level is enforced flexibilization not only of the production 
process, but of all stages of the whole circulation process of capital: new 
production concepts (Kem/Schumann 1984) in order to rationalize the 
production process as a technological and social system, new management 
strategies in order to minimize capital outlays for stocks and inventories 
("just-in-time"), corporate financial strategies in order to economize 
monetary capital and to use financial markets as "parking lots" for liquid 
funds. Therefore, modem industrial corporations behave increasingly like 
financial institutions ("Toyota-Bank"; "Siemens is a bank which holds a 
small electronic workshop"), where cash management is more important 
than labor management. Of course, tendencies of this kind have always been 
present in capitalist economies, but under the regime of high interest rates 
which cannot be controlled by the nation-state, the driving forces to adapt 
real processes to the tendencies of monetary accumulation become much 
more important than ever before. 
On the national level, adjustment and adaptation to world market 
structures becomes a powerful political imperative. Consequently, neither 
the old Fordist equation nor Keynesian policy models fit into this economic 
environment at the end of the century. The trajectory of Fordism has come 
to a halt. The rupture with the "old" model of accumulation and mode of 
regulation is quite obvious, but although there are signs of "post-Fordist" 
structures, so far no new stable, complete, compatible, and cohesive system 
has emerged. First, interest rates that are permanently higher than profit 
rates (and Tobin's q less than unity) are not compatible with real accumula-
tion, economic growth, and full employment. Even in a world characterized 
by high real interest rates there may be some growing points, but these 
regions (today Japan and some countries of Western Europe, especially 
Germany) are accompanied by the expansion of lagging areas of poverty and 
even misery in other parts of the world. Second, no new institutional 
framework for the regulation of reduced labor and expanded leisure time 
has evolved. Third, the regulation of the metabolism of human beings with 
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nature is deficient; the ecological question - which has not been discussed 
in this chapter - remains unsolved. And, last not least, in the aftermath of 
national Keynesianism, neither monetarism nor supply-side economics 
resolved the urgent problems of unemployment on a national level. Post-
Keynesianism, however, makes sense only on a global scale. In order to 
achieve this, the reconstitution of a new hegemonic order is necessary. But 
none of these deficiencies, at present, can simply be removed. The first 
function of the "great crisis" already has been fulfilled: the "de-formation" 
of the old Fordist structure. Thus far, it is possible to speak about "post-
Fordism", but only in a negative sense. For, the second phase, i.e. the 




FORDISM AND POST-FORDISM 
A critical reformulation 
Bob Jessop 
As the language of Fordism and post-Fordism has entered everyday 
discussion it has also been vulgarized. 1 This reduces its utility for theoretical 
understanding and empirical analysis and generates many confusions and 
controversies. This chapter critically reworks the conventional terminology 
of Fordism and post-Fordism by distinguishing four levels on which they 
can be analyzed. It also notes a fundamental analytical asymmetry between 
the two terms and calls for more cautious and critical use of the notion of 
post-Fordism. 
THE FOUR LEVELS OF FORDISM 
The concept of Fordism was popularized in the USA by Henry Ford himself 
and was already part of social scientific and popular consciousness in North 
America and Europe in the 1920s. Even then it had different nuances and 
these have since become disturbingly diverse. We can introduce some order 
into this confusion by distinguishing four levels of Fordism: the labor 
process, the regime of accumulation, and its modes of regulation and 
societalization. 
The labor process 
As a distinct type of capitalist labor process, Fordism refers to a particular 
configuration of the technical and social division of labor involved in making 
long runs of standardized goods. Fordist "mass production" is typically 
based on a technical division of labor which is organized along T aylorist 
lines, subject in its immediate production phase to mechanical pacing by 
moving assembly line techniques, and organized overall on the supply-
driven principle that production must be unbroken and in long runs to 
secure economies of scale. The assembly line itself mainly exploits the 
semiskilled labor of the "mass worker" but other types of worker (craft or 
unskilled manual workers, foremen, engineers, designers, etc.) are employed 
elsewhere. In addition Fordism ideally involves systematic control by the 
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same firm of all stages of accumulation from producing raw materials 
through to marketing (cf. Siegel 1988: 5). This complex technical division 
of labor is sometimes related to a complex regional division within or across 
national economic spaces: in late Fordism, for example, one might find 
"engineering and conception in region I, skilled production in region II, 
unskilled production in region 111" (Lipietz 1982: 37). Thus the dominance 
of mass production in a given enterprise or sector does not exclude other 
labor processes or types of worker. Instead it subjects them to its own logic. 
For the dominance of mass production means that, by virtue of its impact 
on productivity and productivity growth, it is the main source of dynamism 
in a firm or sector; and that other processes and activities will be organized 
to support, enhance, or complement it.2 This level of analysis is basically . . 
m1croeconom1c. 
The regime of accumulation 
As an accumulation regime, i.e., a macroeconomic regime sustammg 
expanded reproduction, Fordism involves a vinuous circle of growth based 
on mass production and mass consumption. Many studies assume that the 
Fordist regime and its reproduction are autocentric, i.e., that the circuit of 
capital is primarily confined in national boundaries. On these assumptions 
Fordism's virtuous circle involves: rising productivity based on economies 
of scale in mass production, rising incomes linked to productivity, increased 
mass demand due to rising wages, increased profits based on full utilization 
of capacity, increased investment in improved mass production equipment 
and techniques, and a funher rise in productivity. The apparent harmony 
among the steps in this virtuous circle does not guarantee its realization. 
Thus some analysts note the role of various margins of flexibility3 and/or 
"built-in stabilizers" that help to keep the circle virtuous despite the 
inevitable tendencies towards instabilities and disproportions ( e.g., Boyer 
and Coriat 1986 ). Others note that these virtues themselves require at least 
two key proportionalities to be met. These are that: 
1 increased productivity in Department I (the capital goods sector) offsets 
the rising technical composition of capital4 if the capital/output ratio is 
not to increase and thereby depress profits; and 
2 the growth rates in wage earner consumption and in productivity in 
Depanment II (the consumer goods sector) move in a similar range -
countering tendencies toward a crisis of underconsumption due to 
insufficient demand and toward a wage-induced profits squeeze ( e.g. 
Lipietz 1982, 1985). 
Not every firm or branch of production must be dominated by Fordist 
techniques for this mode of growth to occur as long as the leading sectors 
are Fordist. Indeed, if mass production is to find a mass market, there must 
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be matching growth in output of other types of goods (such as steel, oil, 
roads, family housing, and electricity) and services (such as retailing, 
consumer credit, and the servicing of consumer durables). Thus some 
authors note the dominance of an "auto-industrial complex" under Fordism 
to highlight how other production sectors complement mass production in 
the vehicle sector (cf. Perez 1983: 369). Even with such refinements, 
however, work on the Fordist accumulation regime is firmly rooted in 
economic analysis. To consider its institutional and organizational supports 
we move to a third analytic level. 
Its mode of regulation 
Fordism can also be examined as a mode of regulation, i.e., as an ensemble 
of norms, institutions, organizational forms, social networks, and patterns 
of conduct which sustain and "guide'.' the Fordist accumulation regime and 
promote compatibility among the decentralized decisions of economic 
agents despite the conflictual character of capitalist social relations (cf. 
Lipietz 1985: 121). Fordism can be specified through the forms assumed by 
different moments in the circuit of capital, the ways in which these forms 
get reproduced, and their articulation with each other. Thus one could 
explore the distinctive features of the Fordist wage relation (the skill profile 
of the collective laborer, the organization of labor markets and wage-effort 
bargaining, the nature of the wage form, and the balance between the private 
and collective reproduction of labor power); the Fordist enterprise (its 
internal organization, the source of profits of enterprise, forms of competi-
tion, other ties among enterprises, links to banking capital); the nature of 
money (its dominant form and its emission, the banking and credit system, 
the allocation of money capital to production); the nature of commercial 
capital (especially in mass consumption and distribution); and the links 
between the circuit of capital and the state (the forms of state intervention 
in different moments of the circuit of capital). This third level of analysis 
entails a mesoeconomic, institutionally focused analysis of the circuit of 
capital. It gives a middle-range link between the labor process and the basic 
features of macroeconomic reproduction and must be carefully defined for 
each moment in Fordism: 
• The wage relation is organized around the key role of semiskilled labor 
in large plants or concerns;5 management recognizes unions for collective 
bargaining, unions in turn concede management's right to control the 
labor process and corporate strategy; wages are indexed to productivity 
growth and prices and are downwardly sticky despite fluctuations in 
demand for labor; collective bargaining and/or minimum wage legisla-
tion spread rising wages to employees in non-Fordist sectors and thereby 
maintain relativities and demand; and indexed welfare benefits financed 
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from progressive taxation generalize mass consumption norms to the 
economically inactive. Even in a largely autocentric Fordist regime this 
pattern is compatible with dual labor markets and/or non-unionized firms 
or sectors - as long as there is adequate overall social demand for mass-
produced goods. 
• The ideal-typical Fordist enterprise is a large concern in which owner-
ship and control are separated. It has a distinctive multidivisional, 
decentralized, market-oriented organization overseen by a central board 
which engages in long-range planning. This pattern was pioneered at 
General Motors and became the norm for other large US industrial firms 
in the 1920s and 1930s. Elsewhere mass production was often coupled 
with trusts and cartels. The main source of profits of enterprise in Fordism 
is relative surplus-value based on continual improvements in productivity 
and economies of scale. Those firms at the forefront of Fordist process 
and product innovation can also earn "technological rents." In both cases 
the main form of capitalist competition is monopolistic rather than liberal. 
Rather than participating in a flexi-price system in which prices vary with 
demand, firms engage in cost-plus pricing, price leadership behavior, and 
competition through advertising. 
• Money is fiduciary and national in character rather than an interna-
tional commodity money; private credit is supplied by a hierarchically 
organized banking system overseen by a central bank; corporate expan-
sion depends on access to private credit as well as reinvestment of profits 
of enterprise; consumer credit is a major factor in households' ability to 
purchase housing and major consumer durables and thus sustain demand; 
and state credit policies are targeted on aggregate demand and full 
employment. 
• Commercial capital has a key role in establishing the links between mass 
producers and mass demand via mass advertising, mass retailing (multi-
branch retailing, supermarkets, mail order), mass credit (installment-plan 
transactions, mortgage finance), consumer research, etc. The mass media 
have acquired a crucial role in diffusing mass consumption norms (Beniger 
1986 ). Marketing needs also feed back into design ( even at the expense of 
strict pursuit of the logic of mechanized mass production) to encourage 
marginal product differentiation, annual style changes, etc. Thus design 
becomes a key factor in linking mass production and mass consumption 
(Sparke 1986: xxi). 
• The Fordist state is a Keynesian welfare state which has two key functions 
in promoting the virtuous circle of Fordism. It manages aggregate demand 
so that the relatively rigid, capital-intensive investments of Fordist firms 
are worked close to capacity and firms have enough confidence to 
undertake the extended and expensive R&D as well as the subsequent 
heavy capital investment involved in complex mass production;6 and it 
generalizes mass consumption norms so that most citizens can share in 
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the prosperity generated by rising economies of scale. Where the latter 
function involves only limited state provision for collective consumption, 
the state must ensure adequate levels of demand through the transfer of 
incomes. More intense intervention is likely both as Fordism rises to 
dominance and during its declining years. 
Analysis of the mode of regulation is concerned with the economy in its 
integral sense, i.e., the social context in which expanded economic reproduc-
tion occurs.7 It specifies the institutional and organizational conditions 
which secure Fordism as a national accumulation regime and is especially 
helpful in defining the peculiarities of different Fordist regimes. But it 
should not be divorced from work on the more general dynamics of 
capitalism. For the latter defines the basic tendencies and counter-tendencies, 
structural contradictions, strategic dilemmas, and overall constraints which 
inevitably shape modes of regulation, which find a provisional, partial, and 
unstable resolution in the latter, and whose continued presence and even 
development eventually undermine any given institutional and organiza-
tional solutions. In shon, while this level is distinct from Fordism as an 
accumulation regime, it cannot be properly understood without considering 
how modes of regulation modify and yet remain subject to the generic laws 
of capital accumulation. 
Its mode of societalization 
Other analysts approach Fordism in terms of its overall social impact. 
They go beyond its microeconomic base, its meso-level institutional pre-
conditions, and its macroeconomic effects to explore its general repercus-
sions on other institutional orders (such as the political system or cultural 
life) and/or other axes of societal organization (such as its spatial patterning). 
Such concerns involve not only the direct impact of Fordism but also its 
indirect effects. Among the latter one could explore measures adopted to 
deal, for example, with its adverse effects on social cohesion and institutional 
integration. The recursive pursuit of these effects and their funher repercus-
sions has no inherent limits. Thus one could study the impact of growing 
social welfare expenditures on the labor process and employment, the 
structure of demand, the dynamic of central-local government relations, or 
the rise of social movements oriented to welfare issues. With these direct 
and indirect effects we reach the founh level of analysis. 
Considered as a generic mode of "societalization," i.e. pattern of institu-
tional integration and social cohesion, Fordism moves social relations 
funher towards a mass societe salariale in which the vast majority of the 
population depend on an individual and/or social wage to satisfy their needs 
from cradle to grave (Aglietta and Brender 1984). This contrasts with the 
pre-Fordist period, when workers were involved in capitalism primarily as 
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producers and met their consumption needs mainly from petty commodity 
and/or subsistence channels. Fordism itself promotes two complementary 
trends in consumption: first, growing private consumption of standardized, 
mass-produced commodities in nuclear family households and, second, 
provision of standardized, collective goods and services by a bureaucratic 
state. The first trend is tied to the strategic marketing of "ideological 
commodities" (such as cars, televisions, washing machines, refrigerators, or 
mass tourism) whose individualized consumption becomes a mechanism of 
permanent self-normalization as consumers adopt the "American way of 
life" (Haug 1986; Luescher 1986; Wolf 1987). The second trend reflects the 
growing socialization of the social reproduction of labor power as well as 
efforts to manage the individual and social costs of the Fordist model ( cf. 
Jessop 1986). 
Thus, in addition to the state's role in such activities as general education 
and vocational training, unemployment and retirement insurance, health 
care, or housing provision, it often deals with such side effects of Fordism 
(or Fordist forms of modernization) as drastic falls in the rural population, 
destruction of traditional working class milieux, the privatization of family 
life, the depopulation of inner cities, or the environmental and social impact 
of the automobile. One major effect of Fordism here was to expand the local 
state as the vehicle for socializing consumption, coping with the side effects 
of the Fordist mode of growth, and managing its local crises - regardless of 
whether local accumulation itself was mainly Fordist or not. Closely related 
to this was the growth of the new middle classes (including state employees) 
who serve Fordist expansion and/or deal with some of its social repercus-
sions. In tum this growth prompted crisis to the extent that such services 
were less amenable to productivity boosting Fordist techniques. 
Another dimension of societalization is its spatial patterning. Fordism 
involved the growth of core industrial regions comprising large metropolitan 
areas surrounded by networks of smaller industrial cities. These regions 
were dominated by the leading Fordist firms and their suppliers; drew in 
raw materials and, on a growing scale, migrant or foreign labor, from the 
rest of the world; and churned out mass-produced goods for global markets 
(Harvey 1989: 132; Storper and Scott 1988: 10). As the Fordist regime 
developed, firms allocated activities, sourced supplies, and sought markets 
on an increasingly global scale. Urban life also assumed Fordist characteris-
tics. This can be seen in suburbanization (especially in the USA) and/or 
high-density urban renewal based on industrial construction techniques, 
especially in Europe (Florida and Feldman 1987; Harvey 1989). There was 
also a Fordist "politics of place" centered on "a consumerist representation 
of urban life as manifest in ideals about the nuclear family, suburban 
residence, and private car ownership" {Storper and Scott 1988: 30). 
Somewhat further removed from its economic logic are the specific forms 
of political life associated with Fordism. State intervention was reorganized 
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to facilitate the Fordist mode of regulation through economic and social 
programming and increased administrative discretion as well as an expand-
ing role for the local state in collective consumption and social welfare. 
Forms of representation and the social bases of the state were also modified. 
Thus trade unions and business associations had a key role in economic 
management and political bargaining over social welfare; and, as the parties 
of government accepted the Fordist compromise between capital and labor, 
they tended to become "catch-all," people's parties. In northwest Europe 
this pattern was closely linked to the dominance of social democratic or 
labor parties but similar policies were pursued elsewhere by regimes with 
more conservative governing parties (cf. Hirsch and Roth 1986; Roobeek 
1987). 
So far we have not questioned the common assumption that the Fordist 
accumulation regime, whether or not it is autochthonous, is at least 
essentially autocentric in character. But small, open economies (such as 
Denmark, Sweden, Austria, or Canada) actually moved towards a mass 
consumption society after 1945 by occupying growing non-Fordist niches 
in an emerging supranational productive system. In short, under global 
Fordism not all economies had to be Fordist in all respects. Rather, in a 
global division of labor whose dynamic was mainly determined by the 
leading Fordist sectors in the leading economies, economic success could 
occur in at least two ways. First, national economies could themselves 
assume a mainly Fordist dynamic, with growth being largely based on an 
expanding home market; or, second, they could occupy one or more niches 
which allowed them to enjoy rising standards of mass consumption based 
on growing export demand and profits in non-Fordist sectors (small batch 
capital goods, luxury consumer goods, agricultural goods, shipping or 
financial services, and/or raw materials). Where an economy is not itself 
primarily Fordist, however, its mode of growth must complement the 
dominant Fordist logic. In this way it can still be involved in the Fordist 
growth dynamic rather than being (increasingly) excluded from it. 
STRUCTURE AND STRATEGY IN THE ANALYSIS OF 
FORDISM 
Besides these different levels of Fordism we can distinguish their structural 
and strategic moments. The former refer to the actual organization of the 
level in question, the latter to the strategic perspectives and discourses which 
are currently dominant on that level. Structure is the legacy of a complex 
historical process and often embodies major structural contradictions, 
strategy could well be short-term or ephemeral and involve irrational means 
and objectives. Indeed, structures rarely have a simple, unequivocal relation 
to a single strategy and they often prove recalcitrant in the short term 
to attempts to recompose them. Conversely, even when strategies are 
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long-term and organic in character, they may not yet have been institutionally 
embedded in structures nor have constituted new "worlds of work" in 
practical consciousness.8 New conceptions of work usually emerge ahead of 
their time and become hegemonic and embedded in common-sense practices 
only through complex historical practices. The same holds for accumulation 
regimes and modes of regulation. In addition, of course, many strategies are 
"irrational, arbitrary, and willed" and so will sooner or later fail if they 
remain unmodified (for good illustrative studies of these points, see Elam 
and Borjeson 1989; Jenson 1990; Kristensen 1990; and Williams, Haslam, 
Wardlow, and Williams 1986 ). This suggests that we must establish whether 
the Fordist era really involved the predominance of Fordist structures. Or 
was it just marked by the hegemony or dominance of Fordist strategies 
which lent coherence and direction to what would otherwise have remained 
rather inchoate and disconnected economic, political, and social changes? It 
is essential but hard to disentangle Fordist myth from Fordist reality. 
It is indeed problematic that Fordist concepts were often hegemonic even 
when national economies were less often clearly Fordist in their organiza-
tion and dynamic. The history of many national economies both before and 
after World War II could well be written in terms of successive attempts to 
impose Fordist principles on non-Fordist economies. This led to some 
interesting hybrid economies which have placed national economies in very 
different positions to exploit post-Fordist opportunities. The vitality of the 
"Third Italy" is often cited here - although both its reality and relevance 
are often contested too. There are also many more general questions about 
the heuristic value of the whole debate about Fordism and post-Fordism. 
Indeed, as the ensuing remarks might suggest, there is a risk of getting 
bogged down in mainly taxonomic discussion. 9 Whereas this might help in 
clarifying some of the issues at stake in disputes over Fordism, it does not 
as such advance our understanding of the dynamics of postwar growth, the 
origins or nature of the crises which emerged in the mid- to late 1960s, or 
the way out of the crisis. For this we must move beyond taxonomy 
to consider the causal mechanisms and connections implied in different 
approaches to Fordism. 
PROBLEMS WITH THE CONCEPT OF FORDISM10 
The labor process 
Fordism a la Henry Ford was actually quite limited in diffusion and was 
never fully realized even in Ford's own plants in North America - let alone 
those in Europe. Indeed two common criticisms are that only a small part 
of manufacturing output is produced in Fordist conditions and only a small 
proportion of the labor force is employed in Fordist manufacturing. Both 
charges hold even for the supposed golden years of Fordism. In part this 
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reflects basic technical limits of assembly line techniques for automated and 
continuous-flow processes, jobbing or small batch production, or even 
potentially high volume goods whose composition and level of demand are 
too varied to justify using product-specific techniques. This means the 
potential for Fordism depends on the weight of specific sectors and the 
nature of their products. Thus, before judging the utility of "Fordism" for 
understanding the labor process in a given economy, we should examine 
both its industrial profile and its competitive performance. Its explanatory 
force would be cast in doubt where an economy managed to compete 
successfully in supposedly Fordist sectors without itself being Fordist. Its 
utility would be confirmed where a failure to adopt Fordist techniques is 
linked to manufacturing decline in open competition. Britain's combination 
of "flawed Fordism" and continuing economic decline would seem to fit 
the Fordist model. So does Germany's ability to translate a strong capital 
goods sector and high value-added consumer durable sectors into continuing 
export success. But Japan poses problems. Indeed Sayer has claimed that 
"while Japan has forms of organization not unlike those described as 
'flexible specialization', it also has other characteristics which cannot 
usefully be subsumed under western versions of fordism or postfordism" 
(Sayer 1989: 667). 
The limited spread of Fordism also reflects certain social limits making it 
impractical or unacceptable even where it is applicable. For existing labor 
market institutions and social traditions could well prevent or block 
penetration of Fordism even for that "classic" Fordist sector - cars. Several 
recent studies demonstrate how Fordist mass production has been blocked 
here by such factors as skill structure, managerial capacities, market size, 
labor market conditions, and union organization (e.g., Tolliday and Zeitlin 
1987). 
We might also ask whether studies of the Fordist labor process have been 
too concerned with manufacturing or, indeed, in this sector, with mass 
consumer durables generally or even cars and trucks alone. 11 For this diverts 
attention from the growth generated since 1945 by other sectors (such as 
aerospace, petrochemicals, or synthetic materials) and biases studies of mass 
production itself towards some, possibly atypical, manufacturing sectors. A 
less restrictive definition of Fordist mass production helps us find it 
elsewhere. Defined as the production of standardized goods or services 
through a Taylorized technical division of labor, the use of dedicated 
machinery, and a focus on economies of scale, 12 for example, Fordism 
occurs in sectors ranging from battery farming to tax collection, mass 
retailing to mass incineration, multiple choice testing for the mind to mass 
screening for the body, fast food to mass transit ( on US agriculture, see 
Kenney et al. 1988; on agriculture in general, Kamppeter 1986; on office 
work, Beniger 1986: 432f). 
Regarded as a labor process, then, Fordism can be variously defined. 
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Descriptively this does no harm as long as each definition is relatively precise 
and different definitions are clearly distinguished. 13 But problems occur in 
causal explanation because more inclusive definitions entail different chains 
of argument and/or causation from less inclusive definitions. Here too 
clarity is essential. For each definition, given certain assumptions about 
the capital-labor relation and forms of capitalist competition, one could 
generate arguments about the dynamics of class conflict in the enterprise 
and/or the course of capital accumulation. We also need a more complex 
set of distinctions which does not residualize all but a small subset of labor 
process relations. Even the dichotomy between "flexible specialization,. and 
"mass production" with its two positive terms is not much better. A multi-
valued typology would generate rich descriptions and explanations. 
Regime of accumulation 
To put the historical cart before the conceptual horse, we can ask whether 
there was ever a Fordist regime of accumulation and how one might identify 
it? Emphasizing the virtuous circle of mass production and mass consump-
tion in an autocentric national economy means that few national economies 
could be described as Fordist. Only the American economy had the 
continental scope and range of resources to be virtually self-sufficient and 
develop something like a true Fordist accumulation regime. In these terms 
it might be better to argue that Fordism occurs mainly on a local or regional 
scale in the form of Fordist industrial districts or else panregionally or 
supranationally in the form of Fordist circuits of capital.14 Fordist regional 
economies, pockets of flexible specialization, and other local regimes can all 
be found inside national boundaries. This poses problems about their role 
in the national mode of growth and their insertion into the dominant mode 
of regulation. A further complication arises because advanced capitalist 
economies were significantly involved in foreign trade from the formation 
of Fordism through its heyday into its declining years. This holds above all 
for small, open economies. Thus, whatever the virtues of an ideal-typical, 
autocentric Fordist regime, ideal and reality were often far apart. 
The idea of a Fordist accumulation regime could be rescued if one agreed 
that its virtuous circle need not actually occur through a close coupling of 
mass production and mass consumption within national economies but 
could be secured instead where a national economy has the following 
features. Its dynamism would be based on intensive accumulation in one or 
more leading sectors, rising productivity due to economies of scale and/or 
other sources of relative surplus value, rising wages indexed to rising 
productivity and profitability, a corresponding growth in mass consump-
tion, rapid domestic expansion in the production of mass consumer goods 
and/or the various complementary goods and services needed to enjoy them, 
and, to close the circuit, sufficient export earnings to finance the import of 
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mass consumer goods and other inputs needed to keep the virtuous circle 
in operation. Thus a given national economy need not itself produce 
complex mass consumer durables as long as it generates enough export 
earnings to finance their importation and has a mode of regulation which 
generalizes both mass consumption norms and effective demand. Even so 
the overall economic dynamic would differ from that in other regime types: 
for example, from those based on extensive accumulation and competitive 
regulation or intensive accumulation without mass consumption. For mass 
consumption would still require a supporting infrastructure and comple-
mentary service sectors and this would modify occupational and sectoral 
patterns. 
Treating Fordist accumulation regimes in this way involves some complex 
theoretical maneuvers with somewhat ambivalent implications for the utility 
of Fordism as a concept. Positively it eschews analyzing national or regional 
economies in isolation and brings into focus the complementarities among 
different national accumulation regimes. It bans assuming that Fordism 
emerged through the simple diffusion of the US model and requires closer 
attention to its different modes of regulation. It also highlights the need to 
examine how international regimes (or modes of international regulation) 
served to block further exploitation of dependent peripheries and encourage 
trade among the metropolitan economies. Negatively we are led to ask 
whether work on Fordism involves anything more than putting old growth 
models into a new terminological bottle. Sometimes it seems that a Kaldor-
Verdoorn type of explanation {stressing the virtuous effects of a shift from 
low-productivity agriculture to high-productivity manufacturing and/or the 
potentially self-reinforcing effects of rapid growth in productivity and 
output) has been repackaged and sold (in some cases misleadingly) as 
Fordism.15 If this type of explanation holds, the key to growth in mass 
consumption would be rising mass incomes from rapid economic expansion 
rather than mass production as such. In turn this would direct attention to 
the general conditions of postwar economic growth. Perhaps Fordism could 
then be brought back as an accumulation strategy or organizing myth giving 
shape and coherence to economic growth. But this would be to emphasize 
strategic issues rather than merely describe the actual growth dynamic. The 
origin and spread of Fordist ideas, projects, and strategies would still be 
important fields of enquiry but should not be mistaken for actual modes of 
growth in different postwar economies. Equally important would be studies 
of the real driving forces behind growth - contrasting the roles of military 
spending, 16 Keynesian welfare spending, and so forth. 
A longer historical perspective is valuable here, as it shows the experi-
mental, accidental development of the dominant Fordist paradigm. For, if 
Fordism's history is limited to the domestic consolidation of Americanism 
and its diffusion, one ignores attempts to develop alternative models of 
Fordism in the interwar period. Taylorist and Fordist paradigms were 
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significant in the Soviet Union, for example; and, voiced in various 
productivist, technocratic, and futurist projects, they also enjoyed wide 
cultural and political appeal in Western Europe - especially "where repre-
sentative government was deemed to be working badly" (Maier 1970: 29). 
Nazism and Fascism gave Taylorism and Fordism a distinctive political 
gloss. They proposed state-sponsored "rationalization" of all economic and 
social life as a prelude to winning mass markets elsewhere through bilateral 
trading agreements and/or force of arms.17 As a resource-rich, continent-
wide, and still expanding economy, the US could plausibly adopt an 
isolationist stance and aim for autocentric growth: German and Italian 
policymakers felt their economies had to look abroad to secure the potential 
of Fordist rationalization ( cf. Siegel 1988). European fascination with 
Americanism and Fordism was undermined by the Great Depression, 
however, reviving only after Allied victory in its turn undermined faith in 
block policies such as the Nazi Grossraumwirtschaft or Japan's "Asian Co-
Prosperity Sphere." This helped the US to hegemonize postwar reconstruc-
tion and assert the virtues of Fordism and the American way of life. In 
promoting its own model of Fordism the US was advantaged, of course, by 
its economic and military dominance. This enabled it to influence institu-
tional reform in West Germany and Japan and establish international 
regimes which encouraged Fordist accumulation - most notably through 
installing an international oil regime which secured increasingly cheap and 
plentiful supplies of an energy resource essential to Fordist expansion 
(Bromley 1990). Thus, even accepting that early postwar growth regime was 
mainly autocentric, various favorable international conditions were needed 
for this domestic takeoff to occur. 
Mode of regulation 
The key problem here is the wide variation in the modes of regulation 
compatible with Fordism considered as an accumulation regime. Metro-
politan Fordism has occurred with the most varied labor market institutions. 
The mass Fordist worker and the mass union were not always the pivotal 
forces in industrial relations and collective bargaining. The M-form (or 
Sloanist divisional company) mostly took root in Europe in the late 1960s 
rather than in the take off to Fordism (Franko 1974); and Japanese company 
forms are far from Sloanist (Sayer 1989). Many European economies as well 
as Japan have retained a sizable and politically significant petty bourgeoisie 
in the commercial sector long after a Fordist model would have seen a shift 
to mass retailing. Conversely mass consumption emerged in the late 
nineteenth century in both Britain and the United States (Beniger 1986; 
Tedlow 1990). In addition metropolitan Fordism is associated with liberal, 
corporatist, and dirigiste forms of political regime. Keynesian demand 
management developed rather late in most countries and was applied rather 
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ineffectively in almost all economies. Likewise the timing and pattern of 
welfare state developments assumed very different forms across all the 
advanced capitalist economies. 
Thus, rather than insist on one particular institutional configuration as 
comprising the Fordist mode of regulation, we should search for family 
resemblances. Some common patterns can be discerned: a linkage between 
wages and productivity; the spread of collective bargaining; monopolistic 
competition; the growing role of state credit in investment and consump-
tion; state involvement in generalizing mass consumption norms to signifi-
cant groups - peasants in Japan, farmers in Europe and the USA, the 
growing army of state employees, and welfare recipients. There was also a 
growing strategic concern with economies of scale, productivity, planning, 
"growthmanship," etc., which affected social and political life as well as 
forms of economic activity. 
Mode of societalization 
The Fordist mode of regulation, if such there is or was, has proved so varied 
that its consequences for societalization also vary massively. Moreover, since 
the starting points for Fordist expansion differed and sociopolitical and 
institutional structures are hard to transfer across societies, we can find quite 
different "national Fordisms." But it is often unclear how far these 
differences are due to a generic Fordist logic working in different circum-
stances or to preexisting structural differences fundamentally modifying the 
generic logic to produce different modes of growth. Thus we turn to another 
issue, namely, periodization. 
Periodization 
Since each of the elements in Fordism has its own prehistory and many 
elements will survive beyond the Fordist epoch, crucial questions arise about 
the exact timing of this epoch. If there is no discontinuity or rupture as the 
labor process, accumulation regimes, modes of regulation, or social struc-
tures of accumulation evolve, are we justified in talking about a Fordist 
epoch? Even if we concede that mass production makes a difference, it might 
not be the key innovation in explaining postwar growth. Research on long 
waves reveals that more periods of economic expansion have occurred than 
is implied in the simple contrast between pre-Fordist and Fordist regimes. 
It also suggests that postwar growth was based as much on abundant cheap 
energy, petrochemicals, synthetic materials, other process industries, and 
aircraft as on mass production of consumer durables. Likewise, we could 
ask whether the crucial divide in the transition to post-Fordism is the demise 
of the Fordist assembly line (or even mass production as a whole) or the 
penetration of microelectronics into an ever-growing range of economic 
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activities (including mass production). Without satisfactory answers to such 
questions, discussions about Fordism and post-Fordism have little point. 
Nor can satisfactory answers be found in the genesis of individual 
elements of Fordism (however this is defined) but only in discontinuities in 
their overall articulation. Thus we should try to identify new configurations 
which have acquired a distinctive and emergent dynamic as a result of this 
articulation. At least two problems arise here. Firstly a great deal of effort 
must go into tracing the long gestation of a rather short-lived phenomenon 
- since Fordism's heyday did not even cover the full thirty-year postwar 
boom.18 Secondly, the takeoff into Fordist growth seems to depend on a 
long series of chance events with the end of World War II providing only 
a convenient but stereotypical reference point for later periodizations. 
My own conclusion is that any serious discussion of Fordism as a distinct 
phase in capitalist expansion must proceed from a focus on the mode of 
regulation. Analyses of the labor process are too limited - especially since 
there are real problems in assessing the significance of the Fordist labor 
process in its strict meaning. Emphasizing the Fordist regime of accumula-
tion is undermined by the problematic character of the claims about 
autocentrism and the virtuous circle of balanced growth generated by mass 
production and mass consumption. But stressing societalization, i.e., the 
ramifications and repercussions of Fordism on the pattern of institutional 
integration and social cohesion, assumes the unassumable - that we already 
agree how to define Fordism. By a process of elimination we must either 
define it in terms of a specific mode of regulation or else reject Fordism as 
a useless concept. Many critics would welcome the second alternative but a 
reasonable case can be made for the first. Thus I recommend that Fordism 
be defined in terms of a core mode of regulation whose minimum features 
comprise: 
a) a wage relation in which wages are indexed to productivity growth and 
inflation, 
b) the state has a key role in managing demand, and 
c) state policies help to generalize mass consumption norms. 
Working with this basic definition we can examine the economic precondi-
tions of the Fordist mode of regulation in specific modes of growth ( or 
national accumulation regimes and their insertion into the world economy) 
and forms of organization of the labor process; we can examine the crisis 
of Fordism in terms of changes in the circuit of capital and/or the modalities 
of class struggle which help undermine the effectiveness of the Fordist mode 
of regulation as well as in terms of the distinctive, sui generis dynamic of 
this mode of regulation itself; we can examine the attempts to maintain this 
mode of regulation in the face of its crises and their eventual failure; and we 
can examine its broader preconditions and effects in the organization of 
state, economy, and civil society. In each case we must be sensitive to 
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national variations among different modes of growth and regulation as well 
as to the changing pattern of complementarities and tensions among them. 
THE TRANSITION TO POST-FORDISM 
What conclusions follow from this concerning post-Fordism? An adequate 
account must treat it like Fordism - distinguishing its different levels and 
adopting the same critical spirit. During the current economic turbulence, 
however, even its generic features are uncertain. The asymmetry between 
Fordism and post-Fordism in this regard is even suggested by the simple 
chronological prefix in the latter term. So let us be wary. If such prefixes 
really conveyed much information, terms like "postliberalism" or even 
"pre-post-Fordism" would tell us much about Fordism.19 Yet even 
a detailed specification of the latter's different dimensions leaves a lot 
unanswered. Thus a minimum condition for mentioning post-Fordism 
would be to show why it emerged after the Fordist era. Otherwise we 
should talk of a variant of non-Fordism.20 
If the prefix is to convey real meaning rather than just provide a 
chronological marker akin to the initial French usage of "apres-fordisme" 
(literally, "after fordism"), further arguments must be adduced. A case 
might be made along one or both of the following lines. Either one could 
show how post-Fordism has emerged from tendencies originating within 
Fordism but marks a break with it; and/or one could indicate how the 
ensemble of old and new elements in post-Fordism resolves or displaces one 
or more of the contradictions and crises which decisively weakened 
Fordism.21 If post-Fordism is said to emerge from Fordism, major discon-
tinuities must also be demonstrated: otherwise it would be better to talk of 
high Fordism, late Fordism, or neo-Fordism.22 Alternatively one could 
justify the concept by showing how post-Fordism resolves or displaces the 
distinctive contradictions and crisis-tendencies of Fordism. This does not 
imply that post-Fordism would lack its own contradictions and crisis 
tendencies. These can be taken for granted. But it would still make sense to 
"post" this new regime if it somehow overcomes ( or is widely held to do 
so) the problems typical of the Fordist era.23 
Serious analysis of post-Fordism must go beyond noting that it occurs 
after Fordism and show how it relates to specific developmental tendencies 
and crises of Fordism. Doing so would not as such prove that "post-
Fordism" is the best rubric for exploring and explaining current changes in 
advanced capitalist economies and/or the capitalist world economy as a 
whole. This is all too often assumed in post-Fordist perspectives, however, 
which simply ignore other bases of periodization with no attempt at 
justification (cf. Bromley 1988). 
Apart from these basic conceptual problems, there are sound empirical 
reasons for casting doubt on post-Fordism. There are clearly many different 
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starting points and trajectories en route to post-Fordism and most evidence 
is contradictory, incomplete, or provisional- especially in relation to post-
Fordist accumulation regimes, mode of regulation, or societalization. Even 
assessing whether the American, Japanese, or German model will be the new 
hegemonic paradigm risks marginalizing other possibilities. These include 
an emergent pax trilateralis based on a complementary, tripolar global 
division of labor or a variety of paradigms based on elements drawn from 
each model and adapted to local circumstances.24 Moreover, since it is 
doubtful whether Germany or postwar Japan are best seen as Fordist, it 
might prove misleading to treat the eventual dominance of a "Fujitsuist" 
paradigm and/or a recharged Modell Deutschland as post-Fordist. 
Faced with these difficulties, prudence might well be the better part of 
valor. But, as Marx reminds us, "hie Rhodus, hie salta!" Having written 
elsewhere on post-Fordism and having just spent some time here looking 
about me, I might just as well leap. Taking as my springboard the basic 
assumption that a post-Fordist accumulation regime will be based on the 
dominance of flexible production in combination with differentiated, non-
standardized consumption, I will specify the various levels of post-Fordism. 
As a labor process, post-Fordism can be defined as a flexible production 
process based on flexible machines or systems and an appropriately flexible 
work force. Its crucial hardware is microelectronics-based information and 
communications technologies. These are relevant to "manual and non-
manual work, to small, medium and large businesses, at corporate, divisional 
and workplace level, to managements and unions, and so on" (Clark 1989: 
6). They can also be used "to steer, control and provide immediate feedback 
on a wide range of human and machine operations. When linked into 
electronics-based telecommunications systems, these 'real time' technologies 
can also effect enhanced information links and flows across space, inte-
grating activities across departments and sites, and between individuals and 
organizations in different countries" (Clark 1989: 6). This would allow new 
or enhanced flexible specialization by small firms or producer networks 
even in small-batch production and, indeed, outside manufacturing, could 
promote flexibility in the production of many types of services in the 
private, public, and so-called "third" sectors. Hence the scope for the post-
Fordist labor process to shape the dynamic of the emerging economic 
system is far greater than was true of Fordism. In some areas post-Fordism 
will see a further extension of Taylorism (e.g., lower grade clerical work and 
some aspects of design) or its further intensification (e.g., sweated manufac-
turing or assembly work). Elsewhere there may be a bilateral convergence 
towards diversified quality production from both mass production and 
handcraft production (Streeck 1987). 
This pattern could properly be labeled post-Fordism insofar as it emerges 
from the Fordist labor process itself and/or is seen as responding to the crisis 
of Fordism. While not denying the partial validity of the former link, it is 
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easier to defend the latter. Stressing how post-Fordism emerged from the 
Fordist labor process makes it hard to distinguish it from neo-Fordism. 
And, since post-Fordism can be applied to branches which were not 
previously organized along Fordist lines, further doubts are raised over the 
validity of the prefix. By looking at how post-Fordism evolves in response 
to crises of Fordism, however, we can include process and product 
innovations which emerged outside any immediate Fordist context. Flexible 
specialization complexes which have long coexisted with Fordist mass 
production and now seem to have won a new lease of life in both material 
and ideological terms could be included here; so could the key role of new 
technologies ( such as microelectronics, biotechnology, and new materials) 
in overcoming some of the problems of Fordist control. In seizing on these 
new or recharged sources of flexibility, capitalists hope to overcome the 
alienation and resistance of the mass worker, the declining quality of 
products, the relative stagnation of Taylorism and mass production, 
the competitive threat from low-cost "peripheral Fordist" or "bloody 
Taylorist" producers in the Third World, and the relative saturation of the 
markets for standardized mass-produced goods; and/or to meet the growing 
demand for more differentiated products, for measures to break the rising 
costs of non-Fordist service sectors (especially in the public sector), and to 
boost productivity in other manufacturing sectors. The new technologies 
may also help resolve more general problems in Fordism such as its excessive 
use of fuel, energy, and raw materials and its damage to the natural and built 
environment (cf. Roobeek 1987). 
As a stable mode of macroeconomic growth, any virtuous post-Fordist 
circle would reflect the newly dominant form of labor process as well as 
changes in international economic relations. An ideal-typical national post-
Fordist accumulation regime would have the following dynamic. It would 
be based on flexible production, growing productivity based on economies 
of scope, rising incomes for polyvalent skilled workers and the service class, 
an increased demand for differentiated goods and services favored by the 
growing discretionary element in these incomes, increased profits based on 
technological rents and the full utilization of flexible capacity, reinvestment 
in more flexible production equipment and techniques and/or new sets of 
products, and a further boost to economies of scope. Compared with the 
ideal typical Fordist accumulation regime, post-Fordist growth need not 
involve generalizing core workers' rising incomes to other workers and/or 
the economically inactive. Moreover, as Fordist expansion is said to have 
been largely based on a growing home market and post-Fordist modes 
will be more oriented to worldwide demand, global competition could 
further limit the scope for general prosperity and encou. age a market-led 
polarization of incomes. 
One possible solution to this latter problem would be international 
Keynesianism to manage global demand and generalize high consumption 
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norms together with more local supply-side policies to enhance the struc-
tural competitiveness of the productive systems engaged in the race for post-
Fordist modernization. Another solution would be more "extensive" in 
kind: reintegrating the former Soviet bloc and Communist China into a 
single world market to generate demand through the decomposition of the 
crisis-ridden relations of state socialist production and new forms of East-
West trade. 
Besides its emergence from and organization around genuinely post-
Fordist labor processes, this new accumulation regime could be treated as 
post-Fordist insofar as it resolves (or is held to do so) crisis-tendencies in 
its Fordist predecessor. These were the relative exhaustion of the growth 
potential which came from extending mass production, the relative satura-
tion of markets for mass consumer durables, and the disruption of the 
virtuous circle of Fordist accumulation due to internationalization and the 
problems this created for national regulation. In these respects post-Fordism 
transforms mass production and goes beyond it, segments old markets and 
opens new ones, and is less constrained by national demand conditions. 
As a mode of regulation, post-Fordism would involve commitment to 
supply-side innovation and flexibility in each of the main areas of regulation. 
Given current uncertainties about this aspect, I offer only a brief and 
tentative account of some possible features. 
• The post-Fordist wage relation could involve a basic recomposition of the 
collective laborer (with a tendency towards polarization between poly-
valent skilled workers and the unskilled as compared to the Fordist 
tendency towards homogenization around semiskilled "mass" labor); the 
organization of internal and external labor markets around different forms 
of flexibility (functions and skills, duration and form of labor contract, 
wage package, etc.); a shift towards enterprise- or plant-level collective 
bargaining; and new forms of social wage. Industrial relations strategies 
could focus on integrating core workers into the enterprise and on 
mobilizing the production intelligence of workers by dissolving the 
T aylorist distinction between conception and execution. There may also 
be more intensification, marginalization, and insecurity for peripheral 
workers. They will often be poorly paid, unorganized, and recruited 
from politically marginalized social groups such as ethnic minorities, 
rural-urban migrants, and illegal immigrants. 
• The post-Fordist enterprise system could see a shift from the primacy of 
the hierarchical, well-staffed, bureaucratic "Sloanist" form of corporate 
structure towards flatter, leaner, more flexible forms of organization. 
New forms of organization between hierarchy and market will become 
more important in managing strategic interdependencies both within and 
among firms and in responding quickly to changing demands. More use 
will be made of outside consultants, specialists, and subcontractors as well 
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as revolving teamwork and greater internal competition; firms will also 
tum to joint ventures, licensing or contracting of technology, strategic 
alliances, collaborative R&D, design partnerships, and so on. Profits of 
enterprise will depend on: the capacity to engineer flexible production 
systems and to accelerate process and product innovation; the search for 
technological rents based on continuous innovation in products and 
processes; and economies of scope. Competition will tum on non-price 
factors such as improved quality and performance for individual products, 
responsiveness to customers and customization, and rapid response to 
changing market conditions. Some commentators also expect a polariza-
tion between giant transnational firms offering a full range of goods and/ 
or services in generic and multifaceted fields of technological competence 
and a multiplicity of smaller (but often transnational) firms aiming at 
specific niches within global or other markets. Others predict a new 
hierarchy of industrial-financial relations with its peak occupied by global 
players in high value-added and expanding product markets and interna-
tional banks oriented to the needs of transnational firms (cf. Grou 1984; 
Amin and Robins 1990). 
• On current trends the money form will be dominated by private, rootless 
bank credit which circulates internationally; more flexible forms of credit 
will be developed linked to a growing range of financial instruments; state 
credit will be subject to limits set by the logic of international money and 
currency markets. Whether these trends are sustainable is hotly debated. 
• With the increased emphasis on differentiated forms of consumption, 
commercial capital will be reorganized to create and serve increasingly 
segmented markets. The hypermarket, the shopping mall, and the bou-
tique are often cited as archetypal post-Fordist forms of consumption and 
contrasted with the supermarket and department store. 
• State intervention will shih from a Fordist concern with managing 
national demand through Keynesian and welfare state measures. For the 
irreversibly international character of post-Fordism has the paradoxical 
consequence of reinforcing the state's role in promoting competition -
not just of individual firms or national champions but of the overall 
productive system and its sociopolitical supports. If this marginalizes the 
state's role in managing national demand, it increases its role in the 
constant and continuous restructuring of the supply side (Kundig 1984: 
60). Welfare policy will also be closely integrated into this restructuring 
process. Moreover, as individual nation-states may well lack the means 
to organize competition, this implies an enhanced role for continental or 
panregional states (such as the European Community). During the 
transition to post-Fordism this will not only involve rolling back the 
frontiers of the Fordist type of state but also rolling forward those of a 
new type of state. The post-Fordist world will be structured through the 
interaction of national or regional rivalries in the race for societal 
modernization and the dynamic of a global production system. 
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Taken together these forms comprise a distinctive ensemble of regulatory 
practices. They also seem to emerge out of tendencies inherent within 
Fordism and to resolve at least some of its crisis-tendencies. Some of these 
new structural forms and regulatory practices developed from attempts to 
manage the crisis of Fordism, others from attempts to escape it; some are 
primarily defensive, others offensive. Among the problems they help solve 
are: the collapse of Fordist incomes policies and the crisis of Fordist labor 
market institutions, the contradiction between Fordist wage forms and the 
post-Fordist need to promote responsible autonomy, rising R&D costs, 
rapidly changing and shonening product life cycles, greater risks of market 
failure, the availability of technologies permitting greater task integration 
and easier communication between divisions, and so on. Politically, the new 
forms of state intervention respond to Keynesian stagflation, the fiscal crisis 
of the state, slower productivity growth in the welfare state compared to 
the private sector, the rigidities and dysfunctions of bureaucratic administra-
tion and planning, the growing resistance shown by class forces and new 
social movements toward the forms and effects of the Fordist state, and so 
fonh. 
The post-Fordist "mode of societalization" is especially uncenain because, 
in contrast to the postwar dominance of the American model, there is now 
strong competition between Japanese, German, and American models. At 
best we can describe the societalization effects of the uneven transition 
toward post-Fordism. There are already clear signs of reorganization in the 
spatial division of labor in and across national systems. For flexible 
production seems to be avoiding the old Fordist production centers and is 
typically located in the suburban extensions of Fordist metropolitan areas, 
in relatively nonindustrialized hinterland areas, and, at least in services, in 
central business districts (Storper and Scott 1988). These new sites of 
production are reaniculated into the global circuit of capital and only its 
central nodes (the primary milieux of innovation) can function as locally 
integrated, agglomerated, self-generating growth poles; other sites are 
becoming more fragmented and are being insened at various lower points 
in the global hierarchy (Amin and Robins 1990). 
PROBLEMS WITH POST-FORDISM 
There is a risk that building a model or paradigm of post-Fordism might 
encourage teleological and/or functionalist analysis. At worst this involves 
assuming that an inevitable, preordained transition is under way from 
Fordism to post-Fordism - impelled by the changing logic of the productive 
forces and/or competitive pressures imposed by the strongest capitalist 
forces. The theoretical fallacies here are well known since there is much 
scope for social forces to resist and/ or shape the technical and social 
innovations. Even if we avoid teleology, functionalism may yet ensnare us. 
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The risk here is that, having constructed a paradigm of post-Fordism, we 
then assess everything in terms of its role in advancing ( or else blocking) 
the transition to post-Fordism. But, if we cannot yet tell what the final 
form(s) of a post-Fordist labor process, accumulation regime, or mode of 
regulation will be, it is both foolhardy and fallacious to argue that specific 
structures or strategies must prove functional or dysfunctional in the 
transition. This helps explain the fundamental asymmetry between the 
concepts of Fordism and post-Fordism. 
The tabor process in post-Fordism 
Let us ignore the many scientific, technical, and financial limits making the 
fully automated factory impractical and examine the more general shift 
towards flexibility in manufacturing. 25 This can take two main forms: static 
and dynamic (Coriat 1990) see also Coriat, in this volume, chapter 6. The 
former depends on a firm's ability to adjust its product mix "instantly" to 
demand fluctuations and thereby operate at or near to full capacity. This is 
only effective where the goods produced have a short life or will soon 
become obsolete so that economies of scale are limited: otherwise a larger 
firm equipped with flexible machinery would outperform small or medium-
sized firms (Coriat 1990: 157-9, 163). By contrast dynamic flexibility 
operates on a longer time horizon and involves "production lines able to 
evolve rapidly, in response to changes in engineering of products or of 
processes" (Coriat 1990: 167). It is ideal for new products with growing 
demand and/or products with stable volumes of demand but periodic shifts 
in the features offered or demanded (Coriat 1990: 169; cf. Elam 1989). Lying 
even further beyond the reach of flexible specialization is the production of 
large, lumpy investment goods such as public telecommunications switching 
systems (Sayer 1989: 675). These may benefit from computer-integration of 
different stages in production but their actual manufacture will be beyond 
the scope of small or medium-sized firms even when organized flexibly in 
industrial districts. Nonetheless the changes occurring in the labor process, 
even if limited in scope and often realized only partially, do seem to involve 
significant departures from Fordist practice. Even if one is not justified in 
talking about a novel post-Fordist accumulation regime or mode of regula-
tion, the evidence does indicate certain genuine post-Fordist trends in the 
labor process. The real problem is to assess their signifir.ance in relation to 
other trends and alternative accounts. 
The accumulation regime 
It is still too soon to define the macroeconomic regime of accumulation 
other than in abstract terms. This is especially true given the complex and 
still uncertain changes occurring in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
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Union as well as the continued development of the European Community 
and its associates. Coupled with the rapid changes occurring under the aegis 
of transnational companies and their strategic alliances, this makes it easy to 
forecast that there will be no return to the Fordist status quo ante and hard 
to anticipate the precise forms of any new regime. 
Mode of regulation 
Since objects and modes of regulation are mutually related, it would be 
foolish to forecast the main outlines of any future post-Fordist modes of 
regulation. Objects of regulation are not fully constituted prior to struggles 
over their regulation but are partially constituted in and through such 
struggles 0essop 1990a). Chance discoveries and trial and error experimenta-
tion also play a major role in consolidating modes of regulation. Given the 
uncertainty about the elements of post-Fordist accumulation regimes, their 
articulation into durable moments of a stable post-Fordist mode of regula-
tion is doubly uncertain. This explains the conflicts over key aspects of post-
Fordism such as flexibilization of the wage relation; the meaning, scope, and 
importance of flexible specialization; the nature and significance of indus-
trial districts; and the relevance of small, flexible firms in many still crucial 
areas of production. It is also much debated whether the international 
monetary system has become too flexible for its own good - let alone that 
of productive capital (see Altvater, in this volume, chapter 2). Niche 
marketing strategies often end up entombing their protagonists. And, while 
there seems to be a "hollowing out" of nation-states as functions are 
transferred upward to supra- or transnational bodies and/or downward to 
new forms of local and regional state, the forms of the state and state 
intervention in promoting and managing the transition to an uncertain post-
Fordist future are too many and too varied to allow easy prediction. Nor is 
it clear how far current changes in state forms and functions are due to the 
transition to post-Fordism and how far they result from other trends, 
dilemmas, and contradictions. 
Societalization 
Neither a viable post-Fordist accumulation regime nor a coherent post-
Fordist mode of regulation has yet arrived - if they ever will. This suggests 
that discussion of post-Fordist societalization must be restricted to three 
areas of enquiry: 
a) how shifts in the labor process affect class, gender, and other social 
relations; 
b) the social problems due to Fordism's crisis and the search for alterna-
tives; and 
c) the political processes involved in this search process. 
67 
A NEW PERIOD IN CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT? 
At most we can describe some of the social forms involved in the transition 
to post-Fordism but equally in the transition to other structural forms. It 
is too soon to talk of a post-Fordist mode of societalization. 
Periodization 
Regarding the labor process we can raise similar doubts on periodization to 
those involved in accounts of Fordism. The question naturally arises 
whether the computer-integration of production from design to marketing 
really marks a crucial break in industrial organization or whether other shifts 
are more important. This is especially problematic since there is clearly a 
continuing role for mass production in many product areas. Conversely, 
many Japanese solutions now adopted in the West (such as JIT production) 
actually originated in the 1940s and 1950s - before the crisis of Fordism ( cf. 
Sayer 1989: 670). This does not rule out inserting them into a distinctive 
post-Fordist system, but it does require a more nuanced and balanced 
analysis to show exactly what is new and/ or "post" about this system. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
But few positive substantive results have emerged from this review. This is 
mainly due to the intellectual raw material on which we have been working: 
the distinction between Fordism and post-Fordism. Thus my conclusions 
largely consist in methodological reflections and involve few substantive 
comments. In particular I have suggested that there are three main sources 
of confusion involved in this distinction: 
1 a failure to differentiate among possible sites where Fordism and 
post-Fordism may develop; 
2 a failure to distinguish between the strategic or rhetorical affirmation of 
one or another aspect of Fordism (or post-Fordism) and its actual 
instantiation in specific structural features of a social formation; and 
3 a failure to recognize the basic asymmetry between the concepts of 
Fordism and post-Fordism which is due to the closing of the Fordist era 
and the uncertain future of post-Fordism. 
This said, if one or other concept is to be used, I prefer Fordism. In part 
this reflects the opportunity the passing of the Fordist era gives to study 
both the transition to Fordism and the regularities in and across different 
areas of consolidated Fordism. "Fordism" serves both as a heuristic concept 
when establishing the historical specificity for particular formations and, in 
its guise as an accumulation regime, it is useful in defining the basic 
tendencies, counter-tendencies, and crisis forms of postwar capitalism. Even 
here it has been necessary significantly to qualify the nature and meaning of 
Fordism, however, by giving rather loose definitions of its manifestation on 
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different levels and/or by admitting a multitude of subtypes or hybrid 
forms. This is what prompts complaints about taxonomic fury overwhelm-
ing both detailed histories and dynamic causal analysis of tendencies and 
counter-tendencies. However justified these complaints may be in some 
cases, it still seems worthwhile to deploy the notion of Fordism as part of 
a broader conceptual system. 
These problems are reinforced in dealing with post-Fordism. It is hard to 
define a coherent post-Fordist accumulation regime or mode of societaliza-
tion as an ideal type or as a heuristic construct. There are also real doubts 
as to whether the path of capitalist development leads to a "post-Fordist" 
future. Quite specific theoretical and empirical conditions must be satisfied 
before we can reasonably talk of post-Fordism. Moreover, even if this 
particular concept were abandoned in favour of one lacking a chronological 
prefix (such as flexible accumulation, Fujitsuism or "Spaethkapitalismus"),26 
good grounds would still remain for doubting that it adequately describes 
the future of capitalism. For this will be determined by the class struggle 
and capitalist competition in all their manifold forms as well as by forces 
rooted in other institutional orders; it will also depend increasingly on 
global forces rather than those confined to particular nation-states or 
plurinational productive systems. This inevitably introduces problems both 
for those trying to find solutions to the problems of Fordism and those 
trying to study them. The debate has only just begun and I have tried to 
present some conceptual guidelines and some more substantive reflections 





Theory, evidence, and policy implications 
Paul Hirst and Jonathan Zeitlin 
There is widespread agreement that something dramatic has been happening 
to the international economy over the past two decades: rapid and radical 
changes in production technology and industrial organization, a major 
restructuring of world markets, and consequent large-scale changes in the 
policies of economic management at the international, national, and regional 
levels. At the same time there is a great deal of confusion about how to 
characterize these changes, the mechanisms at work, and the policy implica-
tions for different groups of economic and political actors. One way of 
accomplishing these tasks is to postulate a change of basic manufacturing 
organization from a "Fordist" pattern that prevailed in the years of the long 
post-1945 boom to a "post-Fordist" successor in the later 1970s and 1980s. 
Many people habitually conflate three approaches to industrial change under 
this heading: flexible specialization, regulation theory, and a more diverse 
body of explicitly "post-Fordist" analyses. The resulting problem is that 
significant differences of approach are concealed by a superficial similarity 
between the proponents of flexible specialization and a set of apparently 
similar but underlyingly divergent ideas. The purpose of this chapter is to 
examine systematically the differences between flexible specialization, regu-
lation theory, and other variants of "post-Fordism." 
The chapter is organized as follows. In the first three sections we outline 
the basic arguments of the three approaches, focusing on their fundamental 
assumptions and theoretical architecture. In a fourth section we deal with 
the problem of evidence, first by examining the general methodological 
approach of each theory, and second by examining the substantive 
issues raised by their different attempts at evidentialization. In the fifth and 
final section, we consider the policy implications of the three theoretical 
approaches for the manufacturing sector. 
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FLEXIBLE SPECIALIZATION: TECHNOLOGICAL 
PARADIGMS AND POSSIBLE WORLDS 
Despite their apparent similarities, flexible specialization and post-Fordism 
represent sharply different theoretical approaches to the analysis of indus-
trial change. Where post-Fordism sees productive systems as integrated and 
coherent totalities, flexible specialization identifies complex and variable 
connections between technology, institutions, and politics; where post-
Fordism sees industrial change as a mechanical outcome of impersonal 
processes, flexible specialization emphasizes contingency and the scope for 
strategic choice. The distinctiveness of flexible specialization as a style of 
analysis can best be appreciated by examining the way in which its 
theoretical architecture builds upwards from simple ideal types to a complex 
and multileveled system of concepts applicable to a diverse range of 
empirical cases.1 
The central building block of this approach is its distinction between mass 
production and craft production or flexible specialization as technological 
paradigms, ideal-typical models or visions of industrial efficiency. Mass 
production for these purposes can be defined as the manufacture of 
standardized products in high volumes using special-purpose machinery and 
predominately unskilled labor. Craft production or flexible specialization, 
conversely, can be defined as the manufacture of a wide and changing array 
of customized products using flexible, general-purpose machinery and 
skilled, adaptable workers. 2 
Neither mass production nor flexible specialization on this view is 
inherently superior to the other. Each model is theoretically capable of 
generating a virtuous circle of productivity improvement and economic 
growth. Under mass production, subdivided labor and dedicated equipment 
can reduce unit costs through economies of scale, extending the market for 
standardized goods and facilitating new investments in special-purpose 
technologies, which further reduce costs, extend the market and so on. 
Under flexible specialization, conversely, versatile labor and universal 
equipment can reduce the cost of customization through economies of 
scope, extending the market for differentiated goods and facilitating new 
investments in flexible technologies, which narrow the price premium for 
customized products, extend the market and so on. But the practical 
realization of either possibility depends on a contingent and variable 
framework of institutional regulation at the micro-level of the firm or region 
and the macro-level of the national and international economy. Hence the 
technological dynamism of each model and its potential for sustained 
development cannot be evaluated outside of definite institutional and 
environmental contexts. Thus, just as there may be technologically innova-
tive forms of both mass and craft production, so too are there stagnant 
variants of each model in which firms compete through squeezing wages, 
71 
A NEW PERIOD IN CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT? 
working conditions, and product quality - practices as common in large, 
declining enterprises as in small sweatshops. 
The structural properties of each technological paradigm define a set of 
micro- and macroregulatory problems whose resolution is crucial for their 
long-term economic success.3 In each case, however, similar problems may 
be solved in different ways, and a plurality of institutional frameworks can 
therefore be observed within both mass production and flexible specializa-
tion alike. For mass production, the crucial microregulatory problem is that 
of balancing supply with demand in individual markets: coordinating the 
flow of specialized inputs through the interdependent phases of production 
and distribution; and matching the output of productive resources that 
cannot easily be turned to other uses with the normal level of demand for 
each good. But as Piore and Sabel argue in The Second Industrial Divide 
(1984), these common goals may be pursued through a range of individual 
strategies, such as market segmentation, inventory variation, and superficial 
product differentiation, while the institutional framework provided by the 
large, hierarchical corporation likewise varies considerably both within and 
across national economies. Thus the organization of mass production firms 
in the United States, Germany and Japan, to choose some notable examples, 
differ significantly along key dimensions such as levels of administra-
tive centralization and vertical integration, relationships with financial 
institutions, and systems of shop floor control. 
For flexible specialization, by contrast, the crucial microregulatory prob-
lem is that of sustaining the innovative recombination of resources by 
balancing cooperation and competition among productive units. Two major 
types of institutional framework may be identified for the performance of 
these functions: "industrial districts" of small and medium-sized firms; and 
large, decentralized companies or groups. In the industrial districts, geo-
graphically localized networks of firms subcontract to one another and share 
a range of common services which are beyond the capacity of individual 
enterprises to provide for themselves, such as training, research, market 
forecasting, credit, and quality control. Successful districts are also typically 
characterized by collective systems of conflict resolution which encourage 
firms to compete through innovation in products and processes rather than 
through sweated wages and conditions. Within any particular district, 
however, there may be substantial differences in the roles played by specific 
institutions, from trade or employers' associations and cooperative banks or 
credit unions to trade unions, churches, and local government; and the 
political complexion may also vary sharply from "red" regions such 
as Tuscany or Emilia to "white" ones such as the Veneto or Baden-
Wiirttemberg. 
In large, decentralized companies, on the other hand, the relatively 
autonomous productive units often resemble small, specialized firms or craft 
workshops, while obtaining services such as research, marketing, and 
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finance from other divisions of the parent enterprise. As in the case of mass 
production corporations, however, large, flexible firms may also differ 
significantly from one another - for example, in their relationship to banks 
or trade unions - depending on their individual histories and the national 
institutional context. There are signs, too, that the extended period of 
volatility in international markets since the mid-1970s is giving rise to what 
Sabel calls a "double convergence" of large- and small-firm structures, as 
small firms in the industrial districts build wider forms of common services 
often inspired by large-firm models, while the large firms themselves 
increasingly seek to recreate among their subsidiaries and subcontractors the 
collaborative relationships characteristic of the industrial districts.4 
As the Great Depression of the 1930s demonstrated, the market stabiliza-
tion strategies of large corporations by themselves could not solve the 
central regulatory problem of mass production: how to ensure a continuing 
balance between consumption and production across the national economy 
in order to amortize lumpy investments in product-specific equipment. 
While the Keynesian welfare state emerged as the dominant form of 
macroregulation during the postwar period, here too the differences among 
national economies remained striking: differences, for example, in the 
methods of managing budgetary aggregates, in the commitment to counter-
cyclical deficit finance and public welfare provision, and in the role of 
collective bargaining agreements and other "private" means for relating 
purchasing power to productivity growth. Like mass production itself, 
Keynesian macroregulation was as much a project as an accomplished fact; 
and nowhere was this more true than at the international level. Despite 
Keynes's own postwar proposals, no effective institutional mechanisms were 
created to ensure a steady expansion of global demand in line with 
productive capacity or recycle purchasing power from surplus to debtor 
countries in the world economy. 
If the macroregulatory requirements of mass production are relatively 
well defined, those of flexible specialization remain the least developed 
aspect of the model. Thus Piore and Sabel argued that the superior capacity 
of flexibly specialized firms to accommodate changes in the level and 
composition of demand makes macroregulation less vital than in mass 
production, giving the price mechanism a greater role in equilibrating supply 
and demand as in the nineteenth-century competitive economy. But Piore 
and Sabel also emphasized the microregulatory need for such an economy 
to take wages out of competition and maintain welfare services in order to 
avoid debilitating breakdowns of solidarity among economic actors, dis-
tinguishing possible low- and high-consumption variants of a flexible 
specialization regime through the contrasting images of Bourbon Naples and 
a Proudhonian artisan republic. 
More recently, Sabel has developed these ideas by treating macroeco-
nomic regulation as a problem of reinsurance: whereas for mass production, 
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the key problem is that of reinsuring firms against unpredictable fluctuations 
in the level of demand through macroeconomic management, the problem 
for flexible specialization is that of reinsuring regional economies against 
large-scale shifts in its composition by establishing interregional mechanisms 
to facilitate structural adjustment. On this basis, in turn, he distinguishes 
two possible futures for the welfare state under a regime of flexible 
specialization: an exclusive or dualist variant in which regional economies 
increasingly opt out of the national welfare state while remaining vulnerable 
to unpredictable external shocks as well as to disruption from those left 
outside the system; and an inclusive variant which would integrate firms and 
industrial districts into national systems of training and reinsurance, extend 
flexible specialization to less successful regions and social groups, and build 
on existing trends towards the decentralization of the welfare state itself.5 
A final macroregulatory issue concerns the implications of flexible 
specialization for the international division of labor. In The Second Indus-
trial Divide, Piore and Sabel suggested that one possible scenario might be 
the emergence of new forms of interdependence in the world economy, as 
mass production migrated to underdeveloped countries, while advanced 
economies increasingly shifted over to flexible specialization. Under these 
conditions, the First and Third Worlds might also come to share a common 
interest in a new institutional framework of multinational Keynesianism to 
regulate world demand and ensure macroeconomic stability (Piore and Sabel 
1984: 279-80). But flexible specialization might also be conceived as an 
alternative development strategy for parts of the Third World itself. Such a 
strategy might build on existing forms of small-scale enterprise concentrated 
in the substantial "informal" sectors of many developing economies; and it 
might also build on the unavoidable flexibility of preexisting forms of mass 
production imposed by the constraints of narrow markets and shortages of 
appropriate skills and materials. Either way, flexible specialization might 
offer an attractive route to economic development for such countries in 
which "appropriate technologies" were not necessarily inferior and modem 
forms of industrial organization could more easily be adapted to local 
conditions.6 Like any development strategy for the Third World, flexible 
specialization would clearly be advanced by the creation of effective 
mechanisms of international macroeconomic coordination, but unlike mass 
production it could also be successfully pursued under the more likely 
conditions of continued volatility in the world economy. Which of these 
possible worlds may in fact be realized, and to what extent, like the 
institutional frameworks of micro- and macroregulation, cannot be derived 
from flexible specialization as an abstract model, but depends instead on the 
outcome of strategic choices and political struggles. 
From this account it should be clear that flexible specialization is at 
once a general theoretical approach to the analysis of industrial change, 
and a specific model of productive organization whose micro- and 
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macro-regulatory requirements may be satisfied through a variety of 
institutional forms. But in no sense can this general approach be understood 
as an evolutionary teleology in which the triumph of flexible specialization 
as a specific model is a necessary consequence of some immanent logic of 
economic or technological development. Much of the debate over flexible 
specialization has in fact missed the mark by construing the latter as a similar 
type of theory to post-Fordism in its many variants. 
Contrary to what many critics have supposed, for example, mass produc-
tion and flexible specialization are ideal-typical models rather than empirical 
generalizations or descriptive hypotheses about individual firms, sectors, or 
national economies.7 As the original formulations made clear, neither model 
could ever be wholly predominant in time or space. Thus mass production 
requires a continuing role for skilled workers and craft production both 
inside and outside the large firm, to design, set up and maintain special-
purpose machinery on the one hand and to manufacture goods for which 
demand is too small or unstable to justify investments in dedicated equip-
ment on the other. Conversely, some standardization of intermediate goods 
and components is a necessary condition for the flexible manufacture of 
diversified final products. 8 Hence the persistence of firms, sectors, and even 
whole national economies organized on alternative principles does not in 
itself undercut the notion of a dominant technological paradigm in any given 
period. 
At a deeper level, moreover, the analytical distinction between mass 
production and flexible specialization is also compatible with the empirical 
finding that hybrid forms of productive organization are the rule rather than 
the exception. As historical research conducted within this framework 
shows, firms in most countries and periods deliberately mix elements of 
mass production and craft or flexible production because they are acutely 
aware of the dangers involved in choosing an unalloyed form of either 
model. Thus economic actors' understanding of the pure models paradoxic-
ally leads them to hedge against risks in ways that blur the lines between 
them. The resulting interpenetration of elements of flexible and mass 
production also means that firms often find it easier to shift strategies from 
one pole to another than an abstract consideration of the two models might 
lead one to expect.9 
Contrary to another widespread misconception, therefore, flexible 
specialization is neither a technological nor a market determinism.10 Just as 
trajectories of technological development in this approach are shaped by 
competing visions of production, so too are patterns of demand shaped by 
competing visions of consumption. Thus, for example, the realization of 
either virtuous circle between investment, productivity and the extension 
of the market depends not only on the creation of an appropriate 
institutional framework, but also on the relative success of flexible and 
mass producers in persuading consumers to accept or reject a price premium 
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for differentiated goods over their standardized counterparts. This dynamic 
interaction between production and consumption means that the flexible 
specialization approach regards market structures not as fixed parameters 
which impose a uniquely appropriate form of conduct on economic actors, 
but rather as contingent historical constructs which reflect the competitive 
strategies of the actors themselves. Hence, for example, current trends 
towards the diffusion of flexible specialization as a productive strategy result 
not only from the pervasive volatility of demand but also from the conscious 
efforts of firms organized along these lines - most notably in Japan - to 
fragment the mass market still further through the constant introduction of 
new speciality products. 11 
While flexible specialization strategies may be pursued within a plurality 
of productive and institutional forms, the range of variation is neither 
infinite nor arbitrary. Thus, for example, the regulatory requirements of 
flexible specialization are incompatible with a neoliberal regime of unreg-
ulated markets and cutthroat competition. In each of its institutional forms, 
flexible specialization depends for its long-term success on an irreducible 
minimum of trust and cooperation among economic actors, both between 
managers and workers within the firm and between firms and their external 
subcontractors. And as we have already noted, such cooperation depends 
in tum on the establishment of rules limiting certain forms of competition 
such as sweated wages and conditions, as well as on collective institutions 
for the supply of nonmarket inputs such as technological information or 
trained labor. Hence flexible specialization should not be conflated with 
opposed conceptions of "flexibility" as labour-market deregulation which 
have become common currency not only among businessmen, policy-
makers, and trade unionists, but also among post-Fordists and their critics.12 
If flexible specialization depends on trust and cooperation, finally, this 
does not imply the absence of any conflict. On the contrary, flexible 
specialization, like any system of production, is prone to potentially 
debilitating conflicts among economic actors, not only between employers 
and workers, but also between firms and their subcontractors or sub-
sidiaries. The reproduction of social consensus within these systems, though 
it may build on formative experiences in the past, can only be sustained in 
the longer term through the creation of institutional mechanisms for the 
resolution of disputes whose operation is broadly satisfactory to all the 
parties concerned. While the maintenance of consensus is always provisional 
and contingent, so too is the crystalization of particular conflicts into 
durable antagonisms between social groups: neither outcome is predeter-
mined by flexible specialization as a technological paradigm without 
reference to a definite social and institutional context. For flexible specializa-
tion, unlike post-Fordism and its Marxist antecedents, social and political 
identities cannot be derived from the structure of production through the 
ascription of objective interests to abstract categories or classes of actor; and 
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therein lies another fundamental difference between these two contrasting 
approaches. 
"POST-FORDISM": TOTALITIES AND SOCIAL TYPES 
The term "post-Fordism" has such a wide currency and is used 
so indiscriminately that some demarcations are necessary if different 
approaches grouped under the term are not to be confused. It has often been 
used, along with "Fordism", to characterize aspects of the work of the 
flexible specialization and regulation schools. Here it will be used to specify 
a body of work quite distinct from both of them, although in many cases 
drawing eclectically on their concepts. 
One of the most popular and influential advocates of the concept of post-
Fordism in Britain was the political magazine Marxism Today, which 
attracted a politically varied readership right up to its closure in 1990. The 
edited collection New Times Oacques and Hall 1989) is largely drawn from 
the pages of that journal. Here we will take it as a typical exposition of the 
rise and fall of Fordism as an economic and social system and its replacement 
by post-Fordism. This popular account is similar in most respects to other, 
more academic versions such as Harvey (1990) and Lash and Urry (1987), 
which we will ignore here for reasons of economy. 
Marxism Today depended heavily on a stereotyped version of the 
technical, economic and social relations that preceded "new times" -
typified by the concept of "Fordism." As its leading members were mainly 
neo-Gramscian Marxists, this concept owed much to Gramsci's essay 
"Americanism and Fordism" in the Prison Notebooks (1971) and also to 
works like Harry Braverman's Labor and Monopoly Capital (1974), which 
emphasize Taylorism as a form of production and labor organization 
characteristic of the Fordist era. Ford's name was used to sum up a series 
of innovations in manufacturing introduced in the first two decades of this 
century in the USA and supposedly generalized as a model of industrial 
production worldwide thereafter. Fordism is mass production on the 
assembly line model, using special-purpose machinery and mainly unskilled 
labor in a division of labor based on the increasing fragmentation of tasks. 
The Fordist era is characterized by the dominance of mass markets and long 
runs of standardized goods. Fordism is based on the technological efficiency 
of planned production arising from the separation of conception and 
execution, and on the economic efficiency of large-scale plants. It comes to 
dominate by economic logic, the logic of competitive advantage and market 
pedormance. However, it was only when Fordist production was coupled 
with appropriate macroeconomic policies by national governments that this 
production system could find the stability to exploit its full potential; 
Fordist growth was possible when the mass purchasing power to sustain the 
mass markets necessary for mass production was assured. Fordism and 
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Keynesianism were responsible for the great postwar boom from 1945 to 
the first oil price crisis of 1973. 
The Fordist system implied a definite type of society, industrial society 
based on a homogeneous, male, full-time working class, concentrated in 
large plants in large industrial cities. The assembly line, the concentration 
of labor in large plants and a full-employment economy promoted the 
central role of the unions and workers parties in politics. Traditional social 
democracy was underwritten by Fordism and with it the primary role of 
the welfare state. 
What is wrong with the Fordist stereotype? First, that it ascribes the 
dominance of Fordism to economies of scale, to a narrowly economic 
explanation without reference to actual markets, plant sizes or specific 
forms of production organization. Taylorism is taken for granted, without 
reference to the actual complexities of work organization or the role of 
labor. The division of labor has never been a purely management preroga-
tive: strongly institutionalized patterns of industrial relations mean that it 
is impossible to read off work organization from stereotyped visions of 
management objectives. Moreover, these objectives have never been so 
stereotyped or free of other complex constraints of economic calculation as 
the notion of Taylorism supposes. Distinct national patterns and phasings 
of adoption of standardized mass production are ignored.13 Second, it takes 
Keynesianism for granted - ignoring the complex questions of what 
macroeconomic policies were pursued in different national economies. 
Thus, for example, neither West Germany nor Japan followed "Keynesian" 
policies in their major periods of postwar expansion, adopting instead 
orthodox fiscal and monetary policies.14 Close attention to the different 
national experiences in the great postwar boom reveals quite different 
manufacturing strategies and institutional underpinnings to growth. The 
Second Industrial Divide, far from conforming to the Fordist stereotype, 
has the great merit of carefully considering these different national routes 
to economic organization.15 
"Fordism" involves a simplified view of manufacturing and macroeco-
nomic management, homogenizing the postwar world to overstress the 
social and political differences after 1973. "Fordism" was the coherent 
concept in Marxism Today's analysis; it provided the rigid point of 
departure against which to project the changes from the early 1970s 
onwards. "Post-Fordism" is a much less coherent concept. It is a way of 
bundling together a series of economic and social changes. Just as Fordism 
is supposed to have prevailed throughout the industrial world - other 
countries following the American model - so "post-Fordism" is a world-
wide phenomenon, with, it appears, Japan leading the way. Marxism Today 
argued that Britain exemplifies the new "post-Fordist" pattern of economic 
relations. 
Not only are national and regional complexities obliterated here, but there 
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is no real explanatory core to the post-Fordist case other than the decom-
position of Fordist structures. The post-Fordist case involves, by and large, 
borrowing and radically simplifying the flexible specialization approach to 
manufacturing. However, this borrowing is accompanied by very little 
attention to the wide range of forms and hybrids of flexibly specialized 
production and their social and institutional conditions. The primary role 
in explaining change is assigned to the collapse of mass markets. Market 
differentiation and volatility are taken as purely external factors enforcing 
new patterns of manufacturing. The switch from Fordism to post-Fordism 
is seen in conventional economic terms as market-led. Classic capitalist 
entrepreneurs of the conventional type and individual firms respond with 
new intrafirm strategies to the new market conditions. Strategies are reactive 
and firm-initiated, decisions draw production techniques, product ranges 
and labor market changes after them. This violates the basic assumptions of 
the flexible specialization approach, that effective strategies are anticipatory 
more than reactive, and that not merely the firm but interfirm and collective 
regional and national patterns are crucial in the balancing of competition 
and cooperation necessary for their more progressive institutionalizations. 
Marxism Today characterized Britain as a "post-Fordist" society without 
enquiring further into the extent to which British firms have, indeed, 
adopted new forms of production technique and manufacturing organiza-
tion. The evidence for such adoption is scant. British firms appear to be 
reproducing many of their worst faults of the postwar decades: inattention 
to training, poor delivery times, misuse of technology, misconceptions of 
competitors' strategies, etc.16 How then can Britain's economy be typified 
as "post-Fordism"? Only by our realizing that its use by Marxism Today 
was not as a rigorous concept organizing a detailed empirical account of 
British manufacturing but as a loose sociological metaphor. 
Most of Marxism Today's authors were Marxists or post-Marxists. The 
use of a concept drawn from production organization to characterize a 
whole era would thus seem to be following on the traditional Marxist 
methods of assigning a determining role to the forces of production. But 
technological determinism was one of the main things Marxism Today and 
its key authors like Stuart Hall strived to avoid for over ten years. The use 
of features of the production system to characterize the wider society is no 
longer a rigorous, if rigid, causal determination, rather it has slipped to the 
level of a casual metaphor. 
The analysis of post-Fordism in New Times is little more than pop 
sociology combined with a tendency derived from classical Marxism to 
think of societies as coherent types. The "post-Fordist" concept is linked 
to that of postmodernism to produce a view of modern society as fluid and 
changing, dominated by a shift from collectivism to individualism, from 
production towards consumption and the service sector, from substance 
toward style, and to new political issues and new social movements. 
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Pointing out that a traditional collectivist socialism based on the assumption 
of the electoral primacy of a mass, homogeneous manual working class is 
dated can hardly count as either politically innovative or sociologically 
novel; it has been a commonplace since the 1950s. The characterization of 
the "Fordist" era in these terms is an absurdity, no one attentive to the 
politics of European labor movements could ever have believed in this 
unitary working class, this hegemony of collectivism or this assumption of 
previous political and electoral success. 
When we tum from this fantastic history of the era before 1973 and the 
illusory post-modernist contrast with the world afterwards we can see how 
unlike "new times" are the most successful regional and national economies 
that have followed flexible specialization strategies.17 Neither the Third Italy 
nor Japan are models of postmodemist social and cultural fluidity. In 
Germany and Italy flexible specialization has been based on legacies of labor 
skill and institutions of regional and social cooperation that persisted into 
the supposedly "Fordist" era. In each of these countries conservatism in 
social relations and attitudes has provided the basis for social cooperation 
and economic coordination necessary to develop innovative strategies in 
manufacturing. Social continuity has provided the stability and support 
to absorb and promote radical change in technology and economic 
organization. One can overstress the role of conservatism and traditional 
"bourgeois" attitudes in these cases, since all three societies were radically 
disrupted by the experience of fascism. Nevertheless, all three rebuilt their 
societies and economies after the war, combining innovation and conserva-
tism, and drawing strength for cooperation from the experience of the 
antagonisms and divisions of the fascist era. Other regions have found 
different routes to the patterns of cooperation and institutional collaboration 
necessary to promote flexible specialization, but none of the major industrial 
districts looks remotely like "new times.'' The best thing one can say for 
Marxism Today is that it sought to discard obsolete socialist shibboleths, 
but the means it chose to do so were almost as damaging as the illusions 
from which it sought to escape. In particular it portrayed Britain as a rapidly 
changing and innovating country, with Mrs Thatcher's Conservative Party 
in the lead because it recognized these changes and sought to exploit the 
new individualism consequential upon them. Not only has British manufac-
turing not changed in the way Marxism Today supposed, not only is the 
British economy rerunning on a new basis the macroeconomic failures of 
the 1960s, but British social attitudes stubbornly refuse to conform to the 
stereotype of "new times."18 Marxism Today's analysis comes close to 
celebrating Thatcherism: seeing it as breakthrough when Britain is teetering 
on the edge of economic failure. 
The writings of Christopher Freeman and Carlota Perez offer another 
distinct and far more academically sophisticated variant of the use of the 
terms "Fordism" and "post-Fordism."19 Their work in contrast to the 
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above is marked by two key differences, a sophisticated attention to 
economic theory (particularly Joseph Schumpeter's work on investment, 
technological innovation and growth cycles, and Kondratiev's work on long 
waves of technological innovation linked to periods of upswings and 
downswings in growth) and a more detailed and specific attention to 
technology. 
Freeman and Perez identify five successive waves of innovation linked to 
Kondratiev cycles. In each of these waves the upswing is dominated by the 
generalization of a new "technological paradigm," which emerged from the 
crisis in the preceding downswing and which in turn leads to a new 
downswing as the impact of technical innovations and the investment cycle 
falters. Each successive wave involves new institutional forms which support 
the phase of economic and technical innovation; these institutions then fall 
into crisis during the period of downswing, and then involve a period of 
institutional transition or crisis as the conditions for the next wave are 
prepared. 
The five waves are set out schematically in Freeman and Perez (1988): 
1 the period from the 1770s-80s to 1830s-40s, divided into an upswing 
called the "Industrial Revolution" and a downswing called "Hard 
Times" and characterized by early mechanization; 
2 the period from the 1830s-40s to the 1880s-90s, divided into an upswing 
of "Victorian Prosperity" and a downswing of the "Great Depression" 
based upon steam power and railway technologies; 
3 the period from the 1880s-90s to the 1930s and 1940s, divided into an 
upswing called the "Belle Epoque" and a downswing of the second 
"Great Depression" in the 1930s and based upon electrical and heavy 
engineering technologies; 
4 the period from the 1930s-40s to the 1980s and 1990s and divided into 
an upswing called the "Golden Age of Growth and Keynesian Full 
Employment" and a downswing called the "Crisis of Structural 
Adjustment" and based upon Fordist mass-production technologies; and 
S an emerging fifth period beginning in the 1980s and 1990s based upon 
new information and communications technologies, basically a "post-
Fordist" phase. 
The work of Freeman and Perez involves major and crippling theoretical 
problems despite its seriousness and its attempts to avoid some of the major 
pitfalls of explaining growth through cycles of innovation. They are careful 
to try to specify the technologies underpinning the major waves, and to look 
for evidence for their periodization and diffusion. Unlike other "post-
Fordists" they are careful to remain at the level of techno-economic 
evolution and not to generalize from this into social types, which are 
ensembles of economic, social, and cultural relations. They are also careful 
to avoid drawing simplistic and overblown political conclusions from their 
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successive waves of technological innovation. However, they still sub-
scribe to the "Fordist/post-Fordist" dichotomy and to roughly the same 
periodization as the other two bodies of work considered here. 
The first major theoretical problem is that Freeman and Perez's analysis 
is closely tied to the cycles of long waves of technological innovations 
proposed by the Russian economic statistician Nikolai Kondratiev 
(Kondratiev 1979). Kondratiev's cycles do not merely illustrate their thesis, 
they are central to its periodization and to its explanation of successive 
phases of growth, crisis, and innovation. If Kondratiev's claims are false then 
so is the framework of Freeman and Perez. Kondratiev's work is statistically 
based and depends on inferences from economic data on growth - particu-
larly on relations between prices and output. As such it offers no convincing 
causality for a 50-60 year cycle, or why the pattern of technical innovation 
should "bunch" in this way. It is essentially a work of statistical economic 
history and its periodizations are dependent on certain relationships being 
shown to be statistically significant and to correspond to the chosen cyclic 
periods. It has stimulated a great deal of debate and it has been comprehen-
sively tested and found wanting by Solomos Solomou (1987). Solomou 
found that there was no significant correlation between production trends 
and Kondratiev's waves in Britain, France, Germany, or the USA, and no 
correlation of innovation clusters in the way Kondratiev supposed. In the 
absence of a 50-60 year cycle divided into roughly equal periods of upswing 
and downswing, shorter and more contingent cycles of growth or techno-
logical innovation will not sustain the Freeman-Perez framework. In the 
absence of a rigorous statistical proof of the Kondratiev cycle Freeman and 
Perez must fall back on a weaker version of Schumpeter's account of the 
investment cycle. 
The second major theoretical problem is that although Freeman and Perez 
are careful to refuse a simple teleology of autonomous technical change, 
recognizing the role of economic and conjunctural factors in the reception 
and diffusion of technologies, they still tend to see change in productive 
systems as driven by technology rather than by business organization and 
strategy. As we have seen, the flexible specialization approach - far from 
foregrounding technology - emphasizes the adaptation of techniques to 
distinct forms of productive organization. Thus the adoption of microelec-
tronics, the core technology of Freeman and Perez's fifth ("post-Fordist") 
wave, does not of itself lead to flexible specialization strategies and produc-
tion methods. Perez's discussion of "flexible production," despite its relative 
sophistication, remains predominantly at the level of technical processes and 
potentialities and does not give due weight to production organization, 
market transformations and institutional changes at the suprafirm level 
(Perez 1985). 
Third, the concept of a "techno-economic paradigm" is very different 
from the "technological paradigm" of flexible specialization, despite the 
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apparent similarity of the terms. A "techno-economic paradigm" is a 
diffusible pattern of technology linked to changes in cost-structures. It 
remains the case that this paradigm is the core of an evolutionary phase of 
a technical-economic system that comes to dominate every branch of the 
economy, and it prevails because of the intrinsic gains of the technologies 
involved and the availability of generalizable low-cost inputs, corresponding 
to classical economic ideas of competitive efficiency. It is not an ideal-typical 
model of a new form of productive efficiency, effective because adopted by 
key economic actors; rather it is a new form of technological efficiency per 
se. 
Fourth, technical change is evolutionary in Freeman and Perez's analysis 
and prevails because of its inherent adaptational advantages, after giving due 
allowance for delays and crises. It is, despite qualifications, much closer to 
a form of technological-economic determinism than flexible specialization 
theory. Evidence of this is the tendency to view successive waves of 
innovation as necessary and to view the corresponding institutional adapta-
tions of the economy to the new technologies in a functionalist manner. 
Technical change is conceived much in the manner of Marx's inherent 
dynamic of the forces of production. The "socio-institutional framework" 
needed to accommodate such technologies is seen much in the manner of 
Marx's relations of production, as a social linkage that is functionally 
necessary to a certain phase of technology and which then moves into a 
crisis of functional mal-adaptation when the potential for innovation in the 
prevailing technology is exhausted. This can be illustrated by a passage from 
Carlota Perez which could be a translation from Capital: 
the prevailing pattern of social behaviour and the existing institutional 
structure were shaped around the requirements and possibilities 
created by the previous paradigm. This is why, as the potential of the 
old paradigm is exhausted, previously successful regulating or stim-
ulating policies do not work. In tum, the relative inertia of the socio-
economic framework becomes an insurmountable obstacle for the full 
deployment of the new paradigm. 
(Perez 1985: 455) 
Freeman and Perez are more careful in building their social types than 
Marxism Today: the types are techno-economic systems not ensembles of 
all possible sociocultural relations, and they offer a more coherent and 
general causality than do the other "post-Fordists," but the result is an 
evolutionary theory with a strongly technical necessitarian cast. As such, 
although their theory is not classically Marxist, it has many of the same 
faults as the technological determinism explicit in the dynamic role of Marx's 
forces of production. The flexible specialization approach has been con-
structed to avoid just these faults, and so, despite some similarities of 
terminology and despite some very interesting points about technical change 
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and the specific technologies involved, Freeman and Perez's VIews are 
fundamentally opposed to its main theoretical thrust. 
REGULATION THEORY: MIDDLE WAY OR BLIND 
ALLEY? 
These theoretical contrasts emerge most starkly from a comparison of 
flexible specialization with the more simplistic versions of post-Fordism put 
forward by Marxism Today or Freeman and Perez. But between these two 
poles stands a large but elusive "middle ground" which seeks to combine 
the openness and contingency of the flexible specialization approach with a 
continuing insistence on the systematic nature of capitalism as a mode 
of production and the centrality of class struggle in its development. 
Undoubtedly the most important and developed representative of this 
approach is the French "regulation school" in its "Parisian" variant.20 
Despite the many subtle differences among themselves, the Parisian regula-
tionists share a conceptual framework and methodological approach which 
appears to mark them off from flexible specialization and post-Fordism 
alike. This group of heterodox economists, many of whom are associated 
with the French state planning apparatus, draw their inspiration from 
a distinctive combination of Althusserian structuralist Marxism, post-
Keynesian macroeconomics, and Annales-school historiography of the 
longue duree. On this basis they are out to execute a "slalom between 
the orthodoxies" of neoclassical general equilibrium theory and classical 
Marxism to produce a rigorous but nondeterministic account of phases of 
capitalist development which leaves considerable scope for historical varia-
tion and national diversity.21 As in the case of post-Fordism and flexible 
specialization, this section will examine the theoretical architecture of the 
regulation approach before going on to consider critically the relationship 
between this conceptual edifice and its putative methodological foundations. 
Like post-Fordism, but unlike flexible specialization, the regulation 
school takes as its point of departure the concept of capitalism as a mode 
of production. Capitalism, in this view, is a contradictory and crisis-ridden 
economic system which requires some form of institutional regulation for 
its continued reproduction; but in contrast to orthodox Marxism, the 
operation of these crisis tendencies and their resolution is "underdeter-
mined" by the abstract properties of the mode of production iself. Social 
and political struggles therefore play a crucial role in the creation of the 
regulatory institutions which sustain each new phase of capital accumula-
tion; and like post-Fordism, but unlike flexible specialization, the central 
actors involved in these struggles are conceived essentially in class terms. 
At a lower level of abstraction, the regulation school analyzes successive 
phases of capitalist development in terms of a series of modes of develop-
ment based on a combination of regimes of accumulation and modes of 
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regulation. 22 A regime of accumulation is a relatively stable and reproducible 
relationship between production and consumption defined at the level of 
the international economy as a whole. Each regime of accumulation 
encompasses a number of interrelated elements, from the pattern of produc-
tive organization and the time horizon for investment decisions through the 
pattern of income distribution and effective demand to the relationship 
between capitalist and noncapitalist modes of production. Within any 
regime of accumulation, however, each national economy may have its own 
distinctive mode of growth depending on its insertion into the international 
division of labor. Thus the regulation school distinguishes four major 
regimes of accumulation in the history of capitalism since the eighteenth 
century: extensive accumulation; intensive accumulation without mass 
consumption (Taylorist); intensive accumulation with mass consumption 
(Fordist); and an emergent post-Fordist accumulation regime whose 
contours have yet to be fully determined. 
A mode of regulation, on the other hand, is a complex of institutions and 
norms which secure, at least for certain period, the adjustment of individual 
agents and social groups to the overarching principles of the accumulation 
regime. Like regimes of accumulation, modes of regulation are complex 
ensembles composed of a number of interrelated elements: the form of 
monetary and credit relationships; the wage-labor nexus; the type of 
competition; the mode of adhesion to the international regime; and the 
form of state intervention. On this basis, the regulation school likewise 
distinguishes four major modes of regulation over the past two centuries: 
old regime regulation (regulation a l'ancienne); competitive regulation, 
monopolistic regulation, and an emergent semiflexible mode of regulation 
whose contours again remain to be determined. Within any national 
economy, however, each mode of regulation may be realized in very 
different ways depending on the preexisting institutional context and the 
outcome of domestic social and political struggles. 
When a regime of accumulation comes together with an appropriate mode 
of regulation, the resulting mode of development makes possible a sustained 
period of technological progress and economic growth. Under these circum-
stances, crises are essentially cyclical and perform an equilibrating function 
for the economic system as a whole. But each mode of development also 
contains its own internal limits - reflecting the deeper contradictions of 
capitalism as a mode of production - and eventually comes to decay over 
time. The consequence is the onset of a structural crisis in which regulatory 
institutions no longer perform a positive function for the regime of 
accumulation, and the economic system loses its self-equilibrating character. 
Only the creation of a new relationship between accumulation and regula-
tion can break the impasse and revive the growth process, but such a 
breakthrough in tum depends on the strategic choices and political struggles 
of the major social actors. 
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Despite differences of emphasis between individual writers, for example, 
the regulation school attributes the crisis of Fordism during the 1970s and 
1980s primarily to two structural tendencies within this regime of accumula-
tion. First, the progressive exhaustion of productivity gains from Fordist 
forms of work organization undercut the virtuous circle between consump-
tion and investment, and precipitated a clash between corporate profitability 
and the institutional mechanisms which sustained aggregate demand within 
each national economy. Second, the gradual erosion of American hegemony 
in the world system undercut the role of the dollar as an international 
currency, destabilizing the implicit mechanisms which had ensured a steady 
expansion of global demand during the postwar period despite the absence 
of more formal institutions of international macroeconomic coordination. 
The effects of these tendencies were then amplified by conjunctural shocks 
such as the oil price rises of 1973 and 1979 and by the strategic responses 
of the major actors: internationalization of production and marketing on 
the part of large firms; defense of real wages on the part of trade unions; 
and adoption of deflationary policies on the part of the state. If the roots 
of the crisis of Fordism for the regulation school are at once structural and 
conjunctural, there is nothing automatic about the emergence of a new mode 
of development, and a number of future configurations are conceivable, 
from neo-Taylorism plus neo-liberalism through flexible specialization 
in the narrow sense to flexible mass production plus international 
Keynesianism. Which of these possible outcomes will in fact be realized is 
determined, on this view, both by the compatibility between the various 
components of the emergent regime of accumulation and mode of regula-
tion, and by the strategic choices of large firms, trade unions and the state.23 
At first glance, therefore, the regulation school appears to avoid the 
theoretical pitfalls of the more simplistic versions of post-Fordism while 
maintaining a close link between empirical analyses of industrial change and 
the structural dynamics of capitalism as a mode of production. Like flexible 
specialization, the regulation school avowedly rejects both determinism and 
functionalism, while enthusiastically embracing historical contingency and 
national diversity. Neither the onset of structural crises nor their resolution 
are automatic processes dictated by the laws of motion of capitalism itself; 
regimes of accumulation do not secure their own regulatory requirements; 
and neither the capitalist class nor the state plays the role of a "system 
engineer" consciously ensuring the dynamic stabilization of the economy. 
The emergence of an appropriate mode of regulation is thus always 
"miraculous," provisional, and potentially unstable: at best, one can speak 
of an a posteriori functionalism in which a particular set of regulatory 
institutions, once constituted, prove compatible with the demands of a 
viable mode of development.24 Finally, as we have seen, different national 
modes of growth may coexist within the same international regime of 
accumulation, while each mode of regulation may be realized through a 
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variety of institutions, giving rise to a wide range of distinctive national 
experiences in any historical epoch. 
But how consistent are these methodological principles with the theoreti-
cal architecture of the regulation approach? On closer examination of the 
key texts, a series of problems can be identified which highlight the tensions 
between such methodological declarations of intent and the practical 
application of regulation theory to the explanation of empirical phenomena. 
The first set of problems concerns the nature of regulation itself. What 
precisely is to be regulated within this approach? Is it the general contradic-
tions of capitalism as a mode of production - redefined in neo-Keynesian 
terms as the need to maintain a dynamic balance between production and 
consumption - or the specific dilemmas of an individual regime of accumula-
tion? What is the relationship between the various elements of the mode of 
regulation and which level is most crucial to the achievement of sustained 
growth? Despite formal declarations that modes of regulation are complex 
structures each of whose elements must be compatible with the others, most 
regulationist analyses in practice tend to privilege a single component of the 
system - usually the wag~labor nexus or the form of competition - and 
use it to characterize an entire phase of development as Fordist or post-
Fordist, competitive or monopolistic. How far do the objects of regulation 
such as the wage relationship or the form of state intervention precede the 
emergence of a particular mode of regulation, and how far, as Jessop 
suggests, do the objects and mode of regulation form a structural coupling 
whose contours can only be determined under a definite set of historical 
circumstances? Despite their methodological reservations about functional 
explanations, most regulation school analyses reason in practice as if the 
persistence of the objects of regulation could be accounted for by the 
development of a smoothly functioning mode of regulation. 25 
A second set of problems concerns the relationship between higher and 
lower levels of analysis or between theoretical abstractions and empirical 
cases. How far can the historical succession of regimes of accumulation and 
modes of regulation be separated from the structural properties of capitalism 
as a mode of production? To what extent is the existence of a plurality of 
national modes of growth genuinely compatible with the postulation of a 
dominant international regime of accumulation during any given period? 
How far can divergent national configurations of institutions such as 
collective bargaining or the welfare state be legitimately considered as 
limited variations of a single mode of regulation? 
When the regulation school seeks to characterize broad historical periods 
in terms of dominant regimes of accumulation and modes of regulation, its 
exponents tend to elide the diversity of national experiences acknowledged 
in more detailed case studies.26 Despite the many empirical caveats scattered 
through their work, therefore, regulation theorists, as other critics have 
charged, systematically overstate the dominance of Fordist modes of 
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regulation during the postwar period, whether in terms of the pervasiveness 
of Taylorist work organization, institutionalized collective bargaining, 
Keynesian demand management, or the welfare state.27 Conversely, the 
application of a regulation approach to national case studies, typically 
involves not only a severe "stylization of the facts" to fit its theoretical 
categories, but also ad hoe modifications of the categories themselves to 
accommodate observed variations. The result is the multiplication of 
hybrid formulations poised uneasily between theory and empirical descrip-
tion, such as "flex-Fordism" (Germany), "blocked Fordism" (UK), "state 
Fordism" (France), "delayed Fordism" (Spain, Italy), "peripheral Fordism" 
(Mexico, South Korea, Brazil), or "primitive Taylorization" (Malaysia, 
Bangladesh, the Phillipines).28 When regulation theorists discuss the possible 
shape of an emergent post-Fordist mode of development, finally, they often 
fall back illegitimately on general tendencies of capitalism as a mode of 
production - such as the concentration and centralization of capital or the 
development of economies of scale - to privilege the likelihood of certain out-
comes over others. Thus, for example, in arguing against the viability of flexible 
specialization as the basis for sustained growth, Boyer revealingly asks: "Is 
it plausible that the trends that have operated since the Industrial Revolution 
could be reversed? Does it not imply a complete shift in the balance of power 
and social and economic structures? Is it conceivable that all the indivisibilities 
that characterize contemporary society could thus be reduced ... ? "29 
A third set of problems concerns the role of classes as social actors in 
the emergence and decay of successive modes of development. At a 
methodological level, regulation theorists reject the idea of classes as 
collective subjects whose interests can be derived from the abstract structure 
of capitalist relations of production, recognize the existence of a plurality of 
social actors, and assign considerable autonomy to the state as something 
more than a bulwark of capitalism. When it comes to more specific 
regulationist analyses, however, social forces are typically analyzed in class 
terms with little attempt at empirical justification. Thus, for example, the 
declining rate of productivity growth under Fordism is largely attributed to 
class struggle at the point of production, assuming without argument that 
particular disputes between managers and work groups can be unproblem-
atically aggregated into more general conflicts between capital and labor. 
Similarly, national modes of regulation are characteristically treated as class 
compromises, with little specific attention to the identity or organization of 
the actors concerned: to what extent, for example, can trade unions, business 
firms, or employers' associations in countries as different as the US, France, 
and Japan all be treated as direct representatives of wider social classes? 
Finally, despite occasional references to the importance of "new social 
movements," regulation school analyses of the political forces and social 
constituencies which may shape a possible post-Fordist future are over-
whelmingly couched in class terms.30 
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Each of these problems highlights the inherent tensions between the 
totalizing ambitions of regulation theory - taken over from classical 
Marxism as well as from neo-classical economics - and its putative commit-
ment to the recognition of national and historical variation. The regulation 
school set out to discover a middle way between general theory and 
empirical analysis, but their approach has run into a blind alley in which its 
conceptual holism must alternatively override or be undermined by the 
diversity of particular cases. Despite its apparent methodological sophistica-
tion, therefore, the theoretical architecture of the regulation approach is 
ultimately little different from the more simplistic versions of post-Fordism, 
while contrasting quite sharply with that of flexible specialization. 
PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 
Methodological questions 
So far we have considered the theoretical structure and major substantive 
claims of the three main bodies of work which address the problem of 
changes in methods of manufacturing organization, and the approaches to 
technology and business strategy that accompany them. We have shown that 
each of these approaches stems from a distinct theoretical background and 
that each makes quite distinct claims about the type and level of changes 
that are taking place in contemporary manufacturing industry. These very 
real differences tend to be masked by widespread assumptions in political 
and academic debate that the theories are all saying something similar about 
the same basic, if changing, reality. This is a common-sense mistake that it 
is essential to rebut if we are to be able to assess the respective claims of the 
theories to validity and to consider the adequacy of their means of 
demonstrating the very distinct knowledge-claims that they advance. 
It is an illusion to assume that each of them can be tested by reference to 
some common set of changes occurring "out there" in the real world. Each 
of these bodies of work sets up a very different world, each preconstructs 
it in theory, and each specifies in a particular way what sort of evidence and 
research strategy will count in showing what they claim to be happening is 
taking place. Theory, in the sense of a set of concepts, the construction of 
a set of objects on the basis of such theory, and the postulation of a domain 
of evidence relevant to such concepts and propositions are all particular to 
the style of work in question. We cannot construct a theory-neutral domain 
of evidence that will suffice to adjudicate between the claims of the three 
styles. 
Rather we must look first at each of the styles of work and see what 
theory-evidence relation it seeks to establish. Then we must question the 
adequacy of that relation. Is the process of evidentialization consistent with 
the claims of the theory? Does the evidence proposed and gathered actually 
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justify these claims? Is it practically possible to build up a body of evidence? 
If not, are there substitute forms of evidentialization that will provide 
weak.er but indicative or persuasive support for the theoretical claims 
advanced? 
All these questions relate to the relationships possible between theoretical 
concepts, the objects they construct and the type of evidence considered 
appropriate. These relationships are complex. We assume that there is no 
one "correct" set of epistemological doctrines or methodological protocols 
that will cover them all. We are far from wishing to legislate prescriptively 
about epistemological doctrines or styles of research. Clearly, we have little 
time for the naive empiricism or positivist phenomenalism that would refer 
each of these theories to some common body of given facts or constructed 
operationalizations of observable phenomena. Equally we are by no means 
satisfied that a realist epistemological premise actually enables one to capture 
"reality" more effectively than conventionalist premises about the theory-
dependent nature of the objects of investigation. In practice, all demonstra-
tion and evidentialization is more complex for any definite body of 
work than general epistemological protocols or methodological textbooks 
suppose. We are skeptical about the merits of generalized doctrines in 
epistemology and the philosophy of science as guides to social-scientific 
research. But we are not indifferent to questions of validity and evidence. 
Our concern with these questions is governed by two suppositions. 
The first is that justice must be done to the distinct claims of a theory 
about the evidence relevant to it. It is illegitimate to seek to "refute" a theory 
solely on the basis of evidence external to the theory and in disregard of the 
arguments it may make about why that evidence is inappropriate. However, 
serious contradictions between theory and evidentialization - exemplified 
by inconsistency, uncertainty of claim, and constructing ad hoe arguments 
to make evidence fit ambiguous propositions - all tend to diminish the 
possibility of taking the tests proposed by a theory seriously or to accept 
its evidence at its own value. We shall claim that there are such contradic-
tions between theory and evidence implicit in regulation theory, and that 
they stem from its basic objectives and intellectual starting points. We shall 
also claim that the "post-Fordist" view as advanced by Marxism Today in 
particular, is too loose theoretically to be evidentialized in any rigorous way. 
The second supposition is that ultimately the only way to determine the 
validity of these theories and their very distinct constructed objects is not 
to refer each of them to a common external "reality," but to relate each of 
the theories one to another and judge them, in terms of the plausibility of 
the arguments that can be advanced within one of the theories - flexible 
specialization - against the others. This claim is not theory-neutral and its 
outcome rests not on some general methodological protocol, but on the 
explanatory power of the specific argument advanced. Ultimately the test 
of a theory is its intellectual productivity, not its elegance, nor its conformity 
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to established methodological canons, nor its relation to pregiven political 
expectations or desirable policy outcomes. That productivity rests solely on 
its capacity for arguing and showing what it claims is the case with a 
reasonable degree of probability.31 
We shall now consider each of the main styles of work in tum in order 
to examine the general theory/evidence relation it constructs before going 
on to consider substantive questions about that evidence. 
Flexible specialization 
The flexible specialization approach takes its start from a criticism of social 
theories which assume that society is a "totality," a set of relationships 
governed by a single general principle and consistent in their character with 
such a principle. It also entails the criticism that such theories frequently 
presume a process of necessary social development or evolution based on 
certain fundamental "tendencies" operative in such a totality. 32 These 
criticisms apply to both Marxist and non-Marxist general sociological 
theories alike. Flexible specialization emphasizes the contingency and com-
plexity of the connections between social relations; it insists on the 
distinctiveness of the national and regional routes to the establishment of 
such connections between social relations; it recognizes the crucial role of 
strategy and bodies of ideas in constructing such routes, and it is aware that 
things could have been otherwise. It is, therefore, alert to the specific 
conditions producing certain outcomes and to the possible coexistence of 
several distinct sorts of outcomes. The variety of possible outcomes that can 
be constructed from the basic ideal-typical concepts of flexible specializa-
tion is, therefore, considerable and each establishes a different relation 
between concepts, constructed social objects, and type of evidence that will 
demonstrate whether or not the social outcomes connected to such objects 
are operable. 
To illustrate this complexity we shall outline three kinds of relation 
between theory and evidence in flexible specialization. 
First, flexible specialization can be used in a mode we call the normative-
empirical. Flexible specialization emphasizes that each social "world" 
contains a number of possibilities. A prevalent technological paradigm and 
the typical modes of social organization connected to it arises for a complex 
variety of factors, and has predominance over other possible outcomes for 
reasons that fall far short of social-structural or historical logics or necessi-
ties. This means that we must be alert to competing strategies and assess 
outcomes in terms that do not predetermine which of them will prevail. 
Hence the attention given to historical alternatives to mass production and 
the search for other reasons for the saliency of mass production strategies 
than an assumption of their inherent efficiency due to economies of scale.33 
Part of the role of evidence here consists in showing that other alternatives 
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were possible, that they coexisted with the dominant paradigm, and that 
they offer distinct routes to innovation and change should the specific 
complex of conditions favouring the dominant paradigm cease to apply. 
Thus flexible specialization is concerned to rewrite history in order to 
show that the complexity of the past helps us to recognize that there are a 
variety of options in the present. The relation of theory and evidence in such 
historical work is complex, in particular such claims cannot be refuted by 
pointing to the importance of mass production; rather they depend crucially 
on the conditions under which it came to prevail and national and regional 
variations in the forms of mass production strategies themselves. The same 
complexity of evidence about the coexistence and possibility of a number 
of worlds relates to present debates as well. Part of the role of theory is to 
identify certain instances or cases of progressive flexible specialization 
strategies, to show that such things are socially possible and to investigate 
whether they can be generalized given appropriate policy commitments and 
satisfactory conditions. If flexible specialization strategies are possible, if 
their conditions are not too difficult to satisfy, and if certain of their policy 
consequences and social outcomes are attractive from a certain normative 
standpoint then the role of evidence here is to serve as a support for 
advocacy and a means of generalizing the process of learning from certain 
national, regional, or enterprise experiences. 34 Simply showing that flexible 
specialization strategies have not been generalized, that they exist only in 
certain cases, and that they do not exist in a pure ideal-typical but in a hybrid 
form thus does not constitute a refutation of flexible specialization as 
advocacy. All the advocate of flexible specialization as a normative approach 
has to do is to show that such strategies are possible and that they can be 
expanded beyond given cases, even if in a hybrid form. Thus much of the 
"empirical" criticism of flexible specialization analysis is beside the point, 
since the use of such concepts is not confined to the hypothesis that flexible 
specialization is the prevailing or generalized mode of manufacturing 
organization. 
Second, flexible specialization serves as a positive heuristic. Thus flexible 
specialization theory includes a battery of concepts drawing attention to a 
number of distinct ideal-types of production systems, progressive and 
stagnant variants of the same, possible forms of hybridization, and also ways 
in which these various forms can be combined in large and small companies, 
national and regional economies. The result is a very large range of possible 
situations and complex cases, a wide variety of types and hypotheses. Thus 
it will not do to select one of these types or hypotheses and seek to "refute" 
it without reference to the others. This is a common failing of the critical 
literature which tends to operate as if flexible specialization were a theory 
which gives necessary prominence to small firms over large ones, or which 
supposes that the industrial district based on small firms is the sole or major 
form of flexible production. The ideal-type is not to be taken as an empirical 
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generalization, and, therefore, it should not be treated as if it consisted in a 
proposition that the majority of firms in a given national economy would 
conform to its features. Moreover, the simple ideal-type is just a part in a 
more complex and multilayered process of theorization. This process 
emphasizes the importance of social context, the complexity of coexisting 
strategies and structures of manufacturing, the contingent nature of their 
conditions of existence, and the variety of possible outcomes. Flexible 
specialization cannot be reduced to a few simple hypotheses. At the same 
time, this theoretical complexity is not the result of ad hoe argumentation 
and incoherence. 
Third, flexible specialization serves as a negative heuristic. Flexible 
specialization is a theory about the nature of manufacturing as a form of 
social organization. Even if flexible specialization were not widespread, the 
concept would still be valuable. For the analysis of mass production and its 
conditions of existence could not remain the same, the specific social routes 
to its generalization as a paradigm and the variant forms of its institu-
tionalization would gain in saliency as against traditional claims that mass 
production prevailed because of technological necessities and economies of 
scale. Flexible specialization is thus not merely an hypothesis about one type 
of production but is part of a much wider theory about production systems 
in general and their soci~political conditions of existence. 
"Post-Fordism,, 
The advocates of "post-Fordism" are trying to respond to certain perceived 
social changes, however much this may clash with Marxist orthodoxy. Yet 
"new times" remains haunted by the Marxist concept of mode of produc-
tion. "Post-Fordism" is created by generalization from a bundle of actual 
or supposed social facts, and the concept of the new social system is then 
used to explain all the phenomena of "new times." Thus the presence of 
certain changes in the composition of the labor force is taken as indicative 
of the development of productive flexibility in UK manufacturing, whereas 
no such claim is warranted by the evidence. The vices of Marxist 
schematization of social relations persist, even though metaphor and ad hoe 
generalization have replaced rigorous concepts. 
"Post-Fordist" arguments like that of Marxism Today simultaneously 
under- and overtotalize. They overtotalize by aggregating together phenomena 
into a social type: deriving social relations from a metaphor based on produc-
tion organization. "Post-Fordism" is a new type of society and despite claims 
about fluidity of social relations, the co-present elements are not permitted 
to vary except to the most limited degree. Thus the inability to see that those 
areas in which the most "advanced" production exists {the most "post-
Fordist" manufacturing organization) are frequently socially and institution-
ally conservative (the least "postmodernist" social relationships). 
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At the same time these arguments undertotalize because they are incapable 
of postulating consistent causal relationships between the phenomena in this 
new social type, its elements are merely co-present. For the post-Fordists, 
economic determinism is passe, and so is the essentialism of the mode of 
production and its necessary tendencies. But no new explanatory schema 
has been developed consistent with the level of generality of the social 
typology. Like regulation theory, "post-Fordism" is a retreat from classical 
Marxism and classical sociological theory that has not fully settled its 
accounts with the latter. 
The result is a form of argument that is ad hoe in its basic substance, 
rather than just forced into ad hoe arguments to reconcile specific contradic-
tions and ambiguities as is the case with regulation theory. It is difficult to 
see how the "post-Fordists" could construct a domain of evidence since 
there is no coherent theory to be evidentialized. Merely pointing to certain 
phenomena, showing things have changed, or showing that the bits of a list 
do indeed exist will not do. "Post-Fordism" is simply not coherent enough 
as a theory to merit more specific concern about the evidence that might 
justify it. We shall not, therefore, go on to discuss it when we consider the 
specific issues about evidence below. 
For Freeman and Perez, on the other hand, definite questions of evidence 
do arise. The most important of these is the question of statistical proof of 
the existence of Kondratiev waves. As we have covered this issue in our 
theoretical discussion of the "techno-economic paradigm" approach we will 
not take it further in the following section on substantive problems of 
evidence, and as this issue is the one on which their analysis stands or falls 
we will not consider lesser issues of evidence further here. 
Regulation theory 
The regulation theorists share the same basic concepts, though their specific 
methodological pronouncements differ. At the same time two methodologi-
cal positions are common to most regulationists: first, a desire to move away 
from the more rigidly economic determinist, historicist, and conceptual 
realist features of classical Marxism; second, a willingness to use forms of 
evidence, such as econometric tests, quite alien to classical Marxism. 
Alain Lipietz expresses this methodological opposition to conceptual 
realism particularly forcefully in Mirages and Miracles (1987). He argues 
that concepts are only valuable insofar as they enable us to grasp pheno-
mena, and that one should not make a fetish of them. Conceptual realism, 
the hypostatization of concepts into entities, is a major fault of much 
Marxist social analysis and an epistemological obstacle to concrete analysis. 
Lipietz uses Umberto Eco's nominalist monk William of Baskerville to 
make his point. 35 The rejection of conceptual realism has been a common-
place, at least since Whitehead's day.36 But conceptual realism has been a 
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persistent feature of Marxism precisely because of its strong Hegelian legacy. 
Marxism views society as a totality driven toward certain states of affairs by 
tendencies inherent within it. This totality can be apprehended in general 
concepts because it exists as a determinate generality; concepts thus partake 
of the nature of this social reality. Conceptual realism in Marxism is not 
misplaced concreteness: it is rather the apprehension of the concrete 
generality in thought. 37 
Conceptual realism makes methodological sense only within a strongly 
structuralist or historicist conception of Marxism. Yet this is exactly the sort 
of determinism Lipietz, Boyer, and the other regulationists wish to avoid. 
They want to insist on the concrete variability of capitalism, on its crisis-
ridden nature, and on the absence of historical inevitability. Yet they wish 
to retain the concept of capitalism as a mode of production and the existence 
of certain fundamental tendencies within it. How can this be done? The 
answer, it appears, is to postulate levels of analysis, and to use the higher 
levels of generality to explain the specific conditions which are the only real 
states of existence of the capitalist system; capitalism exists not as generality 
but as specificity. 
In fact it is much more difficult than the regulationists think to be a 
nominalist and yet to retain some major elements of classical Marxism. 
Three main problems present themselves. First, conceptual nominalism 
prevails in regulation theory only at the formal level, and conceptual realism 
is overcome in practice by injecting elements of classical Marxist concepts 
into the phenomena. Nominalism is compatible with Marxism only by the 
"Marxianization" of the phenomena to be explained. The very problem of 
regulation is of this nature - it is a consequence of "Marxianizing" the 
economy. Regulation theory involves taking a version of the "problem" of 
reproduction outlined in Volume II of Capital as a necessary economic 
problem, and seeking to show how production and consumption can be 
interconnected by specific institutional forms. Concrete economic relations 
are treated as if they must actually resolve at least temporarily the contradic-
tions in the capitalist mode of production. This is only a "problem" if you 
read Capital in a certain way, and believe that concrete economies actually 
have to answer in practice the problems posed by this reading. 
Second, there is a theoretical failure to explain how the more general 
concepts and abstract levels of analysis derived from classical Marxism can 
actually be carried over into and made compatible with the more specific 
concepts and levels of analysis sought by regulation theory. This problem 
arises from rejecting as unacceptable the classical Marxist conception of the 
capitalist mode of production as a totality (a concrete generality) which 
subsumes particular capitalisms as mere instances of the workings of its laws. 
Levels of abstraction are needed because this direct presence of the totality 
in the concrete simply does not work: it leads to the postulation of certain 
necessary states of affairs, and yet these states of affairs stubbornly fail to 
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materialize. Capitalism, far from collapsing, survives and proves capable of 
institutional innovation and national variation within a prevailing interna-
tional regime of accumulation. Hence the withdrawal of the totality to a 
higher level of abstraction, and the postulation of the concrete as the specific 
domain in which the general «problems" of the capitalist mode of produc-
tion are worked out in specific spatio-temporal forms. The problem is not 
merely one of levels of abstraction, how capitalism is present in and as its 
specific spatio-temporal conjunctures, but also involves that of concealed 
conceptual realism. The more general concepts are supposedly merely a 
means to get at a reality that is always and inevitably concrete, and yet 
somehow these concepts get "behind" reality and particular national 
economies become exemplars of variant forms of phases in the evolution of 
capitalism. 
Third, there is the problem of the status of social actors, and social classes 
in particular, created by the complexity of the regulation school's relation 
to the classical concept of the capitalist mode of production. In classical 
Marxism classes are both categories of economic agents, defined by their 
relationship to the means of production, and social forces active in politics. 
The evolution of the capitalist mode of production, its contradictory 
tendencies, and the emerging crises of capitalism lead the social groups active 
in politics to crystalize around the opposed social poles of bourgeoisie and 
proletariat. Marxism has been in retreat from this simplistic social teleology 
of economic and political class relations ever since the Communist Manifesto 
was written. But regulation theory has a special problem since for it classes 
as categories of economic agents can only relate to capitalism at the highest 
level of abstraction. At more concrete levels, economic and political actors 
are seen to be specific and contingently constituted agencies. However, 
regulation theory has devised no means to relate classes at the different levels 
of abstraction any more than it can relate any other social phenomena. Thus 
it tends to continue to treat classes as stereotyped entities and to refer to 
them as active social agents, alongside or underlying more specific social 
groupings and organizations. The result is schematic analysis and the 
tendency to overgeneralize the political consequences of and responses to 
forms of economic relations both nationally and internationally - treating 
capital and labor as if they were a coherent social actors.38 
Thus the main methodological problem of regulation theory is not some 
specific difficulty with evidence, but the much more basic issue of whether 
the basic entities and processes it seeks to evidentialize exist at all. As these 
entities are of a more general nature than specific bodies of evidence, such 
as statistical series, the latter cannot serve to demonstrate their existence but 
presuppose it if they are to count as evidence. Indeed, the use of evidence 
in regulation theory presupposes the general truth of its conceptions of 
capitalism. 
Unlike flexible specialization, regulation theory is tied to certain general 
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concepts that must be present in reality; it cannot operate in an ideal-typical 
mode. Flexible specialization does not suffer from this problem of different 
levels of generality; from a need for the device of concretizing abstractions 
through the construction of specific states of their realization in definite 
conditions. Flexible specialization neither needs to posit a totality nor does 
it need to limit the range of variation of regional and national economies to 
fit in with some prevailing phase of its actualization. We should be clear 
that the postulation of a social totality (in however complex and qualified a 
form) is not inherently more virtuous in explanatory terms than theories 
like flexible specialization which stress the variation, contingency and 
complexity of phenomena. We should also be clear that anti-totalizing 
theories are not more "empiricist" than theories that seek to make totalizing 
general concepts operative in reality. There are other routes to conceptual 
rigor than totalization or quasi-totalization: flexible specialization uses 
concepts as ideal-types to organize analysis and explain how in the concrete 
case contingent phenomena are causally connected one to another. 
The problem with totalization is that it stakes too much on the validity 
of concrete generalities. It is forced to limit possible phenomena to fit in 
with the general principles of social organization that make social relations 
consistent wholes. The problem with regulation theory is not its commend-
able drive to break away from the worst features of totalizing Marxism; 
rather it consists in the belief that they can be purged by using the device 
of levels of abstraction while retaining elements of the concept of mode of 
production. Like most halfway houses, or third ways between alternatives 
that are perceived as unacceptable, it suffers in practice from the faults of 
that from which it seeks to retreat. The problems of evidentialization in 
regulation theory are thus effects of its basic theoretical strategy, and it is 
difficult to see how they can be overcome or that strategy reformed. Only 
a complete break with classical Marxism would resolve these problems of 
evidence, but that would explode the general problem of "regulation" in 
terms of which these questions of evidence arise. 
From theories to evidence 
Regulation theory 
Of all the competing approaches, regulation theory has undoubtedly 
devoted the most explicit attention to the problem of empirical verification. 
Among its central methodological objectives is the reconciliation of Marxist 
analytical concepts with modem methods of formal economic modeling and 
econometric testing. Hence the regulation school characteristically seeks to 
verify its hypotheses by translating key concepts into appropriate micro-
and macroeconomic models, which can then be assessed both for their 
internal consistency and for their ability to explain comparative and 
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historical variations in statistical data sets. What were the mechanisms of 
wage formation in panicular countries during different periods? What were 
the central causes of the crises of the 1930s and the 1970s for individual 
countries and the international economy as a whole? What are the prospec-
tive relationships between demand, investment, productivity, and growth 
under different possible configurations of regimes of accumulation and 
modes of regulation? These are the types of question which the regula-
tionists' methods of empirical testing are designed to answer. 
There can be little dispute about the ingenuity deployed by the regulation 
school in constructing such models, and the assumptions involved are often 
more realistic than those of more conventional economic analysis. But a 
number of fundamental problems can nonetheless be discerned. The first 
concerns the nature of the modeling exercise itself. However sophisticated 
the model, the theoretical conclusions that follow are no better than its 
initial assumptions. Thus, for example, Boyer's conclusion that flexible 
automation (combined with international Keynesianism) offers better pros-
pects of sustained growth than flexible specialization follows directly from 
his assumption of an inferior trade-off between flexibility and productivity 
under the latter, an assumption which would not be accepted by theorists 
of flexible specialization themselves. 39 
The second problem concerns the quality of the data to which the models 
are applied. As with much quantitative economic history, the statistical 
evidence is rarely robust enough convincingly to support the econometric 
tests to which it is subjected by regulation school analyses. Thus, as Boyer 
acknowledges in his long-term study of French wage formation, the 
unreliability of nineteenth-century statistics on unemployment and intersec-
toral wage variations make his conclusions "suggestive rather than defini-
tive,'' while it is unclear how far the apparent reinforcement of competitive 
processes of wage formation between the wars is a real phenomenon rather 
than a result of changes in the method of constructing the industrial 
production series.40 Even more seriously, his discussion of real wage 
movements, as in most such studies, appears to be based on indices of money 
wage rates, although detailed sectoral research typically reveals significant 
differences between rates and earnings, reflecting the influence of fluctua-
tions in hours worked across the business cycle as well as of variations in 
bargaining power and the incidence of state regulation.41 
The third problem concerns the conclusions that can be drawn from the 
confrontation of these models with empirical data. Like all econometric 
tests, those deployed by regulation theorists can only demonstrate statistical 
correlations rather than causal relationships between the variables investi-
gated. Thus, for example, it is a central claim of the regulation school that 
the major cause of the depression of the 1930s in countries such as France 
and the United States was an imbalance between intensive accumulation and 
competitive regulation, as demonstrated by the disparity between the rate 
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of growth of productivity and of effective demand during the preceding 
decade.42 But the regulation theorists simply infer the transition to intensive 
accumulation from rapid growth of French productivity during the 1920s, 
despite considerable evidence that the diffusion of Taylorism and scientific 
management in French industry remained quite limited throughout this 
period.43 And when it comes to the crisis of Fordism, Boyer himself admits 
that the explanations put forward by the regulation school, at least for the 
moment, "are both too numerous and insufficiently articulated amongst 
themselves" (Boyer 1986a: 103-4). 
Such problems are common to all forms of economic modeling and 
econometric analysis, and are in no sense peculiar to regulation theory. But 
they present special difficulties for the regulation school because of the 
distinctive nature of its theoretical project. For orthodox economists, 
following the methodological precepts of Friedman and others, the inability 
of econometric tests to verify causal hypotheses is unimportant because the 
value of economic models lies in their predictive power rather than the 
descriptive realism of their assumptions.44 For the regulation school, on the 
other hand, econometric tests are intended to demonstrate the truth of its 
models as descriptive hypotheses about the real world (Boyer 1989: 
1403-5), and their inadequacy for this purpose opens up an unbridgeable 
disjunction between the theory and its preferred mode of evidentialization. 
This disjunction, in tum, is simply a further sign of the regulation theorists' 
continued but unacknowledged attachment to conceptual realism, together 
with the impossibility of escaping from the deterministic consequences of 
classical Marxism while retaining key elements of its underlying conceptual 
framework. 
Flexible specialization 
For flexible specialization, by contrast, the relationship between theory and 
evidence is significantly more complex. Unlike regulation theory, the central 
problem for flexible specialization is not to demonstrate the truth or falsity 
of its basic concepts, since these are explicitly conceived as ideal-types 
instead of real forces operating behind the observable phenomena them-
selves. The appropriate criterion for the assessment of such ideal-types is 
not their truth value but rather their heuristic productivity: how far does 
the conceptual framework of flexible specialization illuminate observable 
processes of industrial change? As we have seen in previous sections, flexible 
specialization as a general theoretical approach is compatible with a broad 
spectrum of possible forms of productive organization - including the 
continued predominance of mass production. But a hypothesis whose 
validity does depend on empirical evidence is whether - as much of the 
literature argues - current manufacturing practice is moving in the direction 
of flexible specialization as a specific model of productive organization, 
99 
A NEW PERIOD IN CAPIT AUST DEVELOPMENT? 
taking account both of the plurality of institutional forms within which it 
may be pursued and of the possibilities of hybridization. 
What sort of evidence might permit us to test this hypothesis? Both macro 
and micro levels of analysis are in principle relevant. At the macro level, one 
would ideally like to establish statistical indicators of cross-sectional varia-
tions and changes over time in the distribution of different forms of 
production across industrial sectors, national economies and the interna-
tional economy as a whole. Thus one would need large-scale data about such 
issues as product diversification (number of distinct products manufactured, 
rate of introduction of new models, average batch size); productive flexi-
bility (costs of product changeover, nature of equipment used, minimum 
efficient scale of operation); work force versatility (skill composition, job 
content, training); interfirm relationships (extent and nature of subcontrac-
ting, reliance on collective services); and geographical agglomeration of 
economic activity. 
But there are good reasons, both practical and theoretical, why reliable 
macro data of this type are likely to be difficult if not impossible to obtain. 
The first arises from the nature of the available industrial statistics. Like all 
official statistics, the classification systems used by industrial censuses in 
different countries reflect particular sets of theoretical assumptions and 
administrative practices. Thus as Storper and Harrison rightly point out, 
national statistical accounts cannot be used to analyze the operation of real 
input-output systems or industrial sectors "since they tend to classify 
whole firms or. establishments according to their 'principal' activities" 
(Storper and Harrison 1990: 6). And even within these limitations, as Luria 
has shown, there are fundamental difficulties in measuring intertemporal 
variations in product diversity because of widespread inconsistency in 
classification, frequent code changes and suppression of data to protect 
proprietary information (Luria 1989: 16). The more rapid the rate of 
product diversification, moreover, the more serious these difficulties 
become, since earlier classifications become obsolete more quickly and 
incommensurability of data from different periods increases. 
For many of the other empirical questions thrown up by the flexible 
specialization hypothesis such as product batch sizes, work force versatility 
or patterns of subcontracting, little large-scale data is available because 
official statistics have not been compiled with these issues in mind.45 But 
even if industrial census classifications were rewritten with an eye to flexible 
specialization, significant conceptual problems would still remain in the 
interpretation of such evidence. The key issue is the context and strategy-
dependence of each element of a productive system within the flexible 
specialization approach. Each industrial branch or sector, for example, has 
its own specific market and technological characteristics against which any 
particular indicator must be assessed. Thus a given product batch size will 
have a different significance in, say, clothing, steel or automobiles, and there 
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is no obvious way to aggregate such data across the economy as a whole. 
At a deeper level, moreover, the same component or practice may have a 
different significance depending on its place in the broader strategy of the 
individual firm: thus as a substantial body of research has demonstrated the 
same equipment such as numerically controlled machine tools or flexible 
manufacturing systems can be used in contrasting ways in different national 
and industrial settings.46 Similarly, even the most determined mass producer 
may be obliged to manufacture some speciality lines in small batches, while 
the best-selling lines of a successful flexible specialist may likewise be turned 
out in significant volumes. 
For all these reasons, such macro-level indicators can only provide a 
suggestive guide to broad trends in industrial reorganization rather than a 
definitive test of the flexible specialization hypothesis. The preferred form 
of evidentialization for flexible specialization is instead the analytical case 
study conducted at the micro-level of particular firms, regional economies 
or industrial sectors. Only detailed case studies permit the close attention 
to context and strategy which is the hallmark of a flexible specialization 
approach; and only this method makes possible the comparative analysis of 
relationships between forms of production and institutional frameworks 
which is central to its theoretical architecture.47 
Two major problems arise from this strategy of evidentialization through 
case studies: interpretation and representativeness. As we have already 
noted, most firms or regional economies characteristically combine elements 
from both flexible and mass production rather than embodying pure 
examples of either model. How then can one assess the precise balance 
between the two models in any given case from the standpoint of the flexible 
specialization hypothesis? In principle, the solution might appear to lie in a 
search for objective indicators of flexible specialization such as those 
discussed at the macro level which could more successfully be applied to 
less heterogeneous micro data. Considerable mileage can undoubtedly be 
obtained through this route in documenting the spread of flexible specializa-
tion, as a number of suggestive studies have indicated.48 In practice, 
however, the conceptual problems raised by such indicators remain the 
same: their precise meaning in any case cannot be determined without 
reference to the strategies of the actors concerned. Hence the case study 
method necessarily entails an ineradicable element of subjective interpreta-
tion, in which there is considerable scope for legitimate disagreement among 
different observers. But if there is an unavoidable degree of indeterminacy 
about the interpretation of case study evidence, this does not mean that there 
is no valid basis for discriminating among competing views, contrary to 
what current fashions in literary theory might appear to suggest. 49 Com-
peting interpretations, like competing theories more generally, can properly 
be ranked in terms of their plausibility in accounting for agreed features of 
a common body of evidence according to internally consistent criteria. 
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These considerations can be illustrated more fully through a brief 
examination of current debates about the nature of Japanese manufacturing 
practices. How far can the success of Japanese firms be properly interpreted 
as evidence of the diffusion of flexible specialization, and how far instead as 
evidence of the development of increased flexibility within mass production 
itself? At one level, as Sayer points out, this question may be considered 
largely semantic, since there is considerable agreement among apparently 
conflicting interpretations about key features of the Japanese system: the 
rapid pace of model renewal and new product development; the productive 
flexibility obtained through organizational innovations such as just-in-time 
component supply, quick die-changes or mixed-model assembly lines; the 
prevalance of job rotation, teamworking and other forms of functional 
flexibility among large sections of the labor force; and the importance of 
"relational subcontracting" between large and small firms. so At another 
level, however, this question is crucially important, given the centrality 
of Japanese manufacturing to the characterization of current trends in 
competitive strategy and productive organization in the international 
economy. 
Some differences between the two interpretations are based on a mis-
specification of the opposed view: thus it is no objection to the flexible 
specialization hypothesis properly understood to emphasize the continued 
role of larger firms in Japan, nor the high overall volume of different 
products manufactured within the same firm or plant. Others arise from the 
results of new empirical research, such as David Friedman's (1988) demon-
stration of the limited role of MITI and the importance of small-firm 
industrial districts in the development of key Japanese export industries such 
as machine tools. But many differences of interpretation arise from ambigui-
ties in Japanese industry itself. There can be little doubt that most Japanese 
innovations in sectors such as automobiles or consumer electronics origin-
ated in domestic firms' adaptation of mass production methods to local 
conditions during their postwar drive to catch up with the West. 51 And 
important features of more recent Japanese practice can still be legitimately 
interpreted in this light, from the limited range of variation on certain 
models and the long production runs of key components through the 
continued importance of hard automation and the relatively narrow skills 
required for many jobs to the dominance of large firms over their subcon-
tractors. But there are also signs that many Japanese manufacturers are 
pushing these innovations in a more radical dimension in order to trade on 
their competitive advantage in catering for fragmented markets and volatile 
demand. Thus leading firms in these sectors appear to be dramatically 
increasing the pace of product innovation, expanding the range of distinct 
models which can be manufactured with a given combination of workers 
and machinery, and devolving responsibility not only for component supply 
but also for final assembly and product development to suppliers whom 
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they often encourage to work for other manufacturers as well. Such 
strategies may not lead Japanese manufacturers to converge on a pure model 
of flexible specialization, but like many Western experiments at industrial 
reorganization, they have already progressed too far to fit comfortably into 
an alternative conception of neo-Fordism or flexible mass production.52 
But even if it were agreed that particular cases could legitimately be 
interpreted as examples of flexible specialization, a significant problem of 
representativeness would still remain. As Sabel himself remarks, "for 
example is not a proof" (Sabel 1989a: 23), and no quantity of case studies, 
however convincing, could demonstrate the validity of the broader flexible 
specialization hypothesis. In the absence of a comprehensive macro-level 
map of the relative importance of competing models of productive organiza-
tion, this difficulty may appear insuperable. But the Japanese case discussed 
above suggests an alternative strategy - common to most approaches to the 
analysis of industrial change - of focusing on those national economies, 
regions, and firms that have proved most successful in the current phase 
of international competition. Beyond Japan itself, for example, flexible 
specialization analyses have concentrated on regions such as Emilia-
Romagna and Baden-Wiirttemburg, whose technological dynamism, export 
competitiveness, and importance to the national economy are relatively well 
documented.53 Other analyses, conversely, have concentrated on countries 
such as Britain in which flexible specialization has been weakly developed, 
highlighting its role in explaining their poor performance in manufacturing 
competition during the 1980s.54 In either case, finally, the claim is not that 
international competition imposes a single form of productive organization 
on economic actors, given the plurality of institutional frameworks and the 
possibilities of hybridization, but rather that tendencies can be observed 
towards the displacement of mass production by flexible specialization as 
the dominant technological paradigm of the late twentieth century. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Our discussion of policy must begin with a number of caveats that make 
clear our approach to this issue. In discussing the policy implications of the 
three broad perspectives outlined above it is necessary to consider which 
policies actually follow from these ways of conceptualizing forms of 
manufacturing organization and their wider sociopolitical conditions. It 
would be all too easy to slip into discussing the general views of the authors, 
confusing the policies that can strictly be justified by their approach to 
manufacturing with their political opinions and wider social concerns. 
Hence we need to consider the specific types and levels of policy interven-
tion that have some direct connection with the explanatory and analytic 
frameworks in question. 
Thus we must avoid overgeneralizing policy into politics. But we must 
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also avoid considering policy implications too specifically, as if the sole 
relevant domain of policy is "industrial policy" in the narrow sense. 55 It by 
no means follows that an approach to manufacturing will, by reason of its 
own conceptual apparatus, foreground industrial policy in the sense of 
targeted interventions in particular industries. Broader policies for educa-
tion, training, industrial finance, and macroeconomic management may be 
considered the most effective ways of securing the conditions for advanced 
forms of manufacturing organization. 
"Post-Fordism" 
Of the various "post-Fordist" approaches little need be said. There are 
obvious political implications of, for example, Marxism Today's arguments 
but few policy implications. Given the inattention of Marxism Today to 
specifying and analyzing the economic relationships involved in "post-
Fordism," this is hardly surprising. 
Freeman and Perez's work, by contrast, does have definite policy 
implications. Both authors make comments on many policy areas, including 
education and training, but here we are concerned with the strict implica-
tions of their basic thesis about the role of technical change. Given the 
primary role they assign to the diffusion of the new core technologies that 
form the basis of a new "techno-economic paradigm," then the key areas 
of intervention are technology policy and R&:D policy. The aim of policy 
should be to identify the emerging technologies and adopt programs that 
favor their diffusion through the whole economy. Freeman (1987, 1988) 
comments favorably on the role of Japan's Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry (MITI) in this context. One could characterize his view as a 
variant of the strategy of "picking winners," which we discuss further and 
criticize on page 109 below. In his case, the primary object of such a 
policy of selective state intervention is not support for potentially successful 
firms (which is what the phrase often means in US debates) but support for 
technologies whose generalization is capable of producing growth across the 
whole economy. 
Regulation theory 
The regulation school's approach to policy is developed in relation to its 
general theory of capitalism as riven by periodic and specific systematic 
crises that are far more than the normal cyclical crises recognized by 
conventional economics. Regulationists claim that the present period is one 
of crisis and transition in the structures sustaining capitalism on a worldwide 
scale. The regulationist approach to policy can best be seen as a combination 
of a neo-Keynesian expansionary program at the international level on the 
demand side and a neo-Marxist conception of the restructuring of the supply 
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side, involving a new settlement between capital and labor in order to 
stabilize current economic volatility and class conflict. The expansionary 
policies are relatively clear, if both relatively conventional and very difficult 
to implement on either a global or a national scale. The policies that further 
the emergence of a new mode of regulation are less clear, and to the extent 
that they are developed in the political programs of regulationist authors 
they have little to do with the original neo-Marxist terms in which the 
problem was set up. 
Regulation theory must thus seek policies that both secure a new 
international regime of accumulation and a new mode of regulation, with 
the various particular institutional settlements being thrashed out as the 
result of social and political struggles in the national capitalist economies. 
Regulationist policy must operate across a number of different levels and be 
relatively coherent between these levels. These levels are: the international 
economy, the major economic blocs like the European Community (EC), 
and the relation of the major social forces within the national economies. 
The regulationists' policy domain is thus far more extended than those of 
flexible specialization and its policy requirements are inherently far more 
ambitious. 
The regulationists argue that the current period of crisis within capitalism 
creates both major conflicts between the main components of the world 
economy, between the First and Third Worlds, between the major industrial 
powers, and between the major social interests within the different national 
capitals. The previous international regime of accumulation based on 
American hegemony has broken down. The hitherto successful combination 
of Keynesianism sustaining demand and Fordism generating the produc-
tivity gains on the supply side to make an expansionary policy possible is 
no longer stable or sustainable. Reaching for classic Keynesian or Fordist 
solutions will not do. We are in a transitional period characterized by 
instability and crisis in the regime of accumulation and the mode of 
regulation. There are different routes out of this crisis. 
The regulationists' value standpoint is to resolve the crisis on the terms 
most favorable to the left - to the peripheral economies of the Third World, 
and to labor in rich and poor countries alike. This resolution, however, will 
be within the limits set by the continuation of global capitalism. The 
regulationists reject the old classical Marxist breakdown theory of capitalism 
as a global system. In policy, as in theory, the regulationist approach claims 
to represent a "middle way"; in this case between the illusions of interna-
tionalist revolutionary socialism and the insularity of reformist social 
democracy in the national economies of the advanced countries. Regulation 
theory remains concerned with capitalism as a global system and it seeks 
policies for the international economy that will promote stability and 
growth. 
Lipietz (1987, 1989) is clearest on this international program. He argues 
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passionately that conventional policies will only exacerbate the plight of 
the Third World, driven into accelerated crises by the burden of debt. 
Ultimately an international expansionary policy that permits the First and 
Third Worlds to grow would be of mutual benefit, and in the interest of 
the advanced economies. While he is aware of the improbability of "world 
Keynesianism" (1987: 192), Lipietz argues (1989) for a new international 
order founded on multilateralism, involving a "new Bretton Woods' agree-
ment. The latter would involve a new international credit money, the 
cancelation of Third World debt, and the financing of aid to the Third World 
through the institutions of the new agreement, and a system of open trade 
- not defensive protectionism. One might agree with most of this: it would 
be hard to defend First World banks or to argue that development aid should 
be less than the trickle it is. Our main point of criticism is not just that a 
new Bretton Woods is unlikely, rather it is that it is a classically Keynesian 
radical-liberal position. The regulationists' problems are drawn from 
Marxist theory, and yet their solutions, when they are clear, are fundament-
ally neo-Keynesian. This is not intended to disparage neo-Keynesianism. 
On the contrary, it is to insist that such policies can be adopted without 
reference to the theoretical problems from which the regulationists started. 
For the developed countries, and the EC in particular, the regulationists' 
arguments for revitalizing the economy are less clear and less emphatic. Both 
Lipietz (1989) and Boyer (1988) argue for the further development of the 
EC. Lipietz (1989) argues for a new wages pact between labor and capital. 
This would be based on a trade-off of realistic wages for a measure of control 
over new technology, security of employment and greater free time. It 
would also involve a new form of the welfare state involving in particular 
a guaranteed minimum income and a "third sector" of socially useful 
subsidized work. Boyer (1988) argues that a variety of scenarios are possible 
for the restructuring of wage/labor relations and labor markets. But 
ultimately he appears to consider a form of neo-Fordism incorporating 
elements of flexibility the most likely. This, combined with neo-Keynesian 
demand management, a suitable regime of international trade, and restruc-
turing of production, may be sufficient to resolve the crisis. Again, as with 
policies to stimulate world demand, the difficulty is that the neo-Marxist 
emphasis on the class struggle leads in practice to policy proposals that, 
while radical, are in no sense tied to the regulationists' own theoretical 
problems. Many of Lipietz's ideas are widely scouted by post-Marxists like 
Andr Gorz or advocates of "associative democracy" based on flexible 
specialization like John Mathews (1989). 
The regulationists seem unclear whether or not the Fordist era in either 
production organization or wage/labor relations is really at an end. They 
appear to see the most likely future as one in which elements of flex-
ible specialization and new information technologies and robotics are 
incorporated into Fordism to produce a neo-Fordist synthesis. Which of the 
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several possible outcomes or scenarios prevail will depend ultimately on the 
struggles of the key players: state decision makers, capitalist managers, and 
trade union leaders. Policy in this sense is largely advocacy and shades into 
a general political program. It is striking how little industrial policy in the 
narrow sense can be found in regulationist texts and that, in respect of the 
wider policies for re-regulation, how little there is that is specific to them 
or dependent on the theoretical problems of regulation. This may well be, 
to be fair, because figures like Lipietz are effective and pragmatic political 
advocates. It may also be because the regulationists' starting point in the 
problems of classical Marxism is quite irrelevant to the actual problems of 
economic policy. 56 
Our aim here is not to counter the regulationists' actual political ideas, 
many of which are pedectly reasonable. The point we want to make is that 
the political positions taken by the regulationists are not strictly policy 
implications of their underlying theory, or rather, that even if they are 
compatible with that theory they are not necessary to it and can be sustained 
on other theoretic bases. Insofar as regulation theory has a distinct policy 
dimension, it is to give prominence to the need to stabilize the international 
economy and achieve a more equitable balance between its different 
components. That, however, is the most difficult level at which to achieve 
coordinated policies between the various agencies and actors. 
Flexible specialization 
We may begin our consideration of the policy implications of flexible 
specialization by noting that it involves a critique of traditional economic 
and industrial policy instruments. Flexible specialization challenges four 
widely canvassed ways of promoting the manufacturing sector through 
specific forms of intervention: 
1 classic Keynesian strategies for promoting effective demand in particular 
national economies, the claim being that state action to promote effective 
demand will support the manufacturing sector by sustaining the overall 
level of economic activity and therefore maintaining or accelerating 
demand for manufactured goods; 
2 strategies based on state-directed planning, promoting manufacturing 
output by coordinating investment policies of firms and concentrating 
development on advanced technologies and sectors - the three variants of 
such a policy are socialist command economies directing investment and 
orchestrating industry through administered prices, indicative planning 
on the French model, and the state direction of industry through 
analogues of Japan's MITI;57 
3 state intervention through deregulation and measures to improve the free 
working of market mechanisms, active competition policies, and the 
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promotion of the prerogatives of enterprise management through indus-
trial relations and labor market reform; and 
4 a contrary policy of state intervention to promote concentration of 
ownership and through it to exploit both organizational economies of 
scale at the level of the firm and production economies of scale at the level 
of the plant (both also objectives of state planning strategies. 
Flexible specialization is not anti-Keynesian in principle or opposed to 
demand management for general economic-theoretic reasons, such as those 
implied in monetarist and free-market doctrines. Rather it argues that there 
are severe practical limits to Keynesianism as a national policy to support 
manufacturing under current conditions. 
The internationalization of trade in manufactures between advanced 
industrial countries and the liberalization of international trade through 
GA TI and economic blocs like the EC means that domestic manufacturing 
sectors can only survive if they meet the conditions of international 
competition. This can only be achieved through appropriate supply-side 
policies and business strategies. Stimulating domestic demand may merely 
promote the ingress of foreign manufactured goods and even accelerate 
deindustrialization if the manufacturing sector is not able to meet interna-
tional standards of competition. The experience of France under the first 
Mitterrand government and the consumption and credit expansion-based 
policies of the Thatcher government from 1983-8 (although the latter is not 
formally "Keynesian")58 only serve to confirm this. Moreover, the increas-
ing volatility of international markets and rapidly shifting patterns of 
demand in the period since the early 1970s favor more specific strategies of 
response like that of flexible specialization. Keynesianism should not be seen 
to be obsolete because it is linked in some necessary way with "Fordism." 
Demand management will not work to secure the home market for long 
runs of standardized goods by domestic manufacturers under the current 
conditions of international trade, since foreign "Fordists" might be able to 
be more competitive. Equally, were Keynesianism possible and flexible 
specialization widely developed, demand management would not automatic-
ally favor "Fordist" strategies, since flexible specialists might be able to 
exploit production, marketing, and design advantages in a climate of rising 
demand and growth. Keynesianism is problematic for macroeconomic 
reasons, not because "Fordism" is obsolete. Flexible specialization is thus 
not tied to a view of the functional obsolescence of Keynesianism, as some 
"post-Fordist" ideas clearly are, but to a view of its conjectural and 
structural inappropriateness in manufacturing economies under current 
conditions of international trade and competition. 
Planning of a centralized and state-directed kind is seen to be inappro-
priate by flexible specialization theory for a variety of reasons. First, 
command economies tend to be ineffective, whatever the prevailing form of 
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manufacturing organization. The Soviet model did not prove effective at 
organizing production on "Fordist" or mass production lines. It supposes 
that the major economic parameters can be held stable and that shifts in 
output and accelerated growth of sectors can be preestablished by planning 
norms. This is difficult in a semiclosed economy where demand is sub-
ordinated to programmed supply, it is virtually impossible in an open 
economy that is forced to match foreign economies, and that is necessarily 
required to respond to consumer demand. Add to this the volatility of 
international currency and equity markets, the changing patterns of demand 
for manufactured goods and the rapidity of product innovation and it 
becomes difficult to hold any of the major national macroeconomic para-
meters stable enough for them to be planned. Central planning has failed 
in command economies, and it is clearly impossible for Western-style 
economies. 
Similar objections also hold for more limited forms of interventionist 
planning. State direction of investment and the anticipation and promotion 
of leading technologies presupposes that state officials, with or without the 
collaboration of business, have the information necessary to "pick winners" 
and to concentrate national resources on key future technologies. There is 
little evidence that government bureaucracies are flexible enough and well-
informed enough to do this. On the contrary, they will tend to equate 
economic success with promoting key "over the horizon" technologies; 
these technologies are frequently not the most commercially successful. 
Officials will tend to pick major projects capable of state management, and 
not families of technologies capable of rapid state-of-the-art diffusion. There 
is a great deal of evidence both that MITI is a "peculiar institution," heavily 
dependent on the close and informal links between senior civil servants and 
corporate executives that would be regarded as unacceptable in a Western 
democracy, and that it has a more mixed record than its most enthusiastic 
Western advocates allow. Moreover, there is much evidence for both 
orthodox company-level innovation in Japan and for the success of the local 
regulation, industrial districts, clusters of small and medium-scale firms, and 
major company organizational structures and manufacturing strategies 
which are characteristic of flexible specialization. 59 
Deregulation and the promotion of "free" markets are becoming decidely 
less fashionable among policymakers now. Flexible specialization is strongly 
opposed to the free-market model precisely because it emphasizes the 
importance of social relationships that secure crucial inputs and vital 
collective services for firms. Such inputs that cannot be guaranteed by the 
model of sovereign enterprises purchasing the factors of production in 
open markets include: trained labor, low-cost finance, market and export 
information, the diffusion of technical information, and ongoing relation-
ships based on trust with subcontractors and partner firms. The high costs 
to firms of low-trust relationships, the commodification of information, and 
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the absence of ongoing collaboration with labor involve real competitive 
disadvantages. We have called these factors "dis-economies of competition" 
and they are most evident in those countries and regimes that have failed to 
balance cooperation and competition, conflict and coordination (Hirst and 
Zeitlin 1989b ). These "dis-economies of competition" can offset the econ-
omies of scale supposedly available to large firms free to choose how best 
to secure the factors of production in open markets. Some of the most 
important "factors" are intangible and are also not readily tradeable - trust 
relationships with other firms and cooperation with labour are two good 
examples. 
One aspect of free-market advocacy is the celebration of small firms. 
Flexible specialization is not a theory predicated on preferring small firms 
to large ones. Small firms have no necessary economic ~ttributes, other than 
some arbitrary cutoff point that defines their size (number of employees, 
value of capital, etc.).60 "Large" firms, indeed, multiproduct, multinational 
companies, can adopt flexible specialization strategies and so can small 
workshops. 
But flexible specialization is clearly opposed to the policy objective of 
promoting concentration of ownership to secure economies of scale. This 
policy was widely adopted in the 1960s and 1970s, linked to views of the 
inherent efficiency of large-scale mass production, in order to promote firms 
of the size necessary for international competition - "national champions." 
In the UK, for example, the Labour governments of 1964-70 supported such 
concentration and created an agency - the Industrial Re-organization 
Corporation - to promote it. The results varied from ghastly failures (British 
Leyland) to stagnant survivors (GEC).61 Such ideas are once again current 
in the EC, in response to the present merger wave. Policymakers take for 
granted the need to concentrate capacity in a few Euro-companies in each 
major industrial sector.62 However, just as small firms are not inherently 
more responsive or innovatory in the way that free-market advocates often 
suppose, so large firms are not inherently more stable or successful, nor are 
they necessarily able to exploit economies of scale.63 Size divorced from 
strategy is no inherent advantage, as the examples of General Motors or US 
Steel demonstrate. In practice active concentration policy or state indulgence 
of merger waves has tended to prevail over free-market inspired antitrust 
and procompetition policies, even in the recent period of widespread belief 
in the virtues of the market. 
There are good reasons to suppose that large firms which have rapidly 
concentrated by a process of merger and/or acquisitions are not particularly 
efficient and that they do not possess the means adequately to direct their 
subsidiaries. Those major multinationals that have sought functionally to 
decentralize into constellations of subunits, able to cooperate or compete as 
needful, seem to have judged the matter better and to be one of the complex 
routes to industrial efficiency outlined by flexible specialization theory. 
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So far we have considered the negative criticisms made by flexible 
specialization theorists of other major approaches to policy; we now tum 
to positive proposals. Flexible specialization in its policy implications is a 
radical supply,-side policy. It starts from the relationships necessary for 
effective manufacturing strategies and pedormance, and is concerned with 
wider macroeconomic and social policies on this basis. It is not a compre-
hensive economic and political program as such, although flexible specializa-
tion concepts can be integrated into such broader advocacy of strategies for 
reform. 
Flexible specialization emphasizes the wide variety of possible institu-
tional forms. There is no flexible specialization equivalent of the "workers' 
fatherland," a chosen national or regional path that offers a given model to 
policymakers in other regions or countries. German regions, or Japan or the 
"Third Italy" offer examples of institutions that sustain flexible specializa-
tion, but they cannot be slavishly copied. Strategies have to be adopted that 
take account of national and regional conditions. Important in this respect 
are the institutional and political conditions that favor or hinder the patterns 
of cooperation and coordination which support flexible specialization 
strategies. Those countries most dominated by liberal competitive politics, 
by the stress on the sovereignty of the firm, and by antagonistic competition 
between social interests are least likely to be able to introduce such 
patterns. 64 The UK offers the most obvious example, and it is further 
hampered by weakly differentiated and institutionalized regional economies. 
The broader components of flexible specialization strategies cannot be 
directly transferred in the way technologies can, precisely because they 
are not centered on a model of a technology or a form of corporate 
organization, but on a more complex ensemble of sociopolitical conditions. 
Despite the wide variety of institutional routes to flexible specialization 
they have one major factor in common: the existence of political, normative, 
and organizational means of creating relationships to foster cooperation and 
coordination. Flexibly specialized economies at regional or industrial district 
level are embedded in patterns of social relations that go beyond the market 
and the formal structures of democratic government. Such embeddedness 
may arise from preexisting institutional and political legacies that promote 
solidarity and interest cooperation. These patterns may involve more or less 
developed forms of "corporatist" intermediation of organized interests. 
Crucial to the development of such cooperative relationships, either from 
existing legacies, or by explicit strategies of reform, is an agency capable of 
exercising social leadership, of providing the conditions for a pact which 
cements a consensus between firms and between the major interests. This 
agency is not fixed: it may be a political party, a public body like a regional 
economic development agency, or a strongly led trade association. 
Trust needs to be institutionalized and cooperation presupposes forums 
in which it can be developed. This is the most important lesson for 
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policymakers seeking to revitalize declining regions or to sustain previously 
successful industrial districts. This "political" dimension of economic policy 
is more important than any specific economic doctrine or any particular 
conception of the leading technology. Politics in this sense is broader than 
the policies of public agencies; it involves the creation of a regional or 
sectoral "public sphere" in which firms, labor interests, officials, and 
politicians can interact and cooperate. Such a "public sphere" is essential if 
cooperation and competition are to be constructively balanced in the 
interaction of firms, and if coordination and conflict are to be constructively 
balanced in the relationship of management and labor. These balances are 
crucial if economic fluctuations and technical changes are to be handled 
effectively, if continuity and innovation are to be given their respective roles. 
Those districts than can change and adapt are most likely to be successful 
and to weather the effects of volatility in international markets.65 
The sociopolitical conditions in which manufacturing is embedded form 
the core of the flexible specialization approach to policy. There are two 
main routes for developing and institutionalizing flexible specialization: 
one may be called the strategy of building up, linking firms with col-
laborative institutions to form and cement industrial districts, and seeking 
to generalize and link such districts so as to form the dynamic core of a 
national economy; the other is the strategy of building down through the 
reorganization of major multinational firms into constellations of semi-
autonomous subunits that may cooperate one with another or with other 
firms in an industrial district. Ultimately, these two strategies can converge. 
Constellated firms mirror internally the patterns of cooperation and trust 
that are found in the most developed and cohesive industrial districts. Such 
firms are also less likely to be invasive or destructive of the industrial 
districts in which they are located, they find it easier to link horizontally 
with other firms and cooperative institutions in a district and they are more 
likely to collaborate than centrally directed and hierarchically organized 
firms. 
Flexible specialization is not just a new management philosophy. It 
emphasizes those aspects of economic life that cannot be bought on the 
market and it emphasizes relationships with other firms, public bodies, and 
labor that cannot easily be accommodated to the management prerogatives 
of the "sovereign" firm. At the same time flexible specialization is not 
antimanagement and antibusiness; the purpose of cooperation and coordina-
tion is to make firms more productively efficient and more commercially 
competitive. It involves managements learning lessons and adopting a style 
of operation not widely taught in Anglo-Saxon business schools. 
The core of a flexible specialization policy is thus to create and sustain 
those institutional patterns that lead firms to cooperate one with another as 
well as compete. These policies may be informal and firm-centered, or they 
may be more formal and involve firms collaborating with trade and industry 
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associations, regional governments, and organized labor. In both cases the 
purpose of collaboration is to secure the inputs firms cannot easily purchase 
on the market - such as suitably trained labor, low-cost finance, and 
commercial information. Such collective services enhance the efficiency and 
competitiveness of firms. Flexible specialization policies thus place consider-
able emphasis on training, since broadly skilled workers are a core com-
ponent of such a strategy. Such training cannot be undertaken by firms alone 
if each firm is competing for labor and most firms adopt the attitude of a 
free-rider by poaching personnel from those firms that bear the costs. 66 
Equally importantly, broad-based training involves cooperation with 
organized labor to set mutually acceptable standards and employment 
policies. Flexible specialization is often highly profitable for the firm but it 
is by no means the case that such firms can bear individually the full costs 
of R&D, marketing information and new investment at prevailing commer-
cial costs. Cooperative institutions lower and spread these costs; allowing 
smaller firms to gain economies of scale outside of production by pooling 
the costs of supporting developed networks of collective services for 
marketing, consultancy, technological information and so on. 
If flexibly specialized firms are profitable they will often be targets for 
asset-rich major companies that seek to acquire them. Alongside collabora-
tive institutions there is the need for public policy to protect firms from 
unwelcome acquisitions and to preserve the autonomy of management in 
successful industrial companies of less than major multinational size. 
Flexible specialization, therefore, requires something akin to a competition 
policy, that is, a policy that enables firms to retain autonomy. Competition 
policy has too often been linked to the dual assumptions that free markets 
are the most efficient allocative mechanisms and that the more intensely 
firms compete in open markets the better. Such free-market policies in 
practice tend towards further concentration. This is because their anti-
monopoly aspects cut against the primary objective of increasing the 
freedom of firms as market actors. Deregulators are in practice more 
concerned with freeing management from restrictions than with ensuring 
effective competition. Recognizing that competition must be balanced by 
cooperation involves giving greater emphasis to protecting firms from 
predators through company law and policies regulating equity markets.67 
Flexible specialization strategies thus do not emphasize an active indus-
trial policy in the narrow and traditional sense - that is, targeting key sectors 
or firms for state aid and intervention. Flexible specialization theory assumes 
that a wide variety of sectors can be successful components of an advanced 
economy; varying from high-tech sectors like advanced machine tools or 
computers to traditional sectors like clothing or furniture.68 Traditional 
sectors may utilize advanced technology to gain competitive advantage, and 
may need public support to introduce and pay for such investment. Public 
policy should be confined primarily to providing broad-based support for 
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sectoral and regional initiatives, rather than seeking to favor a few major 
firms in a few key industries. Support for training, investment, the building 
of collaborative networks, the protection of company autonomy, and so on, 
does not involve public agencies directly choosing which private firms to 
favor. All firms in a district or sector may benefit from such broad-based 
policies, if they have the initiative and energy to do so. This policy aspect 
of flexible specialization is thus more compatible with the requirement for 
liberal democratic states to be neutral and not to bestow public favours on 
private agencies by administrative discretion. This is not a free-market or 
anti-interventionist point, it concerns the forms and objects of a policy of 
active public support for industry. Dirigiste industrial policies favor central-
ism and large bureaucracies. Far from being a policy of laissez-faire, flexible 
specialization is an interventionist policy that favors democratic account-
ability. The close link between centralized state and major business corpora-
tions is a real threat to democracy: it is a source of corruption, and, all too 
often, a means of protecting big but inefficient companies. Westerners have 
been so seduced by Japanese economic success that many industrial policy 
advocates see MITI as a model to be copied. Japanese radicals do not, and 
the unhealthy links between big business, the Liberal Democratic Party, and 
the state are now a key target of democratic criticism and one of the sources 
of support for opposition politics. 
Flexible specialization emphasizes the effectiveness of regional institu-
tions of economic cooperation. It points to the need to build regional 
autonomy and to foster the collaboration of industry, labor and public 
bodies at the regional level. This is important since regional economic 
policy offers the best way of compensating for the lessened effectiveness 
of national macro-economic policies. Flexible specialization offers the 
prospect of radical supply-side policies, vital in a conjuncture where 
rightist free-market, supply-side policies have manifestly failed at the 
national level and Keynesian demand management at the national level 
has severe limits. Moreover, regional intervention is not confined to 
policies for manufacturing alone, but also involves the health, education, 
and welfare policies necessary to reinforce them. In many countries 
the regionalization of intervention and the development of a federal 
welfare state are proceeding hand in hand (Sabel 1989b ). Some countries, 
like the UK, have continued to maintain a national centralized welfare 
system in social security, health, and education. In the case of the UK 
this goes along with highly centralized government, weak institutions of 
regional economic management, and a declining manufacturing sector. 
Britain is the major industrial country where flexible specialization strategies 
have had the least impact, and which faces the greatest problems of 
deindustrialization and poor international competitiveness. British top 
executives are strongly commited to retaining exclusive company-level 
management control, seeing little need to build cooperative relationships 
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with other firms or an ongoing partnership with labor. Britain is thus the 
acid test of whether flexible specialization can be consciously encouraged 
by public policy initiatives, since the UK both desperately needs such 
strategies to become competitive and yet has few of the institutional 
resources needed to develop them. 
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A CHANGE IN CAPITALISM FROM FORDISM TO 
POST-FORDISM 
The Regulation school, which originated in France in the 1970s, has 
analyzed the post-1973 world depression and the resultant capitalist restruc-
turing as a product of the breakdown of the postwar "Fordist" regime of 
capital accumulation.1 According to this school, the long postwar boom in 
the advanced capitalist countries was generally realized through a Fordist 
regime of accumulation. In 1920s Henry Ford organized his car factory with 
a belt conveyer system to increase productivity, paying wages substantially 
above the social average so as to enable his workers to purchase their 
products and also to maintain the necessary number of workers for heavy 
monotonous work. Similarly but in a social scale, the postwar Fordist 
regime of accumulation realized both increases in labor productivity and 
roughly proportional increases in real wages. These lay behind the con-
tinuously expanding effective demand for consumer durables and other 
products. Such a regime of accumulation was formed and maintained by a 
set of institutions and a social consensus concerning the social positions of 
workers and trade unions as well as the role of the state for Keynesianism 
and social welfare policies. The social mode of organic regulation includ-
ing such institutions worked smoothly to foster the Fordist regime of 
accumulation in the long postwar boom period. 
Regulationists, in their concept of Fordism, thus focus especially on the 
role of effective demand, by absorbing one element of Keynesianism. 
However, unlike Keynesians, they see the factors that achieved the con-
tinuous postwar long boom in a wider range of social relations and 
institutions relating to capital-labor relations, not confined to governmental 
macroeconomic policies. In this regard, the analyses of economic coordina-
tion and the politics of relations of production in the post-war advanced 
capitalist countries have recently been pursued as a development of Marxian 
political economy while flexibly absorbing approaches and views from the 
Keynesian and the Institutionalist school. 
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Then further in the Regulationist view, the economic crisis since the 1970s 
was triggered when the Fordist mode of regulation exhausted its potentials. 
Capitalism was forced to restructure a new mode of regulation appropriate 
to a new regime of accumulation. The new regime of accumulation is called 
post-Fordism. The contents of the post-Fordist regime of accumulation are 
not yet very clear, and may vary even among advanced capitalist countries. 
Among them Japan is often regarded as a typical or ideal model for post-
Fordism. The so-called Japanese style of labor management is underlined as 
the basis for the successful restructuring of Japanese capitalism with 
increased competitive power and flexibility of firms in commodity markets, 
the labor process, and financial markets. The newly developing microelec-
tronic (ME) informational technologies are fully utilized in various aspects 
of such restructuring. 
A change in capitalism from Fordism to post-Fordism then appears to be 
a model change from the US type to the Japanese type, particularly in the 
field of labor management. While US Fordism enforced task fragmentation, 
functional specialization, mechanization, and assembly line principles, the 
Japanese model of post-Fordism is based on work teams, job rotation, 
learning by doing, and flexible production. The model change is seen 
not only as necessary by the capitalist firms in the US and European 
countries in order to be competitive with Japanese firms, but also desirable 
even from the view of workers so as to maintain more stable jobs for 
multiple skills. 2 
This sort of Regulationist approach is somewhat consonant with Japan-
ologists' general tendency to emphasize that Japan has successfully formed 
an exceptional, stable, crisis-free, and relatively harmonious economic order 
on the basis of more flexible social human relations in work places. 3 
However, there are certain problems in such an approach and tendency. 
In particular, the Japanese model of post-Fordism is treated as too excep-
tional, stable, and excessively idealized. In reality, a historical change 
from Fordism to post-Fordism must be observed in a more global transition 
from the postwar long boom regime of capital accumulation to a world 
economic crisis and a new period of restructuring. Japanese capitalism could 
not be completely outside of the global economic crisis, and has serious 
difficulties in common with other capitalist countries. In the process of 
coping with such economic difficulties, Japanese capitalism is dismantling 
the stable and harmonious social positions of its workers and reducing the 
role of postwar traditional Japanese style of labor management. A historical 
change from Fordism to post-Fordism in the Japanese case is surely worth 
careful studies in both its specialties and universal ground or common 
features compared with other capitalist countries. Let us begin with exam-
ining the common features and specificities in the Japanese model of 
Fordism. 
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THE "FORDIST" PERIOD IN JAPANESE CAPITALISM 
(1955-73) 
The notion of a "Fordist regime" of accumulation applies well to Japanese 
experience in the postwar boom, but there are some specific features or 
qualifications. Just after World War II, Japan started from a heavily damaged 
economy, and experienced successively: chaotic and disastrous inflation, the 
depression of 1949-50 following restoration of a balanced state budget with 
a fixed exchange rate 1 US dollar = 360 yen, and a sudden export boom 
prompted by US special procurements for the Korean War in 1950-53. After 
such experiences, 1955 is generally taken as a starting point for the stable 
period of Japan's high economic growth. Symbolically, labor's annual spring 
offensive (Shunto) strategy of a unified movement demanding wage increases 
began in this year. This represented the emblematic transformation from 
more militant trade union movements into a unified labor strategy focused 
almost exclusively on wage rates. The so-called postwar Japanese style 
of labor management was established by this period. This management 
style comprises three basic characteristics: customary guarantee of lifelong 
employment until the age of 55 or 60 for regular employees in big 
corporations, a seniority escalation system of base wages, and company-
based trade unions. 
If a characteristic feature of the Fordist regime of accumulation is the 
internal expansion of the market for capitalist commodities, especially 
consumer durables produced by improved methods of mass production, this 
pattern is discernible also in the Japanese process of high economic growth 
beginning from about 1955 until 1973. Despite continuous rapid increases 
in labor productivity, the Japanese rate of export dependence (exports/ 
GNP) remained constant at around 10 percent in the years 1956-60, and 
rose only slightly to 11·7 percent in 1970, as we see in Table 5.1. It was far 
below the prewar Japanese level of 18·8 percent in 1935 and differed in its 
constant nature from the upward motion (if not very rapidly) following the 
crisis of the 1970s. It was much lower than that of most contemporary 
European capitalist countries. Therefore, Japanese high economic growth 
with an average annual growth rate of real GDP of 10·1 percent in the years 
1955-70 was clearly domestically oriented in its market. 
A different impression may arise from the rapid increase in the Japanese 
share of world manufactured exports, from 5·5 percent in 1957 to 9·9 
Table 5.1 Japan's export dependence 1935-87 (exports/GNP) 
1935 1947 1956 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1984 1987 
18·8% 0·8% 10·0% 9·5% 10·0% 11·7% 11·2% 12·5% 13-5% 9·7% 
So•rce: 1935-56: Hitotsubashi University Economic Research Institute, [Annotated Economic 
Statistics of Japan], (Tokyo: Iwanami-shoten, 1961). 1~: Bank of Japan, Comparative 
Economic and Financial Statistics. 
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percent in 1970 and to 11 ·5 percent in 1973. But this increase in exports 
corresponded with Japan's rapid economic growth, almost twice the average 
of the advanced capitalist countries. 
A factor that enabled Japanese capitalism continuously to expand the 
domestic market in line with its rapid economic growth and increasing 
productivity was the annual rise in real wages through Shunto. The annual 
labor offensive thus served as an important gear for Japanese capitalism to 
realize a "Fordist mode of regulation." We should note, however, that 
Shunto and the lifetime employment system for regular workers with the 
seniority wage system was not due to the Japanese traditional family type 
of culture in general, but a result of concessions by Japanese capitalist firms 
to tame militant workers' struggles, especially protests against dismissals. 
Such militant workers' struggles in the preceding period of reconstruction 
after World War II had often threatened Japanese big corporations and their 
managers. Yearly increases in real wages through Shunto and the lifetime 
employment custom with the seniority wage system also enabled big 
corporations to maintain the increasing necessary number of experienced 
male workers, with relatively low wages for the younger workers. They also 
served to purchase workers' loyalty to companies in their workplaces. 
At the same time, the increase in real wages was an inevitable result of 
expanding employment of regular workers in the process of rapid economic 
growth, and it was actually accelerated as the labor market tightened toward 
the end of the period of high economic growth. I am sure that there was no 
intention among Japanese business circles, bureaucrats, and politicians to 
raise real wages as an essential source of effective demand for increasingly mass 
produced consumer durables. The realization of a "Fordist regime" of accumu-
lation in Japan was rather an anarchic result of socioeconomic factors. 
In fact the increase in real wages was by no means regularly proportional 
to the increase in labor productivity in Japan. If stable proportionality 
between rising productivity and real wages is essential to the concept of 
"Fordism," then Japanese capitalism did not form a pure "Fordist regime." 
As shown in Table 5.2, real wages lagged behind the increases in labor 
productivity in Japanese manufacturing in this period until 1970. 
As product wages in Table 5.2 are calculated upon the basis of real GDP 
in manufacturing defined in terms of the manufacturing GDP deflator, the 
difference between the motion in real wages and that in product wages 
relates mainly to the disparity between the consumer price index and the 
manufacturing GDP deflator. In 1960-5, while consumer prices went up 
fairly rapidly, the manufacturing GDP deflator did not rise much. Reflecting 
this disparity, while the growth rate of real wages still remained far below 
the growth rate of productivity, the growth rate of product wages surpassed 
it, so as to reduce the net profit share from 41·5 percent in 1960 to 36-1 
percent in 1965. The reduction in the net profit share was not much, 
however, and recovered in the next five years to 40·7 percent in 1970. 
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Table 5.2 Productivity and wages in Japanese manufacturing (annual percentage 
increase in each five years) 
1955-60 1960-65 1965-70 1970-75 1975-80 1980-85 
(1) Labor productivity 9·7 6·8 12·5 5·1 9·2 6·9 
(2) Nominal wages 6·2 10·1 14·7 18·0 8·3 4·6 
(3) Consumer prices 1-6 6·1 5·4 11·5 6·5 2·8 
( 4) Real wages 4·6 3-7 8·8 5·8 1·7 1·8 
(5) Product wages 4·7 8·8 10·9 12-9 8·2 7·3 
(6) (4)/(1) 0·47 0·54 0·70 1-14 0·18 0·26 
(7) (5)/(1) 0·48 1·29 0·87 2·53 0·89 1·06 
Sources: (1), (5), Based upon P. Armstrong and A. Glyn, Accumulation, Profits, State Spending: 
Data for Advanced Capitalist Countries 1952-1983, Oxford Institute of Economics and 
Statistics, July 1986, updated from OECD, Historical Statistics 1960-86, 1988. 
(2), (3), (4), are from Japan Productivity Center, [Praaical Labour Statistics], (Tokyo: Japan 
Productivity Center, 1988.) 
Notes: (1) Based on manufacturing GDP per person employed. 
(5) Calculated from productivity multiplied by labor's share ( = 1- profit share). 
(6), (7) Simple division, not percentage increase. 
Excepting 1960-5, real wages and product wages rose more or less parallel 
and both of them less than the growth of productivity up until 1970. This 
occurred especially in 195~0, as both were less than half the growth rate 
of productivity, so obviously the production of relative surplus value took 
place so as to raise the net profit share from 26·5 percent in 1955 to 41 ·5 
percent in 1960. Viewed from the demand side, this situation meant that 
Japanese capitalism needed the expansion of markets for their products 
besides the growth of wage workers' consumption expenditure. 
Another important source of increasing effective demand in Japan was 
investment in plant and equipment. Actually private investment in plant and 
equipment increased by as much as 22 percent a year on average in 
1956-73, more than twice as fast as the real growth rate of GDP, and 
occupied 25·1 percent of Japanese GDP in 1973. So long as more and more 
capital goods were absorbed by such investment, the internal effective 
demand for goods could increase even without a proportionate increase in 
real wage rates. In this regard Japanese high economic growth was more of 
an investment boom to make physical assets of capitalist firms grow faster 
than the physical flow of consumer goods for workers. The very high 
rate of investment of Japanese capitalist firms introducing new industrial 
technologies and consumer durables from the US was financed not only by 
reinvestment of their own profits but also by "over-borrowing" from banks 
based on the high rate of savings, approximately 15-20 percent of Japanese 
personal income. A substantial portion, amounting to 40-50 percent of the 
necessary fund for investment in plant and equipment, was obtained by such 
loans from banks and other financial institutions with an almost zero or 
negative real interest rate of deposit for people's savings. This financial 
transfer of purchasing power thus added to a substantial deviation from a 
120 
THE JAPANESE MODEL OF POST-FORDISM 
pure and simple model of "Fordist regime" of accumulation in the Japanese 
case during the long boom. 
Although the prewar pattern of family-owned "zaibatsu" concerns was 
dissolved through the postwar US occupation policy for democratization of 
Japanese economic order, groups of corporations often remained closely 
linked to their earlier counterparts in zaibatsu. The relations among big 
corporations in each group became non-hierarchical and horizontally co-
operative even between banks and industrial corporations. Some new 
industrial groups were formed outside of old zaibatsu groups, but were 
obviously influenced and promoted by the existence of old groups. Big 
industrial corporations could usually "overborrow" from their main banks 
within the same affiliated groups. Each industrial group would extend their 
industrial activities competitively by the "one set principle" - establishing 
a set of companies to cover the whole industrial, trading, and financial 
sectors, so that each group could basically do business independently. This 
practice promoted the high pace of investment in plant and equipment in 
the process of introducing new types of industrial products until the 1960s. 
There was a third important domestic source of effective demand in 
Japan's high economic growth, namely increasing real income in rural 
agricultural households. The domestic market for agricultural machinery, 
fertilizer, electric home appliances, houses, cars, etc. was continuously 
expanding in the rural areas. As the proportion of employed population in 
primary industry decreased sharply from 41 ·0 percent in 1955 to 19·4 percent 
in 1970, the number of agricultural families also decreased, but only from 6 
million to 5·3 million. In the same period, while average nominal wages in 
all industries increased 4·3 times (real wages increased 2·3 times), the average 
nominal income of agricultural families cultivating a typical Japanese farm 
of 0·5-1·0 hectare also increased 4·4 times, reaching 1·3 million yen a year. 
This matched the average annual 1 ·4 million yen nominal income of all 
Japanese households. The portion of purely agricultural income in it, 
however, declined sharply from 66·9 percent to 29·0 percent as more than 
70 percent of income of agricultural families came to be earned outside of 
farming, mainly as wages. 
Labor productivity in agriculture simultaneously increased substantially, 
enabling farm households to sell more labor-power outside the village in the 
form of seasonal or pan-time workers or even as regular workers in nearby 
factories. Thus, the lifestyle and living conditions in rural areas changed 
greatly from the prewar situation in which an impoverished agricultural 
population remained roughly constant during a period of rapid industrial-
ization. The changes show well how Japanese villages served both as a 
powerful source of cheap wage workers and as an expanding domestic 
market especially for consumer durables. 
Although a considerable portion of the income of rural families became 
dependent upon wages, which were often earned by main family members 
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temporarily working in the urban areas, the increased rural purchasing 
power surely served widely to spread the modem, automated lifestyle 
throughout the country. Modem houses with a range of home electronic 
equipment replaced old houses with thatched roofs. The government 
policies effectively helped such changes in rural villages. In particular, 
protective policies to maintain rice prices for producers, both by subsidy 
and by import restrictions, worked in steadily leveling up the agricultural 
income. At the same time, public expenditure to construct highways and to 
modernize rural roads helped to form an automobile society throughout 
Japan. While the level of social welfare policies for the urban working people 
was still relatively low in this period, these economic policies for rural 
agricultural areas did serve to modernize Japanese rural areas. 
Following the relatively favorable period for agricultural areas due to 
severe food shortages just after World War II, Japanese rural areas experi-
enced a modernization process and joined in a long boom, by extending 
effective demand for various capitalist products. This is an important feature 
of the Japanese Fordist period, and it differs from the prewar dual structured 
regional development between rapidly growing urban cities and stagnant, 
poor agricultural areas. The regional development was in this regard 
substantially equalized in the postwar Fordist period much more than in the 
prewar period. 
However, disparity in socioeconomic life between different regions surely 
remained and continuously served as a basis for the dual structure of 
Japanese labor market. As we see in Table 5.3, there used to be a wide 
difference in wages between large and small businesses. The wages of small 
manufacturing enterprises hiring between 5 and 29 persons was just 54·2 
percent, and those of enterprises hiring between 30 and 99 was 65·8 percent 
of those of big enterprises in 1960. 
Table S.3 Wage disparity between different sizes of manufacturing enterprises 
Enterprise size (employees) 
































The double structure of labor markets related not just to the wage 
disparity but also to a wide range of differences in labor conditions between 
regular workers in big corporations and those working in medium and small 
businesses or irregular workers even in big corporations. Usually without a 
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lifetime employment system, without the seniority wage escalation system, 
with fewer fringe benefits and with a very much lower rate of organization 
for trade unions, workers in medium and small businesses were really 
outside of the so-called Japanese style of labor management. In 1962 the 
proportion of employees in work places smaller than 300 persons in 
the whole nonagricultural areas was 53·5 per cent, and it was 80 percent if the 
public-sector employees were exempted. Japanese big industrial firms could 
utilize affiliated medium and small corporations quite flexibly under the 
hierarchical subcontracting system, so long as the latter could elastically 
adjust the number of employees and could use much cheaper wage costs. 
At the same time, big parent corporations used to assist the affiliated smaller 
firms in their subcontracting system to modernize equipment both tech-
nologically and financially, often endorsing long-term borrowing from their 
main banks. Thus, the subcontracting system was effective in making big 
firms grow easily more flexibly and faster, and also in promoting investment 
in plant and equipment more broadly than without it. 
What about the role of the state of strategic industrial planning on the 
part of MITI (Ministry of International Trade and Industry)? Although 
Japanese economic policies were sometimes overrated even as "the most 
dexterously performed planned economy in the world" or as an ideal 
Keynesian practice, they did not really constitute a planned economy, and 
could not be effective without a whole set of more basic favorable conditions 
for continuous economic growth. Among those basic conditions, there were 
abundant supplies of relatively cheap labor from domestic agricultural areas 
and of primary products from abroad, the availability of a series of new 
industrial technologies imported mainly from the US, and a relatively stable 
international economic order with the Bretton Woods monetary system 
under the US economic hegemony. Actually in the long process of high 
economic growth, Japanese state budgets kept well balanced and did not 
practise any scale of fiscal deficit policy to level up the macroeconomy. We 
have to note, however, that the yearly "natural" increase of tax revenue 
beyond initial budget plans continuously enabled expansion of public 
expenditures to construct infrastructure such as ports, roads, etc., for 
industrial development. At the same time, monetary policy to keep interest 
rates relatively low in the process of mild inflation served to make the 
interest costs easy to pay for the industrial firms and promoted their 
investment in plant and equipment by means of overborrowing. Strategic 
industrial policies on the part of MITI were more powerful in the period of 
postwar reconstruction and the initial phase of high economic growth, when 
the allocation of foreign currency (mostly dollar) necessary to pay for 
imports of industrial machines, raw materials, and technologies served as a 
means to control priority for investment among various industrial areas and 
individual firms. This means of industrial policy became ineffective as the 
shortage of foreign currency was reduced due to increased industrial 
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competitive power. The foreign currency allocation system was abolished 
in 1960. The import restrictions were another protective industrial policy 
and were kept longer. For instance, imports of passenger cars were not 
exempted from the "negative list" for restrictions until as late as 1965. 
Through the 1960s, however, the import restrictions for manufactured 
goods became generally reduced and abolished. Tax reductions such as 
allowances for accelerated depreciation - often combined with favorable 
conditions for long-term finance, as in the case of the synthetic fiber 
industry in the early 1950s or the electronics industry since the late 1950s -
also worked to a certain extent as a protective policy for strategic industries, 
especially in the early process of high economic growth. 
As a whole, the weight of industrial policies to sustain and control 
Japanese economic growth was in effect tendentially reduced through this 
period in the 1950s and 1960s. As for the five-year plans by the government 
since 1955, they could not be long-lived, and were altered every two to three 
years. They served just as rough guidelines for the activities of private 
capitalist firms and could not be a main driving force for economic growth. 
ln fact, real economic growth rate overshot the planned rates in the 
government forecast in the period of high economic growth, and then 
suddenly became unable to achieve the government plans in every aspect in 
the 1970s. Thus, while the contribution of the administrative plans and 
guidance to high economic growth should not be overestimated, the major 
cause of economic crisis thereafter must be not so much in mismanagement 
of economic policy as in the more basic changes in the conditions for capital 
accumulation. 
The process of capital accumulation in the high economic growth period 
was not at all harmonious and was even destructive to its own basic 
conditions. For one thing, as extensions of employment in the cities 
continued in the 1950s and 1960s, depopulation of rural villages began to 
spread toward the end of this long boom, and caused difficulties in 
maintaining population levels in increasing numbers of remote villages. 
Regional economic development became substantially distorted in a way 
difficult to restore. 
Simultaneously, overaccumulation of capital in relation to the limited 
supply of labor-power appeared for the first time in the history of Japanese 
capitalism, and made both real wages and product wages rise faster than a 
rise in productivity at the beginning of 1970s (Table 5.2). The pressure of 
the labor shortage has reduced the wage disparity to some extent since about 
the middle of 1960s (Table 5.3 ). The Fordist regime of accumulation in Japan 
became thus untenable toward the end of the postwar long boom, as a basic 
condition in flexibility of the labor market was much eroded and then 
disappeared. As a corollary, labor discipline in work places tended to loosen 
even in Japanese capitalism, and the working days lost by labor disputes 
increased. 4 The difficulty of capital accumulation basically due to labor 
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shortages - together with the rising prices of primary products which finally 
included the oil shock in the world market as a result of the global 
overaccumulation of capital in relation to the limited elasticity of supply of 
such primary products - brought the period of Fordist prosperity to an end. 
The difficulty of overaccumulation of capital to squeeze the real rate of 
profit was accompanied by the accelerating inflation in the process of the 
breakdown of the Bretton Woods international monetary system. 5 
"POST-FORDISM" IN JAPANESE CAPITALISM (1973- ) 
Japanese capitalism was not at all exceptional in experiencing an acute 
inflationary crisis in 1973-5. Japan joined other advanced capitalist countries 
in experiencing a fall of the real rate of profit due to overaccumulation of 
capital in relation to both the laboring population and the limited flexibility 
of supply of primary products. The difficulty of capital accumulation was 
combined with the explosion of the money and credit supply so as to 
generate an inflationary crisis also in Japan. As the Japanese government 
implemented an "adjustment inflation" policy and consciously accelerated 
inflation in order to mitigate damage to Japanese exporting industries by a 
sharper appreciation of the yen, Japanese inflation became particularly 
vicious at that time. The annual rate of inflation of wholesale prices reached 
16 percent in 1973-5, and it recorded 31 ·6 percent in 1974. As overaccumula-
tion of capital proceeded with accelerating inflation, speculative stockpiling 
of various commodities increased and disturbed the Japanese economy by 
making it difficult for firms to obtain necessary materials at profitable prices. 
The highest rate of reliance on imported energy among the advanced 
capitalist countries seemed especially harmful to Japanese capitalism in this 
process of acute inflationary crisis. Although the Japanese rate of unemploy-
ment was still quite low, at 1 ·9 percent in 1975, Japanese manufacturing and 
mining production fell rapidly by 20·4 percent from the end of 1973 to the 
beginning of 1975, and one in three Japanese firms was estimated to be 
running a deficit at that time. 
Nevertheless, Japanese capitalism managed to recover relatively quickly 
from the first oil shock, and showed certain strength in the face of the 
following global great depression and the shock repeated by the second oil 
crisis. Japan's strength in international trade, dramatically reversing the trade 
balance from a big deficit during the oil crises to a wide surplus, seemed 
particularly impressive. The financial positions (as shown in the ratio 
between the financial assets and liabilities) of Japanese big firms also 
substantially improved and often turned from big borrowers to net lenders 
or financial big investors even in the case of manufacturing corporations. A 
relatively low rate of unemployment in Japanese official statistics was seen 
as further evidence of the exceptional strength of the Japanese economy. It 
mildly increased to 3·0 percent by 1987. 
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The so-called Japanese style of management is frequently cited as the basis 
for the exceptional strength of Japanese capitalism. The lifelong employment 
system for regular workers, the seniority wage system, and trade union 
organization based on company are generally seen as the three main 
characteristics of the Japanese style of labor management. "Look east 
and learn the Japanese style of management" has become a fashionable 
slogan throughout the world in the "post-Fordist" period of crisis and 
restructuring. Capitalist managers hope to find in it ways of obtaining loyal 
cooperation from workers in changing methods of production and operation 
by introducing new information technologies. Even among progressives 
in the West, including some Regulation scholars, the Japanese style of 
management tends to be idealized as a model to realize a "post-Fordist mode 
of regulation" in a harmonious, stable economy with less unemployment 
and some form of a profit-sharing principle for workers. 
From the managerial point of perspective, the loyal cooperation of regular 
workers under the Japanese style of management was surely useful for 
raising productivity and industrial competitive power by introducing new 
microelectronic automation technologies. Japanese unions and workers 
generally did not resist transfer from old jobs or workplaces to new 
positions within the company. Japanese unions, which were organized on 
the basis of the company unit and not on the basis of specific skills or kinds 
of work, generally focused demands on the annual wage increase as long as 
their members were not dismissed prior to retirement (55-60 years old). 
These postwar patterns of Japanese management and trade union practice 
were actually fully utilized for the formation of flexible production lines and 
business operations as an essential characteristic of the "post-Fordist regime 
of accumulation." 
Flexibility of Japanese capitalist corporations was indeed much increased 
in various ways by the combination of both spreading microelectronic 
information technologies and the cooperative attitude of Japanese workers 
in adjusting themselves to new technologies. A range of practices became 
common among Japanese capitalist corporations in their attempt to restruc-
ture and to "rationalize" through the pressure of economic crisis and 
depression. Among these practices were flexible production of multiple 
models of cars, electric equipment, and so forth on the same conveyer belt 
line, flexible adjustment of supply according to the movement at points of 
sale (POS), flexible reallocation of workplaces including multinationaliza-
tion by more business and manufacturing corporations, multiplication of 
commodity products and operations, flexible and more economical com-
binations of segmented workers often increasing a proportion of irregular 
part-timers and workers employed by outside firms, and flexible rotation 
of workers by giving them multiple tasks in workplaces. 
The "success" in executing these practices explains to a considerable 
degree why Japanese capitalism could intensify industrial competitive power 
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in the world market much faster than other advanced countries in the 
current great depression. It is clear that not only the technological changes 
but also institutional and ideological elements played certain roles in 
organizing the formation of a "post-Fordist regime" of accumulation by 
Japanese firms in such a way as to increase their managerial flexibility. 
A social institution, which served Japanese big firms to increase man-
agerial flexibility besides their own relations with employees, was the 
subcontracting system. In the process of adjusting to new information 
technologies, Japanese big firms attempted to restructure the whole set of 
subcontracting relations with smaller firms by cutting off inefficient subcon-
tractors, and enforcing "rationalized" equipment and costs to remaining 
subcontractors. The famous Toyota "Kanban" method of management to 
reduce the costs of stocks of parts and materials cannot be realized and 
maintained without hard effort on the part of subcontractors to keep just-
in-time delivery of their products. The subcontracting system became 
utilized also for flexibly using irregular workers who work in the parent 
big firms but are employed by subcontractors. The labor laws were 
deregulated so as to enable such a managerial practice. The newly intensified 
subcontracting system serves as a means to increase flexibility for Japanese 
capitalism to use segmented cheaper workers. 
The role of economic policies of the Japanese government or MITI in the 
transition from declining to growing industrial sectors and from lower 
value-added to higher value-added products with new microelectronic 
technologies must not have been great and surely not so much as often cited 
as keys to the successful Japanese model. Certainly they served as a general 
guideline expressed typically in the Maekawa Report for individual firms 
to restructure by introducing more and more information technologies. 
However, unlike in the initial phase of high economic growth, there has not 
been an effective policy means by which the government can control priority 
of investment or positively protect certain industries. Especially in the 
1980s, the neoliberalist economic policies worked in general to reduce the 
role of the state. The working of the market and the efficiency of private 
capitals tended to be emphasized so as to reactivate them. The attempts to 
restructure Japanese industries were thus pursued in practice and in the main 
by private capitalist firms. The role of the state to assist them was rather 
effective in weakening the social positions of workers and their trade union 
movements. 
At any rate, if recent Japanese capitalism is seen as an ideal "post-Fordist 
regime" for achieving a harmonious and stable economic life, this is simply 
not true for most working people. The economic life of general wage 
workers has become rather unstable and difficult to improve. As we have 
seen in Table 5.2, real wages have stagnated since the latter half of the 1970s, 
forming a wide and growing gap with labor productivity (Table 5.2 (6)) after 
1975. Unlike in the "Fordist regime" of accumulation, wages now tended 
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to be treated mainly as a cost to be economized, as Japanese industrial 
restructuring followed a more export-oriented strategy. As a result Japan's 
rate of export dependence (export/GNP) rose from 11·2 percent in 1975 to 
13·8 percent in 1984 (Table 5.1). At the same time, Japanese unions, which 
had succeeded in raising real wages if not to levels fully proportional with 
increasing productivity, ceased to be effective even in this area. 
However, a big gap between the increase in productivity and the stagnant 
real wages did not serve to restore the profit share of Japanese capitalist 
firms until quite recently. The gap served rather as a flexible basis to absorb 
the increased costs of energy resources and some primary products imported 
from abroad, and also to maintain export dollar-prices relatively lower even 
in the process of severe appreciation of the yen from 360 yen to the dollar 
at the beginning of 1970s to 120-40 yen to the dollar in the latter half of the 
1980s. The domestic prices of manufactured products and the manufacturing 
GDP deflator tended competitively lowered as microelectronic automation 
technologies spread. As a result, "product wages" measured in terms of the 
manufacturing GDP deflator went up much faster than the real wages in 
Table 5.2, so as to make a recovery of profit rate difficult.6 A characteristic 
feature of the Japanese post-Fordist regime of accumulation is thus its 
competitive pricing strategies. 
As microelectronic technologies generate factory automation (FA) and 
office automation (OA), the experiences and skills of regular workers 
became more and more superfluous in the workplace. Capitalist firms began 
to employ more irregular cheap workers, many of them housewives as part-
timers. While the number of male employed workers increased by 3· 7 
million, from 24·3 million in 1973 to 28·0 million in 1986, female employed 
workers increased more by 3·9 million, from 11 ·9 million to 15·8 million. 
Among female workers, the number of part-timers increased from 1·7 
million to 3·3 million in the same period. Although these changes partly 
reflect a shift from the primary industry (agriculture) to urban tertiary 
industry, they reveal a feature of "post-Fordist" transformation with more 
flexibility in labor management. Especially, unskilled women part-timers 
became effectively utilized in flexible FA and OA lines in more and more 
workplaces. As a result of such "rationalization,'' the rate of organization of 
Japanese trade unions, traditionally based on regular (male) workers, 
declined from 33·1 percent in 1973 to 25·9 percent in 1989. The social power 
of trade unions to raise real wages in the process of increasing productivity 
had thus to weaken. 
As Keynesian expansionist economic policies failed in reactivating econ-
omic growth and resulted in a huge amount of state debt with an increasing 
burden of interest payment, Japanese economic policies turned to a neocon-
servative direction since 1981, in accord with Thatcherism and Reaganomics. 
Aiming at reconstruction of a balanced national budget without tax increases, 
the Japanese government began to reduce the financial support to health and 
medical services, curb subsidies to private universities and schools, and to 
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trim government subsidied programs in various areas. Such a reduction of 
the economic role of the state and a farewell to the welfare state as well as 
to Keynesianism were implemented together with deregulation in various 
fields, and also with privatization of public enterprises by emphasizing the 
need for reactivating the fundamental rational workings of a market economy. 
Although such a policy stance was well suited the post-Fordist regime of 
accumulation with more flexible competitive strategies of capitalist firms, 
it certainly added to the economic difficulty of working people. 
More and more housewives have been driven into the labor market as 
suppliers of cheap, often part-time, labor, as real wages of regular male 
workers stagnated and costs of education, taxes, medical services, and 
housing increased as a result of neoconservative economic policies. At the 
same time, the life pattern of housewives working outside the home, many 
as part-timers, was generalized in Japanese society. The result has been to 
split and reduce the value of labor-power per person which is necessary to 
sustain the economic life of a whole family.7 This effect contributed to the 
stagnation of real wages for general workers, forming a sort of vicious circle. 
Since the Japanese style of labor management was formed in the main 
for regular workers in big corporations, its function of protecting the 
economic life of its members inevitably weakened as a growing number of 
unorganized irregular workers replaced experienced regular workers. The 
lifetime employment system for regular workers which was an essential 
element of the Japanese style of labor management is no longer secure. In 
the process of privatization of the Japan National Railway ONR), for 
example, more than one third of the total, 130,000 experienced workers, 
were fired. Privatization and division of JNR into several private companies, 
together with privatization of Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public 
Corporation (NTI) and Japan Tobacco and Salt Public corporation, was an 
important part of the administrative reform carried out by the Nakasone 
Cabinet. Privatization actually constituted a powerful blow to the strongest 
and most militant trade unions within the Sohyo Union Federation. Sohyo 
had to decide to dissolve itself in 1989 so as to form a new Federation 
(Rengo) fused with the traditionally more conservative Domei (the Japanese 
Confederation of Labor). Although two smaller national centers for the 
trade union movement remain, the dissolution of Sohyo symbolizes the 
weakened social position of the workers movement in Japan through 
the combined pressures of great depression, microelectronics industrial 
renovation, and neoconservative policies of the state. 
Meanwhile, in the depressed industries like shipbuilding, steelmaking, and 
petrochemicals, numerous regular workers were dismissed as yards and 
factories closed. While Japan's official rate of unemployment rose to a 
historic height of 3·0 percent (unemployment is very strictly defined in Japan 
and must be at least doubled in order to be compared with the rate of 
unemployment in other advanced capitalist countries) in 1987, labor markets 
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in Hokkaido and Kyushu deteriorated further with the decline of heavy 
industries and mining. In these circumstances, middle-aged and elderly 
unemployed workers face great difficulty in finding appropriate work. Wage 
differentials segmented by categories such as gender, educational back-
ground, regular or irregular positions, etc. are widening in the "Post-
Fordist" restructuring of the Japanese economy. As we have seen in Table 
5.3, wage disparity between big and middle or small enterprises in Japanese 
manufacturing, which had once declined in the process of high economic 
growth, widened again since the latter half of the 1970s. 
Thus ironically in the very period when the Japanese style of labor 
management became idealized abroad as a stable and harmonious ground 
for both capitalist firms and workers, the essential features of Japanese 
postwar labor management were collapsing. Flexible managerial strategies 
in the "post-Fordist mode of regulation" are being incorporated into 
Japanese firms, including their growing global operations. The same process 
is increasing instability and income stagnation for the mass of Japanese 
workers who now face the violent forces of the capitalist market economy 
largely bereft of protection by trade unions and state welfare policies. 
The recent phase of Japanese economic recovery from 1987 depends again 
more on the expansion of the domestic market. The Japanese rate of export 
dependency (exports/GNP) has thus been reduced again (Table 5.1). This 
shift back to a more domestic-oriented recovery was a result of adjustment 
both to the increased trade frictions with the US and other advanced 
capitalist countries, and to the effect of appreciation of the yen. However, 
it was not caused by nor has it resulted in an increase in real wages 
proportional to productivity, unlike the process of previous high economic 
growth until the 1960s. 
In addition to general replacement demand for consumer durables and 
houses, a new and important element of domestic demand has arisen from 
the "new rich" who have gained directly or indirectly by wide appreciation 
of urban land prices, rent for real estate and stock prices. Inflow of rich 
foreign business persons, especially into the Tokyo area, added to this 
element for luxurious consumption demand and for office space. More 
expensive cars and luxury flats of more than 300 million yen came on the 
market. The price of land more than doubled in two years until the end of 
1987 in the metropolitan area, and the increase in the total estimated land 
prices in Japan was 248 trillion yen in 1987, almost matching the 276 trillion 
yen of Net National Income for the year. It is also said that increased 
housing prices forced people in big cities to give up saving to buy a house 
and thus to spend more for other consumer durables. Therefore, the recent 
economic recovery depending more on the domestic demand does not mean 
a return to the previous Fordist regime of accumulation, but strongly 
maintains a post-Fordist feature of uneven development with continuous 
economic difficulty for the majority of working people. 
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On the other side, the post-Fordist regime of accumulation in Japan has 
clearly formed uneven development also among different regional areas. The 
economic depression since 1973 did not push back the redundant working 
population into the rural agricultural villages unlike the historical experience 
of previous depressions. As a substitute, the tertiary industries continued to 
grow on the basis of new microelectronic information technologies in urban 
areas. The proportion of Japanese working people in primary industry 
declined from 17·4 percent in 1970 or 12·7 percent in 1975 to 8·3 percent 
in 1987, while in tertiary industry it increased from 47·4 percent in 
1970 or 52·1 percent in 1975 to 58·5 percent in 1987. Thus, depopula-
tion has proceeded further - with devastating effects in the rural villages 
located far from urban areas. Also, appreciation of the yen, subsidy cuts, 
and the open-door policy for agricultural products as an integral part of the 
neoliberalist deregulation policies, which also follow US political demands, 
continuously hit and endanger Japanese agricultural farming and the rural 
economy. 
Reallocation of manufacturing and business activities to more economic 
sites of operation upon the basis of new microelectronic information 
technologies has served to stimulate the local economy to a certain extent, 
but it did not help those deteriorating rural villages remote from cities or 
resort places. The difficulties of old manufacturing and mining areas with 
depressed industries also remained. Therefore, uneven regional development 
even within the local prefectures became conspicuous in the process of post-
Fordist restructuring of the Japanese economy. 
At the same time, centralization of business and financial activities, 
especially those of headquarters into the metropolitan Tokyo area, has been 
strengthened as an ironical result of the development of information 
technologies. The technological possibility of forming a more decentralized 
regional economic order by means of various information media does not 
seem easy to realize under the current post-Fordist regime of accumulation 
in Japan. While a generally accessible range of information is rapidly 
widening, the importance of more specific timely information often of a 
face-to-face type seems to be growing in the recent unstable world of 
business, particularly as Japanese economic activity has become more and 
more internationalized. It is observed that more than 300 headquarters and 
operating departments are annually moving into the Tokyo area. 8 Even giant 
corporations in Kansai (around Osaka) have often shifted their headquarters 
to Tokyo, sometimes even by splitting the headquarters across the two sites. 
A ratio of average personal income in Osaka prefecture (which is the center 
of Kansai business activity), compared to that in Tokyo Metropolis, fell 
from 84·3 percent in 1973 to 78·6 percent in 1985. Such regional centraliza-
tion of economic activity is a basic cause of the soaring land price problem 
in the Tokyo area, giving rise to "the new rich," and pushing out general 
working people into more distant living places from their working places so 
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as to enforce many of them to spend more than three hours a day to 
commute both ways. 
THE NEED FOR ALTERNATIVES 
With all its specialities, the Japanese model of post-Fordism represents 
common tendencies in the advanced capitalist countries. The model was 
formed as a result of capitalist restructuring through the worldwide great 
depression. A change in industrial technologies by the growth of new 
microelectronic information technologies enabled a reduction in size of 
investment in plant and equipment. Introduction of new methods of 
production and business operation became realizable by smaller units of 
flexibly mobile investment. The social position of trade unions has been 
clearly weakened as an effect of technological changes so as to enable 
capitalist firms flexibly to employ cheaper irregular workers. Rapid changes 
in costs, types, and models of commodities - combined with more inter-
national marketing - have intensified competition among capitals. Capitalist 
firms are more interested in their market shares rather than in maintaining 
monopolistic prices. 
To a certain extent, the neoconservative state policies that became 
dominant in the capitalist world in the 1980s reflect and foster such changes 
in a capitalist economy. The Keynesian welfare state with various social 
controls of the free market system was ideologically abandoned. Deregula-
tion, privatization, and cuts of social expenditures were implemented so as 
to reactivate the flexible and competitive power in a capitalist market 
economy. The social positions of workers and trade unions have severely 
been attacked by such a shift in state policies for neoliberalism. 9 
Insofar as the model change from a Fordist to a post-Fordist regime of 
accumulation in Japan contains these socioeconomic alterations, it is not 
specific to Japanese capitalism but more or less common to advanced 
capitalist countries in the past decade. At the same time, the change has to 
be regarded as a historical reversal backward over a century and is really not 
confined merely to a model change within a long wave cycle over half a 
century. Scaling up the units of investment in plant and equipment, 
strengthening the social positions of workers and trade unions, and increas-
ing economic roles of the state were mutually related together and formed 
a basic tendency in capitalist societies from the late nineteenth century until 
the postwar age of Keynesianism or Fordism. The post-Fordist regime of 
accumulation reversed all these tendencies especially in the 1980s under the 
neoconservative policies in major capitalist countries.10 
The alleged strength of the Japanese model of capitalism must be 
in its relatively smooth and fast adjustment for such a reversed his-
torical tendency. It is clear that the loyal and cooperative attitude of 
Japanese workers and trade unions specifically facilitated introduction of 
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new micro-electronic types of technologies in workplaces and remodeling 
Japanese firms suitable for the post-Fordist regime. As I have argued, this 
remodeling has not at all been a harmonious and even development, but 
is uneven, and regionally distorts the Japanese economy. The success story 
of the Japanese model of post-Fordism thus actually belongs mainly to 
capitalist corporations with their improved financial positions and streng-
thened competitive power in the world market, but not to the majority of 
working people, peasants, and weaker people like the aged, the sick or 
many women. 
After a decade of neoliberal post-Fordist policies, the social choice of 
people began to oppose such an unfair and uneven development. Beginning 
with a series of local elections, the government party LOP (Liberal 
Democratic Party) found it hard to win in 1989 and lost the majority in the 
House of Councillors in the national election of July 1989. LOP lost some 
seats and JSP Oapan Socialist Party) increased its number of seats again 
dramatically in the general election for the House of Representatives in 
February 1990, though the LOP managed to maintain a stable majority in 
this election. As a result there was a reversed balance in the number of seats 
between the House of Councilors and the House of Representatives. There 
were three major political issues fought in these elections; the Recruit 
scandal, the introduction of consumer tax, and the policy for the freer 
import of rice and other agricultural products. All these issues relate in one 
way or another to the neoliberal political attitude in believing in the freer 
market system which tends to allow moneymaking even by means of 
political corruption, and to shift the burden of economic depression to the 
shoulders of the general populace while enabling the new rich easily to 
become wealthier. 
The need for alternatives seems obvious and actually begins to move 
people's political choice even in the alleged stable and harmonious Japanese 
society. There are two conspicuous related tides in this recent movement. 
The rural areas, which were traditionally strong bases for the conservative 
LOP, have become quite unstable and now often provide serious setbacks 
to the LOP at various elections. The uneven regional development and 
worries about future regional development seem to move people's political 
choices. Simultaneously, the participation of women in political action has 
become more and more positive, from the grass roots in regional social 
activities such as citizens movements against nuclear power-generation, 
the co-op movement, local elections, etc. Although the reorganized trade 
union movement, the major portion of which is represented by Rengo, is 
attempting to strengthen its influence in the political landscape, the need for 
alternatives is thus no longer solely based upon it but begins to work more 
broadly from below. 
Therefore, the alternative socioeconomic strategies for the 1990s cannot 
be a simple return to the Keynesian macroeconomics or the Fordist regime. 
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The alternatives must be flexibly proposed through more democratic 
participation of the general populace in decision making at various social 
choices, regional issues and multiple levels of social life. We have to see 
whether trade union movements in Japan can be reconstructed to strengthen 
workers' control in the workplace, though this seems at the moment the 
most difficult aspect in the Japanese model of post-Fordism from the view 
of economic democracy for the people, by the people. Flexibility in the 
post-Fordist regime of accumulation on the basis of new microelectronic 
information technologies, however, can possibly be and should be re-
modeled in such a democratic way for the future. The democratization of 
socioeconomic order must thus remain an important demand for the 
pathway in the 1990s for common people no less in Japan than in other 
contemporary countries. 
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The starting point of this chapter is common to many people working in 
the field of industrial economics. Most observers agree on the two following 
basic propositions: 
1 as a response to decreasing productivity gains and the new structural 
instability of the market, the present moment is marked by a set of 
interrelated organizational and technological innovations at the level of 
the firm, and 
2 this set of innovations has given rise to a new technological trajectory, 
where the search for more flexible arrangements is the key distinctive 
feature; along with this new trajectory new principles of economic 
efficiency are emerging and spreading throughout the whole economy. 
From this common starting point, different interpretations of what is 
happening to the old classical Fordism are emerging. A number of different 
theses have been sustained. One can identify two basic, opposed, arguments. 
1 The long waves hypothesis (Freeman 1984, Mensch 1978): after a more or 
less difficult and long transition, the economy will recover and enter onto 
a new path of economic growth. According to this view, attention must 
be concentrated on the process of transition. Efficient R&D and tech-
nological policy is required, along with a strengthening of education and 
training systems. 
2 The flexible specialization hypothesis (Piore and Sabel 1984): the new 
technological trajectory means the end of the whole Fordist structure and 
emergence of a new form of industrial organization where flexible small 
and medium-sized firms play the dominant role, since they have a greater 
capacity to react to the new structural instability of the markets. 
Many different variants and submodels of these two basic approaches have 
also been devised. 
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Along with Robert Boyer, in an earlier essay I attempted to trace a vision 
of the process (Boyer and Coriat 1989). In brief our thesis is that as regards 
the norms and conditions of production, the new technological trajectory 
is much more a revitalization of mass production principles than an 
alternative and new way of producing goods. The paper then develops the 
thesis that the arrangements around the "wage relation nexus" (rapport 
salarial) will finally decide the definitive configurations of the general 
structure of post-Fordism. 
In this chapter I would like to elaborate this first vision. To do so, I have 
chosen to begin with a short but general reconsideration of the elementary 
principles of efficiency embodied in the typical Fordist "engine of growth." 
The second part of the chapter is then dedicated to a preliminary attempt 
to formalize the main changes experimented with during the present days 
by the classical principles of efficiency. 
Furthermore, I introduce some new analytical tools to approach the 
different components of the so-called "post-Fordism." My starting point is 
that the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism, in fact, means a transition 
in the principles of economic efficiency of the whole structure of modern 
capitalism. It is obvious that during the last twenty years a set of very deep 
changes has taken place. These changes are specific to each level of the 
capitalist structure and largely interdependent. So while it is easy to localize 
and describe the different "local" changes, it is more difficult to obtain a 
clear and organized representation of the new articulations between the 
different separate levels. It is, however, the purpose of this chapter to give 
a first characterization of the specific local changes and of the new general 
structure which is emerging. 
FORDISM AND ITS PRINCIPLES RECONSIDERED: 
SOURCES AND ORIGINS OF ITS EFFICIENCY 
The "theoretical skeleton" of Fordism consists of a series of coherent and 
interrelated norms as far as the different levels of analysis of the capitalist 
dynamics (productivity, production, consumption) are concerned. 
In the following my purpose is to give a theoretical characterization of 
the implicit dynamics of the Fordist productive structure and organization. 
I begin with the simplest lev-el (origins of the productivity gains in the labor 
process) and proceed by trying to integrate the other more abstract levels 
(norms of production, of competition, industrial organization, etc.). The 
point here is to "open up" the fantastic engine of growth of the classic 
Fordist mode of accumulation, to extract and make visible the different 
sources and natures of its productivity gains. 
The basic principles of the classic Fordist "engine of growth" 
We can pose the following "stylized facts" concerning the sources of 
efficiency of the Fordist model. 
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• At the level of the labor process productivity gains (or if one prefers, the 
"norms of productivity") are based on a simple and rough parameter: 
division of Labor + mechanization and rigid automation. The type of 
division of labor (coherent with mechanization and rigid automation) is 
itself sustained by the old "classical" idea that maximum output is closely 
related to the maximization of the efficiency of the individual worker. 
Here the idea is that important "learning" gains are based on fragmenta-
tion and repetition. This is the reason why we have chosen to term the 
implicit principle of efficiency at work in this paradigm as (the pursuing 
of) a "Smith effect,", in reference to A. Smith, who certainly placed 
maximum emphasis on this particular concept of efficiency. Taylor and 
Ford systematically exploited this concept and principle of economic 
ef~ciency through scientific management and the introduction of the 
assembly line. In this sense, they contributed to the hegemony of the basic 
paradigm, first introduced by Smith and the classical economists. 
• Consistent with this vision of the sources of productivity gains, the 
specific norms of production of the Fordist mode of accumulation were 
based on an attempt to capture in a systematic way the benefits of 
economies of scale through long series of standardized products. A 
"Young effect" is thus one of the characteristics of the origins of the 
productivity gains pursued by the classical Fordist structure. The Fordist 
factory is typically a big factory and vertical and/or horizontal integration 
is the natural complement of this organizational structure of the economy. 
In my view, this is the reason why the transaction cost analysis pioneered 
by Coase and reshaped by Williamson has been mainly used until very 
recently to justify the growing process of internalization of activities in 
the firm. The benefits of what we can call the "internalization effect" were 
thus explicitly evoked to explain and justify the continuous process of 
concentration experienced by the firm during the classical period of 
hegemony of the Fordist mode of accumulation. 
• The norms of competition reflect this basic organization: the competition 
between firms basically involves a long series of standardized products. 
In the rivalry between firms, the capacity to offer products at lower costs 
is more important than any other attribute of the products. So clearly 
we are in a world dominated by oligopolies, and the competitive game is 
played under the specific rules of oligopolistic competition. Barriers to 
entry are formed by the economies of scale required to maintain a 
competitive position in a world of growing firms and markets. Certainly 
it was Bain (1954 and 1959) who painted the most precise picture of the 
universe crated by the progressive hegemony of Fordism. 
• A well-defined pattern of industrial organization emerges from these 
characteristics: basically the center of power lies in the hands of the 
big enterprise (the so-called "monopoly capitalism"); around it a series 
of dominated small or medium-sized enterprises are subjected to 
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subcontracting procedures. They are thus obliged to assume many of the 
inherent risks of market changes. Among these firms some are "captured" 
since the big enterprise tries to reap the benefits of vertical (or horizontal) 
integration through consolidated links with some of its suppliers. 
• Last but not least, if we consider the whole macro-model emerging from 
this set of norms, the huge productivity gains extracted from these 
arrangements made it possible to transfer a sufficient amount of them to 
the wages to be able to capture the benefits of mass consumption along 
with mass production. 
To summarize, one can present the specific Fordist engine of growth as a 
combination of division of Labor and mechanization (Smith effect) + 
economies of scale (Young effect) + vertical integration in a world domi-
nated by competition through long series and oligopolistic markets. 
The disintegration of the Fordist engine of growth 
Continuing with stylized facts, we can advance the notion that the disinte-
gration of the efficiency of the Fordist engine of growth has two basic and 
largely interrelated origins: 
• The first one is the so-called "productivity slowdown" which begins (in 
the US) at the end of the 1960s, and spreads through the whole economy 
during the 1970s. Many different explanations were given for this crucial 
phenomenon (see, for instance, the sophisticated studies of The Brooking 
Papers dedicated to this point). Obviously there is no unique and simple 
explanation. It seems, however, that one of the important causes of this 
productivity slowdown is the end of the potential benefits embodied into 
the old Smithian paradigm: the trajectory "division of labor + mechan-
ization" reached obvious technical and social limits (see Coriat 1982 or 
in the radical American tradition, Bowles, Gordon and Gintis 1983). 
• These limits appeared to be stronger in the 1970s, since markets faced 
dramatic changes, meaning dramatic modifications in the norms of 
competition. The individual firm was thus faced with a completely new 
environment. Markets became unstable and largely unpredictable, and 
product life cycles experienced dramatic decreases. In such conditions 
new possibilities were opened up and the whole classical Fordist structure 
- under dramatic pressure - entered into a process of continuing change 
which imposed an adaptation to the new reality. 
THE PRESENT CHANGES: PATHWAYS TOWARDS POST-
FORDISM 
In practice the adaptation began at the workshop level. A set of tech-
nological and organizational innovations took place and began to modify 
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the traditional way of producing goods in order to generate new sources of 
productivity gains. 
The rise of flexibility and the emergence of new "post-Fordist" principles 
of efficiency 
If we concentrate on the enterprise, the content of the so-called new 
technological trajectory is basically twofold, since the interrelated fields 
concerned are technology and organization. Further specification is neces-
sary to understand the full implications of the theoretical issues at stake. 
Concerning technology the main novelty is the rise of flexible and 
programmable automation, starting with individual tools (robots, numeric-
ally controlled machine tools) and spreading itself through a series of new 
integrated systems (FMS, CAD/CAM). The benefits given by these new 
tools and arrangements can be summarized as follows: 
1 Process-flexibility: the new automation makes it possible to use facilities 
at full capacity even under uncertain demand; by producing more than 
one product in the same basic installation the full capacity installed can 
be worked on, which is impossible in a "rigid" factory. In the latter, any 
shortage in demand is necessarily followed by certain percentage of 
under-utilization of capacity, with obvious negative effects on profitability. 
This advantage given by new flexible automation is termed "Marshall 
effect" (see Figure 6.1). 
Technical Basis Origin of the Empirical Concepts Theoretical 
Final 
Procb:llvlly Gains Conceals Designation 
(1)~ New Balance Decrease Marginal "Static" "Marshall" Between Axed 
Costs b=111 the Economy of Effect and Variable Costs Fun city Scale 
lnsta 
and 
(2) Product Joil'C Production Decrease in Economy of ·eaumor 
Flexibllty with Variable Average Costs Scope Effect 
~n of the 
Oulputs 
Figure 6.1 Economics of multiproduction from the Marshall effect to the Baumol 
effect 
2 Product-flexibility: this is another dimension of the same phenomenon. It 
basically concerns the benefits of the economies of scope associated with 
flexible technologies. I refer to them as the benefits of the "Baumol effect" 
in reference to the seminal contribution made to their understanding by 
Baumol, Panzar and Willig {1982) (see Figure 6.1). 
3 Dynamically (see Figure 6.2): the cumulative investment in flexible 
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A. Rigid Plants: A Process of Cumulative Gaps 
Curve 2 = accumulated inveslment in "rigid" capacity 
jl 
- 1 • - Curve 3 = capacity actually used .- ·-I ... 
Curve 1 • total production 
'-----------------------► TI~ 
Comments: 
- The '1Ypo1hesis of a slow grow1h rate of demand is represented by Curve 1. 
- The impact on total capacity investment is represented by Curve 2. 
- The gap between Curve 1 and 2 relies on the fact that the different "models" 
yield sales quantities different from the actual production. 
- Curve 3 is a representation of actual procluctiori. 
- The gap between Curves 3 and 2 is a "graphical" expression of under-utilization. 
B. Flexible Plants: A Convergent Process 
.---C Curve 4 = total capacity of the plants 
Curve 1 .. total production 
Curve 5 .. accumulated capacity to be invested in "flexible" 
._-~--------------------~TI~ 
- Curve 1 (total s,roduction) is the same as in the former case , but; 
- Capacjty"inatalled to produce the first "moder {A in the fiaure) can be used (at 
low additional cost) to produce the new models (B and C) as the fonn A 
djsappears from the market. 
- It is the case that the Curves 4 and 5 (equivalent to Curves 2 and 1) are now 
basically convergent 
Figure 6.2 Flexible technology: long-term impact of firm capacity strategy 
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technologies permits optimization of the total amount of capital invested 
to produce the different products sold on the market at different stages 
in their respective life-cycles. 
Summarizing the theoretical benefits associated with the new electronics-
based technologies, we can say that flexible automation gives rise to two 
fundamentally new phenomena: 
a) a "Marshall effect," based on the fact that the capabilities can be used at 
full capacity even in a changing environment, 
b) a "Baumol effect," which refers to the fact that economies of scope can 
be secured in an ordinary way, using the same basic (flexible) lines of 
production to produce a set of differentiated goods according to the 
market needs. 
It is essential to note that these new tools and integrated automatic systems 
are emerging along with new organizational concepts and procedures. It is 
increasingly clear that the organizational revolution is probably more crucial 
than the technical one. The growing evidence concerning this organizational 
revolution is that a new Japanese school is taking the place of the old classical 
American school. In theoretical terms, the organizational revolution (at the 
workshop level) is the combination of new principles and techniques 
involving two dimensions of the classical production management methods: 
at the level of logistics and of production planning. 
By logistics, we refer to the way the flow of semifinished products (raw 
materials, components, energy, etc.) is coordinated with production opera-
tions. One can say that the essence of this new conception consists in a new 
optimization between elementary circulating and operating times, allowing 
a high level of economy in lead times. 
At the level of planning, either through MRP (Material Requirement 
Planning) or through Just-in-Time, benefits of different types and origins 
are gained. Techniques such as Just-in-Time, Kan-Ban, and Quality Circles 
are the elements of a new paradigm in the field of production management. 
A set of original sources of productivity gains is thus explored in the new, 
different layouts and "orgwares" conceived and installed at enterprise level. 
Figure 6.3 outlines these new developments in detail. (For a detailed analysis 
of the Japanese school on production management, see Coriat 1991.) 
As a consequence of these changes, the classic Fordist structure and organ-
ization of production face dramatic shifts. To sum up the situation, the transition 
from Fordism to post-Fordism can be read as a move toward new principles 
of efficiency. Fordism is establishing itself on new micro-foundations. 
"Post-Fordist" principles of efficiency: the new micro-foundations of 
mass production 
Following the same methodology used in the previous section we can sketch 
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1 At the level of the division of labor: the transition is from the old and 
rather rough "Smith effect" to a new paradigm based on the idea that the 
maximization of the output does not rely on the performance of the 
individual worker, but is primarily related to the optimization of opera-
tions and processes in a world where the adaptation to unpredictable 
markets is the new rule of the game (see Ohno 1989 and Shingo 1983). 
In such conditions, a revolution is underway in the organization of the 
assembly line and the process of balancing jobs along the production 
process. In this field, we are passing from allocated time procedures to 
organization in sharing times, or in other words from rigid standards to 
flexible and modulable ones (see Figure 6.4). This revolution based on 
new layouts (linearization and "U" form of productive arrangements) was 
achieved by Ohno (1989) inside Toyota. In conceptual categories these 
new methods and procedures belong to the "organizational efficiency" 
principle first emphasized by Leibenstein (1966) in his seminal essay on 
"X" Efficiency theory. This is the reason why this concept of product-
ivity may be characterized as the passage from the "Smith effect" to the 
"Leibenstein effect". 
2 At the level of the production process: to face the new characteristics of 
the market (uncertainty, unpredictability) and the changing behavior of 
the consumer, the transition is from specialized and dedicated layouts to 
new patterns of production organization, based on economies of scope. 
The objective here is to pass from the benefits of the "Young effects" to 
the advantages of the "Baumol effects" (see Figure 6.3). Combining the 
potential resources of the new organizational concepts (Ohno and the 
Japanese school) with the new programmable technological tools the 
productive arrangements are now able to mix the advantages of long series 
with those of differentiated products in small and medium-sized batches. 
3 At the level of the industry: a new organization supported by original 
configurations is emerging. The benefits of vertical integration (i.e. 
internalization or quasi-internalization through hierarchical subcontract-
ing systems) are no longer - if they ever were - a panacea. Horizontal 
de-concentration, quasi-disintegration in new subcontracting systems, 
based on long-term contracts are taking the place of the classical Fordist 
industrial arrangements. Briefly, we can say that in the place of the Bain 
principle of efficiency, an Aoki principle (to refer to his vertical versus 
horizontal anatomy of the respective "A" and "J" forms assumed by the 
firm) may be found (Aoki 1986). 
Thus, some common basic principles of any type of post-Fordist productive 
structure can be defined. As for the theoretical skeleton of the post-Fordist 
regime of accumulation at the level of the industrial structure as a whole, 
the norms of production are moving from standardized products to mass-
produced but modulable and differentiated ones, while the norms of 
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A: The basic lay-out of the "U" form organization 
DO 6 machines 
• Six work stations 
• Inside each work station successive tasks are daffmited (18 tasks in 
workstation A. 9 in B, ... ) 
• These tasks are performed every month by variable numbers ol workers 
(performing a changing number of tasks) 
B: Work standards In January 
3 4 5 8 
2<::$::! 
7 
9 8 7 8 
C: Work standards In February 
34589123 
2-----
2 1 2 
.0. 
7 3 10 3 
13 .0. 
8 




Cycle time • 1 min per unit 
numberolwmkers•Bpe!SOIIS -+ work 11111111 of each--, 
Cycle time • 1,2 min par unit 
number of wmk8rs • 6 parsons 
-+ WOik 11111111 of each--, 
ff - compare the work organization in January and February, everything differs. The number of workers 
employed from (8 to 6), the cycle time (from 1'to 1', 2') and the conlant of the work standards attributed to 
each worker. 
This iUustratas what can be called Iha _principle of organization based on "flexible Work Standard." or 
based on "Shared Time• to strictly-defined tasks attributed to each worker (as opposed to Iha old Smithian 
paradigm). 
Figure 6.4 The Japanese revolution in product management: linearization and 
flexible work standards 
Source: Adapted from Monden (1983) 
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competition are passing from high-volume, low-priced goods to batched and 
differentiated ones. Here, elements of monopolistic competition (in 
Chamberlinian style) are penetrating the classical oligopolistic forms of 
rivalry between firms. 
How all these new principles can be articulated in a macroeconomic 
model of accumulation remains a question to be answered. Many different 
combinations are possible, under different hypotheses of market configura-
tions, product life cycles and so on. 
NEW POST-FORDIST CONFIGURATIONS 
Two basic configurations (each one including different variants) appear to 
be emerging to structure the productive process. Following Piore and Sabel 
(1984) on the one hand, and B. Klein (1986) on the other, these two 
principles may be characterized as follows. 
The flexible specialization principle and its limits 
It is not necessary here to insist on the role played in the scientific 
community (and far beyond) by the very stimulating book published by 
Piore and Sabel presenting their flexible specialization hypothesis as a 
possible root for "prosperity." 
Since many works have been dedicated to exploring the different implica-
tions and meanings of the hypothesis, it seems better to concentrate on what 
we have learned during the last five or six years, concerning the way the 
universal need for (more) flexibility has been assumed in different contexts 
and situations. The following propositions are a preliminary summary of 
the evidence on both theoretical and empirical levels. 
First, it seems clear that flexibility introduced at the level of the individual 
firm (either through organizational arrangements or through technology) is 
the basis of a specific competitive advantage. Using the resources of what 
we have called the "Baumol principle" and exploring in a systematic way 
the potentialities of economies of scope, the small or medium-sized firm, 
operating in unstable and changing markets, may be more efficient than the 
large, rigid one. The theoretical and empirical problem here is that of the 
limits of the strategy of economies of scope with regard to that of economies 
of scale (see below for a tratment of this crucial question). It is clear that in 
certain circumstances a strategy based on systematic efforts to secure the 
benefits offered by the economies of scope can be successful. (See Figure 
6.5, where these kinds of successful strategies are illustrated.) 
Second, it is a well-established fact that - here again, under certain market 
conditions and product life cycles - organized networks of small and flexible 
enterprises are able to compete even on mass production markets with the 
big classical Fordist factory. Many different forms of "industrial districts" 
147 
NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION 
1. Flexlble Speclallzatlon - Building a competitive advantage on Economies of Scope 
Q 
Passive Differentiation 
A,B,C are three dfferentiated 







When the finn faces a break down of 
the demand for the product A, it 
inlrOduces a new product B. This 
strategy of •permanent innovation" Is 
efficient in markets dominated by 
products with short life cycles. 
2. Dynamic Flexlblllty- Combining Economies of Scale and Economies of Scope 
Q 
T 
Differentiation by Systematic 
"Dematuratlon " policy 
The finn extends the Hfe cycle of 
product A by systematic 
dematuration poHcy, introducing A', 
A" and AM new characteristics fnto 
the product A. Thus, through 
differentiation, the finn maintains the 
benefits of economies of scale. 
Q 
Differentiation by Product 
Development 
T 
When the product A1 reaches the lmit 
in its penetration into the market, a 
second generation of the same 
product (,¾) is introduced by market 
innovation into the market. 
Figure 6.5 Technical flexibility and product life cycles: four basic strategies 
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have proved their capacity to maintain an advantage even in very competitive 
environments (see for instance the papers published by the Italian school on 
industrial districts, in Maruani, Reynaud, and Romani 1989). 
Nonetheless there are limits and conditions of validity of these competi-
tive advantages. Two sets of basic conditions are required: 
1 The first conditions have to do with the products: the advantages of 
"flexible specialization" lie solely in manufacturing. The products must 
be "simple," that is to say at a stage of advanced "maturity" in their life 
cycle. The product may not include high conception and R&D costs: if 
the barriers to entry (based on high research costs and investment) are 
very high, the benefits gained at the level of manufacturing would not be 
able to cover the costs of continuing R&D and product improvement. 
This is the reason why, if we consider the products made in the industrial 
districts we find basically simple and mature products such as textiles, 
clothing, shoes, and so on. When the product embodies innovations, the 
innovation is "incremental" (as opposed to "major"), and creates a 
temporary "niche," since followers can easily imitate the first innovators. 
The case of the industrial district producing numerically controlled 
machine tools (analyzed by Capecchi and others) does not invalidate this 
view. The network of small flexible firms basically consists of subcontrac-
ting firms in the sense that the research on numerical techniques and 
procedures is carried out in the laboratories financed by big corporations. 
2 The second - and closely related - set of conditions are related to market 
characteristics: the market, for optimum efficiency of the flexible special-
ization strategy, must be a segmented one. Thus many different niches 
can be occupied by small firms operating in distinctive markets. The 
Italian School - in its best work - insists on the fact that an efficient 
flexible specialization strategy requires segmented markets and/or rapid 
changes in consumer behavior. 
If these conditions are missing, then large enterprises using the opportunities 
offered by the new organizational arrangements are certainly in a better 
position to face market needs, even if small and medium-sized enterprises 
are much more flexible. In this case, the flexible specialization principle 
leaves the field open to a strategy based on dynamic flexibility. 
Combining the benefits of economies of scale and of scope: the principle 
of dynamic flexibility 
To my knowledge the notion of "dynamic flexibility" was first introduced 
into the scientific community by B. Klein. Describing the policy followed 
by certain Japanese firms, he writes: 
As contrasted with static flexibility, dynamic flexibility is not con-
cerned with producing more than one product (e.g., cars and light 
149 
NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION 
trucks) on a single production line - although the Japanese do this too. 
Rather, it is concerned with designing production lines in a way that 
they can quickly evolve in response to changes in either the product 
or production technology. In other words the central preoccupation 
is to get ideas into action quickly. The main purpose of dynamic 
flexibility, however, is to make rapid changes in production tech-
nology for the purpose of lowering costs and thereby improving 
productivity. 
(Klein 1986) 
Following this characterization Cohen and Zysman (1987) insisted on the 
importance of this principle for any policy designed to revitalize the classic 
Fordist industrial structure. In a recent work, I have tried to elaborate 
further on the basis of this idea, and give a conceptual content to the 
principle of dynamic flexibility as opposed to the principle of flexible 
specialization (Coriat 1990). Thus dynamic flexibility is defined as being 
based on an "iterative" process of continuous changes affecting both process 
and product innovations. More precisely a strategy of dynamic flexibility is 
followed when the productive arrangements are conceived and managed in 
such a way that they make it possible to modify the process (at low or zero 
delay and cost) according to the changes introduced into the products. An 
alternative solution is to modify the product to benefit from the innovations 
introduced at production line level. In other words, dynamic flexibility is a 
strategy designed to reap the reciprocal benefits of product and process inno-
vations. Here the concept of flexible and modulable work standards con-
ceived by Ohno is crucial. More generally a completely new model of work 
organization, based on strong and continuous investment in human resources, 
is required here. Flexibility, in this case, is based on the skills of workers 
to whom broad capabilities to respond to changing circumstances are given. 
The main advantage of such a strategy can be shown if we consider its 
effect on the long-term learning curve. Here one may remember (following 
the work on the subject by Albernathy 1978, Albernathy and Wayne 1985) 
that in the long run, the learning curve is not continuous. At every important 
change introduced by the enterprise ( concerning either the product or the 
process) the learning curve experiences upward movements, since the new 
element introduced destroys the "know-how" and the "experience" accum-
ulated at the preceding stages of the product-process configuration. The 
strategy of dynamic flexibility can thus be understood as centrally designed 
to "smooth" these upward movements, and to maintain a continuous 
upward orientation of the learning curve, even when important changes are 
introduced. Thus dynamic flexibility supports cumulative gains of efficiency 
(see Figure 6.6). In a period characterized by an acceleration of this kind 
(affecting products and/or the processes), it is easy to imagine that this 
strategy can play a very important role in the competitive game. 
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Figure 6.6 Leaming and experience curves 
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But, these strategies also require some "permissive" conditions and reach 
definite limits. As in the preceding case, these limits are traced by a set of 
characteristics belonging on one hand to the product life-cycles, and on the 
other to the dimensions of the markets. As regards the former, the product 
must be in a phase of "development," having been introduced with success 
onto the market. Once the product has been introduced and adjusted to 
consumer tastes, large enterprises can enter into the game, with long-term 
strategies and policies of experience curves to lower prices, and take large 
shares of potential markets. 
Another condition is that the market for the product must be a growing 
one, or at least a more or less guaranteed mass market (for illustrations one 
can refer to the market of PCs, compact disks, etc). 
In such interrelated conditions of both "product life-cyle" and "extension 
of the market," it is possible to combine the benefits of economies of scope 
and economies of scale in successful strategies, without leaving any signifi-
cant space for medium-sized enterprises using only the benefits of econo-
mies of scope. 
Of course many different variants of these two basic strategies can be 
imagined. In Figure 6.5 four basic strategies are illustrated. 
THE TRANSITION FROM FORDISM TO POST-
FORDISM: CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The whole Fordist mode of production is in a course of great modification. 
It is too soon to try to formulate any reasonable predictions as regards the 
stable forms and configurations of the future industrial organization con-
sidered as a whole. 
It seems, however, possible to conclude by focusing on certain crucial 
points and issues of the present process of transition (see Figure 6.7 which 
illustrates the new form and principles of the post-Fordist age). 
Quality versus quantity: the new content of the norms of production · 
If we consider the new norms of production, it is increasingly evident that, 
in most situations, it is no longer sufficient to produce at low cost (through 
long series, economies of scope, and so on). Differentiation and quality must 
now enter into the productive process. According to the new tastes of 
consumers, and their volatility, or to different international standards (both 
technical and cultural), maintaining a position in the market necessarily 
means built-in capacity of the sort that allows the productive process to 
follow the many, largely unpredictable changes. New constraints of quality 
and differentiation are now combining with the traditional constraints of 
producing in long series and at low costs. In my view, this is the reason why 
just-in-time techniques are so important, and so successfully used by the 
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Figure 6.7 Origin of productivity gains and form of competition: a typology 
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Japanese finns. Far beyond the economies in "circulating capital" (stocks, 
in-flow products, etc.) the key to success must be attributed to the concept 
of production through flexible (or modulable) work standards, first intro-
duced into the production lines by Ohno inside the Toyota Motor Com-
pany. Along with the new production norm, a new model of work 
organization based on high investments in human resources is emerging 
(Coriat 1990). 
Price versus nonprice competitiveness: the sophistication of the norms 
of competition 
As far as nonns of competition are concerned, this means a parallel 
modification; nonprice competitiveness as opposed to strictly cost competi-
tiveness is becoming more and more important. This is a direct consequence 
of the growing role played by the constraints of product differentiation and 
quality, arising from the structurally unstable markets. But, as I have tried 
to show, the growing importance of nonprice competitiveness must also be 
· related to the opportunities created by new technical tools and organiza-
tional concepts. Since many different strategies can be pursued by firms, 
new ways are being found to bypass the rough and very rigid requirements 
of pure cost-competitiveness. Flexible specialization practices, or strategies 
of dynamic flexibility, open certain opportunities to create profitable niches 
or segment the market. Thus the £inns using these new opportunities can 
conceive strategies based on principles of nonprice competitiveness. More 
generally, flexibility revitalizes fonns of "Chamberlinian" competition even 
inside the classical oligopolistic forms of economic rivalry. The whole 
competitive game is turning out to be much more complex and refined than 
it used to be. 
Is a new post-Fordist "virtuous circle" of growth conceivable? 
Based on all these new principles and arrangements, a large variety of models 
can be imagined. But it is clear that all the virtual possible macro-
arrangements are not equally stable and efficient. I have elsewhere identified 
three basic - more or less sustainable - models of post-Fordism. (Coriat 
1990). 
To conclude this chapter, I have chosen to focus on one of those three 
alternative models. The central point of this model is that it is constructed 
on the basis of a possible new "virtuous circle," which embodies and 
assumes all the novelties and characteristics of the post-Fordist age, as 
reg~rds the set of interrelated norms emerging from the new general 
environment. 
As shown in Figure 6.8 this model rests on two related pillars: quality 
and product differentiation on one side, quality of the organization and of 
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I , 
worker qualifications on the other. One must note that there is a strong 
reciprocal link between the two pillars, in the sense that: 
a) high and continued investment in organization and human resources is 
the str,tegic basis established to face the competition through differentia-
tion and quality, 
b) high quality and adequate differentiation policy as regards market 
changes allows firms to capture some monopolistic rents on the market, 
even in very competitive environments. 
Thus, qualifications nurture quality and quality nurtures qualifications. This 
«qualification-quality" model is supported by a specific "engine of growth" 
(see Figure 6.8, and for concrete example of such a model one may refer to 
some of the German and Swedish strategies; for the German case, see 
Streeck 1988). According to market conditions, this model uses, either 
separately or together, the benefits of flexible specialization and of dynamic 
flexibility strategies. Thus the different new principles of the efficiency 
associated with the rise of the post-Fordist economy ( e.g. the Marshall, 
Baumol, and Arrow effects) can be pursued in a cumulative way. 
In my own vision of the current transformations of the capitalist 
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Figure 6.8 The quality skills model 
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But no-one can contest the right to dream built into the constitu-
tion of human beings; and as is obvious, the German car makers such as 





TRAJECTORIES AND THE 
CLASSICAL REVIVAL IN 
ECONOMICS 
Michael]. Piore 
This chapter is part of a continuing effort to clarify and revise the argument 
which Charles Sabel and I originally put forward in The Second Industrial 
Divide (1984). It is a response to some of the criticism and interpretative 
commentary to which the book has been subject. At the same time, it is 
designed to draw attention to more recent developments in mainstream 
economics and suggest some of the connections between these mainstream 
developments and the French regulation school in terms of which our 
argument was initially conceived. The basic concern is how to understand 
and conceptualize economic growth and technological change. 
TECHNOLOGICAL TRAJECTORY 
The key notions upon which I want to focus are, first, that of a technological 
trajectory and, second, the two specific trajectories which in The Second 
Industrial Divide we term mass production and flexible specialization. The 
concept of a technological trajectory can be located quite precisely, in both 
the theory of regulation and the theory of mainstream economics, but the 
terminology implies a certain interpretation of these theories which many 
who associate themselves with these schools of thought might not accept. 
In mainstream economics, a technological trajectory is the locus of the 
mystery surrounding economic growth. I use the term "mystery" because 
it seems to capture the essence of a story, possibly apocryphal, which I have 
always thought most basic to mainstream growth theory. The story is about 
Bob Gordon and Simon Kuznets, who were commentators for a panel of 
papers on economic growth at the annual meetings of the American 
Economic Association. Simon Kuznets was, of course, the father of national 
income accounting and, in a sense, invented growth measurement. Bob 
Gordon is a member of my arrogant generation, and the story took place 
at the time when we were at our most arrogant age. Bob, as the story goes, 
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spoke first, and began by dismissing all the papers with the comment: "The 
problem of economic growth was solved by Griliches in his article of 19 
... " In the silence which ensued while the audience waited for him to 
continue, Kuznets rose from his chair, walked to the podium, gently put 
his arm around Bob's shoulders and said "Professor Gordon, you cannot 
solve the problem of economic growth." 
In mainstream theory, the mystery of growth is that an industrial 
economy is able to generate progressively more output over time with the 
same resources. This effect is measured by Solow's residual - that, I imagine 
is what the Griliches' paper to which Bob referred "explained." In a crude 
sense, a technological trajectory is yet another attempt to penetrate that 
mystery. The criticism is that it, and the various specific trajectories 
identified in The Second Industri.al Divide, are basically just a new ter-
minology for the same old thing: they may be nice names, but they leave the 
mystery unresolved. This chapter can be read as an attempt to respond to 
that criticism. 
In one respect the criticism is not well-taken. The terminology involves 
a lot of hand waving but it invokes at least one substantive proposition. It 
implies that there is a very specific growth process, so specific that it entrains 
very definite implications for the institutional structures of the economy. 
The valid criticism is that Sabel and I assert that relationship without 
specifying the growth processes in a way in which the institutional struc-
tures actually derive from them. The notion that there is a specific growth 
process - a process so specific that one should be able to deduce the 
institutional characteristics of the economy from it - however, directly 
conflicts with a central (albeit implicit) assumption of neoclassical growth 
theory: that the sources of the residual are so various that they have no 
strong institutional implications. In the class of models which Solow 
pioneered, growth is the product of a vast multiplicity of little human 
actions. That growth is the impenetrable mystery. This view, however, is 
peculiar to neoclassical growth theory and is not universal to mainstream 
theory as a whole. Indeed, the most recent growth literature in mainstream 
economics coming out of Chicago, quite explicitly rejects this position. Its 
ambition is to formulate a theory with strong substantive implications. We 
tum to the question of how well it has thus far succeeded below. 
The school of regulation is not a homogeneous approach to economic 
analysis either. What Sabel and I found interesting in the regulation 
approach was the marriage between the neoclassical lessons about an 
economy as a selfequilibrating system and the Marxist idea of an economy 
as evolving through history, generating tensions and conflicts, which were 
ultimately disequilibrating and were finally resolved through the political 
process. Defined in this way, as a marriage between neoclassical and Marxian 
approaches, the notion of a technological trajectory definitely belongs to the 
Marxian dimension: it is that set of forces which propels the economy 
158 
TECHNOLOGICAL TRAJECTORIES AND THE CLASSICAL REVIVAL 
through history, causing it to outgrow any particular regulatory framework 
and enter into crisis. 
The idea that something quite specific propels the growth process is, of 
course, not simply Marxian. It was shared by the classical economists, 
beginning with Adam Smith, and is, as I have already noted, the central tenet 
of the classical revival at Chicago. In Marx, or at least among Marxians, 
there are a variety of distinct ideas about what it is that ultimately generates 
the historical thrust of the system. The major division is between those who 
see that thrust as rooted in some kind of natural evolution of the technology 
and those who see it as generated by class conflict.1 So long as there is only 
one technological trajectory, however, this distinction does not really 
matter: in the highly integrated process envisaged by Marx, they both lead 
to the same set of institutional outcomes. When one postulates, as we have, 
two trajectories, the outcome is open and the source of these trajectories 
becomes a central issue. In Marxian terms, a major criticism of The Second 
Industrial Divide is thus the failure to address it. But the flaw in the 
argument which leads to this reproach is essentially the same as when the 
argument is viewed from a mainstream perspective: the argument is about 
the way in which alternative technological trajectories generate particular 
institutional structures, but we fail to define the trajectories in a way in 
which the structure can be deduced from them. 
Again, however, to say that The Second Industrial Divide defines a 
trajectory by the institutions with which it is associated is to concede too 
much. A good deal, in fact, is said about the trajectory of mass production, 
independently of its associated institutions. What is said makes the following 
assertions: first, the trajectory of mass production involves the search for 
growth (or technological innovation) through the process of the division of 
labor, as exemplified by Adam Smith in the transition from pin craftsman 
to pin factory. Second, growth of this kind has a set of distinct technical 
characteristics. The critical characteristics, in terms of the institutional 
structures of the economy are foudold: 
a) economies of scale within the firm, 
b) increasing returns for the economy as a whole, 
c) the specialization of productive resources and, 
d) the divorce between conception and execution in production. 
The technological trajectory of flexible specialization is not specified this 
precisely. We did, however, delimit the institutional forms associated with 
it. The organizational literature at that time, especially but not only in 
economics, distinguished two basic institutional forms: "hierarchies" 
exemplified by the large, vertically integrated corporation and· "markets," 
where basic units were isolated small firms communicating through price 
signals in a market. We associated flexible specialization with a third 
institutional structure, one of a series of small (in relationship to the 
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hierarchical corporation) units engaged in intense direct communication and 
embedded in a dense social network. Because there was relatively little 
research on this organizational form, we drew primarily on work on 
industrial districts in central Italy and upon old craft communities, generally 
characterized as "pre-industrial," which in most areas, had disappeared. 
There now exists a much more substantial body of work on what have come 
to be termed "network" organizations, and there is an emergent consensus 
in the management literature that this organizational form is often appro-
priate not only to organize relationships among small firms but also to 
structure the relationship among the internal units of large corporate 
enterprises and between the corporation and its suppliers, customers, and 
even its external competitors. But the question remains: what is the 
relationship between this network organization and the characteristics 
associated with the mass production trajectory? Is it responsive to the 
absence of all of those characteristics? Or merely some of them? If it does 
not generate growth through the division of labor, how is growth generated? 
Before turning to discuss these questions, it is worth recognizing that 
what is said about mass production does clarify several issues in the current 
growth literature. First, it clarifies the relationship between flexible special-
ization and contemporary developments in organizational design and 
manufacturing technology associated with flexibility, to which flexible 
specialization is frequently linked. A number of the latter do not affect any 
of the basic characteristics of mass production. In particular, they maintain 
the distinction between conception and execution, they continue to rely 
on resource specialization, albeit in a somewhat novel way, and they seem 
to involve both substantial economies of scale and increasing returns. This 
difference led, in an earlier paper, to a distinction between flexible specializa-
tion and flexible mass production (Piore 1989). A given productive operation 
in the latter produces a gamut of products and is thus not dedicated to a 
single make and model as in classic mass production. But the variety is 
limited and the products specified in advance. In flexible specialization, by 
contrast, the product line is open-ended. This distinction also involves 
certain cognitive differences in the approach to the productive process, but 
the significance of these cannot be deduced from the list of characteristics 
defining mass production, and requires an expanded definition of flexible 
specialization, to which we tum below. 
Combining mass production and flexible specialization 
A second point which does emerge from the list of characteristics defining 
mass production is the basic difficulty of combining mass production and 
flexible specialization in a single system. To assert that growth under mass 
production involves increasing returns is to suggest that any alternative 
trajectory threatens its dynamism. 
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The essential idea of mass production is captured by Figure 7.1. That idea 
is that the economy moves down the curve, ab, over time; it does so by 
increasing output, through standardization of products. Smith pointed out 
that there was another method of production, craft production, which 
produced specialized goods but with stagnant technology, so that it always 
had cost a. The result: the consumer is faced with a choice, governed by the 




Figure 7.1 Mass production curve 
The postulate about the emergence of flexible specialization as an alterna-
tive growth trajectory is that, at some point in the late 1970s, P" begins to 
fall due to a new dynamic of technological change. As it does so, P "-Pm 
declines, and customers are drawn away from mass markets, and q falls. The 
fall in q, however, itself aggravates the process, raising Pm and further 
narrowing the price differential. 
In analyzing these developments, one can make a further distinction 
between economies of scale associated with fixed investment in specialized 
resources and increasing returns associated with the technological develop-
ment to which the specialization leads. The latter may be irreversible. In 
other words, the expansion of production may generate "new knowledge." 
Whether or not this is the case depends on the precise way in which 
specialization and technological innovation interact, a point to which we 
return below. If there is irreversibility, or some irreversibility, the techno-
logical gains may be preserved in smaller units and at least a part of the 
effects of a declining q are reversed over time as the scale of new plant and 
equipment is adjusted to the reduced market size. Then, mass production 
will makes a resurgence, an effect which we currently seem to be observing. 
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But our characterization of the mass production trajectory suggests that the 
resurgence will be temporary; the dynamism of mass production depends 
on the progressive expansion of q and once the scale is adjusted, the 
technology will stagnate. 
Flexible specialization and the classical revival 
A further observation which one can draw from this characterization of 
mass production relates to the classical revival at Chicago (Lucas 1988). The 
classical revival, as we suggested earlier, has basically accepted the notion 
that there is a technological trajectory in the sense that we are using the 
term, i.e., a growth process that has substantive implications for the 
economic structure. But the literature assumes that this process is consistent 
with a competitive economic structure and the concern is with modeling 
that process as a kind of "general equilibrium" growth. Indeed, the 
competitive nature of the associated institutional structure is such a funda-
mental tenet of this literature that it is not even explicitly stated, let alone 
argued. What makes this curious is that the new Chicago literature draws 
upon exactly the same classical tradition that we use to define mass 
production. How does this happen? What is the difference? 
In terms of the list of four defining characteristics, the difference centers 
on the distinction between increasing returns at the level of the economy 
and economies of scale at the level of the firm. We have defined mass 
production in a way in which the two characteristics are inextricably linked: 
you cannot have the former without the latter. And the Chicago literature 
assumes that the increasing returns for the economy do not imply economies 
of scale at the level of the firm. In the Chicago revival literature, increasing 
returns involve external economies. And Robert Lucas even coins the term 
"external human capital economies" to characterize the growth process. The 
key question then becomes: are the economies associated with the classical 
growth process ·external? 
The idea that such economies are external comes from Marshall. But 
Chicago literature does not actually refer to Marshall himself; it tries to 
make this point instead by reference to Allyn Young (1928). In so doing, it 
confuses precisely those issues that we are attempting to highlight. The 
confusion arises because Young uses Adam Smith's pin factory to illustrate 
his argument. And, in the pin factory example, resources are too specialized 
to generate "external economies" of scale. Thus, Chicago would need to 
postulate an alternative trajectory in order to sustain its models. It need not 
as a matter of logic, of course, join the whole debate: it could simply assert 
that there is a single trajectory with the properties for which it is looking 
and that Smith (and Young) were either mistaken about what the pin factory 
growth process was or about its overwhelming importance. But given the 
extensive literature about network structures which is now developing, this 
may be a little harder to do than it was in the past. 
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Chicago might have gone back to Marshall, instead of Allyn Young, but 
this would not have solved the problem. There is now a very extensive 
literature trying to interpret exactly what Marshall observed in the light of 
contemporary experience. One influential branch of the literature argues 
that what Marshall observed was essentially akin to the dynamic industrial 
districts which emerged in Italy in the 1970s. Indeed, the very term 
"industrial district" is taken from Marshall's text (Becattini 1979). But the 
Italian industrial districts are not, as we have noted, markets: the intensity 
of communications which occurs within them and the social structures in 
which they are embedded makes it very unlikely that they could ever be 
compatible with a competitive price system (Piore 1990). Moreover, there 
is a real question about the "externality" of the economies associated with 
these kinds of network organizations. The research on both the network 
corporation and the Italian districts suggest that they survive and prosper 
only if the economies which are external to particular productive units are 
internalized as parameters in the decisions of some higher level organization 
unit, e.g., the corporate headquarters in large organizations; the municipal 
government, the trade union, and/or a business association in the geographic 
regions (Piore 1990). 
My own reading of the literature is that Marshall did not observe 
industrial districts in the sense that this term is used in the network 
organization literature. I think that Allyn Young's choice of the pin factory 
example was indeed apt: that what Marshall observed might best be termed 
a dispersed hierarchy, i.e. a set of narrowly specialized and hierarchically 
coordinated productive units. These units operated like the mass production 
factory of the functionally divided corporation, but the relationships were 
organized by contracts rather than by internal rules. His observations call 
into question much of the new theory of the corporation, particularly that 
of Oliver Williamson and Alfred Chandler who argue that modern business 
forms are a response to economies of scale. But they are not associated with 
an independent growth trajectory; the economies of growth are internalized 
in contracts among these units just as they are in the vertically integrated 
corporation. Neither reading of Marshall suggests that he was observing 
a competitive market economy in the sense that we use that term in 
contemporary economics or that such an economy could sustain growth. 
To resolve the problem about the relationship between growth and 
organization form, it thus appears that one must go beyond Young and 
Marshall to the classical economists themselves. 
CLASSICAL GROWTH THEORY 
Adam Smith 
The two key propositions of classical growth theory originate in Adam 
Smith: 
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1 growth is produced by the division of labor, and 
2 the division of labor is limited by the extent of the market. 
But the classical growth process was actually defined by Adam Smith's pin 
factory example. Or rather, the classical growth process is defined by the 
example of the transition from the master pin-maker who made the whole 
pin to the factory in which "one worker pulls the wire, a second worker 
cuts the wire, a third worker heads the pin, a fourth points the pin, and so 
forth." 
Why should the division of labor enhance productivity? There is a certain 
ambiguity in Smith here. The ambiguity is important, and we will return to 
it shortly. But the underlying reason is the specialization of productive 
resources: specially trained workers and specialized tooling. 
The specialization leads directly to Smith's second proposition, that the 
division of labor is limited by the extent of the market. Because the resources 
are specialized, they cannot shift to alternative tasks. They become "inflex-
ible" or inelastic. The specialization is thus justified only if labor and capital 
can be kept employed in the tasks which they are "specialized" to do. 
This proposition about the extent of the market is an assertion about 
increasing returns: as the level of output expands, it becomes possible to 
further divide, and hence funher specialize, productive resources. Must 
these increasing returns be internalized, i.e. do increasing returns manifest 
themselves as economies of scale at the level of the firm? Smith did not seem 
to see a connection: or, at least, he never identified the conflict between 
growth and competition which such firm level economies of scale imply. 
But modern human capital theory suggests that in the pin factory example 
the increasing returns must be internalized: the pin factory resources are 
not just specialized, they are spedfic; they can be used only in the particular 
pin-making task. By the time we reach the end point of this growth process 
in the automobile factory, the resources are specific to the make and model 
of a particular product. When the model changes, the worker must be 
retrained and the old equipment scrapped and replaced. Specific investments 
of this kind will not be made unless the firm can capture the returns. In the 
pin factory growth process, moreover, the market will never suppon the 
additional firms which would be required to eliminate the specificity of the 
investments: in a larger market, it will always pay to divide the tasks still 
further and make the resources still more specific. Increasing returns, 
economies of scale and resource specializations are thus inextricably linked. 
The Chicago-Marshallian growth process, like flexible specialization, 
requires a different growth mechanism. 
Marglin 
Clues for an alternative growth mechanism are offered by the debate about 
the relationship between the division of labor and productivity growth. 
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Credit for opening, or rather reopening, that debate goes to Stephen Marglin 
and his 1974 article "What do Bosses Do?" (Marglin 1974). Marglin 
systematically reviews Smith's rationale for the pin factory and adduces 
evidence which suggests that each of the pieces of Smith's argument is either 
empirically false or quantitatively trivial. Marglin then argues that the 
division of labor is the product not of efficiency but of class conflict. It is 
designed to enhance the control of the bosses; it does not contribute to 
growth. Although it would constitute a considerable digression to engage 
Marglin's argument fully here, the argument is difficult to sustain. Its chief 
limitation for our purposes is that it offers no alternative growth theory: 
either growth is an illusion or, as it is for Kuznets, a mystery. The empirical 
evidence which Marglin offers suggests that the particular form of growth 
may have been chosen initially because it enhanced the power of the 
"bosses," and the attempt to alter the growth process may be resisted for 
that reason, but the evidence is consistent with the notion that the growth 
which results from the process is real enough. And, in fact, if one believes 
that growth to be real, the postulate of an alternative, but rejected growth 
trajectory, which we are seeking to sustain here, would only strengthen 
Marglin's assertions about the role of class conflict: the conflict might 
determine which of several alternative paths was chosen and/or why, once 
chosen, the commitment was maintained. To invoke class conflict in this 
way, one need not make growth itself an illusion. But, Marglin's criticisms 
of Smith, while cogent, are not helpful in the construction of an alternative 
theory of growth. 
Marx 
Much more helpful in this regard are the observations of Karl Marx, not the 
Marx of the class conflict, from which Marglin drew his inspiration, but the 
Marx of technological determinism. Marx's ideas about the efficacy of the 
division of labor and the enhancement of productivity are, at root, very 
different from Smith's and much closer to modem theories about cognition. 
Two of Marx's propositions appear particularly promising in terms of 
developing the notion of an alternative growth trajectory. One is the 
distinction which he draws between the social division of labor and the 
detailed division of labor. The second is the relationship which he develops 
between the detailed division of labor and mechanization. Marx makes a 
third observation about the rise of the factory system which is also 
suggestive. 
The social division and the detailed division 
The distinction between the social division of labor and the detailed division 
is essentially the distinction between the pin craftsman and the pin header. 
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Marx suggests that these are two distinct and technologically powerful 
developments. The pin craftsman - which Smith took as the starting point 
in the development process - is actually itself a distinct technological 
development, involving the separation of pin making from the making of 
other products (like sheep-herding, cow tending, clothmaking, and the like) 
which were once all produced together in a self-contained household. The 
separation contributes to productivity because it isolates an activity with a 
distinct conceptual core, and by focusing on that core and understanding it 
better, one will produce better pins, possibly in a more effective way. The 
isolation of pin heading yields no such advantages, because pin heading is 
not a conceptually distinct operation; it has no meaning independent of pin 
making (Marx, Capital: 390). 
Reconceptualization 
Indeed, for Marx, the contribution of the detailed division of labor was very 
different. It enabled the production process to assimilate the logic of the 
machine. In this sense, it is virtually the opposite of the social division of 
labor. One separated out the task of pin heading in order to escape the 
conceptual apparatus of the pin and think of the task instead in terms of a 
rationale associated with machinery. Having done so, one is then able to 
mechanize the task of pin heading. A by-product of this process of 
technological development is the narrowly trained worker who does the 
"pin heading" before it is mechanized. This is an extremely important part 
of the story which Marx tells about capitalist development but it is not 
central to the issues here. 
Reintegration 
A third insight into the process of growth is suggested by Marx's comments 
on the factory system. For Marx, in contrast to Marglin, the factory system 
was a real engine of growth. But, Marx cautioned, the growth potential of 
the factory does not explain its development. The factory itself was created 
for one series of reasons: better to control a productive process and 
supervise a labor force which was previously dispersed under the putting 
out system; to share a common source of power, etc. Once the separate 
tasks were brought together under one roof and performed in proximity to 
each other, people were led to perceive of the productive process in new 
ways and this changed perception was itself a source of innovation. The new 
innovations were associated: they all facilitated the integration of the distinct 
operations. Thus, the innovations associated with the factory are different 
from those associated with mechanization: the latter involves looking at each 
operation separate from every other operation; the former involves looking 
at the operations in relation to each other (Marx, 414-5). 
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How might Marx's views enable us to understand the emergence of 
flexible specialization? Marx's observations can be read in at least three 
different ways. One reading is as a story about a dominant technology: the 
shift from handicraft production to machine production. The natural way 
to extend this story is to postulate a shift in the dominant technology. And, 
surely the new technology upon which one would want to focus is 
information technology, i.e., the computer. A second reading is that mass 
production grows out of a focus on the detailed division of labor, and that 
flexible specialization shifts the focus of technological change backward in 
the cognitive chain toward the social division of labor. A third reading might 
focus on the distinction between the fragmentation associated with the 
detailed division of labor and the integration associated with the factory. 
Innovation in flexible specialization seems more like the latter than the 
former. 
It would be hard to reject any of these as explanations for contemporary 
patterns of technological change, and, indeed, although not presented in 
precisely those terms, much of the contemporary literature develops one or 
the other of these themes. But I would be inclined to abstract from Marx a 
fourth perspective, not necessarily inconsistent with the other three, but 
more abstract, more general: that technological innovation is a cognitive 
process and that one needs a cognitive theory to explain it. 
The particular cognitive theory upon which Marx's own explanation of 
industrial progress is built is something like the following: technology is the 
embodiment of certain concepts or conceptual frameworks in terms of 
which we think about transforming resources. Each of those frameworks 
involves a set of abstract principles which tell us how resources can be 
organized and deployed. The ultimate foundation for technological progress 
involves the reorganization of our understandings in new, more revealing 
and hence, more powerful conceptual frameworks. But, in the meantime, 
there is a second process which involves applying the conceptual knowledge 
we already have to perfect existing technologies and organizations. 
The social division of labor involves the organization of production into 
distinct, conceptually coherent groups of operations. This enables us to 
perfect the underlying technical know-how involved and apply it in more 
effective ways. Thus, for example, building and farming are conceptually 
distinct, and the separation of the two enables us to better concentrate on 
the development of the concepts appropriate to each. Similarly within 
building, carpentry and masonry involve conceptually distinct materials and, 
for this reason, we do better in each when we specialize in them as separate 
endeavors. 
But the organization of knowledge in these ways has certain effects. One 
of these effects is that existing conceptual categories tend to limit the 
imagination. By directing attention in one way, they block alternative 
perspectives. In craft pin making, the production process is dominated by 
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the logic of pins on the one hand and the human being on the other. 
Mechanization involves a different logic. In order to apply that logic, one 
needs to separate pin heading, for example, from the pin. The rationale for 
the detailed division of labor is thus different from the rationale of the social 
division. It is to escape one conceptual frame in order to move to another 
frame. 
Finally, any partitioning of the production process into a distinct series 
of operations creates a problem of reintegration, and this problem arises in 
both the social division of labor and in the detailed division of labor. There 
are several different ways in which one might understand the issue of 
integration (or reintegration). One is that it is simply a mechanical by-
product of the process of partitioning: Marx's view of the development of 
the factory, however, implies that integration is more than this: that it is 
itself a distinct cognitive process. There are other clues in the literature that 
this is the case: a study by Persio Arida shows that innovation in automobile 
manufacturing oscillated historically between phases in which the major 
improvements involved the perfection of separate operations and phases 
where the improvements derived from achieving a better integration among 
operations (Arida 1977). This pattern is evident in a variety of technologies: 
for a period, IBM focused on perfecting individual machines while Digital's 
competitive advantage was achieved through systems. Audio-stereo technol-
ogy seems to oscillate between periods where sales promotion focuses on 
the components individually and periods when the system as a whole is 
being hyped. The linguist Roman Jakobson calls the focus on the individual 
element metaphor and the focus on the sequencing of elements metonomy 
and, in studies of child speech development and of speech impairment in 
strokes known as aphasia, traces these different operations to separate and 
distinct parts of the brain. 
But while integration appears to be a distinct cognitive process, there are 
certain dimensions of it which seem basically mechanical. First, in the 
detailed division of labor, the elements of the production process lose their 
original cognitive meaning in terms of the product. Indeed, the escape from 
the cognitive frame of the product is the purpose of the detailed division. 
This loss of independent cognitive meaning is what we mean by the divorce 
between conception and execution. It therefore leads to both the inflexibility 
(or rigidity) of task definition and to a strictly hierarchical organization in 
which the execution of the individual tasks is subordinated to a higher 
authority capable of reassimilating them into a cognitive frame in terms of 
which they have economic meaning. 
In the social division of labor, the operations do not necessarily lose their 
economic meaning. But they might: in a social division of labor, one can 
make a further distinction between a partitioning of operations that maps 
directly onto the structure of consumption and a partitioning that does not. 
Examples of the former are such crafts as baking, tailoring, shoemaking, 
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and, indeed, pin making. But the building trades are an example of a 
partitioning of operations in production which retains cognitive frames but 
does not map directly onto the structure of consumption: the carpenter, 
electrician, plumber, mason, etc. In the first set of crafts, the consumer 
performs the integration. In the latter case, the integration must be per-
formed prior to consumption in the production process itself. This, I would 
like to argue, is the definition of flexible specialization. It achieves innova-
tion through the tension between a deepening of understanding within a 
given cognitive frame and the pull to reintegrate back into a different frame 
in order to produce a sellable commodity. And it lends itself to a network 
structure. 
This broad story can be reduced to a series of more sharply delimited 
propositions and summarized as follows: 
1 Economic growth is the product of the division of labor. 
2 The division of labor involves the partitioning of economic activity. One 
needs to understand both the cognitive and organizational implications of 
different partitioning principles. 
3 The division of labor has two distinct dimensions: specialization and 
integration. 
4 Cognitively, specialization has two distinct functions: 
a The deepening of knowledge: the development of a deeper conceptual 
base, e.g., specializing in carpentry as a way of focusing on the 
properties of wood. 
b Reconceptualization: a change in the conceptual frame itself. 
5 Reconceptualization also has two dimensions: 
a Transfer: the movement of an element from one conceptual frame to 
another, e.g., the mechanization of pin-heading. 
b Invention: the creation of a new conceptual frame. 
6 The problem of reintegration is created by a divergence between upstream 
conceptual categories and downstream conceptual categories, and 
especially a divergence between the categories in which production is 
organized and the categories of consumption. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
To summarize and conclude: what I would like to suggest is that mass 
production involved growth through the detailed division of labor: growth 
through reconceptualization and within reconceptualization, primarily 
transfer. As a result of the transfer the conceptual categories in terms of 
which the elements of production were performed were distinct from the 
categories of the final product. This created a problem of reintegration, 
which led in tum to a hierarchical organization form. 
Flexible specialization involves growth through the "social division of 
labor": the deepening of knowledge within given conceptual categories. But 
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the partitioning of the productive process is different from the partitioning 
of the consumption process, and hence, there is a problem of reintegration, 
similar to the problem in mass production. NetWork structure facilitates 
both the deepening and the integration because, to integrate better with 
other conceptual specialties, the specialists are forced to develop their own 
specialty more fully. The conceptual level of understanding in this form of 
growth permits horizontal coordination, thus avoiding hierarchy, but the 
degree of interaction across specialties is too intense to permit a market. 
The market organization of the kind which the Chicago School envisages 
would seem to be more likely when the conceptual structure of production 
maps directly onto the conceptual structure of consumption. Why this 
should ever be the case, however, is unclear. 
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THE STRUCTURE OF 
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION 
AND THE BOUNDARIES 
BETWEEN FIRMS AND 
MARKETS 
Giovanni Dosi and Roberta Salvatore 
INTRODUCTION 
A puzzling feature of contemporary industrial structure is the relative 
stability of a skewed distribution of firm- and plant-sizes over all the 
industrial history for which data can be estimated: approximately, a Pareto 
distribution. In tum this plausibly implies that the relative frequency of 
activities and transactions occurring within single organizations as compared 
to those mediated through the markets has remained roughly constant, 
despite the secular growth of industrial output and despite the secular 
tendency toward technical specialization among production tasks (i.e. an 
increasing "division of labor"). Two other phenomena add to this puzzle. 
First, sectoral distributions may well look different from the aggregate one 
(over "industry" or "manufacturing" as a whole) and seem to be also more 
volatile over time: the clothing industry is quite different from that 
producing mainframe computers, in terms of size distributions, degrees of 
concentration, and probably also in terms of variability of market shares of 
individual firms. 
Second, despite the statistical aggregate stability of the distribution, the 
relative ranking of single firms is quite volatile: it suffices to compare the 
Fortune list today with that from one of the earliest years. 
The interpretation of this evidence involves major theoretical questions: 
what explains the approximate borders between market and organizations? 
How do they change over time? How does one account for the coexistence 
of widely different sizes even within the same productive activity? How 
does one reconcile the sectoral evidence on diverse patterns of entry, exit, 
and changes in market shares with rather stable aggregate size distributions? 
Any answer to these questions also entails direct consequences for the 
"political economy" of contemporary economic systems. In particular, it 
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has been suggested by several authors that the changes in technologies and 
production organization in the last couple of decades are part of a secular 
transformation in the boundaries between corporate organizations and 
markets, biased by novel advantages of smaller-size firms. (And, of course, 
for this interpretation to hold, one must also assess the stability of these 
advantages and show their long-term effects on industrial structures.) 
In this chapter we shall present some ideas and conjectures for an answer 
to the foregoing questions, drawing from the evidence and theoretical results 
which have emerged within "evolutionary" analyses of industrial dynamics. 
In the second section of the chapter, we shall set the background of our 
work by briefly discussing some interpretations of firms' boundaries and 
industrial structure from the economic literature. The next section presents 
a few elements for a theory of firms' boundaries based on the organizational 
and technological specificities of their "core competences" and on the 
features of the competitive environments where they operate. In a fourth 
section we present a simple stochastic model of firm growth, which, 
however, maintains some of the stylized phenomena of firm- and industry-
specificities identified by "evolutionary" industrial economics. We show 
via simulations that a Pareto-type size distribution is likely to emerge by 
aggregation of sectoral dynamics which may well diverge from it. Next, we 
study the consequences for industrial structures of a generalized "techno-
logical shock" which, supposedly, "devalues" the competitive capabilities 
of incumbent firms and plausibly favors smaller entrants. The ensuing 
changes in the size distributions of firms look somewhat like those which 
have been empirically identified in recent data. However, we shall argue that 
permanent competitive biases in favor of smaller-size firms must involve 
also a continuous "evolutionary superiority" of the organizational and 
technological knowledge embodied in the entrants vis-a-vis the incumbents. 
This, in our view, is most unlikely. Rather, one may plausibly interpret the 
current transformations in "industrial demography" as the outcome of deep 
modifications in the patterns of technological learning and market selection, 
which, nonetheless, do not eliminate the advantages that size, cumulative 
learning, vertical integration, and horizontal diversification, under certain 
circumstances, provide. 
REGULARITIES IN INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURES AND 
INDUSTRIAL EVOLUTION 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the evidence on the size 
frequencies of business firms shows remarkable stability of skewed distribu-
tions, resembling rather closely Pareto distributions (cf. Ijiri and Simon 1977 
and the bibliography cited there). Of course, if each firm were specialized 
in one single product, the aggregate dynamics of size distributions would be 
simply the outcome of 
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a) changes in output shares of each firm, and 
b) product-specific output dynamics (i.e. demand changes). 
However, most firms are multiproduct and, thus, the observed aggregate 
distributions must also account for the degrees to which firms are vertically 
integrated and horizontally diversified (i.e. they manufacture various pro-
ducts sold in different markets), and also for the fact that firms may merge, 
divide, sell off parts of themselves, etc. 
For the time being, let us stick to the simpler - and far from realistic -
hypothesis of single-product firms. A long tradition, going back at least to 
Gibrat (1931), has shown that the observed skewed distributions can be 
generated via a stochastic process of proportional growth (plus some 
additional hypotheses which do not always have a clear empirical meaning, 
as briefly discussed below). 1 
If X;,r is some measure of the size of firm i size at time t 
(e.g. turnover, employment, etc.) suppose that 
X;,r I X;,r-1 = a . cl>,{X;,r-1) . Sr-1 (1) 
where a is the growth rate of the market, common to all firms, cl>(.) is a 
function expressing the dependence of current upon past size, and Sr-1 is a 
random multiplicative term. Assuming that 
cl>(Xr-1) = ~t-1> 
for all firms, and taking logarithms, we have 
log xit = log a + P log X; t-1 + log Bt-1• (2) 
The proportional growth hypotheses (Gibrat's law) implies, first, that 
P = 1 (i.e. the rates of growth do not depend on initial size) and second, 
that log Sr = N(o, a2) is independently-distributed and in particular is 
independent of initial size. With some additional assumptions in order to 
prevent the variance of equation 2 from exploding this equation2, one 
actually obtains a skewed limit distribution (a Yule or a Pareto distribution) 
which appears to fit rather well aggregate empirical data (ljiri and Simon 
1977). "Gibrat's Law" has also been tested in various forms on more 
disaggregate data, with rather mixed outcomes. In particular, most evidence 
seems to reject the hypothesis of independence of the variance of growth 
rates from initial size, and some evidence appears also to restrict the 
applicability of the "law" to particular size classes. 3 We are not going to 
discuss here the details of either Gibrat type stochastic models of firm 
growth or the supporting evidence. A few general remarks will suffice. 
Neutral combinations between market and organization? 
First, a general hypothesis of independence of growth rates from the size 
that firms have already achieved seems, at least prima fade, at odds with a 
Marshallian theory of production based on U-shaped cost curves.4 More 
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generally, the few attempts at accommodating the evidence with equilibrium 
models of industrial structures seem to us rather far-fetched: they rely, for 
example, on ad hoe auxiliary assumptions on capital adjustment and unob-
servable distributions of scarce managerial talents (Lucas 1978) or on 
stochastic processes of convergence to supposedly given optimal techniques 
under imperfect information and perfect rationality Govanovic 1982). 
Indeed, the most likely candidates for a theory of production compatible 
with Gibrat-type models imply constant returns to scale: no persistent scale-
biased factor influences growth opportunities (an exception being Kalecki's 
model with increasing constraints to growth related to financial factors). At 
the extreme, all possible combinations between organizations and market 
are neutral equilibria. That is, all possible distributions of industrial struc-
tures, ranging from monopoly to perfect competition, can be expected ex-
ante to show identical efficiency properties. 
The "structure" (i.e. the relative invariant size distribution which data 
reveal) can be theoretically generated by some random process with little or 
no past memory,5 plus some auxiliary restrictions (such as on binh and death 
rates). In this case, the random process stands for a multiplicity of minor 
factors which temporarily make one firm more (less) efficient than the 
competitors, but are not persistent over time. {These considerations, mutatis 
mutandis, apply also to stochastic models based on serial correlations of 
growth rates with decaying effects over time.) Alternatively, one could also 
interpret the random process applied to growth rates not as the outcome of 
a multiplicity of small efficiency-related "shocks," but rather as the random 
degrees of success of some extra-economic variables. In fact, this interpreta-
tion can easily be drawn from "radical" theories of the firm (see Marglin 
(1974) and the discussion in Putterman (1986)). Firms exist essentially 
because of an asymmetric distribution of power in society. Hierarchical 
control is primarily finalized to the extraction and the appropriation of an 
economic surplus. Plausibly, firms grow as a function of the (stochastic) 
success of their owners in accumulating and concentrating capital in their 
hands. Indeed, we do not have any difficulty in accepting factors related to 
power and control among the determinants of the characteristics of firms 
and industries as we see them, beyond and in addition to efficiency considera-
tions. However, we are rather skepcical of a general "neutrality" hypothesis 
(i.e. "all forms of industrial structures are identical in terms of efficiency"), 
either in the Gibrat-type interpretation or in the "radical" one. To trivialize, 
it is difficult to imagine a Boeing aircraft produced with the same efficiency 
in an Italian industrial district by thousands of family-run firms, or, con-
versely, a (now defunct) East German Kombinat producing fashion garments 
with the same efficiency and creativity as an Italian district. More generally: 
microeconomic evidence, admittedly quite impressionistic, seems to suggest 
that in each industrial activity. there are some "typical ways" of organizing 
production. There can be more than one, but not very many. That is, there 
can be a few combinations between organization and markets that are 
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"neutral" in terms of efficiency, but the set is small and possibly not dense. 
This also implies that at a disaggregated level one may not expect to find 
either the structure or the Gibrat-type growth that one sees in the aggregate. 
Industry and firm specificity 
Second, a few analyses within and outside an "evolutionary" approach (cf. 
Nelson and Winter 1982, Dosi et al. 1988, and the review in Dosi 1988), have 
emphasized the sectoral specificities in the process of learning, innovation, 
and imitation. If, as is likely, there is a direct link between innovation and 
growth, these specificities of learning ought to have a direct link with the 
"explanation" of why industrial structures are what they are and how they 
change. In particular, it has been suggested that various activities present 
different degrees of technological opportunity, that is, a different scope for 
improvements in products and processes on the grounds of a given know-
ledge base, and also a different "easiness" in achieving these improvements. 
(One way of formalizing these differences is in terms of the probability 
distributions of achieving an x percent improvement in some performance 
characteristics of a product or a process, given some search effort, say a one 
dollar investment in R&D). Technologies and sectors have also been found 
to differ in terms of appropriability conditions, i.e. the effectiveness through 
which innovations can be shielded from imitation by competitors. Moreover, 
according to the features of the process of innovative search and the 
knowledge upon which it draws, the innovative success of individual firms 
may show varying degrees of serial correlation, often ref erred to as the 
cumulativeness of innovative activities. Finally, it has been argued elsewhere 
that radical changes in the knowledge bases, procedures, and directions of 
technological change, i.e. a change in the "technological paradigm" (Dosi 
1982) also imply significant changes in the relative innovative capabilities 
and growth potential of firms embodying "old" or "new" competences. 
These findings have direct implications on the evolution of industrial 
structures which can be easily seen by comparison with the stochastic 
interpretation discussed earlier. 
• Differences across industries in technological opportunities (assuming 
some positive correlation between innovation and growth) imply different 
means and variances of the stochastic term in equation 1. Moreover, if 
"opportunities" change over the development of each technology, one 
should also expect correlated changes in the distribution of the Et· 
• Appropriability of innovation, cumulativeness of technological advances, 
and tacitness of some elements of technological knowledge imply some 
firm-specificity in the factors that foster or hinder growth. The findings 
from the economics of innovation, as well as complementary findings 
from business studies, suggest that <I>; ( • ) functions in equation 1 can 
hardly be assumed to be identical across firms. Some firms may be 
persistently "better" or "worse" than others. In turn, that means that 
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every pattern of evolution of industrial structures must not only be 
interpreted in terms of a multiplicity of little transitory shocks on 
individual growth opportunities, but also account for the interaction 
among firms that may be persistently different in their technological and 
organizational characteristics. 
• Differential degrees of appropriability and cumulativeness, and different 
characteristics of the knowledge underlying innovative activities are also 
likely to imply a different entry condition in each industry. For example, 
in industries characterized by highly idiosyncratic knowledge, by serial 
correlation in learning, and by high appropriability of innovations, one 
may expect the rates of entry to be low. The opposite should hold for 
industries where innovation can draw on a variety of sources of freely 
available knowledge, appropriability is low, etc.6 
• Abandoning the assumption of single-product firms, the variegated 
sources and procedures of learning and innovation are bound to affect the 
corporate patterns of horizontal diversification and vertical integration 
and, thus, also the structure of individual industries and of manufacturing 
as a whole. 
To summarize: the microeconomic findings on the innovation process high-
light rather permanent factors accounting for learning specificities of both 
firms and industries. If, as is the case, innovation is a crucial ingredient of 
corporate growth, then a satisfactory interpretation of the emergence of the 
observed industrial structures should account for such processes of differ-
entiated learning and the ensuing competition among heterogeneous agents. 
Such an interpretation ought to have two major components: first, an 
account of the "structures" generated by learning and market selection 
dynamics in individual industries, and second, an explanation of the 
interlinked dynamics of firm diversification, vertical integration, specializa-
tion, entry, and exit from the various markets. Let us start from the latter. 
THE STRUCTURE OF MODERN CORPORATIONS: THEIR 
CHANGING BOUNDARIES AND THEIR COHERENCE7 
There are at least two remarkable characteristics of the boundaries of the 
modem corporation that ought to intrigue theorists: 
a) their multiproduct scope, and relatedly 
b) the non-random distribution of product porfolios across firms. 
That is, the activities of the modem corporation display a considerable 
degree of relatedness, what we call coherence: thus Shell Oil Company is 
primarily in the oil business, IBM is in information technologies, Intel is in 
semiconductors, ICI and Dupont are primarily in chemicals, and Boeing is 
in areospace. Setting aside for the moment the conglomerate form of 
business organization, what is remarkable about the majority of firms is 
their relative "coherence" in their lateral and horizontal business activities. 
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Admittedly, the boundaries of the firms are sometimes quite fuzzy, with 
interfirm agreements, joint ventures, and consortia rendering precise 
delineations of the firms' activities imprecise. Still, even interfirm agree-
ments, joint ventures and consortia exhibit a degree of coherence with other 
activities in which associated firms are involved. At a very superficial level, 
the most salient attribute of diversification is that it tends to increase over 
time, and new product lines bear certain technological and market similari-
ties with the old. Thus firms generally begin with a single product and 
subsequently become multiproduct rather than the other way around; and 
new product lines very often, though certainly not always, utilize capabili-
ties common with existing product lines. Indeed, many prescriptions in 
business economics with respect to diversification strategies are charac-
terized by their emphasis on the desirability for firms to "stick to their 
knitting," though such prescriptions rarely specify what the knitting is to 
which firms should stick. 
The casual empiricist is also likely to remark upon the fact that rates of 
diversification vary among firms. Thus Western Union has been in the 
telegraph business and little else for over a century. Shell Oil has been in 
petroleum for almost as long, having added petrochemicals only in the 
postwar years. 3M, on the other hand, has diversified into an extremely 
broad range of coatings, adhesives, and related products in the last two 
decades. Corporate diversification is also a phenomenon that can expand 
and contract. Firms not only add business, they also commonly divest. 
Indeed, there often appears to be a degree of circularity of the fashion 
in which new businesses are added and subsequently divested. This is 
particularly so when corporations diversify through acquisition. 8 On the 
other hand, corporations often display remarkable similarities with respect 
to their diversification strategies. Almost everywhere car and truck com-
panies have diversified into buses, e.g. Mercedes, Leyland, Fiat, GM, and 
Renault all make cars and buses. The challenge is to develop a theory to 
explain not only coherence, but also similarities and differences in the nature 
of coherence across firms and industries. 
Coherence, we should point out, is different from "specialization". Special-
ization refers to the performance of particular tasks in particular settings. 
This is the manner in which Adam Smith implicitly defined the concept, 
and it is the way we will use it. In the famous pin making example, Smith 
referred to specialization in terms of particular tasks. Thus a firm may exhibit 
coherence though it may not necessarily be specialized. We are, accordingly, 
defining coherence in a multiproduct sense. A firm exhibits coherence when 
its lines of business are related, in the sense that there are certain character-
istics common to each. Coherence is increased with the number of common 
characteristics present across lines of business and the level to which they 
are present. A corporation fails to exhibit coherence when common charac-
teristics are allocated across firm's lines of business in no greater frequency 
and to no greater depth than could be explained by chance. 
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Neoclassical theories of industrial organization, including the so-called 
new industrial organization ( e.g., Tirole 1988) has little to say about 
diversification and integration issues. While there is some development of 
market power and economies of scope explanation for diversification, these 
theories are without strong organizational implications. Thus one can 
"explain" diversifications through notions of "full line forcing" or "econ-
omies of scope," but such theories rarely explain why a set of contracted 
relationships among specialist firms could not accomplish the same objec-
tives. In this regard, consider economies of scope. If the production of x1 
and x2 involves scope economics, then: 
(2) 
However, in standard treatments, the organizational discussion of the joint 
cost function c(x1,x2) is never explained. The amalgamation implied by the 
cost function could be accomplished by a variety of organizational mech-
anisms, including contracts (Teece 1980, 1982). A theory of multiproduct 
organizations thus does not emerge from the economics of scope literature 
or from other theories of the firm. 
Admittedly, transaction costs considerations contribute significantly to 
explaining the degrees of vertical integration, that is "make or buy" 
decisions with regards to the firm inputs (Williamson 1975, 1985). However, 
exchange relations - from which transaction costs may derive - alone, do 
not appear to be the crucial domain in which to search for the causes of the 
horizontal boundaries of the firm. Drawing from another work of one of 
us, we advance the fundamental proposition that the boundaries of the 
corporation need to be understood not only in terms of transaction cost 
considerations, but also in terms of learning, path dependencies, techno-
logical opportunities, selection, and complementary assets (Dosi, Teece, and 
Winter 1992). 
Learning 
A fundamental characteristic of economic activity is that it provides the 
opportunity for learning. Learning is a process by which repetition and 
experimentation enable tasks to be performed better and faster and new 
production opportunities to be identified. In the context of the firm, if not 
more generally, learning has several key characteristics. First, it is generally 
cumulative. What is learned in one period builds upon what was learned 
in earlier periods. Individual knowledge gained through learning must, 
however, be constantly used in order to be preserved. 
Corporate learning involves organizational rather than individual skills. 
While individual skills are of relevance, their value depends upon their 
employment in particular organizational settings. Learning processes are 
intrinsically social and collective phenomena. Leaming occurs not only 
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through the imitation and emulation of individuals as with teacher-student 
or master-apprentice, but also because of joint contributions to the under-
standing of complex problems. Leaming requires common codes of 
communication and coordinated search procedures. 
The knowledge generated by such activity resides in organizational 
"routines.,, Routines are patterns of interaction which represent successful 
solutions to particular problems. These patterns of interaction are mainly 
resident in group behavior, though certain subroutines may be resident in 
individual behavior. Because of the complexity of such behaviors, knowledge 
embedded in routines cannot be fully captured in codified form. That is, it 
has a tacit dimension that often cannot be readily articulated. Hence, it is the 
routines themselves, and the ability of management to call upon the organiza-
tion to pedorm them, that represents an organization's essential capability. 
Routines can be of several kinds. "Static,, routines embody the capacity 
to replicate certain previously pedormed tasks. Needless to say, such 
routines are never entirely static, because with repetition routines can be 
constantly improved. "Dynamic,, routines are directed at learning and new 
product/process development. Thus R&D activity proceeds through the 
employment of routines to ascertain where to probe, how to probe, and 
how much to probe. 
Because routines involve a strong tacit dimension, they may not be easy 
to imitate. To the extent that it is so, routines contribute to a firm's 
distinctive competences and capabilities. Such capabilities, by virtue of their 
evolution in particular environments and organizational contexts, are likely 
to differentiate firms from each other and provide the basis for differential 
pedormance vis-a-vis competitors. 
Path dependencies 
In standard textbook theories firms have an infinite range of technologies 
from which they can choose, and markets that they can occupy. Changes 
in product or factor prices will be responded to instantaneously, with 
technologies moving in and out according to a value maximization criterion. 
Oliver Williamson (1975, 1985) has done much to enrich the standard 
treatment by introducing transaction-specific assets. Such assets have 
idiosyncratic uses and cannot be redeployed without substantial loss of 
value. Williamson demonstrates how the need for such assets generates 
particular requirements with respect to an industry's governance apparatus. 
The notion of path dependencies goes even further than notions of 
irreversibilities implied by transaction cost economics. It recognizes that 
"history matters ... Thus a firm's previous investments and its repertoire 
of routines (its "history,,) constrains its further behavior. This follows 
because learning tends to be local. That is, opportunities for learning will 
be "close in,, to previous activities and will thus be transaction- and 
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production-specific (Teece 1988). This is because learning is a process of 
trial, feedback, and evaluation. If too many parameters are changed simul-
taneously, the af:>ility of firms to conduct meaningful quasi-natural experi-
ments is attenuated. Thus, if many aspects of a firm's learning environment 
change simultaneously, the ability to ascertain cause-effect relationships is 
confounded because cognitive structures will not be formed and rates of 
learning diminish as a result. 
Complementary assets 
Related to path dependencies is the existence of complementary assets. Prior 
product and commercialization activities require and enable firms to build 
such complementarities. Such capabilities and assets, while necessary for the 
firm's prior activities, may have other uses as well. Such assets typically lie 
downstream from product-process development in the value-added chain. 
The presence of complementary assets, particularly those that can be 
enhanced by innovation, helps steer the evolution of new technologies. The 
reason why Singer Sewing Machine got into the furniture business was 
related to the fact that it had designed and manufactured sewing machine 
tables to help facilitate the sale of sewing machines. Thus, firms' path 
dependencies are not just technological in nature. Paths are generated by 
technological trajectories and constrained further by the complementary 
assets the firm develops over time. 
Technological opportunities 
The concept of path dependencies can be given further meaning through the 
consideration of an industry's technological opportunities. As mentioned 
above, how far and how fast a particular area of industrial activity can 
proceed is due to the technological opportunities that lie before it. Such 
opportunities are partly a lagged function of foment and diversity in basic 
science, and partly the outcome of search activities by firms themselves. The 
depth and width of technological opportunities in the neighborhood of a 
firm's prior research activities are likely to affect a firm's options with 
respect to both the amount and level of R&D activity that it can justify. 
Convergence of path dependencies 
While path dependencies are unique, they do not necessarily run in parallel. 
They can both diverge or converge. The latter are of special interest, as the 
confluence of particular evolutionary paths (or "trajectories") can have 
important organizational ramifications. 
Convergence may occur because of serendipity of knowledge or as an 
evolutionary outcome of a series of unique historical events. Thus, for 
example, the convergence of computers and telecommunications is the result 
of the application of digital microelectronics to both fields. 
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The survivability of a business activity depends on the selection environ-
ment and, in particular, the level of competition (both in the product market 
and the capital market), public policy, and the frequency of technological 
discontinuities (i.e. changes in the dominant "technological paradigms"). 
Selection environments 
Firms sell their products in markets where customers' average response to 
relative price changes (within the industry or among different suppliers) and 
to changes in relative product performance may well differ. Economic 
notions such as "own-price elasticity of demand" try to capture the former 
phenomenon. Indeed, the sensitivity and speed of demand adjustment to 
variations in prices and product-quality can be interpreted in terms of the 
"tightness" of the selection environments within which firms operate. 
Selection may or may not be "tight". Whenever it is not, less efficient 
firms may be able to survive and possibly even prosper for quite some time. 
The selection environment for a product may be stronger or weaker than 
that for a corporation depending on how corporate management treats 
internal divisions and products that are not performing up to par. 
The availability of free cashflows is perhaps the key regulator of selection. 
If a firm or a business is generating sufficient cash flow to sustain itself and 
take care of reinvestment needs and opportunities, it will typically be able 
to survive. If it does not, then it will need additional debt or equity 
financing. To obtain funding of either kind exposes the firm to capital 
market discipline that might not otherwise intervene. Hence, the capitaliza-
tion and the "inherited" capital structure of the firm are likely to affect the 
strength of selection processes with respect to particular business units. 
Core competences 
A core competence (Teece 1988) is a set of differentiated technological skills, 
complementary assets, and routines that provide the basis for a firm's 
competitive capacities in a particular business. "These people are good at 
X" summarizes external perceptions as to the nature of these competences. 
Typically, such competences have an important dimension, making replica-
tion by others difficult but not impossible. Indeed, when a core competence 
exists, its replication proceeds either through deliberate efforts directed at 
internal expansion or through the exit of key individuals who collectively 
take certain competences with them, and then raise capital to buy the 
necessary complementary assets. 
Great companies like IBM, Exxon, and Toyota consist of clusters of such 
competences. Hollow corporations, on the other hand, lack such capacities. 
Business gets performed under contractual agreements struck with others. 
When the contracts terminate, the firm's ability to deliver value evaporates. 
We define a hollow corporation as a business entity that does not have any 
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core competence and uses contractual mechanisms to link particular market 
requirements with productive capacities. Thus a hollow corporation is a 
nexus of contracts for design, manufacture, distribution, and service. 
Likewise, a conglomerate is a portfolio of autonomous business units held 
together in a holding company. It is a "mutual fund" of business without 
core competences at the corporate (holding company) level. As discussed in 
Oosi, Teece, and Winter (1992), we do not believe that organizations such 
as those that lack core compences have survival properties unless they are 
somehow shielded from product and capital market competition. 
Proposition from the theory 
A firm consists of a cluster of core competences and supporting complemen-
tary assets. The degree of coherence displayed among them depends on 
the interaction between learning, path dependencies and opportunities, 
inherited complementary assets, and selection. Specifically: 
Proposition 1: Specialist firms With rapid learning and tight path depen-
dencies, one will observe "single" product (specialist) firms growing rapidly. 
Compaq Computer, Sun Microsystems, Intel, Boeing, and Airbus are good 
examples. 
Proposition 2: Vertically integrated firms With slow learning but high 
path dependencies and specialized assets, one can expect specialist firms with 
some degree of lateral integration and significant vertical integration (e.g. 
Exxon, Shell, Dupont). 
Proposition 3: Coherent diversification With rapid learning, broad path 
dependencies due to the presence of generic technologies, and tight selec-
tion, one can expect to see coherent diversifiers, like IBM, Hewlett Packard, 
W. R. Gore, and Raychem. 
Proposition 4: Conglomerates With high path dependencies, slow 
learning, and weak selection, we predict the emergence of conglomerates or 
other highly diversified companies displaying little intercorporate trading 
and technological transfer. 
Proposition 5: Network firms With rapid learning, colliding path 
dependencies and tight selection, one can expect to see incumbent firms 
becoming enveloped in a dense skein of intercorporate relationships involv-
ing partial equity holdings or joint learning. Thus, because of the conver-
gence of telecommunications and computers, AT&T is becoming embedded 
in a thicket of intercorporate relationships. So are biotechnology firms like 
Genetech and Cetus because the biotechnology research paradigm yields 
products and processes competitive with pharmaceuticals and chemicals, to 
name just two examples. If learning in the relevant paths were slower, then 
there would be a good possibility that firms could diversify internally 
without the assistance of interfirm agreements. 
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Proposition 6: Hollow corporations With converging path dependencies, 
opportunities may arise for entrepreneurs to use contractual mechanisms 
quickly to assemble diverse capabilities directed at the development and 
commercialization of a particular product. We refer to such entities as 
hollow corporations. Unless these capabilities are underpinned by equity 
links and unless distinctive organizational reactions emerge to "glue" such 
organizations together, they will not survive, except where the selection 
environment is weak. 
In Dosi, Teece, and Winter (1992), the details and a few interpretative 
consequences of these propositions are discussed. In this view, the coherence 
( or lack thereof) of the modem corporation is thus explained by the 
characteristics of learning (or its absence), path dependencies, and comple-
mentarities, mediated by transaction costs and market selection. Pavitt et al. 
(1987), in a work highly complementary to this interpretation, find that the 
patterns of technological and market diversification can be approximately 
mapped into a taxonomy of learning and innovation modes. 
For the purposes of this work, two major consequences can be drawn. 
First, the nature of the core competences of each corporation and of the 
learning regimes within which it operates explains to a good extent its 
horizontal and vertical boundaries. Second, the observed relative stability of 
the output shares of the larger firms in manufacturing as a whole implies 
indeed that on average the characteristics of learning and market selection 
have not dramatically changed. Manufacturing firms - especially large firms 
- have been able to grow, in the markets in which they were originally 
established and, even more important, via diversification and vertical 
integration, at rates, on average, comparable to the overall market growth. 
However, it follows from our interpretation that the scope for growth via 
horizontal diversification is not uniform across firms: on the contrary, it 
depends, again, on features of the "technological paradigms" which they 
master. The evidence on the long-term changes in the relative ranking among 
the largest corporations, witnesses, in our view, precisely their diversity in 
the opportunities and capabilities of efficient diversification Gointly, of course, 
with the different rates of growth of the markets in which they operate). 
Clearly, each strategy of diversification or vertical integration is as such a 
decision of entry into an industrial activity. These strategies, together with 
divestment decisions, entries of new firms and bankruptcies determine the 
changing demography of individual industries. In turn, such demographic 
changes, jointly with the variables affecting the variations in market shares of 
each firm, determine the size distribution of business units in each industry. 
INDUSTRIAL EVOLUTION AND INDUSTRIAL 
STRUCTURES 
A major claim of evolutionary theories is not only that firms differ in their 
competences, innovative success, and ultimately, growth opportunities, but 
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also that industries differ in their learning modes and in the ways diverse 
learning abilities affect competitiveness and market shares. In this respect, 
the taxonomic exercise by Pavitt (1984) suggests the existence of broad 
groups of industrial activities differentiated by the sources of innovative 
opportunities, and the size distribution of the innovating firms. Malerba and 
Orsenigo (1989) find robust evidence mapping the characteristics of the 
innovating firms into the features of sectoral technological regimes (identi-
fied by proxies for technological opportunities, appropriability conditions, 
the nature of the knowledge base, and the cumulativeness of innovative 
success). Gort and Klepper (1982) and Gort and Konakayama (1982) 
identify relatively robust patterns of evolution of the supply structure along 
the "technological life cycle" of a sample of products. Literature on the 
"population ecology" of firms has emphasized: 
a) the sectorial differences in the rates of birth and death of firms; and 
b) the significant effects of the age of firms on their growth (which often 
tum out to present a negative sign).9 
Most likely, different learning regimes must also imply intersectoral differ-
ences in the variability of market shares of incumbent firms (i.e. what Caves 
and Porter (1977) call mobility barriers) and in the rates of entry and exit 
of new business units in each industry. Indeed, Audretsch and Acs (1990) 
find a significant empirical difference in industrial "turbulence" ( defined as 
a synthetic measure of entry, exit, and changes in market shares of 
incumbents) between those industries characterized by a regime of "cumula-
tive" learning by incumbents and those others where new entrepreneurial 
activities are more likely to carry innovative advantages. 
Clearly, all this variegated empirical evidence prima facie conflicts at least 
with the simplest Gibrat-type accounts of firm growth: 
a) firms (and business units) are not identical in their growth opportunities, 
and 
b) the distribution of growth possibilities among different types of firms 
vary across sectors and across "regimes of innovation." 
Then, how does one explain the observed industrial structures? Ideally one 
should be able theoretically to generate these structures on the grounds of 
an explicit representation of firm-specific learning process and a selection 
mechanism which favors ( or hinders) the growth of business units charac-
terized by above-average (or below-average) competitiveness. Consider, for 
example, the dynamics of market shares as from Silverberg, Dosi and 
Orsenigo (1988): 
f;(t) = A{E;(t)-E;(tJJ{;(t) 
where f;(t) is the market share of the i-firm at time t; Ei(t)=G(µ;(t)) is the 
competitiveness of firm i - which in tum is a function of some vector of its 
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technological and organizational characteristics µ.;(t); E;(t) is the average 
competitiveness of the industry; and the dots stand for the rates of change. 
The composition of the vectorµ, its changes over time and the G(.) function 
depend in principle also on the learning regimes of each industry. That is, 
the learning mechanism specific to each technological paradigm governs the 
transition probabilities in µ;(t). A necessary condition for a Gibrat-type 
process of growth is that 
(µ/Jt+l = (µ/)t + & 
for every j component of µ, with & an independently and identically 
distributed (i.i.d.) random variable. However, one can easily imagine 
different types of dynamics, ranging between two extreme archetypes. In 
the first one somewhat resembling an extreme version of the "first" 
Schumpeter {1934), (µ/Jt+J = (µ/)0, 'v't: no learning occurs and industrial 
innovation entirely relies on the "creative destruction" associated with the 
entry of new firms. The other archetype is that whereby 
P(e>OI (µ/)t= <p({µ/)t): 
learning is cumulative and the transition probabilities are some positive 
function of the levels of competitiveness already achieved by each firm, 
(somewhat resembling the "second" Schumpeter (1942). 
Indeed, a major theoretical task ahead is to study the limit distributions 
in market shares according to different learning and selection processes. 
Falling short of that, here we present a model and some simulation results 
that try to capture by some proxies the specificities of learning and selection 
regimes. 
Let us start from the following hypotheses: 
a) In cumulative learning regimes the probabilities of exit (that is of "death" 
of a business unit which may or may not be equivalent to the death of 
the firm) decreases with the age of the firm (metaphorically, the older 
one gets the more experienced one becomes and more able to cope 
with unexpected circumstances . . . ) The opposite applies whenever 
discontinuities in the knowledge base make the skills of older firms 
obsolete. 
b) The probabilities of death decrease with size if there are some economies 
of scale in production, R&D, etc. At the opposite extreme, they increase 
with size if scale mainly induces organizational rigidity and inefficiency. 
c) The variance of growth rates decreases with age (which captures the .idea 
that older firms are relatively more stable in the competences that they 
incorporate and the market niches that they occupy). 
d) The birth rates are proportional to the number of incumbents in each 
industry (for some empirical evidence cf. Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson 
(1988)). 
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Formally, the survival probability of firm i from time t to t+ 1 in sector k is 
(3) 
where/ is a dichotomous variable (0 or 1); a stands for age and s for size, 
e is a random variable uniformly distributed in {0;1} and p,.(at;st) is the 
survival threshold specific to each sector. 
In tum, such a threshold is defined as 
were B(a;P) is a Beta function.10 
New firms enter according to 
nt= (r"+a) vt-1 
(4) 
(5) 
where n is the number of entrants (which we shall assume to belong to the 
smallest size class), V are the incumbents and 8 is a random variable with 
mean zero. 
Regarding firm growth, Salvatore (1990) experiments with the alternative 
hypotheses of 
a) a Gibrat process (i.e. independence of growth rates from initial size); 
b) serial correlation; and 
c) a one-period Markov process. 
Here, we present the results of the latter formulation only (however the 
major conclusions hold for all three alternative specifications). Each firm -
whose size is supposedly measured in terms of employees - grows according 
to 
g;,t = l\t-1ei,t (6) 
where g is the growth rate of firm i and e;,t =N(O;a,,) is a normally 
distributed random variable whose variance decreases with the age of the 
firm. 
In this model, the evolutionary specificities of each sector are roughly 
captured by the influence of size and age on survival probabilities. By trying 
different combi.r1ations of a and p in equation 4 one can generate four 
"archetypical" sectors, with "sector 1": decreasing returns to scale (and, 
thus, "evolutionary" advantage of smaller sizes); "sector 2": increasing 
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returns to scale (i.e. higher probability of survival of bigger firms); "sector 
3": a U-shaped probability function (small and very big firms have the 
highest survival probability, which loosely recalls Pavin's description of 
"science-based" sectors industries, suggesting the permanent coexistence of 
big oligopolies and small "Schumpeterian" firms); "sector 4": an inverted 
U-shaped function (i.e. there is plausibly a minimum efficient scale, beyond 
which organizational inefficiencies start operating). Moreover, age acts in 
equation 4 as a shift parameter which moves the survival function upward 
or downward and should implicitly account for the positive or negative 
"evolutionary value" of past experience. Hence, one may get 12 typologies 
of industrial evolution (the four basic relationships between size and 
probability of survival combined with positive, negative or null effect of 
age). 
We do not have any precise idea on the empirical frequencies of the 
various "types," but plausibly they tend to capture a good deal of the 
empirical variety of industries, ranging from cases where both scale and 
cumulative experience determine a differential competitiveness to the 
symmetric opposite wherein smallness, flexibility and "novelty" are major 
evolutionary advantages. 
Given 11 size classes, the simulations study the size distributions after 
100 runs, starting with a uniform distribution across classes. Interestingly, 
most distributions so generated depart to a greater or less extent from the 
Pareto distribution with a density function 
f(x)=qx-<1+9J 
and a right-cumulated function 
F(x)=x-q 
As an illustration, we present in Figures 8.1 to 8.4 the actual distributions 
and those obtained with OLS estimates of the logs of equation 7 on the 
four "archetypical" sectors (assuming no effect of age on survival thresholds). 
There is no striking conflict between these results and the little we know 
about the variety of industrial structures at a very disaggregated level: 
certainly, it does not contradict the evolutionary proposition that the 
"boundaries" between organizations and markets are influenced by the 
industry-specific features of learning and selection. 
Further, we suggest that 
a) manufacturing-wide Pareto distributions are the outcome of aggregation 
over widely different evolutionary processes and industrial structures, and 
b) such aggregate distribution tend to be maintained as long as on average 
the conditions of learning and selection do not dramatically change. 
To see the plausibility of the first proposition, let us extract 20 samples of 
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of industries that the model generates. As can be seen from Fig.5, the fit of 
a Pareto distribution is quite close, even if it was not so in most of the 
underlying sectors. 
Next, let us ask: what would happen if the general conditions of learning 
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of the current patterns of "restructuring" in Western economies argue 
precisely that one is observing a major change in the "technoeconomic 
paradigm," associated with information technologies and, with a "post-
Fordist" organization of production. (See for example, Freeman and Perez 
(1988)). All this - some add - implies a general competitive advantage for 
smaller firms (more rigorously, smaller business units} (Cf. Piore and Sabel 
1984). 
In this interpretation, one would predict that, first, also aggregate 
deviations from Pareto distributions, and, second, that these departures have 
a permanent nature. One actually observes in the 1970s and 1980s significant 
aggregate deviations from Pareto distributions (for evidence on Italy, see 
Barca (1985)), indicating a higher-than-average probability of growth of 
smaller size units. In our view, however, any inference on a competitive bias 
systematically favoring smaller size units might be deeply misleading. 
It has been argued earlier that any observed structure is influenced by 
both age and size (via their effects on the probability of survival and 
growth). Suppose that, in fact, the emergence of a new "technoeconomic 
paradigm" based on microelectronic technologies has partly changed the 
knowledge base of innovation and widened the domain of unexplored 
technological opportunities. All this has plausibly enriched the opportunity 
of entry of new firms, and possibly also challenged the technological and 
organizational skills of older incumbents. In our model, this economy-wide 
change in learning regimes associated with the "devaluation" of older skills, 
may be captured by a negative influence of age on growth: 
g _ g 6(a,i),, i,t - i,t-1 • Citt 
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Table 8.1 Deviations of actual aggregate size distributions from implied OLS 
estimate of Pareto distribution 
Range /(i) f"(i) deviation 
1 43.50 49.79 -12.63 
2 17.00 16.65 2.09 
3-5 17.84 16.69 6.89 
6--9 8.27 6.72 23.09 
10-19 7.50 5.05 48.37 
20-49 3.61 3.04 24.36 
100-249 0.61 0.62 -0.83 
250-499 0.23 0.21 11.54 
500-999 0.08 0.10 -27.60 
1000+ 0.01 0.10 -90.60 
We have simulated 10 years of such "shock" on growth opportunities and 
then calculated the deviation of the actual aggregate size distributions from 
the implied OLS estimate of a Pareto distribution.11 
Table 8.1 reports the results, which look quite like the evidence reported by 
Barca (1985) on Italian Census data: the biggest business units grow less 
than average while small to medium units grow above average. However, in 
our interpretation, this is the outcome of technological novelty and not of size 
as such. New firms are generally smaller, but their advantage does not reside 
in their "smallness', but in their "newness" (they are carriers of technological 
and organizational innovations allowed by the new "paradigm"). 
Under what circumstances can this bias be permanent? If our approach 
is correct, a permanent bias in favor of relatively "new" (and, as a 
consequence, smaller) firms would require 
a) the general disappearance of economies of scale in production, 
marketing, R&D, etc., and, 
b) the total lack of path-dependency and cumulativeness in learning. 
We consider both circumstances as highly unlikely. Rather, we suggest, the 
process of exploration of a new "technoeconomic paradigm" is eventually 
leading to new "trajectories" of path-dependent learning. Older organiza-
tions and new ones that have become big as a result of their innovative 
success, most likely, are progressively internalizing the competences asso-
ciated with the new paradigms. As a consequence, one should expect the 
growth process to return to a form similar to that described by equation 6.; 
and - as simulations not presented here show - the aggregate industrial 
structure to approach again a Pareto distribution. 
SOME CONCLUSIONS 
We have argued in this work that the nature of technological and organiza-
tional learning, jointly with the process of market selection, underlie the 
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explanation of the observed boundaries between the activities that are 
internalized within corporate organizations and those that are mediated 
through the market. The characteristics of learning and selection account for 
the approximate scope for diversification by multiproduct firms. These 
regimes of learning and selection, specific to each industrial activity, 
determine also the variety of industrial structures that one observes. The 
relative stability over time of a Pareto-type distribution of firms (and 
business units) - it has been tentatively suggested on the grounds of model 
simulations - may simply result by the aggregation over sectoral struc-
tures showing significantly different boundaries between organizations and 
markets. 
Further, we have argued, economy-wide discontinuities in the sources of 
innovation are likely to "shock" the size distribution of firms and business 
units by enlarging the "window of opportunity" of new entrants. However, 
long-term changes in the relative efficiency and competitiveness of small and 
younger firms vis-a-vis bigger and older ones would imply also a long-term 
fall on the importance of innovative experience and cumulative learning. 
Indeed, we are rather skeptical on any proposition suggesting that contem-
porary environments have become more "Darwinian" than in the past (that 
is, "learning" counts less and random mutation counts more; organizations 
decrease their abilities of coping with turbulent environments as compared 
with daring individuals ... ). Rather, we interpret the evidence on the 
industrial restructuring of the 1970s and 1980s as witnessing profound 
changes in the sources of corporate competitiveness, which - progressively 
- older and younger organizations are learning to master. 
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TRUST, COMMUNITY, AND 
COOPERATION 
Toward a theory of industrial districts1 
Edward H. Lorenz 
There is now a vast literature on dynamic industrial districts or regional 
agglomerations of firms. Initially regarded as a development confined to the 
Third Italy, industrial districts are now acknowledged to be widely distri-
buted in Europe, the United States, and Japan. The technological dynamism 
of industrial districts has contributed to a declining belief in the superiority 
of mass production techniques and to a burgeoning interest in the region as 
a unit of production.2 
The case study literature has succeeded in cataloging the most prominent 
characteristics of industrial districts and has managed to identify the key 
factor in their technological dynamism: a particular balance between co-
operation and competition among the firms within them (Dore 1986: 
153-204; Friedman 1988: chap. 5; Pio re 1990: 4; Piore and Sable 1984; 
Raveyre and Saglio 1984: 6~7; Sabel, 1989: 45-52; Sengenberger and 
Loveman 1987). 
Cooperation among producers in industrial districts has two principal 
aspects. It takes the form of the provision of collective goods,3 notably 
training or education and research and development, but also medical care 
and unemployment insurance. Collective goods generally are provided 
through the auspices of some local institution: business association, trade 
union, or possibly municipal or regional government. 
Cooperation also takes the form of adherence by producers to a set of 
norms of competition.4 This entails respecting the property rights distribu-
tions implied in contractual commitments, 5 and adhering to certain norms 
of reciprocity: sharing of technical information; subcontracting out to one's 
less successful competitors; and refraining from wage competition and 
labor poaching (Brusco 1982; Dore 1987: 171-9; Raveyre and Saglio 1984: 
165; Sabel and Zeitlin 1985: 146-9). Reciprocity is key to the technological 
dynamism of the districts because it reduces the risk of investing in new 
products or processes, while discouraging the alternative competitive strategy 
of competing through wage competition. 6 
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While the link between cooperation among producers and technological 
dynamism is well understood, there is as yet no theory explaining coopera-
tion within industrial districts, a fact which probably explains the limited 
success of policies designed to create industrial districts (Piore 1990: 9-11 ). 7 
This chapter is offered as a contribution to a theory of industrial districts. 
I argue that an adequate explanation for cooperation among producers must 
systematically explore the relation between cooperation and two observed 
features of dynamic industrial districts: their being embedded within 
"communities," and the high level of trust among producers within them.8 
The chapter is structured as follows. In the first section I develop the 
notion of "community," drawing on Michael Taylor's (1982) theory of how 
community maintains social order9 in stateless societies. In the second 
section I argue that the methods of social control used in communities to 
maintain social order account for, at least in part, the adherence to norms 
of competition in industrial districts. I also argue that differences in the 
degree of flexibility and technological dynamism among industrial districts 
(or in the same district over time) can be accounted for by differing levels 
of trust among the actors. The third section uses the analysis of trust and 
social control in communities to address the policy issue of the intentional 
creation of industrial districts. 
I 
Taylor (1982: 25-33) defines community as a small and stable group of 
individuals who: 
a) hold beliefs and values in common; 
b) whose relations with each other are direct as opposed to being mediated 
by the state or some other bureaucratic institution; 
c) whose relations are many-sided as opposed to specialized (there is no 
clear distinction between economics and politics); and 
d) who practice reciprocity. 
These characteristics can be more or less present and correspondingly we 
may talk of a group constituting a community to a greater or lesser extent. 
For example, a group of individuals forming a "business community" 
constitute less of a community than such intentional communities as Israeli 
kibbutzim, since relations between the actors are more specialized and the 
range of values and beliefs held in common are likely to be narrower. 
Further, contemporary communities, however wide the range of commonly 
held beliefs and values, are embedded in societies with states and some 
relations are mediated by bureaucratic institutions. Correspondingly, con-
temporary communities are less communal in Taylor's sense than, say, the 
historical example of primitive tribal groups in stateless societies. 
The principal types of social controls used to maintain social order in 
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communities are: the threat of "self-help" retaliation (feud, vendetta, etc.); 
the threat of withdrawal of reciprocity; and the use of the sanctions of 
approval and disapproval. These methods of social control are decentralized 
in that there is no political specialization and all may participate in their use 
(Taylor 1982: 80-1, 90-1).10 
In general, these social control methods will be more developed the more 
nearly the community approximates Taylor's definition. For example, 
neither the threat of withdrawal of reciprocity nor the "force of public 
opinion" are likely to be effective methods of securing cooperation in large 
open societies, since repeated encounters among the same individuals are 
less likely and information about others is less likely to be common 
knowledge. Similarly, the threat of withdrawal of reciprocity is less likely 
to be effective if individuals can rely on state provision of collective services, 
while the threat of retaliation is likely to be diluted in communities subject 
to the laws of a centralized state and its police force. 
Taylor argues that "community" provides a decentralized "solution" to 
the collective action problem of assuring security of property rights. 11 The 
threat of retaliation, the withdrawal of reciprocity, and the use of the 
sanctions of approval and disapproval may be thought of as selective 
incentives in Olson's (1965) sense. They alter an individual's expectations 
of the behavior of others to secure his or her cooperation, rather than 
altering preferences among outcomes. However, the decentralized provision 
of selective incentives characteristic of communities assumes a second order 
collective action problem. Since sanctioning the behavior of others is costly, 
why not "free ride" on the sanctioning efforts of others (Elster 1989: 40-1; 
Oliver 1980)? 
Ultimately, there are two explanations for cooperation in communities. 
It is the preferred choice in the context of an iterated Prisoners' Dilemma, 
where rational actors cooperate, not because of selective incentives but 
because the anticipated benefits of future mutual cooperation are valued 
higher than the one-time rewards of defecting while others cooperate 
(Axelrod 1984). This "solution" assumes accurate information about the 
attitudes and beliefs of others and that this information is "common 
knowledge" (Binmore and Dasgupta 1986). Doubts concerning the trust-
worthiness of others are likely to result in a breakdown of the "tacit" 
agreement to cooperate. Since the character of communities as small and 
stable groups would tend to generate the necessary information, it is 
plausible to argue that reciprocity may emerge for reasons of long term self-
interest independently of selective incentives (f aylor 1987: 52-3 ). 
Cooperation also may be motivated by social norms which have been 
internalized through education and socialization and which cannot be 
reduced to optimizing rationality. Norms may operate at the first link in 
the chain of actions, but also at the second: It is a norm to sanction those 
who do not sanction a violation of a social norm.12 In this case, the 
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"problem" of collective action in effect disappears, since, due to the 
internalization of social norms, cooperation is the preferred outcome. 
In eclectic fashion, I propose to argue that both motivations for coopera-
tion may operate. We may prefer to cooperate not only because we believe 
it to be in our long-term self-interest, but also because we believe it is the 
right thing to do.13 However, the reliance of communities on such "selective 
incentives" as expressions of approval and disapproval to secure cooperation 
implies that long-term self-interest alone is an imperfect guarantor of the 
social order. For some individuals the future may not be important enough 
to dissuade them from acting in ways that threaten person or property. More 
tragically, it is possible that all prefer cooperation for reasons of long term 
self-interest, but cooperation nonetheless flounders on lack of information 
and distrust about the intentions of others. Believing (incorrectly) that others 
prefer to defect, we defect, only to have our behavior sanctioned. 14 
Finally, before considering the implications of this discussion for indust-
rial districts, in communities it is difficult to distinguish the methods of 
social control from what is being controlled because of the many-sided 
nature of relations. The violation of a norm in one sphere of activity has 
ramifications in others and affects the entire social order. The prospect of 
this discourages would-be violators of social norms (Taylor 1982: 75-6). 
II 
One implication of the above discussion is that industrial districts should 
be seen as an aspect of the many-sided nature of social relations in 
communities, rather than as something autonomous embedded within 
communities. 15 The relations between the actors forming the industrial 
district may be more or less specialized and correspondingly they may 
constitute more or less of a community. For example, the actors forming 
the high-technology district of Silicon Valley constitute less of a community 
than the actors forming the French industrial district of Oyonnax investi-
gated by Raveyre and Saglio (1984). Since the Oyonnax community is more 
stable, the relations between actors less specialized, and the range of beliefs 
and values held in common wider, it is likely that the methods of social 
control characteristic of communities will be more fully developed in 
Oyonnax than in Silicon Valley. I return to this general issue in the third 
section addressing policy. 
Of the decentralized methods of social control found in communities, two 
are used in industrial districts to assure conformity to norms of competition: 
the threat of withdrawal of reciprocity and expressions of disapproval and 
approval (Raveyre and Saglio 1984: 164-7; Sabel and Zeitlin 1985: 1534).16 
The absence of the threat of "self-help" retaliation can probably best be 
accounted for by the location of industrial districts in societies subject to 
the laws of a centralized state. 17 
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The case study literature shows that these decentralized methods are 
complemented by more centralized methods. For example, in Lyon during 
the nineteenth century the conseil de prud'hommes mediated disputes 
between weavers and merchants, while at the turn of the century the Saint 
Etienne municipal government regulated the length of the working day for 
ribbon workers. The municipal governments of Solingen and Remscheld in 
Germany regulated safety conditions in the metalworking industry (Sabel 
and Zeitlin 1985: 150). 
The use of centralized methods might be explained in terms of the 
progressive intrusion of the state into formerly self-regulating communities 
resulting in the atrophy of decentralized methods (see Chapter 11). Decent-
ralized methods work best in small and stable communities where the actors 
share a wide range of values and relations are many-sided. The use of 
centralized methods might reflect the relative openness of nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century industrial districts to outsiders who because of their 
limited economic dependence on insiders and their lack of common values 
would be relatively impervious to the threat of withdrawal of reciprocity 
and the "force of public opinion." 
Being able to judge the trustworthiness of others is important in industrial 
districts, not only because of the possibility that outsiders may be imper-
vious to the methods of social control used in communities, but also because 
of the inevitable scope for opportunism offered by the necessary incom-
pleteness of contracts (verbal or written) in an uncertain world.18 Unantici-
pated contingencies, associated with technical change or demand shifts, 
provide opportunities to interpret contract terms in ways that shift the 
distribution of returns to the favor of one side.19 Neither third-party 
assistance in dispute resolution nor the force of reputation effects will 
necessarily assure contract compliance, simply because it may be impossible 
for the third party (or community) to distinguish between real and bogus 
claims. Community organization reduces the extent to which we need to 
worry about the trustworthiness of others with whom we have little or no 
personal experience, but it cannot dispose of our concerns altogether. 
Ultimately our decision to trust others will depend on our judgement of 
their honesty based on their behavior in repeated encounters. 
For these reasons, it can be argued that trust and cooperation remain 
problematic in industrial districts. The case study literature shows that 
unanticipated contingencies can trigger behavior which in a mutually 
reinforcing manner undermines high trust relations. Herrigel (1990: 403-8), 
for example, has documented the breakdown of trust and cooperation in 
German industrial districts during the interwar years. Sabel and Zeitlin 
(1985: 158-9) refer to a similar breakdown of trust among producers in 
the Sheffield cutlery industry during the late nineteenth century, the 
Birmingham metalworking shops after 1890, and the Saint Etienne silk 
ribbon industry during the interwar period. 
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In each of these cases, the breakdown of trust was associated with a 
widespread violation of established norms of reciprocity contributing to a 
loss of flexibility and technological dynamism. This occurred in two ways. 
In the case of Saint Etienne and the German industrial districts discussed 
by Herrigel, prolonged economic recession led to a loss of faith in the 
potential advantages of mutual cooperation. In Saint Etienne, for example, 
faced with a decline in demand for ribbons after World War I, producers 
disputed over who should bear the cost of apprenticeship training, and 
investment in new products and processes languished (Sabel and Zeitlin 
1985: 159). 
In the case of Birmingham and Sheffield, the process was the reve~se, with 
the perception of increased opportunities associated with expanding national 
markets encouraging producers to break their established links with the 
community. At the same time, labor in Sheffield, fearing loss of place within 
the district, sought to secure their property rights through enforcing 
substantive rules fixing the division of labor. 
The examples of Birmingham and Sheffield illustrate a tension within 
dynamic industrial districts. On the one hand, as with all communities, 
leveling mechanisms operate within industrial districts to restrict the growth 
of inequality.20 Examples include unemployment insurance and the re-
distribution of demand and provision of credit to support less successful 
competitors in final product markets. Too much inequality invites distrust 
by undermining the perceptions of mutual dependency that help sustain 
cooperation in communities.21 On the other hand, too much leveling 
discourages risky investments in new products and processes. What is 
required is an appropriate balance between rewarding entrepreneurship and 
limiting the growth of inequality. 
The technologically dynamic character of industrial districts depends on 
the beliefs of the actors in two respects: the belief that others can be trusted 
to abide by established norms of competition; and the belief that, while all 
deserve a place within the community, entrepreneurship should be rewarded 
by social advancement. The following discussion of policy, focusing on the 
United States, addresses the question of beliefs and how they change. 
III 
If the argument of this paper is correct, then the dynamism of industrial 
districts depends not solely on the creation of institutions to provide 
collective goods such as research and training, but also on the beliefs of the 
actors: the belief that, while entrepreneurship should be rewarded, all 
members of the community should be guaranteed a place through adherence 
to norms of reciprocity. The question of the intentional creation of 
industrial districts reduces in part, then, to the question of changing beliefs. 
One approach that can be readily rejected is that suggested by the 
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intentional creation of such communities as the nineteenth-century utopian 
American community of Oneida. 22 In Oneida, the forms of cooperation and 
reciprocity that sustained economic innovation emerged as by-products of 
commonly shared religious beliefs and experiences. The difficulty with this 
for policy is that the attempt to establish beliefs, which must be held for 
other than rational reasons, in order rationally to pursue some goal 
(economic efficiency) is likely to be self-defeating (Elster 1983: 51-2; 
Hawthorne 1988). 
A more promising approach is suggested by the examples of such high 
technology districts as Silicon Valley and Boston's Route 128, despite the 
fact that they were not intentionally created. The commonly held beliefs of 
the actors forming these communities are relatively narrow and largely 
understandable in terms of rational economic pursuits. 
Arguably the two principal beliefs underlying the dynamism of Silicon 
Valley are a belief in entrepreneurship, and a belief that technical knowledge 
is common property and should be shared, subject to certain ethical 
standards. As Rogers and Larsen note, the exchange of information is key 
to the ability of the network of firms composing Silicon Valley to manage 
the uncertainties of developing new products and productive technologies :23 
Information-exchange is a dominant, distinguishing characteristic of 
Silicon Valley. Because innovation entails coping with a high degree 
of uncertainty, such innovation is particularly dependent on informa-
tion. Information must be given in order for it to be obtained. The 
nature of the technical information exchange process in the micro-
electronics industry demands a high degree of reciprocity among the 
participants. 
(Rogers and Larsen 1984: 79-81) 
Information exchange in Silicon Valley is achieved in part through an 
exceptionally high degree of mobility of engineers and managers among 
firms: 
Silicon Valley was, by the mid-1970s, distinguished by its unusually 
high levels of job-hopping and new firm formation ... it became both 
common and acceptable for engineers and managers to regularly shift 
between firms. This consistent reshuffling process strengthened the 
region's social and technical infrastructure: as they chose to leave 
established companies, engineers took with them the skills, know-how 
and experience acquired at their previous job ... 
(Saxenian 1989: 37) 
Of these two beliefs, having sufficient quantities of the first ( entrepreneur-
ship) to generate technological dynamism among a network of firms is less 
problematic than the second (information exchange). Given a pool of entre-
preneurial talent in a region, a self-selection process is likely to operate to 
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assure that some of it is present in the firms composing the planned district. 
Some entrepreneurship is required simply to take the initiative to start up a 
firm. 
The reciprocal practices of information sharing among firms in Silicon 
Valley are not the norm in the United States and no doubt would violate 
the codes of secrecy operated by most American firms. The common belief 
in Silicon Valley that technical information is collective property seems to 
be a by-product of the close affiliation of the firms with a major research 
university and the fact that engineering professors took the lead in spinning 
off new high-technology firms.24 
The war thus created the technological infrastructure which supported 
Stanford's first electronics spin-offs during the 1940s and 1950s. The 
contribution of Stanford's engineering dean, Frederick Terman, lay 
less in the linkages he forged between the university and local industry, 
as commonly assumed, than in his active support for aspiring entre-
preneurs ... Terman initiated a tradition of cooperation which his 
proteges in tum replicated in their relationships with other emerging 
Silicon Valley enterprises ... 
One of Stanford's most significant, but overlooked, contributions to the 
development of Silicon Valley was in fostering inter-firm cooperation. 
(Saxenian 1989: 32-3) 
Barring the intentional creation of new industrial districts by major research 
institutes, how might the distinctive values about sharing technical informa-
tion that sustain innovation be promulgated in the United States? 
A promising approach to this question is suggested by Samuel Popkin's 
(1988) notion of the political entrepreneur. A political entrepreneur may be 
defined as an innovator who solves collective action problems not by 
offering selective incentives, but by persuasion and changing beliefs, beliefs 
about the value of the collective good and expectations about the behavior 
of others (Popkin 1988: 16-17). Popkin develops this idea in the context of 
an analysis of the political mobilization of peasant communities during the 
Vietnamese revolution. Popkin shows how four national movements (the 
Catholic Church, the Cao Dai, the Hoa Hao, and the Communist Party) 
won support for their aims by having their cadres work to solve smaller-
scale collective action problems at the village level, including the creation of 
insurance and welfare systems and the provision of educational opportuni-
ties. They accomplished this largely by persuading individuals that the 
contributions of others were dependent on their contributions, and by 
acting as monitors to increase the amount of information about the behavior 
of others. 
The analogous case for industrial communities would have the policy-
maker as political entrepreneur persuading producers, without the use of 
selective incentives, that they would benefit from independently providing 
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tangible collective goods such as apprenticeship training or collaborative 
research and development. The policymaker would also act as monitor. 
Persuading producers actively to participate in the effort would be key. 
Active participation, if successful, would i_ncrease the amount of communi-
cation among producers and would contribute to creating the trust among 
them that is a prerequisite for sharing technical information. As the adage 
goes, "nothing succeeds like success." 
Of course, there is no reason why reciprocity need be limited to the 
exchange of information. The actors might be persuaded to practice other 
forms of reciprocity that are characteristic of European industrial districts 
such as subcontracting work to less successful competitors' and refraining 
from labor poaching and wage competition. 25 
Reciprocal information sharing as practiced in Silicon Valley is not the 
norm in the United States and an important question is: how robust are such 
communities, given their openness to outsiders who may not share their 
beliefs? The actors in communities such as Silicon Valley lack common 
religious beliefs or ethnic ties that would allow individuals to distinguish 
between likely cooperators and defectors. On this point, the recent work of 
Axelrod (1984) on the iterated Prisoners' Dilemma is relevant. Axelrod has 
shown that a group of individuals practicing a "nice" strategy cannot be 
"invaded" by an individual or cluster practicing a "mean" strategy as long 
as the nice strategy is maximally discriminating. A maximally discriminating 
strategy will eventually cooperate even if the other has never cooperated yet, 
and once it cooperates will never cooperate again with someone who defects 
on the first and all subsequent moves, but will always cooperate with 
another using the same strategy it uses (Axelrod 1984: 62-9). Given the lack 
of religious or ethnic ties in planned industrial districts, the policymaker as 
political entrepreneur could play a key monitoring role by providing the 
information to distinguish between "nice guys" and "meanies. " 26 
A final point I want to raise about the maintenance of intentionally 
created industrial districts in the United States, concerns the balance of 
rational self-interest and social norms motivating cooperation. The policy-
maker is likely to operate through an appeal to the self-interest of producers: 
persuading them of the economic value of collective goods and of the 
importance of their contributions for eliciting the contributions of others. 
Given that the desired forms of reciprocity are the exception in the United 
States, an appeal to producers' social norms or values is unlikely to be 
successful. 
For this reason, such informal forms of cooperation as information 
exchange and refraining from labor poaching are likely to be particularly 
susceptible to a breakdown due to changes in the environment that alter a 
producer's perception of the value of cooperation. For example, a period of 
slack demand, increasing a firm's fear of competitive failure, is likely to 
promote information hoarding, as the successes of others are seen as limiting 
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one's own chance of success.27 Although persuasion may play a role, the 
likely remedy for this is the institutionalization of leveling mechanisms, such 
as the provision of credit during downturns and unemployment insurance, 
that assure all actors some place within the community. Thus, to balance 
somewhat the heavy emphasis on beliefs in my discussion of policy, the 
distinctive resources of the policymaker as political entrepreneur are most 
likely to be effective if complemented by formal institutions that assure 




A REEXAMINATION OF THE 
ITALIAN MODEL OF FLEXIBLE 
PRODUCTION FROM A 
COMPARATIVE POINT OF 
VIEW1 
Bruno A. Courault and Claudine Romani 
At a time when new theoretical models to explain the relative contraction 
of national - and growth of international - markets are being developed, 
analysis of the "Marshallian industrial districts"2 has been used by Italian 
researchers to explain the relative process of certain regions in coming to 
grips with these new conditions. The dynamics of employment in many 
regions of that country and the ability of these regions to withstand national 
and international competition is seen as the result of the flexibility of the 
production systems of their industrial districts. This flexibility is said to be 
the reward for a coordination of production between the social base and the 
smooth regulation of economic, social, and political elements in a local 
context. The industrial district promotes flexibility due to the coordination 
of productive structure and its social roots. 
We intend to reconsider the generality of such a model, and to understand 
the conditions under it that might be extended to other countries. Research 
on the Annonay and Oyonnax industrial systems in France pioneered the 
consideration of the general principles of the Italian model.3 A host of other 
studies has since been carried out by Courault, Rerat and Weisz in France;4 
Romani and Bettio,5 Brusco, Garofoli, Solinas and Villa6 in Italy; comparing 
French and Italian industrial zones. This work has stimulated, even among 
the Italian researchers, questions concerning the possible extension and 
durability of the above-mentioned model, i.e. "To what extent does the 
Italian model in itself constitute a specific productive form?". We must ask 
whether the originality of the Italian model is a result of its unique local 
foundations, or whether it describes a generalized economic logic of 
productive decentralization. 
In this chapter we intend to address this question in order to consider the 
extent to which the industrial district model may be reproduced in other areas. 
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OVERVIEW OF THE ITALIAN INDUSTRIAL MODEL 
A network of small and medium-sized companies 
The originality of the industrial district model, as designed by its founders, 
lies in the central role played by the notion of local space: the district is a 
place where products are produced and put in circulation, labor is managed, 
and there exists institutional regulation to ensure the stability and survival 
of the district. Different authors take different views on the articulation of 
these three functions and on the influence of the social and economic 
mechanisms that shape local space (Brusco 1982, Solinas 1982, Bagnasco 
1985, Becattini et al. 1987, Ganne et al. 1988, Sabel 1988, Regini and Sabel 
1989, Saglio 1989).7 Here we shall consider specific aspects of the internal 
workings of this model as summarized by Piore and Sabel, who call the 
industrial district systems of "flexible specialization," and set up this idea 
of flexibility in their book (1984).8 
We may begin with the organizational logic of the "production decentral-
ization" model, which was formalized by Brusco in the early 1980s, and 
identifies the production system as an integrated whole, composed of a 
myriad of specialized units, all of which are linked to the market in a way 
that maximizes the responsiveness of the productive system to market trends 
(Brusco 1982). The system is taken to be the canonical form of production 
flexibility. 9 Decentralization entails at one and the same time specialization 
of units and diversification of the production system as a whole. The 
application of this model to manufacturing industries such as clothing, 
knitwear, silk, footwear, mechanics, machine tools, electronics, metalwork-
ing, and even steel production, underscores the attempt of analysts to 
generalize the model, i.e. to suggest that all locally based industrial special-
izations are in fact Marshallian industrial districts.10 
It is widely argued that the production flexibility resulting from this 
apparatus is linked to labor management. Solinas, for example, argues that 
the economic structure of the districts rests on a distinctive social base, part 
of which is its system of labor-management relations (Solinas 1982). This 
implies that patterns of social relations that are specific to particular places, 
and therefore to the history of each district, play a central role in this 
industrial district. Social relations specific to each village, clan, or family, 
and the specific, local cultural foundations that cement them, underpin the 
economic organization of each district: they act as a system for the exchange 
of economic information that in its tum feeds into and promotes the 
circulation of products throughout the entire district. 
The district therefore appears as a paradox: a blend of archaic and modern 
forms of social life, the age-old, guild-like producers' organizations and 
traditional social networks combined with the most sophisticated tech-
nologies and marketing strategies. Far from vanishing with the extension of 
modern industries, the clan and extended family have strengthened their 
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foothold and received a new lease of life through the recourse to new 
technologies and global markets. It appears that the growth of international 
markets, rather than triggering the classical phenomenon of industrial 
concentration, has simply rendered more dynamic a system of production 
rooted in archaic forms of social organization. Relations of proximity and 
of the family are important in supporting exchange networks which 
constitute the social basis of production. 11 The work force plays a pivotal 
role. The foremost figure is neither the white-collar nor the blue-collar 
worker but rather the independent or "autonomous" worker. The latter is 
not the same as the archaic category of the "artisan." Unlike the artisan, the 
autonomous worker occupies many different roles, such as professional 
worker or home-worker, often switching from one season to the next, and 
never achieving the fixity or stability of the artisan's former situation (see 
Brusco and Sabel 1982, Solinas 1982). The existence of this type of worker 
provokes much interest because his existence is inconceivable without 
specific local supports, on one hand, and because it extends craftsmanship 
to an industrial scale on the other. 
A local area open to the international market 
Another paradoxical aspect of the industrial district model is that it is based 
on fragmented and localized producers who are nonetheless heavily oriented 
toward export markets.12 In the shoe industry, for example, the ability of 
Italian producers to succeed in international markets appears as a direct 
consequence of the locally fragmented sytem of production organized as an 
industrial district. Here, firms are not linked by a tree-like hierarchy, in 
which only those firms at the top of the tree gain exclusive access to the 
end market, while the others are reduced to subcontracting; rather, in the 
footwear industry, many different producers have access to the end market, 
but this position is never secure. 13 
This is difficult to understand, for the structure of production as a whole 
appears to be too fragmented and incoherent to produce such a strong 
position enjoyed on international markets. The strength of Italian producers 
on the international market lies in their creative flair. This means that in 
Italy every shoe company, whatever its current market position and status, 
gears itself up to present a collection each season. If the collection is well-
received, the firm gains access to the end market; if not, it is relegated to 
subcontracting work for that season. The fragmented structure can thus 
consistently capture international markets, in spite of the power of the major 
buyers. With their creative acumen, Italian producers define the qualities of 
supply, and this secures them a position "upstream" of the market itself. In 
contrast to Italian producers, French and English firms face integrated 
distribution systems, and this distances wholesalers from production. 14 
Italian producers push industrial specialization as far as it will go, without 
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making any investment downstream or in the commercial sector. Italian 
production flexibility is therefore based on the way distribution follows the 
productive system and not the other way around (see Courault and Rerat 
1988, Courault 1990). 
The Italian case thus provides reason for skepticism with respect to 
theories of production which assert that competition necessarily stimulates 
industrial concentration. 15 Here the opposite is the case: the end market is 
in many cases represented by foreign buyers who set up offices within the 
specialized districts themselves in order to follow the producers' design 
trends (Courault, Rerat 1988).16 
A GEOGRAPHICAL EXTENSION OF THE MODEL 
We may now ask whether the originality of the Italian district model is the 
result of the history of Italian local economies and to which extent it can 
be applied to other geographical and historical spaces. For example, are the 
traditional forms of local industrial systems and local economies that 
currently exist in the industrial regions of France similar to those of the 
Italian districts? To reply to this question we shall draw on two comparative 
studies. The first is a comparison of French and Italian districts specializing 
in shoe production (Courault et al. 1987; Brusco et al. 1987). The second 
examines the branch agreements passed in the textile and clothing industry 
in the same two countries (Romani 1988).17 
In the Italian case, economic development appears to be rooted in specific 
local rules. In the cases of the knitting industry in Carpi, silk production in 
Como, and textiles in Prato; the rules that govern labor management are 
defined at the level of the district (see pages 212-14). In contrast the rules 
established in the French shoe industry districts have less to do with local 
foundations than in Italy, as they have been developed in line with the 
national system of economic regulation.18 
It must be stressed that in spite of these different local rules for labor 
markets, production methods are very similar in the districts of the two 
countries: the production system consists of a myriad of localized units 
benefiting from the proximity of the work force, neighborhood relations, 
and reliance on interfirm relations. Moreover, in both cases, the local area 
constitutes a zone where a localized work force can be mobilized as needed. 
The principal difference concerns the underlying forms of organization 
and governance of the decentralization of production. In Italy, decentraliza-
tion relies upon a significant mobility of workers between different very 
small units, and these units are sometimes end producers and other times 
subcontractors. In France, on the other hand, decentralization takes the form 
of geographical deconcentration of units of a given firm. In the Italian case, 
the mobility of workers between companies in the district assures the 
flexibility of the units and the system as a whole. A large number of 
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independent workers can thus at any moment be mobilized to provide the 
missing link in the chain of production. The French situation is very 
different; as there exist fewer units of production marked by a greater degree 
of stability in the structural organization, labor mobility involves the 
workers of a given company, and even this is limited as it is unusual for 
them to change units of production. Thus interfirm mobility of workers 
plays the central role in the flexibility of the Italian productive system, 
whereas in France internal Labor mobility is dominant, as is the case of 
companies in the district of Cholet (Courault et Rerat 1987; Lorthiois et 
Rerat 1987). 
The Italian district can thus be said to be a local construction in the sense 
that the industrial system is a product of local social relations (see Bagnasco, 
Trigilia 1985). In Italian cases professional craft skills and local political 
regulation are essential, whereas in the French cases the economic logic of 
the firm - which is not local - is secondary to economic factors (Ganne et 
al. 1988; Ganne 1990). 
The specificity of the Italian economy resides in the way that social and 
occupational mobility underlies the formation of an entrepreneurial class. 
Becattini (1977, 1990) has developed an analysis concerning the central role 
that this class constitutes, but he has been challenged by Bagnasco (1987). 
Becattini insisted upon the role of entrepreneurs acting as a class in the 
development of industrial activity, whereas Bagnasco underlines the roles of 
interclass social consensus, based on shared values and habits, in reproduc-
ing the social environment for the generation of new activities on the model 
of the traditional ones. In this view, the importance of the ways the workers 
learn and enlarge their collective skills is stressed (Courault-Rerat 1989). 
Though management of labor is essential in both the French and Italian 
cases, in the latter access to high skill is fully adapted to external flexibility, 
while internal flexibility is central to the functioning of the French areas. 
THE STABILITY OF INDUSTRIAL DISTRICTS 
We would like to examine the way the district model articulates local rules 
and external economic constraints. One can explain the formation of 
industrial districts in the shoe industry in the different cases we have studied 
in France and in Italy as the outcome of a series of local rules which 
concretize in that sector and territory, a specific path of historical develop-
ment. In each district we can identify a moment when the choice of a 
product policy became strongly identified with local culture. The rules of 
each district thus reflect this historic period when the supremacy of a 
particular product was established and when the locality adopted practices 
different from those in place elsewhere. In agreement with Bagnasco {1985), 
Saglio (1989), and Thevenot (1989), we would say that the local specializa-
tion in each district reflects the social construction of a particular product 
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market. Industrial specialization lasts only as long as the local rules can 
assure the adaptation of the local productive organization to the state of 
competition in those markets. 19 
In the case of four different French shoe industry regions (Marseille, 
Fougeres, Romans, Cholet) we find that local rules exist to harmonize local 
working practices with the needs of production in light of the state of 
competition. In Marseille and Fougeres, high skill levels were required for 
the production of high-quality or handmade products. Product changes 
induced the decline of those regions because they led to the implantation of 
new greenfield sites of production untouched by these traditional working 
practices: it is in this way that we can understand the emergence of new 
regions such as the Cholet, which developed later on the basis of new 
technology and lower quality products. The Italian district of Barletta has 
recently emerged as an alternative to the Marches, which had itself replaced 
Vigevano. In a different way Romans, in France, in contrast to Vigevano, 
saw its productive potential decline as a result of specializing in articles for 
the luxury market. In both countries there is a tradition of a succession of 
new districts joining together with the old, and then, after a certain period, 
supplanting them. Expansion of districts means modernization, crisis, and 
sometimes decline, where the existing work rules cannot be adapted to the 
production of new products. 
THE DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE DISTRICT 
MODEL 
We have thus far considered the shoe industry in terms of models under-
pinned by an economic logic interwoven with local social and political 
factors. It is now necessary to enlarge our field of inquiry to see if these 
models are specific and unique to their times and places or whether they 
have general applications. The question has already been widely debated 
with respect to in the work of Piore and Sabel (1984), who claim that the 
model of flexible specialization could be seen as a possible historical 
successor to mass production. 
Yet it seems hasty to conclude, as do Piore and Sabel, that the Italian 
districts represent a possibly general model of industrialization. The cases 
examined here suggest the importance of different local contexts in the 
emergence and consolidation of the Italian system of industrial districts, and 
this notion is reaffirmed in the work of Bagnasco (1985), Capecchi (1987), 
or Brusco (1982) on the origins and conditions of the emergence of the 
Italian district model (see Brusco 1990; Capecchi 1990). 
The opposition between large companies and small companies once 
appeared to us to provide a solid point of departure for the study of 
productive systems, for large-firm systems and small-firm systems follow 
completely different logics of development (Saglio 1987). In one case, there 
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is a concentration of production capacity as internal economies of scale come 
into play. In contrast to this, the developmental tendencies of small-scale 
units of production appear to be less governed by economic laws; hence 
they are less generalizable. It would be a mistake to reduce them either to 
the Italian model of "industrial districts," or to the equivalent French model 
studied by Ganne (1983) and Raveyre and Saglio (1984), and Courault-
Rerat-Weisz (1987). Such a reduction assimilates the dynamics of small and 
medium-sized companies in general to those of particular local industrial 
systems. Our analysis stresses the factors which make small-scale productive 
units depend on their local bases (social and professional resources, econo-
mic initiatives to develop and reinforce the power of local business, and 
other political factors). Much of the theoretical framework for this line of 
analysis goes back to Marshall, according to whom the market and competi-
tion do not rule out important interactions between solidarity and competi-
tion, consensus and the market, in complexes of small- and medium-sized 
firms.20 
In this light, the recent hypothesis of Regini and Sabel (1989) of a 
convergence between small and large firms is of particular interest. Accord-
ing to them, small and medium-sized firms have developed in compliance 
with the organizational model of large companies but on a different scale, 
for example using forms of alliance or coalition; conversely, large companies 
have decentralized, either in the form of a network, or through the classic 
use of small subcontractors, many of whom were initially dependent and 
who later developed greater independence and separation. This hypothesis 
thus asserts the existence of global dynamics of production systems. In our 
view, however, the districts are not the result of convergence, but represent 
a different intermediate category which bypasses the classic dualism between 
large firms, on the one hand, and small and medium-sized firms on the 
other. We would counter Regini and Sabel, by claiming that this inter-
mediate form is efficient in a context of sharpened competition and is 
potentially long-lasting, but not a replacement for the other two. 
We interpret this intermediate form alternatively as the emergence of a 
productive system incorporating all the small and medium-sized companies, 
or as a new type of firm, derived from large firms and seeking to recuperate 
its autonomy by large decentralization of production, with respect to 
efficiency through the adoption of flexible specialization. 
Regini and Sabel seek to legitimize the district model as a norm and thus 
as a point of reference for development in other areas. This position runs 
counter to our interpretations of these areas, which situates them within 
specific local historical and economic contexts. For example, the fashion-
clothing system in Cholet (France) has the appearance of a 1960s type 
creation ex-nihilo; but it is really the result of a transformation of a large 
number of existing subcontractors. The footwear system in Apulia (Italy) is 
similar but dates from the 1980s. The latter system combines the productive 
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centralization of a number of large units with small subcontracting units 
who draw on a large number of independent workers (Brusco, Garofoli, 
Solinas, Villa 1987). The footwear system in the Marches region (Italy) came 
into being and expanded from a tiny starting point (small production for 
the local market), whereas the Vigevano district fell into decline because of 
the overly specialized products of local firms. The same occurred in the 
Cholet (France) footwear system, confronted with the Fougeres system 
which has now disappeared from the map. Other local industrial districts 
(Carpi or Prato, Oyonnax or Roanne) all present this feature of decentral-
ized units of production linked together to serve the final market; it radically 
differentiates them from deliberate attempts to install districts such as the 
"technopoles" and other networks established by particular groups (see 
Greffe 1988; Domergues 1988). 
According to the Italian authors we have quoted, districts emerge on the 
basis of local processes within a defined local historical context (Capecchi 
1987; Trigilia 1986). Only two authors, Bagnasco (1978) and Fua (1985), 
argue that preexisting social and cultural foundations of districts alone play 
a major role in the development of the district. This conflicts with what is 
suggested by the analyses of Brusco (1982) and Capecchi (1987), who place 
less emphasis on social factors and insist on the role of economic logics, i.e. 
the influence of product specialization in the regulation of the productive 
system. Our argument is that economic foundations have a powerful 
structuring effect on the formation of districts, but that those foundations 
are themselves inseparable from social forces - especially in the labor market 
- in the rise and regulation of the districts. 
LOCAL SELF REGULATION: THE DISTRICT AS A 
REGULATED COMMUNITY 
We need now to understand how the district operates: the constitution and 
negotiation of territorial rule systems,21 in our view, play a vital role in the 
survival and reproduction of industrial districts. These systems of norms go 
a long way to determining the "life cycles" of the districts, their conditions 
of growth, and their survival or disappearance. The district can be thought 
of as an industrial space in which implicit or explicit norms develop, most 
often stabilized in the form of agreements between local partners. Though 
such agreements also owe much to other norms in force outside the district, 
and internal modes of regulation can never therefore be wholly dissociated 
from practices that remain external to the district, it is nonetheless the case 
that the local negotiation of these norms is of central importance. These 
rules reinforce the overall coherence of the local productive system in its 
territorial context, as Saglio (1989) has often emphasized. 
In Italy, local negotiation plays a threefold role. First, it seeks to establish 
local conventions which usually remain implicit. These agreements attempt 
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to stabilize relations on the market in a form that we might describe as 
"relational": this applies both to the norms of strategic solidarity between 
business and to relations between companies and political actors within the 
region. For example, we might call attention to various effons to establish 
alliances or "partnerships" with the aid of local governments. These efforts 
have taken place in two areas: the creation of service centers for firms, 
especially in the industrial districts of Castel Goffredo, Capri, and Como; 
and efforts to aid professional training, both initial and continued, via the 
establishment of training centers such as the technical industrial institute of 
Biella in Lombardy. 
Second, this negotiation establishes institutional means of intervening in 
the labor market at a local level. It provides for local adaptation of national 
institutions, which are then managed for local outcomes. We would draw 
attention to the regulation of overmanning through the intermediary of the 
Cassa lntegrazione de Guadagni (CIG) following a decision made within the 
framework of local agreements (for example, that of Prato, ratified on 22 
July 1987). This institution is a powerful tool of social regulation combining 
industrial and social factors (Romani 1987). The CIG mixes local and 
branch-level negotiations within a framework which combines the logic of 
sociopolitical and professional rationality. The institutional dimension thus 
has an extremely original regulatory function - of which there is no 
equivalent anywhere in the world - in that as it creates a link between 
occupational labor markets and local labor markets that are found nowhere 
else, except in Germany (see Silvestre, 1986). This is a powerful example of 
the way that external institutional mechanisms can reshape local affairs. The 
rules of the CIG envisaged that only firms that were undergoing restructuring 
would be authorized to invoke the "state of crisis" in order to have recourse 
to the resources of the CIG. The agreement had, as its main purpose, to 
allow small firms to suspend activity of a portion of their personnel for a period 
of at least six months. These firms negotiated as a bloc ( of 250), to obtain 
access to the resources of the CIG, affecting 8,600 workers. Such a 
negotiating process required that the individual enterprises be organized at 
the territorial level. Only in this way could they obtain the authorization to 
use resources of the CIG. But by negotiating at the territorial level, they 
established the precedent that the firm is not the exclusive agent in such a 
negotiating process: other territorial partners were now legitimated. There 
are many other examples of the local negotiation of such institutional devices 
as employment training contracts (Romani 1988). But local negotiation takes 
place around other issues, too. Analysis of the content of a sample of district 
agreements negotiated in Italy has shown, among other things, that one of 
the poles around which local negotiating practices are organized is the 
definition of the various different components of salary (Romani 1988). 
Third, the local production of norms creates a hybrid and autonomous 
level of negotiation located at the point of contact between the company, 
213 
THE TERRITORIAL FOUNDATIONS OF PRODUCTION SYSTEMS 
the sector, and the region.22 It redefines the areas of competence of the social 
actors involved in the negotiation process. For example, in Italy, local 
negotiation is not the exclusive province of "traditional" social bargaining 
partners such as the trade unions or employers associations. On the 
contrary, it involves the participation of a range of agencies in local civil 
society - local councillors, local associations - whose presence draws all 
those involved in the negotiation into a process of active cooperation to 
create rules. In comparison with previous practices, this kind of regulation 
of professional relations leads not only to a diversification of those involved 
in collective action but also to a modification of the strategies adopted by 
these parties. This broader-based articulation of social actors, apparently 
inherent in local negotiation, gives the local community a "consensual 
foundation" and reinforces its legitimacy. This has led to a socially 
consolidated management of economic restructuring, including the produc-
tion and organizational strategies of firms. The success of those processes 
goes a long way to explaining the ongoing success of certain local districts, 
and also the disappearance of others: for example, the failure of the old 
French regions of Romans and Fougeres in producing shoes reflects the 
rigidity of professional agreements which had been locally adopted and had 
blocked the possibility for technological innovation ( see Courault, Rerat and 
Weisz 1987). 
The power of local actors can also be seen in local negotiation on issues 
of labor management, employment and layoff policies, and skill and wage 
setting. 
Thus local regulation in the production of norms is a vital part of the 
broader movement toward decentralization of industrial relations in the 
1980s (Romani, 1987). In Italy, the need to render labor more flexible has 
in effect led to a progressive abandonment of standardized and rigid rules. 
The redistribution of areas of competence at different territorial scales has 
therefore given a new push to the local level. This has led to a diversification 
of labor market conventions and a reduction in national level. 
The specifically Italian dynamics thus seem to lie at a crossroads between 
decentralized regulation, which includes the local, market, and domestic 
dimensions, and regulation negotiated at a centralized level of the national 
institutional framework, which is less political in nature and has a greater 
social content, as in the example of CIG. 
DISTRICTS SITUATED IN METROPOLITAN AREAS 
The classical model of the district (i.e. in Tuscany) developed in the presence 
of the extended family, which in tum accompanied the historical form of 
agricultural sharecropping prevalent there (mezzadria). The dense family 
networks form the conditions for a small-scale entrepreneurial class and 
promote solidarity. If the Italian district appears to be well suited to 
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development in this type of rural environment, we may ask whether 
equivalent forms of localism could emerge in metropolitan and industrial-
ized areas. Metropolitan districts stand out from the classical district model 
in that they cannot draw on the same socioeconomic conditions. This is the 
case, for example, in urban Spanish industrial districts. 23 Industrial zones in 
the Barcelona area have the classical structures of a district: a high degree 
of specialization in its production units (in this case in small-scale mechanics 
and metallurgy); a high concentration of small and medium-sized com-
panies24 in a defined geographical area; and a tight subcontracting network 
and dense interdependence between companies. Although this district 
manifests the main characteristics of the Italian districts, its social founda-
tions are in fact quite different. First, it came into being quite recently (the 
early 1960s) in an area without industrial traditions. Second, its formation 
followed an exogenous principle of local development: it grew from the 
massive importation of labor (immigration from the south of Spain, mainly 
Andalusia) and not by drawing on local labor reserves. Industrial develop-
ment here was financed by imponing capital (from large foreign companies) 
and not from any original accumulation of capital by a locally based social 
class. Third, the local small business class in the district is not of rural origin. 
Rather, this class crystalized around the skilled Catalan worker of the 1930s 
and 1950s who, after years of factory work, set up his own workshop. It 
grew by drawing in skilled or highly skilled workers who had migrated from 
the south, and who had given up working for a large company (Seat) in 
order to establish workshops that would then do subcontracting work for 
the company. The small business class has also been nourished by the 
tradition, strong in Catalonia, of "individual companies," created by 
someone in charge of the initiative and by his socio (associate), frequently a 
member of the family if the founder is of the south, but more usually a 
factory colleague if the founder is Catalan. Finally, the relations of solidarity 
on which the cohesion of the district is founded rely less on family links 
than in Italy and more on "factory solidarities" and "brotherhood" 
(gremios). 
Those suggest the heterogeneity of the conditions under which the 
districts are formed and in panicular their most recent forms. This diversity 
in the creation and organization of industrial districts renders any general 





AND LOCAL INDUSTRIAL 
SYSTEMS IN POSTWAR FRANCE 
Political economy of a transformation 
Bernard Ganne 
INTRODUCTION 
Starting from observations in postwar Italy (cf. Bagnasco's Third Italy, 
19n) there has been a rediscovery of the importance of the territory in 
general and localities in particular in the organization of production. The 
local dimension, long overshadowed by concern with the macroeconomy, 
has reemerged as an object of concern. This is due in part to the rediscovery 
of the variety of economic forms that constitute an alternative to the mass 
production system that had come to dominate the economy in many 
countries (Sabel and Zeitlin 1985). It is also due to attempts to anticipate 
developments by observing a congruence between these older forms of 
industrial organization and the new ones based on flexible specialization 
(Piore and Sabel 1984). In light of the performance of the Italian districts, 
and as if to compensate for decades of neglect, the local area is making a 
comeback as a new paradigm of industrial development. 
A new hegemonic paradigm? 
Not long ago, structuralism was hegemonic in French economics and in 
sociology. For the structuralists, the local is nothing more than the 
projection onto a small screen of major macroeconomic forces. Ironically, 
it is often those who were the most ardent supporters of the school of 
development economics, which favored self-perpetuating industrialization 
("industrie industrialisante"), who have become the most ardent defenders 
of territorial and local modes of development (Courlet and Judet 1986a, 
1986b ). This type of about-face appears to be leading to the development of 
a new hegemony which, in my view, is as damaging as the old one. 
First, the Italian example was too rapidly turned into a model which 
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uncritically champions endogenous growth. The success stories are cele-
brated, but the real lessons of the districts are not being learned (Michelsons 
and Baptiste 1989; Courault and Romani 1990; Ganoe, 1989d). 
Second, the current focus on the few zones in France that are most similar 
to the Italian districts (Cholet, the Jura, etc.), masks the fact that these zones 
are exceptions. In France there are few phenomena truly analogous to those 
observed in Italian industrial districts. 
By stressing the direct similarities between types of local development in the 
two countries, one misses the real question: in which political context do 
these local dynamics occur? Surely they have different meanings in the centralized 
French system than in the decentralized Italian one. Undue fascination with 
the success of Italian industrial districts thus forecloses precise assessments 
of the importance and place of local industrial systems in general. 
A study of the French case responds to these difficulties by permitting 
the district phenomenon to be put into a theoretical perspective, which 
underscores its link with the political system. Until the postwar period, local 
industrial systems occupied a relatively important place within the French 
productive system. But then many of them disappeared just at the moment 
when the Italian districts began to prosper and proliferate. 
The first part of this chapter contrasts the evolution of French and Italian 
districts, showing that an effective mobilization of endogenous potentialities 
is insufficient to guarantee the survival of localized industrial systems. Not 
only did the social, economic, and political integration of the communities fail 
to guarantee their survival, but it even contributed to their decline by helping 
to close the local economy off from the outside world. It was from the exterior, 
by means of state intervention, that these involuted systems were reopened. 
The second part of this chapter draws out the lessons of the French case 
by showing to what extent the very constitution of local industrial systems 
depends on political factors. 
Methodologically speaking, it would nonetheless be a mistake to think in 
terms of a local/global opposition, of endogenous versus exogenous forces, 
or of local cultural forces versus economic and political forces. The point, 
rather, is to understand the different ways in which the construction of the 
local is authorized by the political in France and in Italy: the comparison 
illuminates not only the internal structure of districts, but the type of 
relation established between the different systems and their environments. 
Thus, rather than an element-by-element comparison, each system must be 
taken as a whole, of which its politics forms an important part. 
PLACE AND EVOLUTION OF LOCAL INDUSTRIAL 
SYSTEMS IN FRANCE: SOME CONTRASTS WITH THE 
ITALIAN DISTRICTS1 
In the interwar and early postwar years, France had a large variety of local 
industrial systems, all characterized by the importance of small family firms. 
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Often these were well integrated with each other. This system disappeared 
during the 1960s, at the very time when a similar form of economic 
organization began to gain importance in Italy. Why? 
From the 1950s onward, French industry - including the Paris basin, all 
the regions of the north, the northeast and the southeast - was marked by 
extensive restructuring (Browaeys and Chatelain 1984). Even so, the variety 
of industrial systems - and the systems of small firms in particular -
remained important. These included the systeme Motte in the north, 
consisting of federations of family firms; the aristocratic system of paper 
production in Annonay (Ardeche); cutlery in Thiers; the textile centers of 
the Vosges; the small metallurgy and watchmaking industries of Franche-
Comte; and finally the silk industry in Lyon (Sabel and Zeitlin 198S). These 
systems joined communities of persons and populations of firms via 
networks of artisans and merchants in historically bounded industrial 
districts (Becattini 1987). 
Paradoxically, it was perhaps these links - or rather the concern to 
preserve them as they were - that contributed to the disappearance of the 
local industrial systems. The rigid maintenance of these systems put the 
defense of the status quo before the problem of adaptability, thus blocking 
the economic adaptation. A dirigiste modernizing current, created at the end 
of the 1930s, was able to make its mark effectively after the war by 
organizing economic concentration, (cf. the X-crise group, Bonin 1988: 11). 
This was aided by the fact that collaboration with Vichy had politically 
discredited the patronat. 
Thus, contrary to what is observed in the Italian case, local integration of 
the industrial systems does not always guarantee openness or adaptiveness. 
For French postwar planners, these systems constituted just so many 
obstacles to be removed. It is thus the massive disappearance of former local 
industrial systems that characterizes the postwar period in France, with the 
exception of certain specific cases to which we now tum. 
Diffused industrialization and localized industrial systems: limited 
developments 
It was only in certain zones that there developed in France phenomena 
similar to the Italian industrial districts. In the west these zones include the 
Choletais in Anjou, and the Vendee. In the east they include the Savoys, 
the Monts du Lyonnais, and the Jura. Given what is, after all, in France, 
the recent interest in problems of districts and diffused industrialization, one 
might suspect that this meager harvest reflects only the deficit of research 
on the theme. And the inventory certainly remains to be completed. But it 
is also true that outside of these principal zones, industrialization has not 
spread in France as dramatically as in the north-east-center of Italy and 
the 70 area-systems listed by Garofoli (Garofoli 1981, 198S). The reason for 
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this is perhaps that in France such zones are exceptional, isolated culturally, 
politically, socially, and even economically. 
As Bagnasco and Trigilia's observations regarding the white zone of 
Bassano and the red zone of the Val d'Elsa (Bagnasco and Trigilia 1984, 
1988) suggest, diffuse industrialization and localized industrial systems have 
developed in France in ideologically specific zones, places which cultivate a 
certain political, social, and religious autonomy from the rest of the country. 
In the Vendee and Cholet, we thus find wholly "white" zones, formerly 
royalist and very Catholic, marked by an ancient opposition to the 
Republican state; and these characteristics are equally marked in the Monts 
du Lyonnais. In the Jura and areas such as Oyonnax, it is rather the old 
socialist and libertarian tradition of the nineteenth century, and also the 
Utopians, that seem to have played a crucial role, and these traditions are 
reflected in a type of development based on craft firms. 
In recent years, all these zones have had grown rapidly. Examples are the 
shoe industry in Cholet and plastics in Oyonnax. The organization of 
flexibility in these regions is reflected in the way they have succeeded in 
adapting to crises, even using them to facilitate renewal ( changes in the 
productive system in the case of the shoe industry, adoption of new 
techniques in plastics, etc.). 
These zones in a sense cultivated their autonomy, favoring internal 
complementarities and looking first of all within themselves for solutions 
to their problems without, however, closing in upon themselves as did local 
industrial systems. 
In contrast to the preceding examples, where the local order hindered 
openness to the market, here openness to the exterior, and the adaptativeness 
which this implies, constitute the best guarantee of the longevity of the local 
system. 
Networks of small firms: more and more delocalized developments? 
Much recent analysis has shown the superior adaptiveness and capacity for 
offensive flexibility of small firms. Numerous studies have also shown 
the importance in France of this type of development in the creation of 
firms, the transformation of the industrial tissue, and the development of 
technopoles. 
Yet even though these new dynamics may sometimes take place on a local 
basis, they seem in fact to depend more and more on the formation of 
professionalized networks, which are not restricted to the local level. Recent 
studies of French technopoles has shown, for example, how little articulation 
there is between the strictly local milieu and the small established firms: 
local firms are more competitive than they are cooperative (Chanaron, 
Perrin, and Ruffieux 1988). A number of studies of old industrial regions 
have also uncovered the radical degradation of the horizontal solidarity 
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system ( de Banville 1984 ). Our comparisons - Annonay in France and the 
Val d'Elsa in Italy - have also shown the different dynamics of these two 
countries (Ganne et al. 1988). We observed in Italy a reterritorialization of 
activity at a wider regional scale, while in France we found increased 
mobilization of external resources in the form of professional networks: 
the change in the social model of the firm seemed thus to be accompanied 
by a transformation of what has been called the territory-zone into a 
territory-network (Leborgne and Lipietz 1988). 
In view of these latter developments it would seem that the texture of the 
industrial tissue is becoming less and less "local", in the Italian sense. This 
hardly suggests development of industrial districts on the Italian model. 
Thus we observe in the French case that: 
1 whatever their strength in terms of local structuring, local industrial 
systems may disappear; and that they have in large part already 
disappeared; 
2 in recent times the reemergence of industrial districts in the Italian sense 
has not in fact occurred except in isolated and circumscribed cases; and 
3 such recompositions of small firm systems as do exist seem to follow a 
logic where the strictly local aspect now plays a relatively restricted role. 
This suggests striking contrasts, point by point, to almost everything that 
has been observed in Italy. The Italian districts had their phase of full 
development at the very same time that France, under the effect of a massive 
movement of concentration, witnessed the disappearance of old local 
industrial systems. And it was also the case that - at the very time when, 
following the crisis, a certain reterritorialization of activities seemed to be 
taking place in Italy - in France there seemed to be a deterritorialization of 
the small firm networks. 
A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LOCAL INDUSTRIAL 
SYSTEMS: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE FRENCH CASE 
A relative closure of local industrial systems, a preponderance of state action 
over that of the main economic actors, delocalizations resulting from local 
policies: localized dynamics observed in France seem in this way to obey 
completely different rules from those usually considered to hold in the 
Italian case. Could the explanation be that the dynamics of the local 
industrial systems in France depend on other factors? 
Economic Malthusianism and local industrial systems 
We noted above that localized industrial systems were quite important in 
the interwar period in France. To understand the particular position and 
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evolution of local industrial systems in France - and their relative closure -
recall that the period was marked by a Malthusian economic strategy backed 
up by the central state. 
The greater persistence in France than elsewhere of localized systems 
(in the 1930s, France had a much less concentrated industrial structure 
than England or Germany) is due more to the fact that the prevailing 
Malthusian economic strategy reinforced these systems than to their 
internal, autonomous dynamics. 
This economic Malthusianism consisted of a policy of promoting accords 
and cartels, and resulted in involution and closure of the districts2• 
As A. Sauvy wrote: 
The [Malthusian] spirit permeated all of the legislation of the crisis, 
and even the pre-crisis. Conservatives and socialists tried to combat 
the crisis by acting on the symptoms: scarcity, to drive up prices, 
underproductivity, to increase employment, protection and closure of 
professions - these remedies accentuated, at the national level, the very 
problems they were intended to combat. No [ other country] was 
affected to the same degree as France by such a serious problem. 
(Sauvy 1984: 413). 
In 1919 reconstruction was too rapid and ambitious. Many firms simply 
rebuilt their prewar factories, with no effort at modernization. The new was 
already outdated (Bonin 1988: 50). As late as 1931, in spite of some 
concentration in a few branches and increased vertical integration, French 
industry was still much more fragmented than its neighbours: the capitaliza-
tion of Saint Gobain and Alsthom, the two largest companies of the time, 
was only a fifteenth that of the British ICI or the German I.G. Farben. The 
electrical industry was divided among many firms: no less than two thirds 
of the industry's workers were employed in firms with fewer than 100 
workers, with 40 percent in shops with fewer than 10 employees (Kuisel 
1984: 158). 
Essentially, French industrial development was based on networks of 
small firms, with management remaining individualistic, rooted in family 
capitalism, and firms serving regional markets. Firms were not geared to 
conquering larger markets, preferring instead occasional associations to 
fusions (Bonin 1988: 65). They were wary with regard to outside finance, 
which was pejoratively regarded as the domain of speculators, merchants 
and "pirates" (Sauvy 1984: 104). 
In this period the main fear was overproduction. Although management 
resisted the dirigiste practices the state had adopted during the war, after the 
armistice it soon renewed the demand that the state regulate competition. 
This included restriction of external competition through protectionism -
customs duties doubled on average in 1931 - but also, and above all, 
restriction of internal competition through the authorization of understandings 
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and cartels (Bonin 1988: 92). The colonial empire remained for its part a 
privileged domain reserved to French industry. 
In this way the understandings multiplied. Subtle distinctions allowed 
legitimated gentlemen's agreements (thanks to a law of 1926) and even 
created incentives to reach such agreements. They were now not only 
permitted but encouraged. In 1935 a bill designed to require participation 
in such understandings failed only narrowly (Sauvy 1984: 114; Bonin 1988: 
94). It was believed at the time that fixing prices and setting production 
quotas was the best way to balance production and consumption. Over-
production was to be avoided by limiting competition, which lowered prices 
to the level of marginal costs, and ruined firms (Sauvy 1984: 111-12). The 
use of understandings expanded considerably in this period; according to 
Sauvy, on the eve of World War II there were between 1,000 and 3,000 
agreements (Sauvy 1984: 117, note 1). 
Certain trades and industries could thus be organized as closed associa-
tions, the most extreme case being the shoemakers and shoe-repairers: after 
the forty or so instances of direct regulation of the shoe trades by the state, 
the Le Poullen law of 22 March 1936 required authorization of the Ministry 
of Commerce two years in advance of the opening of any factory or 
workshop, as well as any enlargement or relocation of an existing factory. 
On 7 April of the same year another measure instituted the shoe-repairers' 
monopoly: fear of an incursion by Bata and its modem methods motivated 
a five-year prohibition on the opening of any workshop or repair booth 
(Sauvy 1984: 115). 
This "republic of the holes in the soles," as it was called, may seem 
humorous now, but it reflects well the general opinion of the time: F. Dine, 
writing in Le Figaro in 1931, for example took pride in "our timid, 
prosperous economy,''3 and compared it to the "presumptuous, decadent" 
economies of the Anglo-Saxon races (Sauvy 1984: 103). The state inter-
vened in more and more details. The result of such policies was that the 
real degree of competition approached zero in the France of the 1940s 
(Caron 1981: 365). 
This policy guaranteed the status quo, but was incapable of dealing with 
the concentration of firms and the necessary transformation of the industrial 
structure relative to 1900-30 period. It resulted in a freezing of investment 
whose main effect was a decline of almost 20 percentage points in national 
income between 1929 and 1938 (Bonin 1984: 94). Less rich and less dynamic, 
this is how France appeared just before World War II (Bonin 1986: 97). 
It is against this background that one should look at the persistence of 
localized industrial systems in France just after World War II. These systems 
had little openness to the exterior and were organized to defend the status 
quo, while the locale itself was more segmented than unified due to the fact 
that each branch attempted to preserve its link with the state and not with 
other local producers. 
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It is not, as in the Italian case, the autonomy of the zones and their 
structural independence with regard to outside authority that is most 
important here. Rather it was precisely through their articulation to the 
national political structure that the local actors seem to have been defined. 
The "Malthusian state" used the preservation and renewal of local systems 
as the vehicle for the gradual evolution it sought, with local actors expecting 
the state in return to guarantee the status quo. But the circle was closing in 
upon itself. It was thus not in spite of nor in the absence of the state that the 
different local industrial systems persisted in France before the war, but 
thanks to the state and in close contact with it. The "Notable-system" was 
key to local power in a centralized political economy (Gremion 1976). 
Annonay is a case in point. I began studying the zone with the idea of 
finding an industrial ensemble of local small family firms that were closely 
interconnected. I supposed that the interconnection was threatened by the 
concentration of capitalism. I was thus astonished to find a highly segmented 
economic and social space, divided between the vocational community of 
the leather goods industry and that of the paper industry. These two 
communities had essentially no overlap (Ganne, 1983a). They rubbed 
shoulders in a restricted space, with the small firms of the leather sector 
functioning among themselves as a separate industrial district, while each of 
the different paper mills remained rooted in a kind of "estate-based, 
aristocratic" management applied to industry. There were few links between 
the two industries. The leather-working sector was marked by a specific 
system of cooperation/competition that developed work force mobility, 
playing on complementarities on the level of orders as well as that of 
techniques. There was also a system of reciprocal money drafts, under the 
benevolent eye of the local bank, which created a system of mutual insurance 
to cover unforeseen circumstances. 
Otherwise, however, the local universe was socially, economically, and 
politically highly fragmented among different industries, each group relying 
more on its own activity than on the local system for the solutions to its 
problems. The fields of intervention of the local economic and political 
institutions were carefully delineated with the social and equipment side 
being the concern of the local public bodies, and the economic that of the 
Chamber of Commerce. Interference between fields of authority was not 
tolerated. 
In short, this was a local system that was highly fragmented between both 
the economic and the political and the different branches of industry. The 
key to this segmentation was the type of vertical relation that each body 
cultivated with regard to the central power. Through negotiations with the 
state, each industry sought guarantees of its market and the reinforcement 
of the status quo, as in the policy of understandings and cartels. This 
fragmentation was also supervised, on the political level, by the notable 
system. The notable's function was to guarantee and promote diversity and 
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to broker relations with the external world and the central political power. 
This was the source of both his strength and his weakness: at base, his power 
was both guarantor of and hostage to the status quo (Worms 1966; Ganne 
1985). As the interface between the community and society in general, the 
power of the notable thus depends directly on the centralized character of 
the state. We are a long way, here, from the notion of autonomous local 
power as it is understood in connection with the Italian districts, not to 
speak of the American communities. In the brokering game that it plays 
between central power and local actors, the system of notables is at the 
opposite pole from the American ideal of community. In this ideal, a 
"community" is a unit of social action capable of mobilizing itself to resolve, 
without further ceremony, the problems of its survival and development 
(Gremion 1976: 264); community was to be the antithesis of the state. In 
contrast, in France, via the notable system in particular, the state remained 
precisely the frame of reference which defined the action space for local 
actors. The system of notables impeded the widespread mobilization which 
would have allowed collectivities to resolve their problems from the inside. 
It condensed the collective action space. This in tum allowed the notable 
to position himself as an indispensable intermediary. The price of this 
system was steep: absence of information, stifling of conflicts, crushing of 
minorities, formalism of democratic procedures. All of these measures 
prevented the free play of groups, in order to permit the notable to have his 
hands free in negotiations with the state (Gremion 1976: 267). 
The fragmentation of local societies and the system of notables thus seem 
to go hand-in-hand, the notable having the function of representing the 
diversity of interests as those of the locality, a system in which he wields 
all the power, and therefore perpetuates. The traditional local system thus 
appears as an integral part of the system of regulation developed at the 
instigation of the central state in France. In this way we see the danger of 
equating "local" with community-based or endogenous. 
The development of postwar statist interventionism, and the liquidation 
of former local systems 
Under the influence of postwar state planning, the earlier system was 
challenged and many, perhaps most, of the older local industrial systems 
disappeared. The central state also promoted the decentralization that was 
later adopted. Let us take up both points. 
In the postwar period, the state attempted to go beyond its role as a mere 
regulator and become an active agent of economic and social development 
(Gremion 1976: 471). The system of cartels and understandings was 
essentially regulatory; in the postwar reconstruction process, it took on an 
actively directive role, which led it to shake up somewhat the old politico-
economic order. 
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Even before the war, the economic climate had militated for a strengthen-
ing of the role of the state. Faced with the incompetence of the heads 
of family firms and politicians, a technocratic current held that the econ-
omy should be run by specialists - technicians, modem managers, and 
"enlightened" functionaries -in the name of efficiency (Bonin 1988: 114 ss; 
cf. the importance of currents such as those of the Nou'Oeaux Cahiers in the 
management environment, those of X-crise in the Polytechnique world, 
etc.). There was a widespread desire that the state should act as prime mover 
in the modernization process. To do this it had to gain new competences. 
The Vichy regime had in fact already taken the first steps in this direction. 
A number of technocrats at the time regarded the Petain dictatorship as a 
historic opportunity to force the conservative, traditional elements of 
society to accept the upheavals necessary for modernization, which the 
parliamentary system had bound hand and foot through the electoral system 
of the Third Republic. The modernizers believed that France was bogged 
down in a swamp of small family firms; they wanted concentration in 
the hands of specialists, a sort of dirigiste planning philosophy (Bonin 
1988: 122). 
Though this current failed to take hold at the time, in part due to the war, 
it continued to mature through schools such as that of Uriage; and it made 
a forceful comeback after the war. The mixed economy took hold in part 
because management had shown its limits in the course of the previous 
period and had discredited itself politically in the war. 
We will not go into detail here about all the economic policies of the 
successive Plans, of the 1960s and 1970s which organized the concentration 
and reorganization of the French economy. A few points will suffice. 
Initially charged only with improving the spatial distribution of activities 
in France, the policy of Territorial Planning (Amenagement du Territoire) 
was transformed step by step, toward the end of the Gaullist period and 
then under President Pompidou into a key element of economic policy. It 
organized industrial groups, created massive industry-port complexes, and 
developed active intervention at many levels of the system. The local systems 
formed the pockets of backwardness that economic modernization was meant 
to restructure. The only permissible reason for not pursuing concentration 
and growth in establishment size was said to be the size of markets, as noted 
in 1974 by the authors of an important INSEE report on The Industrial 
Transformation of France (INSEE 1974). Agreement was so widespread at 
the time that Marxists and state officials could speak the same language, the 
leftist economist C. Palloix being at one in this regard with J. Ferry, the 
vice-president of the CNPF, the employers' association (Saglio 1985). 
Restructuring had major effects in all the old industrial zones; it led to 
the disappearance, with little resistance, of the old forms of organization of 
the local industrial systems. 
The disappearance of these old systems was all the more dramatic in that 
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it signaled not only the dissociation of the links that had once existed 
between the state and the firm, but also a serious challenge to the notable 
system itself. 
In attempting to be more systematic, policy no longer aimed at activity-
by-activity control. Its aim instead was to shape the general dynamics of the 
industrial economy. Specialized functional interventions were replaced by 
horizontal policies set up progressively by the state, culminating in the 
1982-3 decentralization laws. 
The success of such policies was not a given, however, since earlier 
regional reforms, such as that of 1964, had been absorbed and coopted by 
the local politico-administrative system (Gremion 1976). 
But in the concern for planning - general, this time, and no longer 
just functional and sectoral - a new system of local/national relations was 
promoted. Responsibility was transferred toward subnational entities. 
Policies based on new forms of contracts were also used. The more general 
contracts (zonal contracts, countryside contracts, and then state/regional 
contracts, etc.) progressively supplanted the specialized, sectoral interven-
tions of the previous system. There were dramatic implications for the 
notable system. The latter was characterized by vertical, specialized, and 
privileged relations between the notable and the central apparatus; the new 
system by means of contracts and management modes that are more 
"horizontal." They decompartmentalize the local system, so that it may be 
managed as a unified entity, not as a system of fragments, each of whose 
interests are brokered vis-a-'CJis the central government by the notable 
(Ganne 1985).4 
Thus a real and general transformation of the politico-economic system 
had gradually occurred in France since the war. This transformation affects 
the type of relation between and the forms of regulation of localized systems 
and the central state. A new type of local system, initiated by the 1982-3 
decentralization law, recognized a new moral entity in local collectivities: 
new capacities for decision-making, with control by the central state carried 
out a posteriori, and no longer a priori, as previously. 
The transition from the republican state as a regulator to the postwar 
rationalizing state was paralleled by this passage from a society of represen-
tation, congruent with the notable system, to a society of organization 
(Gremion 1976: 471). The idea was that mobilization should go all the way 
to the local level, where horizontal systems of cooperation would be 
developed. 
This is nonetheless a long way from an endogenous model of local 
development; local systems do not have the independence which, according 
to some, is the guarantor of their efficacy. They are, if anything, created by 
the centralized system of political regulation. This logical relation between 
center and periphery was explicitly elaborated in the preparatory report of 
the Ninth Urban Plan, which advocated the establishment of local systems 
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- based on the mobilization and coordination of endogenous resources - as 
an antidote to structures that were highly fragmented and uncoordinated. 
Towards a standardization of the local? 
These changes also explain the relative homogeneity observed in the recent 
restructuring at the local level. It is indeed according to an identical type of 
model that contracts governing plans for the development of medium-sized 
towns and regions are executed. Local differences and specificities are now 
only taken into account to the extent that they conform to the overall, highly 
normative framework. There are standardized formulae for evaluating 
requests for subsidies for investments in local infrastructure and mobilizing 
local actors. Little space exists for the affirmation of other, less normative, 
specificities. We observe, in other words, the creation of a "canon of the 
local." 
Decentralization thus functions, paradoxically, as a unifying frame of 
reference. We are a long way, here, from the diversity of models of 
organization and local specificities that seem to characterize the Italian 
districts. 
This dynamic of unification explains one of the paradoxes that we brought 
up in the introduction: it is no longer surprising to observe that the 
reinforcement of the local level is accompanied by greater indifference 
with regard to the localization of firms and that it encourages develop-
ment of systems of networks that are more dispersed than localized (Ganne, 
et al. 1988). Decentralization appears to produce paradoxical, perverse 
effects. 
It is thus in its overall context that the problem has to be resituated: the 
imposition of a single political model of management on the local level, by 
homogenizing the framework of action at that level, actually encourages 
economic actors to develop linkages outside their immediate local system. 
Submitted, as it were, to a single set of norms, the local no longer constitutes 
a problem to be controlled. The unification produced by decentralization 
thus promotes mobility of economic activity. 
We observe in any case that there is a wide gap between the constitution 
of the local in contemporary France and Italy. It is important to avoid hasty 
assimilation of French developments to the Italian case. 
CONCLUSION 
What conclusions can be drawn about the functioning of the evolution of 
local industrial systems in France? 
The maintenance of old industrial systems in France, far from being the 
result of local contingent social forces, existing, as it were on the margins 
227 
THE TERRITORIAL FOUNDATIONS OF PRODUCTION SYSTEMS 
of powerful structures, is better understood as an integral part of the 
centralized French administrative system. 
The relatively closed and static nature of the old French industrial districts 
was congruent with the old form of political brokering at the territorial level 
which has been called the notable system. 
Political authorities sought to break down these "feudal" features and the 
productivity blockages to which they led in the postwar years. More 
recently social and cultural homogenization has been pushed by the central 
state all the way down to the local level. The decentralization law has 
actually encouraged this trend. 
It is to this political economy, which allows us to see how economics and 
politics become systems that shape each other mutually, that we must refer 
in order to understand the specificity of the French case, as well as its limits. 
The paradox of the French case is precisely that it challenges contempor-
ary stereotypes by insisting that local industrial systems again be placed 
within the context of the political administrative system. In doing so I have 
also sought to avoid both the neo-structuralism of the Regulation School 
(i.e. the current wave of theorization on the subject of post-Fordism) and the 
neo-culturalist tendencies, which have been revived in the research on the 
Italian industrial districts (i.e. the increasing importance attributed to local 
cultures and enterprise cultures). 
The risk at present is that the political level is being ignored. 
In recent times, a certain fetishization of local development has arisen in 
response to the success of Italian industrial districts. This "neo-localism" 
creates several serious forms of confusion: 
a) it conflates a number of cases which are in fact very different (Sfax in 
Tunisia, Cholet in France, Prato in Italy, etc.);5 
b) it perpetuates, the illusion of local autonomy; 
c) it frequently confuses local systems with new forms of industrial 
organization based on flexible automation, and thus incorrectly confers 
an image of modernity on these local systems. 
The French situation does, nonetheless, seem to provide an opportunity to 
reflect positively on the variety of local industrial systems. First, local 
systems can exist without being characterized, as in the Italian case, by local-
horizontal integration of economic, social and political dynamics. The 
French local industrial system is based on local segmentation of these 
different aspects, each sphere (professional as well as political) favoring 
vertical relations with the central state. 
Second, the local and the endogenous are not the same. If the number of 
local industrial systems between the wars was larger in France than in other 
countries, it was not because they were structured in a more deeply 
endogenous way, or because, as in Italy, they were endowed with a relative 
economic, social, and political homogeneity that made them more resistant 
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than elsewhere. Rather, it was because these local industrial systems were 
more heavily regulated and closed in upon themselves, preserving and 
reproducing, by their mode of articulation with an overall politico-economic 
system, their fragmented mode of organization. 
In the study of the districts and the local industrial systems, the problem 
is not to oppose the cultural and the economic, the local and the general, 
or the endogenous and the exogenous, as is implicit in much research, but 
to understand how differentiated, reciprocal forms of the economic and the 
cultural which are articulated by politics were mediated through the 
institutional system. 
In the French case, reference to a centralized institutional state structure 
was indispensable. Whereas in the Italian case districts manage their 
competition directly, in France a regulating, redistributing state mediates the 
relationships between industrial systems. The state organizes economic 
policy, gives out subsidies, and regulates systems of social and professional 
relations. All of this is, in the final analysis, a question of political habits. It 
is thus essential to develop ways to contextualize the economic in order to 




SYSTEMS IN FRANCE 
A particular type of industrial system 
Jean Saglio 
Have we emerged from the period of srowth linked to a system of economic 
regulation of the Fordist type, and are we now entering a period in which 
flexible specialization will become more imponant? In more basic terms: 
are small firms the future of developed economies? This issue generates 
heated debate. Questions are asked about the role of small firms in the 
comparative industrial growth of different countries, about their capacities 
of adaptation to market fluctuations and technological change, about their 
emergence in the developed economies and their capacity to respond to the 
problems of less developed economies. However, the renewed interest 
shown by researchers in groupings of small firms, and in the dynamism of 
these groups, does not lead us automatically to conclude that this new object 
of research is a new social object as such. Even if we suppose that the 
development of nonconcentrated systems of industries is the future of the 
economies of developed countries, it should be remembered that this was 
also a large feature of their past, as it is of their present: if there is a renewal 
going on, it is perhaps as much in the fact that we are currently concerned 
with improving our understanding of the working of these firms as in the 
fact that they are evolving and developing. 
It is imponant to be careful when making lists of the new conclusions 
that we can draw from recently accumulated observations on such industrial 
ensembles. Or at least we can examine the ways in which these observations 
call into question the classical approaches employed in understanding 
industrialization. In putting forward a differentiated approach to the modes 
of regulation existing in France today, we will attempt to show that 
innovation is perhaps not to be found where one expects it, and that the 
systems that are being set up are perhaps not as new as they appear. On the 
other hand, it is not unthinkable that the new mode of regulation of the 
industrial economy, which is being eased into place today, may differ fairly 
radically from what France has been used to for almost a century now, and 
which is characterized by the positions and roles of the different actors. So 
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it is necessary to introduce a concept of regulation which is not strictly 
linked to the notion of state action. Other types of social regulation of 
industrial development can be found in current French cases, and their 
analysis has led to the introduction of the notion of industrial systems as a 
way to understand these new forms of links between societal problems and 
economic development. Besides altering the means of regulation of produc-
tion, we are perhaps in the process of abandoning a certain mode of societal 
usage of the economy. This would also involve supposing that a change is 
occurring in the very definition of the articulation between French society 
and its mode of production. 
PARADOXES 
The fact that numerous studies have been carried out in different countries 
on this theme of the development of small firms means that we now have 
access to an empirical corpus which is largely of good quality. The 
observations that one can derive from the examination of this material lead 
to the conclusion that there exists here not only an accumulation of 
knowledge contributing to the enrichment of the usual paradigms, but also 
a series of paradoxical results leading to a questioning of the pertinence of 
this paradigm. Most of this questioning arises from some well-known 
criticisms of the classical approaches. Between firms in the competitive 
market, it is impossible to develop forms of cooperation and to stabilize 
places in the production process. Such cooperation, which concerns neither 
oligopolies nor cartels, modifies the functioning of markets, which are 
socially regulated. 
Workers' behavior patterns are not always conditioned by the need for 
the impersonal, bureaucratic protection afforded by the large firm. Their 
involvement in the firm goes beyond simple work force exchanges, and they 
may be actors in the social networks which link the different firms. Such 
networks are not only the result of economic exchanges, they are also forms 
of social community. 
In raising some of these questions at this particular point, we do not claim 
to be drawing up an exhaustive list, but simply to be clarifying those that 
appear to us to be the most productive, in terms of leading to the 
construction of a system of comprehension of industrial history. 
Places in the production process 
The first of these paradoxical observations has to do with the nature of 
places that small firms, plus the totality of nonconcentrated industries, 
occupy in the production process. The classical approach insists on the 
dualism of positions and strategies. Not being in a position to mount 
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effective opposition to large firms, small firms would tend to occupy the 
places that these others leave vacant in the production process. And thus 
they would tend to find themselves in dependent positions of subcontract-
ing, in terms of capacity or of specialty: capacity subcontracting when they 
are supposed to be smoothing out the unevennesses in the production 
process which the dominant firms cannot or will not deal with; specialty 
subcontracting when they take on unit or small-batch production which 
could not be organized in a Taylorist mode of production. 
At first sight, a fair number of results seem to uphold this thesis. But at 
the same time, finer analyses allow us to note that the positions of small 
firms are not ineluctably threatened by growth and concentration in the 
industrial sectors. When production is subjected to the dictates of fashion, 
small firms in the record industry (Hennion and Vignolle 1978), or those of 
the clothing industry, do succeed in occupying places which are not really 
threatened by the appetite of more concentrated firms. A doubt remains, 
however, since it appears that, in such sectors, the system of places is 
probably more durable than the firms themselves, which seem to turn over 
at a rapid rate, quite often appearing only for the time needed to make a 
mark, then disappearing almost as suddenly as they appeared. It may be 
noted in passing (and we will come back to this question later on) that more 
in-depth analyses of such sectors seem to show that certain employees, at 
least, appear to adapt their strategies of employment to this type of 
instability of firms and institutions. 
A second type of case can be observed, where instability and short 
product lifetime are quite closely linked to the rapidity of technological 
evolution, or to the necessity of a high degree of adaptibility of the 
production process. Recruiting more skilled workers, working to order 
and on projects, the firms of this group are often more stable than the 
preceding ones, but are not necessarily more concentrated. Considered as 
specialized subcontractors, they produce by the unit or in small batches, 
sometimes on the premises of their clients (whose ranks may include large 
firms), without, however, becoming dependent on them. 
A fair number of observers are inclined to think that such institutions are 
more frequent today than previously. Do we have to see this as an effect 
of the recent evolution of production and consumption systems which 
nowadays give over a larger share to less standardized products? And could 
this then be explained by the interaction of the evolution of the public's 
tastes and the spread of more flexible production technologies? 
And yet at the same time, such situations are not new. The system of 
fashion, at least in clothing-related industries, pre-dated the industrial 
revolution. Small firms of toolmakers or qualified technicians are not a recent 
innovation. Even at the highest pitch of the movement toward industrial 
concentration, they retained a non-negligible place in the apparatus of 
production. Thus, rather than a dual system, where these small firms 
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would only occupy slots leh temporarily vacant by more concentrated 
firms, one might just as well envisage that this kind of firm has been able, 
sometimes collectively, to set in motion strategies offering an alternative to 
concentration, and, by this means, to parry the threat that larger firms have 
brought to bear on them. 
From access to markets to their mode of construction 
It is commonly supposed that only large firms in a monopolistic or 
oligopolistic situation are capable of dominating and orienting markets and 
techniques for their own benefit. The examples which we have just raised 
tend to show that other configurations are possible, in which collectivities 
of independent firms are nonetheless capable of influencing such markets 
and techniques. 
Of course the two types of situation are not exactly identical. The large 
monopolistic firm, which dominates a market and which wishes to enforce 
its management and influence the behavior of its actors, produces arguments 
of rationalization and prediction which will lead to the required choices 
(Bauer and Cohen 1981). Conversely, in a system dominated by fashion, 
each of the actors rationalizes his own position and strategies while 
discussing a market in which he would individually have no power. On one 
side, therefore, the management of the market is internalized in, and 
dominated by, the organization, and, on the other, evolution is linked to 
relations of power and conflicts over which no single actor is able to exert 
sufficient influence to tum them to his advantage. 
In thus limiting oneself to just the two extremes of the spectrum of 
possible configurations, it might be tempting to see a validation of the 
hypothesis whereby one is dealing with two mutually exclusive alternatives. 
But the large firm is not simply a hierarchical structure where the actors are 
dominated by the managers. It is also a social organization, and management 
is not only a problem of technical adequacy, but also a method of 
mobilization and argumentation designed to convince the other actors and 
to obtain their participation. So the firm is not only a hierarchy, but also a 
complex structure of governance. 
Observations drawn from analysis of intermediate cases lead to the 
development of this kind of criticism of a purely dichotomistic approach. 
Thus oligopolistic situations, like that of the American motor industry in 
the thirty years following World War II (Tolliday 1988), or the one we 
observed in France more recently (Saglio 1989), are already intermediate 
situations. They combine, on the one hand, collective management of 
quantities and qualities of products, and on the other hand a relative 
dependence of the system on the solidity of modes of confidence which 
spring up between the oligopoly's sellers and private buyers. The oligopoly's 
capacity to impose its solutions thus rests on the strength and stability of 
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the process of enlisting buyers which the firms of the oligopoly succeed in 
putting into operation. 
On the other hand, the markets in which the structure of production is 
the most atomized among numerous small production units are not inevit-
ably those which are the least controlled by the producers. The fashion 
system sometimes gives way to more or less formalized collective brands. 
In this way the different segments of the high-class shoe market are tied to 
Italian producers who lay down the law. Beyond that, one may also observe 
real collective monopolies through which a profession composed of small 
firms achieves acknowledgement of its right to fix the qualities and prices 
of products (Saglio and Thuderoz 1989). These are not necessarily 
anachronisms from an old corporatist tradition, but may also be constituted 
as new responses to very real situations. 
If one attempts to take into account this diversity of possible situations 
and strategies, one cannot easily accept the classic hypothesis according to 
which the intensity of control of the market is linked to the relative size of 
the principal producer. The two variables are evidently not so closely 
related. On the other hand, the establishment and stabilization of a mode of 
market management appears as the result of complex strategies linking 
producers and consumers, in which the most probable positions are never 
certain, and the most improbable are never, however, prohibited. This 
means that it is not enough to do an analysis of positions in the production 
system, if one wants to understand the establishment of these modes of 
management of markets; it is rather a question of considering that these 
processes are negotiations, and that their products are social constructions 
of markets (Bagnasco 1985; Saglio 1989). 
In the same roundabout way, it can also be understood that the classical 
approaches which link the size of"the firm too closely to the area of the 
markets in which they participate must equally be called into question. 
According to such hypotheses, it was considered that anisans participated 
in neighborhood markets, small firms in regional or national markets, and 
very large firms with multinational connections in international markets. 
Already, Fernand Braudel (1979) noted that the relationship was not so 
simple, and that, from the sixteenth century onwards, the types of relations 
which became established in these different markets were not identical. 
Corresponding to the neighborhood markets there was an economy of 
reciprocal exchanges, corresponding to the markets of the towns and regions 
a more classical system of market exchanges, and to the multinational firms 
a system more linked to organization. Bagnasco, following Pizzorno, noted 
that there could also exist a founh type of regulation of exchanges, which 
he named political exchange, and that the different types of exchange are 
not so clearly demarcated: thus reciprocity may exist between industrial 
firms panicipating in regional or international markets. 
Although, statistically speaking, the observation that small firms partici-
pate less in international markets turns out to be correct, this does not 
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necessarily mean that it is legitimate to conclude that the fact of their size 
alone renders them incapable of taking part in the different types of 
exchange. At most one may note that the internationalization of market 
management by an organization presupposes, in the case of groupings of 
small firms, the existence of a common collective structure to carry out this 
management, and which would possess sufficiently powerful forms of 
incentives and reprisals to compel most firms to respect collective rules. 
The specialization of employees 
Analyses of the determination of employment rules, and notably the setting 
of wage levels, have long been concerned, in France especially, above all 
with large firms. Here, the organized action of the employees, working 
through disputes and negotiations, came to impose bureaucratic rules which 
limited the arbitrary role of management, and imposed the taking into 
account by the management of the values proper to the employee group. 
On the other hand, it appeared that small firms remained the domain of 
preference of paternalistic, authoritarian forms of personnel management. 
One could then pass from such a dichotomy to a dualistic perspective of 
the labor market, considering that the employees who were the best-off in 
trade union terms would try above all to get into the most highly regulated 
sectors of the market, leaving those individuals who had fewer resources to 
occupy the posts corresponding to the least protected sectors. 
More precise analyses have again led to questioning this kind of simple 
link between forms of firm, forms of work force management, and collective 
aspirations and strategies of employees. In the first place, it does not appear 
obvious that the best-off individuals necessarily look for the kinds of 
statutory protection that the largest firms can offer them. Thus, for example, 
it was found that many highly skilled workers, who specialized in the 
manufacture of complex equipment for presses in the metal and plastic-
molding industries of the Lyon urban district, did not wish to be employed 
in the largest firms in the field. On the contrary, these latter were often 
considered by them as places to begin a career, where one could find a job 
on graduating from a professional school, but which one should leave after 
a few years of experience. For the most qualified workers, the small firm 
offered advantages, in terms of work interest and autonomy, which the large 
ones could not match. As to the impact of arbitrary employer authority, 
this was, in their eyes, greatly limited by the possibility, which they 
constantly envisaged, of changing firms and continuing their career elsewhere 
(Saglio et al. 1984 ). 
Small firms are thus not inevitably the domain of employer arbitrariness 
and of employee submissiveness. Moreover, large organizations are not 
the only places where collective action by employees manages to impose 
forms of work force management which are less unfavorable to the 
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employees than the pure laws of the market would be. In other terms, and 
to go back to Catherine Paradeise's formulations (Paradeise 1984), bureau-
cratic organization is not the only mode of closure of the labor market to 
satisfy the demands of the employees. More collective forms of manage-
ment, which impose strict rules and allow interfirm mobility, can tum out 
just as favorably as bureaucratic systems of the firm. 
To take account of the possible existence of such systems leads to a 
reconsideration of the presuppositions implicit in a number of previous 
analyses. Here again, as in the case of the analysis of market forms 
previously mentioned, the firm is not exclusively the place of negotiation 
and enunciation of the rules. The fact that negotiation does not take place in 
the firm does not necessarily imply that the protection of employees should 
be reduced to its most simple expression. Between the size of the firm 
and the form of management of labor markets, relations are more 
complex than a simple statistical determination. In this respect, the small 
firm is not necessarily a nightmare of employer arbitrariness, any more 
than, reciprocally, the large firm is always the seat of impersonal, blind 
bureaucracy. 
Social networks and exchanges 
The firm is thus neither the only locus of management of market relations, 
nor that of industrial relations. The fact that neither of these is managed 
from the interior of the organization does not, however, authorize the 
conclusion that they are controlled solely by the impersonal laws of the 
market. In the one case, as in the other, modes of collective management 
having to do with formal institutions or informal customs can exist in a 
lasting way, and can structure the strategies of the different actors. 
The existence of such relations, which link the different firms and force 
them into a certain degree of cooperation, encourages the postulation of the 
existence of stable relations between them. The available analyses of the 
functioning of such networks leads, however, to distinguishing this type of 
instruction from the classical model of the firm. A network of firms is not a 
quasi-large-firm, since the system of authority and legitimacy which is exer-
cised there cannot be mistaken for the one which obtains in the classical model 
of the large firm. If, in the latter, one may suppose that legitimacy depends 
on a form of contract, explicit or implicit, in the case of small firm networks, 
on the other hand, it is rather the fact of adhesion which is the foundation. 
Is it, however, a question of claiming that this type of community is 
bound together only by adhesion to the same system of values, and that 
there is thus a certain labor ethic which constitutes the social link that 
provides the foundation of these networks? One finds that for a certain 
number of authors, at least in the interrogative form, the sketch of the 
response is affirmative (Becattini 1989; Raveyre 1988). Such a solution is, 
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however, unsatisfactory, in that this kind of network evidently creates ties 
between actors whose interests and political orientations do not rigorously 
match up. The dissatisfaction comes from the fact that it is then necessary 
to postulate that economic relations are secondary compared to the sharing 
of a common ideology which strongly binds together the community. 
To resolve this dilemma, we have proposed to apply, in such cases, the 
solution advocated by Blau (1964) in order to understand nontrading 
structures of exchange. These are then characterized as social exchanges, that 
is to say that the counterpart of the service is not entirely specified at the 
moment of the primary service. Thenceforth, the two partners are bound 
by a system of involvement which, unlike classical market systems, leads to 
the reinforcement of the totality of their social links. 
The uncertainty that results from such wagers is not insupportable for the 
provider of the first service, in the first place because he can reasonably 
expect that the counterprovision, unspecified at the time of the first 
provision, will constitute, for him, a better deal than he could have obtained 
in a classical market exchange. Thus we have observed cases where the 
counterprovision consisted of economic and commercial information whose 
cost for the provider was small, but whose interest could turn out to be 
quite strategic for his partner (Saglio 1990b ). 
The second reason why such uncertainties are supportable for the first 
provider derives from the existence of a larger community than simply the 
two protagonists in the exchange. In such communities, one can easily 
identify property that is collective, that is to say available to all the members 
without their having to participate directly in the cost of its provision, but 
which is nonetheless reserved to the sole use of the members of the 
community. This is often the case, between industrial firms in the same 
group, for economic and technological information. The availability of such 
information constitutes an advantage for the industrialist. Moreover, if his 
partner should fail to meet his obligations, he can, by showing that he for 
his part has indeed satisfied the collective rules, require that these be used 
for his benefit so as to soften the blow. He thus counts on his other 
industrial partners in the group to mobilize on his behalf: his colleagues 
discriminate in his favor in the awarding of subcontracting work and the 
passing on of commercial information, so as to allow him to get back on his 
feet. Simultaneously, the existence of such collective property constitutes a 
constraint for the beneficiary of the first provision, to the extent that his 
failure to reciprocate entails the risk of his exclusion from the benefits of 
this collective property. 
The non-specialization of relations and resources 
The apparent irrationality of certain behavior patterns of actors in such 
systems of social exchange has often been remarked on, at least with regard 
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to the canons of rationality that can be deduced from the study of large 
bureaucratic organizations. Within these, actors seek first and above all to 
obtain the cooperation of the other members of the organization, while 
minimizing their commitment to these other members. To reach such an 
equilibrium, management attempts to spell out clearly the contributions and 
legitimate means of redress of each. Besides this, procedures for establishing 
relations are also carefully codified. The model of functional analysis then 
applies perfectly, given the fact that relations are perfectly designated. 
Of course it is well known that conflicts of authority are frequent, and 
that more complex strategies are not completely excluded; but such types 
of behavior, outside of the norms, can, at least in a primary analysis, be 
considered as malfunctions of the organization, which the actors will 
attempt to reduce. 
The concrete analysis of the functioning of networks of actors leads quite 
often to the observation that strategies often diverge from this type of 
behavior. In taking up the models developed in analyses carried out in the 
sociology of science (Callon 1986), one observes strategies of engagement in 
which the actors modify their respective positions, while also modifying, in 
the same movement, the qualification of the resources at their disposal. At 
first sight, such strategies of circumvention, playing more on the mobiliza-
tion of resources than the utilization of legitimate skills, appear paradoxical. 
They nevertheless quite often allow a reduction of the shortages and gaps 
that the external observer can pick out in the structure. Thus, the potential 
entrepreneur has a plethora of ways of procuring capital, involving the 
mobilization of family resources, requests to local bankers or to state 
institutions, etc. The argumentation that has to be set forth in order to 
achieve one's ends will be different in each of these cases, and will most 
frequently have little to do with classical microeconomic calculation. In the 
same way, the resources which the worker must mobilize in order to obtain 
a job very often will have little to do with his skills alone; rather, he will 
do better if he can mobilize the right network of relations, which will be 
based on his family, school, professional experience, etc. 
Of course it is the case in large firms also that relations between actors 
are not completely specified by formal organizational requirements. Other 
kinds of social linkages can be used by the actors, in order to form pressure 
groups in the strategic debate. These relations, often described as informal, 
are mobilized by actors when they disagree about the application of formal 
webs of rules. So informal regulation is used, in large organizations, as a 
way of contesting the results of formal regulation. 
In networks of small firms, the situation is quite different. Formal 
networks and hierarchical structures do not exist here, and informal 
networks are often the only way of ensuring cooperation. In systems like 
this, relations between actors are not specified and qualified by formal rules. 
To know that in such systems two well-defined actors have a relation to 
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each other is not enough to tell us what will be the nature of the exchanges 
that they will carry out. In a certain way, in such systems, the division of 
labor does not imply a specialization of relations. 
This absence of specialization implies once more that the argumenta-
tions set forth are multiple. In such situations, it is more important for the 
actor to stimulate the interest of his partner than to convince him of the 
accuracy of his reasoning or the quality of his skills. 
Despite their apparent irrationality, such models of relations are probably 
more widespread than they appear to be, and they may also serve as an 
an,alytic backdrop for the strategies of a number of actors, including those 
who belong to the most bureaucratic of large organizations. In particular, 
this schema appears particularly effective in analyzing the concrete commer-
cial strategies used by established salesmen, oligopolistic situations included 
(Saglio 1989). It is in fact rare that the sales pitches that such salesmen 
make should be exclusively concerned with relations between the technical 
qualities and the prices of the products they are offering. More often, with 
their iong-term clients, they attempt to create a whole skein of diverse social 
relations going from good interpersonal relations to the provision of 
technical and economic information, so as thus to insinuate the commercial 
relation into a strategic context which is closer to that of social exchange 
than to mere trading exchange. In the same way, one observes that, in France 
at least, subcontracting relations are frequently more stable than might be 
expected from the application of market laws alone (Lorenz 1989). 
Identity preferences and rules of belonging 
Such analyses not only lead to the adding of a further category to the 
catalog of the different types of firm that is customarily made use of, they 
also encourage us to think that the decision maker, when he selects the actors 
with whom he is going to establish a stable economic relationship, takes a 
close interest in the social identity of these producers, and not just in the 
qualities of the products which they are offering in exchange. In such forms 
of behavior, it is important for him to share a common identity with his 
future partners. 
In the classical analysis of market relations (Coase 1937; Williamson 
1985 ), this point is treated by omission: the decision maker being the 
entrepreneur, the only reference group that he uses is the firm. The choice 
that he finds himself confronted with is between manufacturing in the firm 
itself and calling on the external market. Already, in Becattini's analysis of 
industrial districts, the situation is more complex, since a third term can in 
effect insert itself between these two extreme solutions: the entrepreneur can 
appeal to the local market, that is, to other firms, but which belong to the 
same social grouping. 
These economic decision makers are in a market where, instead of letting 
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themselves be guided by price structures alone, they manifest orientations 
of preference directed toward other individuals or institutions with whom 
they share reference ~ommunities. It is indeed a question of preferential 
orientation, since belonging does not at this point dictate choice in any 
imperative way. But, at least at identical prices, and sometimes even with a 
certain excess cost, one observes that the buyer does not behave in a random 
way, and that he systematically chooses his suppliers among those he takes 
to be pan of the same reference community. 
Thus characterized, the phenomenon cenainly goes far beyond the 
industrial districts alone. Is it not to be found, at least in a derivative fashion, 
mobilized by those advertisers who, in order to sell an object, try to make 
people believe that the fact of possessing it demonstrates membership of a 
group with high social status? More directly, it is easily observable that 
many other reference communities can play the same role of orientating 
preferences in the market. 
In this kind of conception, the industrial district is therefore just one of 
the forms of economically active social identities. But many other institu-
tions could also be used in this way: family, region, nationality, and ethnic 
group thus become criteria of economic preference. "Achetons franr;ais" or 
"Let's buy British" are the kind of slogans which can have an impact on 
the behavior of purchasers, including industrial decision makers. 
Does the taking into account of such behavior patterns not lead us, more 
generally, to modify our point of view of the analysis of economic decisions? 
In the classical and neoclassical analyses, economic exchange is a means for 
the two partners to increase the value of the economic resources which they 
possess, and to improve, at least, the efficiency of their systems of resource 
allocation. The social consequences of the extension of the pure market are 
well known. It leads to the destructuring of social relations, and their 
replacement by pure individualism (Weber 1971). 
J. Commons' criticism of classical economics emphasizes the point that 
economic exchanges are not only physical exchanges of materials and 
services, relations between man and nature, but are also relations between 
person and person (Commons 1934: 56). In cenain cases, it appears that 
exchange is also a means to manifest one's membership of, and attachment 
to, the social collectivity. Can one be content to consider this behavior 
simply as a tactical means of improving the efficiency of one's proper 
resources? And must we thus indefinitely, on the pretext that we are dealing 
with the heads of firms, interpret their manifestations of social attachment 
in economistic terms? Or can we not, on the contrary, sometimes interpret 
their economic strategies in sociological terms? 
It may then be noted that the firm itself can constitute this reference 
community, but that this is not something that happens inevitably. The 
classic decision maker is supposed to prefer his firm only in cases where, in 
view of the production costs (for Coase) or the production and transaction 
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costs (for Williamson), this solution is objectively preferable, that is to say 
preferable whatever the social identity of the decision maker. By introducing 
this criterion of the orientation of preference with regard to the reference 
social identity, one can also explain situations where decision makers choose 
to reintegrate previously subcontracted production, even when the direct 
economic advantage is not obvious. In acting thus, they manifest their 
attachment to a community for whose survival they are willing to invest 
economically. 
At the same time this first example deals only with situations relevant to 
strategies in the product market. Other types of behavior concerned with 
strategies in the matter of labor relations can probably be explained 
using the same analytical tools. For instance, it was for a long time a 
common habit of observers of French industry to criticize the reluctance of 
heads of firms to lay off workers in times of crisis, even though it meant 
weakening their potential at the time when the market was getting back on 
its feet (Scott and MacArthur 1970; Stoleru 1969). Such a policy of 
stabilization of the workforce had in part to do with strictly demographic 
considerations, which Lorenz plainly perceived (Lorenz 1987): the French 
firm often seeks to exercise a monopoly of employment in its local market 
and, to retain this monopoly, will make a point of guaranteeing its 
employees a certain security of employment. On this point, it differs dearly 
from the English firm, which operates in a more competitive labor market. 
We have attempted, in a previous study (Bunel and Saglio 1979), to give 
a more complete explanation of this phenomenon, showing the extent to 
which, for French management, the firm is more than a simple possession, 
or a mere means of accumulating financial resources. In putting forward 
the concept of the enlarged family circle we wished to bring out the 
phenomenon of the firm as being also a larger social institution, meaning 
that it can engender a certain company patriotism which, in part at least, 
restricts behavior, including that of management. However, it should be 
borne in mind that such a configuration is not necessarily the case for all 
existing firms. One can then suggest the hypothesis that the manager's 
behavior is thereby affected, and that his range of choice is not simply 
between the firm and the exterior, but can also be influenced by the fact that 
for him the firm acts - or not - as a reference community. 
In stressing such types of behavior, one is deliberately moving away from 
what constitutes the heart of traditional economic explanations. These, to 
take up once more Castoriadis' criticism of them, are founded on a 
functional economic viewpoint, which does not take into account the 
symbolic functioning of institutions. The idea that symbolism is perfectly 
"neutral", or - which comes to the same thing- totally "adequate" to the 
functioning of real processes, is unacceptable and, in truth, devoid of sense 
(Castoriadis 1975: 168). 
In their real behavior, economic agents, including managers, thus perform 
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a certain number of acts which, in all good economic logic, must be 
considered as errors. Sociological analysis cannot accept such a judgment. So 
it is up to us, and using the same process in each case, to explain types of 
economic behavior that can be considered as correct, that is to say in keeping 
with economic logic, as well as incorrect types of behavior, that is to say 
behavior which is contrary to such logic to the point where it can lead to 
the disappearance - pure and simple - of firms. 
But to do this it is not enough to consider that the limits of the actor's 
rationality are due to the imperfection of his information, or to that of 
relations between actors. We must also take into account those cases, which 
are more frequent than is generally supposed, where the system of values 
proper to the individual, and incorporated into cenain institutions, becomes 
contradictory to economic rationality, and yet imposes itself on the actor. 
The localized industrial system is then no more than one of the potential 
institutions or configurations towards which the decision maker will exer-
cise this preferential orientation. In other situations, the reference com-
munity will be the firm, or a pan of the firm. We know the efforts that are 
made by the management of large French firms to create the kind of spirit 
within their work forces which will orient their behavior in a way that is 
favorable to the firm. Might we not say that the enterprise culture they talk 
about is analogous to the specific favorable culture of the industrial district? 
INDUSTRIAL SYSTEMS AS TOOLS OF ANALYSIS 
Hierarchical organization is not the only alternative to the market 
In the analysis of a large organization, whether of the administrative or the 
industrial type, it is most often possible to consider that the social relations 
defined by the limits of the institution are largely self-contained. The 
boundaries of the organization thus become the limits of the field of 
analysis, and the exterior can be apprehended as a context which is, 
certainly, not immutable, but whose variations have an influence only at the 
margins on the functioning of the organization, which must however adapt 
itself to such variations. 
This kind of reasoning is not appropriate in the case of smaller work 
units. Here, on the contrary, as we saw previously for some precise points, 
the behavior patterns of individuals, and the systems of relations which 
become established between them, are a lot more strongly influenced by 
what happens externally. Thus, the large firm can define a primacy of 
the internal labor market, in the double sense that individuals' careers 
are acted out in the interior of the organization, and that the rules of 
functioning which fix working relations and individuals' expectations, and 
which allow for the management of possible conflicts, are negotiated and 
enunciated through the play of the actors within the institution. The smaller 
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organizations are not in the same situation. Even if the employees show a 
certain tendency to remain in the firm, one may not deduce from this that 
what is involved is an internalization of the labor market, in the sense that 
the locus of the enunciation of rules, and of the resolution of conflicts, 
remains external to the firm. 
It is the same thing for commercial and economic relations with external 
markets. On account of the weight it carries, the large firm can impose its own 
constraints and demands on its suppliers; and, in situations of monopoly or 
oligopoly, it can even do so with regard to its clients. The smaller 
organization, on the contrary, sees itself forced to follow currently admitted 
procedures, accepted customs, and constraints imposed from the exterior. 
Nonetheless, as we have already seen, the alternative to the externalization 
of the management of constraints in the organization is not always the pure 
market, upon which the firm would have no means of acting, and in which 
the different actors would be considered as atomized, having no possibility 
of intervening to modify the rules of functioning. 
The classical solution brought to this analytic problem concerning the 
functioning of labor markets consists of utilizing a concept of industrial 
relations systems derived from the work of J. T. Dunlop, 1958). 
Very schematically presented, for the purpose of what interests us here, 
this concept corresponds to a double idea: on the one hand that labor 
relations are not regulated by the market, which is governed by the law of 
supply and demand, but by webs of rules which orient the behavior and 
attitudes of the different actors, and, on the other hand, that this system of 
relations is itself a product of the actors' games and their strategic inter-
actions. In the economy of Dunlop's concept of industrial relations systems, 
the economic, technical, and juridico-political environment is analyzed as 
a series of contexts outside the industrial relations system. On the other 
hand, the introduction of the notion of the industrial system corresponds 
to an extension of this concept to other types of rules than the simple rules 
and customs which concern labor relations. 
The notion of the industrial system 
The notion of the industrial system has the objective of defining the relations 
that individual firms carry on with each other. The fiction that these take 
place in an environment which is undifferentiated and governed by the pure 
laws of the market alone is not tenable. On the one hand the establishing 
of a market system, even an imperfect one, necessitates the cooperation of 
the different actors, or the intervention of an organizer who can impose 
himself on the other actors; on the other hand, the environment is never 
totally undifferentiated, and phenomena of customs, of quality norms, etc., 
eventually give a certain stability to relations which, otherwise, would 
remain undetermined. 
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A concept of this kind derives from the notion of industrial relations 
systems. These are in fact governed by webs of rules, elaborated in conflicts 
between actors, but nonetheless, in return, governing these same conflicts. 
The totality of the conditions of employment, of remuneration, and of the 
organization of work, are in this way referred to as the web of rules elaborated 
in interactions and conflicts between employers, employees and the state. 
In this kind of interpretation, two types of distortion must, however, be 
avoided. In the first place, the stated rules are not necessarily imperative, 
and so are not always easily observable by the external observation of 
behavior, since the rule does not dictate the actor's behavior, but rather it 
defines what is legitimate in terms of behavior or expectation. The existence 
of the rule thus means that the real divergences which, in their strategic 
options, the actors decide to operate, can be interpreted in an unequivocal 
way: thus, the announcement of a minimum wage for each profession, in 
the French industrial relations system, is not a determination of real wages; 
most of the time, real wages cannot be simply derived from them. But the 
mere fact that the rule exists allows the actors to take up positions, knowing 
in an unequivocal way the gap between real and minimum wages. 
In the second place, one must also take account of the fact that the fixing 
of the rule is not the same thing as a labor market transaction. Reflection 
on this point has been clarified by the debate, in the English school of 
industrial relations, on the nature of collective bargaining (Fox 1975; 
Flanders 1968). Is this an analog of individual bargaining, where the 
employee tries to improve the terms of the contract of sale of his labor 
power to the employer, or is it an activity of some other nature? In fact, it 
appears that, in most cases, the union is not a monopolistic seller which 
negotiates a collective contract by haggling with the employers. Collective 
bargaining is an activity that is situated on a second level {that of rules). It 
is an activity of enunciation, and not of transaction properly speaking. 
Likewise, the definition of institutions that allows the coordination of 
the actions performed by the various actors, and the organization of their 
cooperation and conflicts, like the definition of the actors in itself, is a 
product of this historical activity of collective bargaining. In the actors' 
games, no position, system of alliances or institution is absolutely predeter-
mined and immutable. On the contrary, all of these are liable to be 
transformed as a function of the game itself, to the point where it appears 
illusory to look for a definition of institutions such as firms, which is not 
itself situated in the framework of a precise system of actors and rules. Or, 
in other terms, it may be considered that the comparability of firms is only 
possible in the interior of a given set of rules. 
The concept of the industrial system derives from this conception of the 
articulation between the actors' games and the set of rules. In the func-
tionalist economy of Dunlop's conception, the social subsystem constituted 
by the system of industrial relations is locked into a set of economic, legal, 
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and technological contexts, where reversibility and substitutability are not 
really possible. 
Congruence of the rules, and a priori nonqualification of resources 
The notion of the industrial system consists in breaking this strict, pre-
defined distinction between context and system. In their interactions, as in 
their strategies, actors are constantly inclined to play off one type of 
element, and one type of rules, against another. At most, the system 
establishes rules of equivalence which ensure congruence between these 
different subsets of rules. 
The example already brought up, that of toolmaking firms in Lyon, 
provides an illustration of this point. It has been seen that, in this kind of 
group of firms, the mobility of individuals between the different firms is 
one of the means of career management open to skilled workers. This 
mobility operates within a set of rules which allow the different actors to 
give a signification to the departure of individuals. In this way, anyone can 
tell whether such a departure corresponds to a normal procedure of 
promotion and qualification or to a disagreement with, or suspicion about, 
the firm in question. Simultaneously, as we saw, this mobility is the usual 
means of transferring technological skills from one firm to another. But also, 
notably as regards the most highly skilled workers, such transfers of 
personnel are also the means of transferring knowledge and openings around 
markets. In the manufacture of precision equipment, technicians from the 
client firm will in effect have ongoing relations, not only with the director 
of the subcontracting firm, but also with the highly qualified worker 
responsible for the production and finishing of the equipment. This is also 
the person who will go to the client's workshop to carry out the installation 
and final adjustment of the equipment. On such occasions, he forms 
continuing relations with the clients. When he changes employer, he may 
thus also bring to his new firm profitable commercial introductions into the 
markets that he has frequented. It is in this sense that we speak here of 
equivalence of rules, to the extent that the rule that enunciates the proper 
behavior with regard to mobility, and the correct attitudes on the part of 
the different protagonists (the skilled worker, the previous employer, the 
new employer, or even the client or the supplier of machines) is concerned 
at one and the same time with working relations, the management of 
technologies, and also that of the product market. 
The different rules corresponding to the forms of management of the 
different resources are not independent of each other, any more than, as we 
have seen, the resources themselves can be strictly qualified. At the same 
time, the rules of a given domain are not strictly determined by the rules of 
another domain. Thus it is, as we very well know, that the rules of 
employment are not strictly linked to the type of technology in operation, 
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any more than forms of competition and of cooperation in the product 
market are closely linked to the forms of management of the work force 
(Saglio, 1990a). This is the reason why we use the term congruence to define 
this phenomenon of the determination of the coherence between different 
types of rules. 
The logical consistency of the rules concerning the different domains is not 
a given: at certain moments, contradictions may appear, corresponding to 
conflicts between actors, and these may produce an evolution of the regula-
tion, a change in the system. So, within the group of small firms in the 
plastic-molding industry in the Oyonnax region, which we have studied, the 
dispute that occurred at the beginning of the 1950s produced a lasting modifi-
cation in the forms of recruitment of injection press workers. From that 
time on, the type of career that could be followed by these workers was 
modified, and thus, also, the mode of creation of new craft firms. In the 
former system, the pierard (a local term meaning piecework employee) could 
progressively begin to set up on his own account, while continuing to work 
in collaboration with his previous employer, or even, sometimes, in the same 
work space. The modalities of wage bargaining, by the negotiation of piece 
rates, were congruent with this kind of opening up of workers' careers. 
The change that appeared aher the strike, with a change in the forms of 
remuneration and wage scales, led to these possibilities of advancement 
being blocked. From this date onward, immigrant workers operating the 
injection presses turned progressively into a particular industrial category, 
not likely to be integrated in the same way as their predecessors. The prewar 
workers were principally of Italian origin (in 1938 they represented 83 
percent of the foreign population of the town), and a number of currently 
existing firms were set up by Italians or their children. After the strike, the 
nationalities of the foreign workers present became much more varied, and 
their integration into. the tissue of Oyonnax became more difficult. Simul-
taneously, the creation of firms ceased to be the work of moldmakers, and 
became that of more skilled French workers, most often metallurgists and 
moldmaking engineers. 
At the time of such a labor dispute, it is thus the equilibrium and the 
consistency of the entire web of rules that is modified. This modification 
does not necessarily affect each of the rules: certain of them may remain 
congruent with the new equilibrium. In this case, the priority accorded to 
local firms in subcontracting remained unchanged, being the same after the 
strike as before, in the same way that the strike did not call into question 
the distribution of work by gender. 
The construction of collective identities 
In the concept of industrial relations systems elaborated by J. T. Dunlop, 
the production of rules, and thus the regulation of the system, is managed 
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by the play of the actors, and not by the domination of any of them, nor 
by a logic coming from outside to impose itself on all of them. It is the same 
thing for an industrial system, in the sense that we are using the term here, 
in that there effectively exists a collective identity which can be referred to 
by all the actors who participate in the enunciation of the rules and of 
regulation. 
The elements, or the controlled resources, which are utilizable to set up 
such a collective identity, are highly varied. Very often, notably in the 
French case, it is the fact of being active in the same product market that 
defines the identity of the system: one is then in the presence of professional 
industrial systems, or branches thereof. These may be more or less closed, 
to the extent that the group of actors exercises more or less tight control 
over the key resource. Thus regulated professions, the very access to which 
is strictly regulated by a system of restrictive practices and peer acceptance, 
are closed professional systems articulated around collective monopolies 
(Saglio and Thuderoz 1989). But closure is not necessarily acquired and 
reinforced by statist regulation: the oligopoly of automobile manufacturers 
in the USA during the years from 1945 to 1975 (l'olliday 1988) was also a 
closed professional system, even though it was not guaranteed by the legal 
protection of the state. 
Belonging to the same geographical ensemble can be utilized as a collective 
reference identity for an industrial system. In this case, we talk about a 
localized industrial system. The local identity to which the actors refer in 
such cases must not, however, be simply confused with the fact of living 
and working locally; here again it is a question of a particular social 
construct, and not of an evident datum. So it is that in the Oyonnax plastic-
molding industry, certain firms which, economically, were a part of that 
branch - that is to say that they produced objects in plastic and were located 
in the town itself - did not consider themselves, and were not considered 
by the other actors, as belonging to the local industrial system. They did 
not maintain favored subcontracting relations with other local firms; they 
did not have the same practices in terms of the organization of work and 
of personnel management; and they did not participate in networks of 
technological exchange. Conversely, certain actors may participate in local-
ized industrial systems without, however, working or living in the locality. 
Collective identity is thus more complex than the geographical reference 
alone: it is rather a question of accepting the web of rules, and of 
acknowledgment by the other partners that one is a member of the group, 
and not just a question of reference to the formal definitions advanced by 
the actors: the fact of living in Oyonnax and of working in the plastics 
industry was not, in the strict sense, either a necessary or a sufficient 
condition for belonging to the localized industrial system. On the contrary, 
what was necessary was to accept the web of rules and to be recognized by 
the other partners as belonging to the system. 
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The industrial district, in the sense given to this term by Becattini, 
corresponds to an industrial system bringing together the double identity, 
local and professional. The firms that participate in this system contribute 
to the manufacturing of the same product, and belong to the same 
geographical entity. This kind of connection is frequent, but not obligatory: 
looking at firms in the Beauce region of Quebec, we find we are dealing 
with a localized industrial system which groups together firms belonging to 
several different branches of activity. 
LOCAL IDENTITY AND PROFESSIONAL IDENTITY IN 
THE FRENCH HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
The structure of representative organizations 
In the French industrial relations system, representative organizations, both 
on the side of the employers and on that of the employees, give considerable 
importance to local organizations. Employees' organizations, or at least the 
principal ones, are organized outside the firm along two lines, professional 
(by branch) and interprofessional. The union brings together all employees 
of the firms in the branch, and in the locality. As to the interprofessional 
body, it brings together all of the unions of the different branches according 
to geographical criteria. At intermediate levels, the two tracks exist simul-
taneously: the local unions are organized in terms of national unions and 
branch federations, the interprofessional organizations in departmental and 
regional unions. The totality of these organizations is unified within each 
large confederation. Such a structure goes back a long time, having its origins 
in the dualism of the organizations: on the one hand the federation of labor 
exchanges, and on the other the trade unions, which later became industry-
wide unions, these two structures being brought together at the time of the 
consitution of the CGT (Confederation Generale du Travail) in 1895. 
On the employers' side, the structure of organizations is more difficult to 
understand. In those organizations founded on the principle of adhesion, 
and participating in collective bargaining, one finds a triple structure: 
geographical interprofessional groupings, with the function of representing 
all the firms in the zone concerned; industry-wide groups representing firms 
in the same branch, in the sense of collective conventions; and groups 
representing firms making the same product or using the same technology. 
These latter do not normally have the function of participating in wage 
regulation, and are involved only with the defense of the economic interests 
of the firms concerned. Besides this structure there are other modes of 
representation of the employers' position, notably chambers of commerce 
and industry, which normally have no role to play in collective bargaining 
in the French industrial relations system (Bunel and Saglio 1979). 
At first sight, such structures could tum out to be favorable to the 
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development of a local bargaining system. On the employers' side, as on the 
side of the employees' unions, local bodies exist, organized according to 
industry and on the interprofessional level. On the other hand, recognition 
of unions in the firm was, in France, a very late development, and it was 
only in December 1968 that legislation was adopted to lay down the rules 
of recognition of union groupings in firms. The local branch level appeared 
then, historically, as the basic level of representation of the employees, and 
also as the basic level of the employers' organizations. It was at this level 
that, starting from before the setting up of the legal structures of the French 
industrial relations system, the actors worked out compromises to put an 
end to labor disputes in the second half of the nineteenth century. Such 
agreements on wages and piece-rates, though they were relatively common, 
did not last very long, as the legislation in force permitted the employers to 
go back on them once peace had been restored. 
The apparent paradox in the French system is thus that this de facto 
preference given to solutions favoring compromise at the local branch level 
has not, however, led to the emergence of numerous industrial districts or 
localized industrial systems. Whatever the name that is used, observers 
(Ganne 1989; Houssel 1989) note in effect that those that exist in 
France have mostly taken root in marginal situations, which are somewhat 
exceptional. 
The explanation of this apparent paradox resides in the difficulty 
experienced by actors in French industrial relations when it comes to a 
stabilization of local regulations. As has previously been noted, French 
employees' unions have had the greatest difficulty in getting their legitimacy 
recognized by their partners on the employers' side. For a very long time, 
heads of companies firmly denied the legitimacy of the union in the firm, 
and this attitude indirectly reinforced the revolutionary orientation of the 
employees' unionism. 
Stabilization through state intervention 
From this point on, stabilization of regulation could only be obtained, when 
it could be obtained at all, by the intervention of a third partner, the state. 
Historically, it has been in situations where the state turned out to be an 
important economic partner that the actors have succeeded in setting up a 
lasting form of regulation of conditions of work and employment. Such 
situations are encountered when the state is a purchaser of the firm's 
product. In such configurations, its behavior as a rational purchaser, seeking 
to lower the prices of products, generates pressure for a lowering of wages, 
and thus becomes contradictory to the second role of the state, which is that 
of the guarantor of a certain form of harmony in labor relations. 
To attempt to break out of this vicious circle, different solutions were 
tried out in the last decades of the nineteenth century, and these resulted in 
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the Millerand decrees of 10 August 1899, which are still, today, the basis 
for regulating the attribution of public market contracts. By these decrees, 
the state required that companies tendering in the public sector should 
respect the customary wages and working conditions obtaining in the 
profession and the region concerned. In the case of an agreement having 
been reached locally between the legitimate representatives of the workers 
and the employees, it was thus imposed on firms serving in the public-sector 
market. 
Such procedures, although not imposed by law outside of the public-
sector market situation, nevertheless had a regulatory effect on employment 
and working conditions, as was indeed remarked, some years later, by a 
tabor ministry official: although the decrees of 10 August 1899 concern only 
contracts negotiated for public administrative bodies, the publicity they are 
given can go well beyond the field of these contracts. Publication of pay 
slips by these bodies reveals salary levels and the normal duration of work, 
as founded on general practice and consent, and in this way everyone, 
employer and worker alike, knows that these are the normal duration and 
rate for the region. Employers and workers quite naturally take them, even 
when they deviate from them, as a basis for their contracts, since they are 
subject to the regulatory influence (Labour Ministry circular, 5 February 
1915, quoted in Oualid and Picquemard 1928: 164, note). 
The progressive setting up of such procedures of regulation assisted the 
reinforcement of branch structures, on the unions' and the employers' side 
equally. The branch became progressively substituted for the trade as the 
center around which interests were grouped, and as the foundation of 
workers' solidarity. But simultaneously, and notably during World War I, 
the state's involvement in the economic and industrial management of 
branches led the actors gradually to favor the national level of regulation. 
Statist policy meant that it was at this level that the actors could influence 
the articulation between wage regulation and economic regulation, by 
intervening in industrial policies. In employees' unionism, and notably for 
the CGT between the two World Wars, nationalization of industries was 
the element of its political program that corresponded to this economic 
orientation (Kuisel 1981: 77-80). For the employers, the priority thus 
accorded to national branch regulation satisfied two classic objectives: on 
the one hand, to distance the level of negotiation from the firm, and leave 
the field open at this level for the exercise of the employer's authority with 
regard to the management of the work force (Bunel and Saglio 1979); 
and, on the other hand, to promote the organization of economic and 
industrial regulation in order to avoid dangerous games of market-based 
competition (Duchemin 1940). 
By such means, the two actors can avoid face-to-face situations and 
confrontational bargaining. To obtain improvements in their salary situa-
tion, employees appeal more to state pressure and to legislation than to the 
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construction of a real bargaining system, articulated or not, which would 
require that each of the partners recognize the legitimacy of the other. To 
fix the conditions of competition, the employers rely on a statist industrial 
policy, with the prospect of criticizing it in practice on account of its 
excessive dirigisme. As to the state, which in France has never been able to 
act simply as a referee, it watches with interest as its roles and prerogatives 
increase. 
The renewal of the local, or the decline of the economic? 
The equilibrium of the roles thus established at the beginning of the century, 
and which were vigorously reinforced by the economic and industrial 
mobilization of World War I, gives the general characteristics of a large 
section of French industrial systems, concerning industrial production 
activities. Of course it is not a question of a single model, and other 
configurations exist, notably in occupations where collective regulation is 
particularly marked, such as high status professions, or banks, or in 
professions whose regulation was introduced after World War II, as was the 
case notably for the health professions and the social services. 
In this model, the essential role has devolved on the central state, which 
ensures the consistency of regulations and arbitrates the principal disputes, 
in questions of the management of wage relations as much as in those of 
economic policy. The internal cohesion of the two other actors is rather 
weak. The employees' unions are divided, and, even taking them all 
together, they represent only a minority of workers. It is only very rarely 
that they can manage to construct an effective closure of labor markets, or 
to impose themselves as negotiating partners who must be given a voice on 
the level of firms. Employers' organizations are scarcely more powerful, and 
their capacity for mobilizing their members remains essentially defensive. 
Such a configuration supplies the key for explaining the scarcity of 
localized industrial systems in France, even though the internal structure of 
the organizations representing the different protagonists corresponds to the 
local level. The partners are not sufficiently strong locally to recognize each 
other and to agree to confine their strategic games to the local framework. 
In the French system the social and economic partners are mostly weak, 
and look for legitimacy through the central state rather than through 
mobilization of their grass roots members on behalf of local negotiations. 
In this kind of configuration, the new interest that has developed since 
the middle of the 1970s concerning forms of regulation that give more 
importance to the local level, like the reinforcement of the company level, 
is, in large part, due to a tendency toward disengagement shown by the 
state. Having given a new impetus, in the middle of the 1970s, to industrial 
relations bargaining but within the existing framework, the state has 
progressively abandoned, or at least severely diminished, its role of direct 
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intervention, while at the same time continuing to impose the opening up 
of the French economy to international competition (Cohen 1989). All the 
same, this progressive disengagement has not produced a real reinforce-
ment of the other two protagonists at the branch level, where they have 
traditionally showed themselves to be the strongest and best structured. 
It is in this conjuncture that new modes of regulation and recomposition 
of industrial systems have appeared, sometimes around older models or local 
identities, reinvigorated by decentralization policies. But in such systems, 
the weakness of identities and of mutual recognition leads to questions about 
the stability of the solutions which have been sketched out, since the new 
equilibrium cannot be considered purely and simply as a transfer of skills 
which had previously been devolved upon the central state and the national 
representative bodies. The emergence of this principal level of regulation at 
the beginning of the century corresponded, for the state itself, to a mode of 
resolution of a double problem: that of the competitivity of French industry, 
of course, but also that of the integration of the working class into the . 
French political system (Donzelot 1984). In a cenain way, the setting up of 
this model of regulation can be considered as a Saint-Simonian solution to 
the social question. 
In current French society, the highest stakes in societal matters have 
shifted. The problem of the political integration of the working class no 
longer threatens overall social cohesion; and so one can also understand that 
the supervision of production and of the industrial economy, from being a 
major political problem, has been reduced to nothing more than a question 
of good management ( and this is notably what has come out of the analysis 
of the form taken in the 1980s by debates on the nationalization and 
privatization programs: the least that can be said is that the politically 
inspired resurgence of traditional arguments in this domain no longer 
attracts much attention). The emergence of new types of regulation can thus 
take place on the basis of this depoliticization of problems of production. 
In this respect, it can be hypothesized that modes of regulation of a less 
restrictive nature than those of previous models, and resting on weaker 











Regular wage labor is neither the present nor the future for a growing 
proportion of the population of industrialized countries. Almost perversely, 
this realization has coincided with a loss of a radical, progressive vision of 
the Good Society. Instead, the fear is that we are witnessing the creation of 
a disjointed society made up, in Marx's words (describing preproletarian 
workers), "by simple addition of homologous magnitudes, such as potatoes 
in a sack form a sack of potatoes." In the past decade or so, we have seen 
the limit of Gramsci's brilliant insight, Fordism, which no longer seems the 
predominant form of the labor process (if it ever was). However, most of 
us are still searching for an alternative paradigm of the present and an 
alternative avenue to utopia. Without some vision, however modest, we 
might as well stay in our gardens or backyards. And perhaps that is a clue, 
for access to a garden is not just a residue of Thomas More's Utopia, but a 
part of many modem visions, encapsulating the possibility of combining 
different forms of paid and own account work. In the reality of Europe 
today, we live in disturbing times, when inequalities are worsening and 
when the Galbraithian strictures on American society of the 1960s are being 
writ large in European cities such as Rome, London, and Amsterdam, with 
extraordinary private affluence (of a few) coexisting with public squalor (of 
many). That is one context in which to approach the issue of alternative 
paths for the 1990s. 
Another contextual point can be derived from the prevailing vocabulary. 
The "key words" of an era both define the underlying trends and help 
in identifying the emerging opportunities for better alternatives. Among 
the key words of the 1980s were individualism, privatization, flexibility, 
deregulation, structural adjustment, liberalization, and supply-sideism.1 As 
we know, those key words are all part of the ideology that has played all 
the best tunes of the past decade. It is an era in which the main voices 
have been profoundly anticorporatist, antisocialist, and antisocial. Margaret 
Thatcher's famous quip was no slip of the tongue: 
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There is no such thing as society. There are individual men and 
women, and there are families. 
It is this rejection of collective responsibility and sense of community and 
social solidarity, as well as the very active promotion of self-interest, which 
epitomizes the mainstream of the past decade, even though "Thatcherism" 
represents its extreme variant. 
This chapter is an attempt to reflect on two routes that different societies 
might follow to varying degrees in the 1990s. These are built on stylized 
facts about labor process developments, the analysis of which has been 
pioneered by many of those who attended the "Pathways to Industrial and 
Regional Development in the 1990s" conference in Los Angeles in 1990, 
and on our ongoing country studies of labor flexibility in the ILO. 
Space precludes empirical and documentary support for the stylized facts, 
although they are fairly well known. Moreover, of course, juxtaposing 
opposing scenarios does injustice to the nuances of any particular country 
or labor process. It will be taken as axiomatic that the changes in the labor 
process (the structure of employment, the forms of labor status, types of 
contract, forms of payment, etc.) reflect changes in the structure of 
production, including technological and organizational dimensions. 
The stylized facts that we need to keep in mind include the extensive 
erosion of secure full-time employment, the persistence of mass unemploy-
ment and "underemployment" of one form or another, the crumbling of 
unionized mass production manufacturing, the growth of both "functional" 
and external labor flexibility, the widening of wage and earnings differen-
tials, and the failure of traditional social security systems (both Beveridge 
and Bismarck varieties) either to compensate for the labor process frag-
mentation or to provide the income security anticipated in the social 
consensus societies of the post-1945 era. Although all these have been 
mainstream trends that each avoided to some extent somewhere or other, 
even the most corporatist societies, of the Nordic region principally, have 
failed to arrest most of them. 
Ultimately, the greatest failure of the 1980s was the disturbingly under-
played tune about distribution. One has difficulty thinking of some haven 
where income, wealth, and other socioeconomic distribution improved; 
one has no difficulty whatsoever in naming a long list of countries where 
they worsened, despite the disgraceful shortage of data needed to make 
comprehensive pictures. 
It might be useful to contemplate two possible scenarios that start from 
recent trends. The first will be called subordinated flexibility, representing 
a continuation of the dominant trends of the 1980s; the second will be called 
cooperative flexibility, although one might call it integrative or social 
flexibility, in that it represents the vital positive value of labor security and 
collective regulations. The hope is that we can move on from those key 
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words cited at the outset, and thereby point to a more attractive set of 
options than implied by the dominant trends in most of Western Europe 
and North America. 
SOME CONCEPTUAL PRELIMINARIES 
In a series of papers over the past few years, it has been argued that since the 
1970s the postwar social consensus has been disrupted by the erosion of seven 
forms of labor security or "labor rights," each of which was strengthened 
in the preceding thirty years or so (Standing 1983, 1989). Those are: 
1 income security; 
2 labor market security; 
3 employment security; 
4 work security; 
5 job, or occupational, security; 
6 labor process security; and 
7 labor reproduction security. 
These are defined elsewhere, but it is strategically important to distinguish 
between what have been called meta rights and instrumental rights. The 
former are those that are long-term goals reflecting fundamental values, the 
attainment of which is not realistic in the short term but which should be 
pursued steadily and consistently; instrumental rights are those that are 
necessary or helpful in the pursuit of real human values and aspirations. All 
social and economic policies should be judged by whether or not they 
enhance the prospect of attaining meta rights. Many critics of the supply-
side orthodoxy of the 1980s have erred by mixing up the two types of labor 
rights, often giving precedence to the defense of labor market security 
(i.e. the pursuit of "full employment") and to anguished concern over 
employment security, both of which should be treated as instrumental rather 
than meta rights. An alternative strategy to the current orthodoxy should 
be based on the recognition that the labor meta rights are income security 
and labor process security. One way of interpreting the trends of the 
dominant orthodoxy of the 1970s and 1980s is that what would be meta 
rights in social democratic visions of a Good Society were treated as 
instrumental or secondary rights, or even rejected as rights altogether. 
In this chapter it will be taken as axiomatic that the meta rights of a Good 
Society would include the following: 
1 generalized income security for all, consistent with the economic level of 
development; 
2 declining inequality, not the reverse; 
3 labor process security, involving the strengthening of a sense of community, 
solidarity and active participation, through economic democracy; and 
4 the right to occupation, and the right to work. 
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These are stated baldly, in the sense that Gunnar Myrdal used to urge social 
scientists to state their values at the outset, and also because they may help 
give a structure to the consideration of key elements of the alternative 
scenarios this chapter attempts to highlight. In that context, it might be 
useful to reiterate some crucial conceptual distinctions that are fundamental 
to the flexibility debate. 
Labor process security is taken to mean that workers and particularly 
their representative organizations have the capacity to determine, or the 
possibility of influencing, the development of the labor process, defined 
in terms of working conditions, work structures, skill acquisition and 
reformulation, and so on. If, for instance, management has almost full 
control over labor relations, and the workers little or none, then there is 
definitionally labor process insecurity. One could never attain "full" labor 
process security, in part because one would find it very hard to agree on 
any ideal structure of institutional mechanisms. Nevertheless, labor process 
security is a meta right, a question of degree and of trends, in the sense that 
reforms and changes in labor practices should be judged by whether they 
increase or diminish the existing degree of labor process insecurity. 
Another distinction that must be preserved is between job and employ-
ment security. Too many authors refer to job security when what they 
mean is employment security. The former exists if workers have secure 
niches within an enterprise or within the labor process more generally, 
niches consisting of a protected bundle of tasks that cannot be abrogated 
arbitrarily. By contrast, employment security exists if workers have protec-
tion against arbitrary dismissal from employment. In the 1980s many groups 
lost both forms of security, some lost only one, and some conceded on one 
to gain on the other. 
One must also distinguish between an occupation and a job. This is 
critically important for the subject matter of our deliberations. It is 
significant that in the English language, the etymologically earliest definition 
of occupation was taking possession of a piece of territory. An occupation 
involves a career of learning and the mastery, or possession, of the mysteries 
of a craft or profession. There is a sense of continuity, a progression, and 
above all an acquisition of status, control, and autonomy. The status aspect 
of occupations is pervasive. One still occasionally thinks of an occupation 
as a "calling." The term stems from a social structure in which the detailed 
or technical division of labor was relatively undeveloped, when apprentices 
were introduced to the "mystery" of a craft. In intention, the concept of 
occupation refers to a positive idea of work, as creative activity, the 
combination of intellectual and manual activities - conception and execution 
- in the context of "skill" refinement. One is tempted to believe that for 
many workers in the latter part of the twentieth century the development 
of the technical and social divisions of labor, under the guise of "numerical" 
and "functional" labor flexibility, has debased the notion of occupation. 
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By contrast, a "job" is a much humbler word, conveying an activity, a 
limited and limiting piece of work, a narrow set of tasks. Often it has 
a pejorative meaning attached to it, implying a lack of permanency, a lack of 
accumulated wisdom or "skill" and an aura of insecurity. Usually it conveys 
a task or period of employment of short and limited duration. Thus "job 
work" is another term for "piece work." A job is what one does now, an 
occupation is what one is. One would not say of a job what John Ruskin 
said of an occupation: 
The character of men depends more on their occupation than on any 
teaching we can give them. 
If someone has a job, without occupation, the social psychologists might be 
able to tell us the likely behavioral consequences. Those surely cannot 
be favorable in influencing the development of community and social 
solidarity. But by putting labor market and employment security on a 
pedestal, the tendency to idealize "jobs" becomes overwhelming. 
It is scarcely less relevant to our task to reflect on another much-used key 
word - skill. A striking theme of the era is that everywhere politicians, 
economists, employers, unions, the media, and sundry consultants are 
agreed on one point; that training is vital and that raising skill levels is 
the principal means of solving "Eurosclerosis," cutting unemployment, 
combatting labor market fragmentation, and solving diverse other economic 
and social ills. To dissent is to risk excommunication from rational society. 
Training is the answer. If that does not work, then more training is the 
answer. If the unemployed do not perceive their need, they must be obliged 
to fulfill their duty to be trained. Already, in some countries being in labor 
market training schemes is equivalent to being employed, and the payment 
for the one is sometimes linked to payment for the other.2 
It is in that context that we need to review our ideas about "skill," which 
has been a much-used term in the literature on labor flexibility. This, like 
the notion of a job, is also mixed up with ideas about occupation. In the 
abstract, a skill implies some combination of creative and manual abilities, 
a learning process and relevant work experience. To develop a skill usually 
requires training, but not always. More than ever, we need to distin-
guish very clearly between "vocational (occupational) training" and "job 
training," and between those and "orientation training." Frederic Taylor 
knew the differences very well, and the distinctions are even more relevant 
now. When training schemes are devised in terms of "minimal modules of 
employable skill," then not only has occupational training been reduced to 
job training but that has been transformed into a form of labor market 
regulation and labor control, in which trainees have little chance of 
autonomy or status. 
Skill has three underlying meanings. To many, it reflects objective 
characteristics of work activity. This is skill as technique. Following Georges 
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Friedman, one might start by dividing "skilled workers" in this sense into 
"specialists" and the "specialized," whereby the latter merely receive 
general training, do routinized work and are excluded from the design 
and comprehension of the production process. By contrast, specialists have 
far more discretion over when and how to carry out their tasks. But 
depicting skill as technique is actually rather unsatisfactory. One can be 
skilled in having certain capacities, but in practical terms be in a job that is 
not skilled in the specialist/occupation sense of the term. As far as the 
current era of labor flexibility is concerned, the way the erosion 
of occupational security has proceeded has probably accelerated the dis-
placement of specialist craftsmen by specialized workers. over more and 
more traditional occupational spheres. We will return to this theme in 
subsequent sections. 
A second notion of skill is autonomy in the production process; this links 
the relevant work activity to aspects of labor control, and various authors 
have actually contended that the skilled are differentiated primarily by the 
degree to which they have an autonomous status. If workers have no 
freedom over the use and development of manual capacities then surely 
those capacities will be restricted and distorted, thus removing a vital 
ingredient for the pursuit of occupation. It is not clear that many of those 
calling for more training to achieve labor flexibility are calling for a more 
autonomous work force. 
A third and related meaning of skill relates to social status. Some social 
scientists argue that some occupations are called skilled simply because of 
custom or because barriers to entry have preserved an artificial or arbitrary 
skill hierarchy, perhaps complemented by a ritual of training that bears little 
relation to the task complexity, the general knowledge, or the specific 
knowledge required. This aspect of skill is closely related to mechanisms by 
which labor market inequalities are intensified. 
These three aspects of skill should be kept in mind in assessments of 
the flexibility debate and literature. 3 Indeed, if one took an integrated 
approach to both the notions of occupation and skill one might conclude 
that, despite the rhetoric to the contrary, trends in connection with skill 
and training in the 1980s were conducive to occupational deskilling, just as 
state involvement in the labor process was spreading in many countries, 
not contracting, while there was growing labor market regulation, not 
deregulation. 
We have dealt at rather tedious length with these conceptual issues, 
though they do seem crucial. One of the difficulties is that the vocabulary 
of the era is so deceptively benign, so liberating in tone. Who could 
be against policies that "provide workers with jobs," "give training," 
and "raise skills" ? One hopes it is permissible to be uncomfortable. 
Those slogans seem to be answers that beg some rather awkward 
questions. 
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SUBORDINATED FLEXIBILITY: LEGACY OF THE 1980s 
An essential part of the supply-side, libertarian agenda of the 1980s was 
that individualistic labor regulations should displace collective protective 
regulations, the twin justification being the desire to promote individual 
property rights and the belief that decentralized, individualized labor 
relations would ensure that markets would "clear" and unemployment fall 
(or rise) to its natural rate, determined by frictional and structural charac-
teristics of the labor market. Ideally, legalization of employment contracts 
would impose behavioral norms based on individualistic common law 
principles. The courts could be relied upon to rule against collective 
interventions by reference to freedom in the labor market. Unions could 
indulge in fanfare flagwaving negotiations once every two or three years, 
when collective contracts were up for renegotiation, but ideally, by the 
tenets of those who advocate this libertarian path, this would become 
atavistic to the point of being unnecessary or ritualistic. To the extent that 
industrial or craft unions persisted they would be constrained to the point 
of being agents of management as much as agents of redistribution in favor 
of labor, let alone anything more radical. 
Much of this agenda has been realized, to some extent. The individual-
ization of employment contracts has extended way down the pay and 
occupational status scales and such contracts seem to have become more 
comprehensive as their practice has spread. While this trend is well advanced 
internationally, there has also been a steady erosion of collective and 
protective regulations. Implicit deregulation has been occurring by: 
a) nonimplementation of protective regulations; 
b) inadequate resources and personnel devoted to the task of policing 
existing regulations; 
c) erosion of the capacity to resist among those denied their rights to 
protection; 
d) a growing and cultivated sense of ambiguity among potential beneficiaries 
about the validity of such rights; and 
e) an increasing loss of entitlements to protection by virtue of their labor 
status. 
One major cause of the last form of implicit deregulation has been the 
widespread drift away from regular full-time employment in large enter-
prises. Major causes of the third and fourth forms have been deunionization 
(or more likely nonunionization), the persistence of chronically high 
unemployment, and the fears engendered by pervasive marginalization and 
widening inequality. Yet the biggest single factor in the implicit deregulation 
of the 1980s, compared with the implicit regulation of the 1960s and 1970s, 
was less tangible: fear changed sides. Whereas in the 1960s employers led in 
introducing practices ahead of regulations to avoid the threat of disruption, 
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in the 1980s they led "deregulation" in the confident belief that the door 
was open, that others were going through it and that resistance was 
enfeebled. 
Explicit deregulation has come about from the repeal of protective laws, 
whether wholly or, more commonly, by the creation of selective or 
"targeted" rather than general "rights," including the creation of loopholes 
in the legislative framework. Rights per se have been eroded by the 
tightening of conditionality, the necessary conditions for protection being 
made more restrictive and the onus of proof of right often being shifted 
to the workers and made more costly to pursue. Examples of explicit 
deregulation include the emaciation of the Wages Councils and the abolition 
of re)trictions on night work for teenagers in the United Kingdom and 
legislation in the Federal Republic of Germany permitting unions and 
employers to derogate from working time legislation. There are numerous 
other cases all over Europe testifying to the underlying trend. 
Although there has been both implicit and explicit erosion of protective 
mechanisms and collective institutions, it would be misleading to charac-
terize this as pure deregulation. Proindividualistic regulations have been 
displacing procollective regulations. For proponents of what we should 
call a path to subordinated flexibility, the 1980s might be seen as a 
transitional era, between one based on collective regulation to one of 
"contractualization." In the process, it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that 
those who could help themselves have been helped, whereas those who need 
help have been left to help themselves. It is also somewhat ironic that the 
current orthodoxy espouses "deregulation" by reference to the desire to 
create "full" employment. Whereas the old orthodoxy was that regulations 
were to protect workers in employment, the current one is that regulations 
should be judged by whether or not they enable more people to obtain jobs. 
Inter alia, this is one indication of the dubious primacy given to the notion 
of full employment. If critics of the prevailing orthodoxy continue to put 
full employment on the highest pedestal of social policy, they should not 
bellyache if regulations are adapted to promote that goal. 4 
The causes of the growth of various forms of labor and employment 
flexibility will not be discussed here. But whether or not "the big firms are 
coming out of the comer," as Maryellen Kelly and Ben Harrison (1989) 
suggest (with good reason, in my view), the way labor and employment 
relations have been moving is unlikely to be reversed. 5 The shift away 
from protected, full-time wage employment to more decentralized, less 
secure forms of labor relation, including outsourcing, subcontracting, and 
casualization, owes more to managerial, cost, and technological considera-
tions than to a passing period of recession and structural adjustment. This 
means that conventional forms of protective regulation will be increasingly 
avoided, rather than evaded. 
Four outcomes of this flexibilization deserve to be stressed - labor force 
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fragmentation, the erosion and restructuring of economic entitlements 
(including welfare), the increasing need to combat the social and economic 
exclusion of a minority, and the continuing search for new means of raising 
productivity, given the partial demise or deficiencies of Taylorist methods 
in the more flexible labor process in the 1980s and anticipated for the 1990s. 
Labor force fragmentation 
The underresearched theme of labor process fragmentation is closely 
associated with growing inequality.6 We know that wage flexibility has 
grown and that this has been a euphemism for the ability of firms to lower 
real wages and widen or change wage differentials more easily. For instance, 
a survey of employers by the United Kingdom's Confederation of British 
Industry in May 1989 found that in the previous three years those firms 
reporting that it was easy to increase wage differentials had risen from a 
third to over a half, while those reporting that it was hard to do so had 
fallen from a third to a little over a quarter (CBI 1989: 14). 
Besides evidence on wage differentials, there are good reasons for 
believing that inequality has grown much more than conventional income 
and earnings data suggest. One reason is the "postcapitalist" nature of 
many employment relationships, and the ongoing process of labor-force 
fragmentation. Any conceptualization of that will be questionable, but it is 
surely essential to have an approximate image of the diverse strata to which 
new regulatory frameworks would have to apply. After all, one of the 
fundamental tenets of the postwar social consensus welfare state was the 
presumption that the labor force was unfragmented, with a norm of a male 
full-time wage worker in regular employment. In the 1990s, labor regulation 
and distribution policy will have to take account of something like the 
following ideal type pattern of fragmentation that has been growing in the 
"post-Fordist" era.7 
In the context of more flexible labor processes, one can identify seven 
strata that deviate from the presumed norm of regular, full-time wage and 
salaried employment. At the top of the heap is an elite who have become 
"capitalist employees," through profit sharing, the acquisition of subsidized 
shares, and also by virtue of a growing range of fringe benefits, some of 
which have a full value way in excess of any taxable monetized value. Thus 
executives increasingly rely on "performance related" bonuses; in 1989 
those accounted for 20 percent of management salaries in Britain, beyond 
which there were numerous other perks which have been growing in 
significance relative to other income sources (CBI 1989: 5). In the USA, 
senior executives commonly receive over half their total income in non-
salary forms. This elite have income security, work security, labor market 
security, employment security, job security, and labor process security, to 
the extent that they want it. The image one has of this elite is one of 
263 
THE INCORPORATION OF LABOR 
internationalization and increasing detachment from the labor process 
beneath them. In terms of inequality, much of their power lies in the 
concealed way their income and wealth accumulate, essentially legally. It 
is hardly comforting that perhaps the main drawback for those involved 
is that their lifestyle is generally intense and fraught with stress, which 
ultimately threatens any individual's hold on positions of status and control. 
At the very peak are a handful of rapacious individuals who seem to live 
on the margins of sanity, crazed by the pursuit of their nth billion dollars, 
but below such Brechtian monsters are layers of very wealthy, sober groups 
affluently detached from national regulatory frameworks. 
Below this elite category one can detect what might be called frenetic 
proficians. A notable phenomenon of the past decade has been the spec-
tacular growth of nominally independent "consultants" and self-employed 
specialists. Key characteristics of this group are their relative youth, their 
frenetic work schedule and their self-satisfaction. Their expansion has been 
a feature of "flexible specialization." They have little labor security, but 
remind us of Tawney's tadpoles - most dying, but some becoming smug 
croaking frogs - except that a far larger proportion seem to thrive, because 
they have taken advantage of enterprise flexibility and the advantage to firms 
of using flexible specialists for short-term purposes. Whether the growth of 
this stratum will continue into the 1990s is hard to predict, since there may 
be a tendency for their "market price" to decline and for enterprises to find 
that as the cost of such workers come down it will be more advantageous 
to reintegrate those functions "in-house" to take account of economies of 
specialist knowledge. Yet it seems more likely that the external flexibility 
granted to the firm and the perceived autonomy granted to the proficians 
will combine to preserve semiautonomy. After all, these two aspects should 
create a monetized wedge that could be shared ( each valuing the flexibility 
and autonomy that the more distanced working relationship entails). 
A key aspect of the growth of these first two strata is that they tend to 
be beyond the welfare state and other regulatory institutions, increasingly 
having access to privatized benefits and neither contributing to nor gaining 
entitlement to social security benefits. This elitist detachment leads them to 
give political support to the associated transformation of the welfare state, 
from what Richard Titmus called the institutional redistributive model to 
the selective, residual model. 
Those two strata represent the upper echelons of "popular capitalism." 
Below them are those who seem increasingly oriented to serving the interests 
of the upper strata, national bureaucrats, who retain the form of labor 
security obtained in the expansive times of the 1960s. In some countries this 
group may have lost some labor security, but it is hard to gain a clear picture 
of the seriousness of any erosion. 
The fourth stratum down is hard to label, but might be called the capitalist 
worker stratum, consisting of those randomly fortunate wage-earning 
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workers who, through share payments or access to successful profit-sharing 
schemes, accumulate savings that allow them to set up a full-time or part-
time business or to live off dividends. The group may be only a tiny fraction 
numerically, but is ideologically rather important. They have gained in terms 
of income security and many have less need for employment or labor market 
security and so be less inclined to oppose implicit or explicit erosion of those 
forms of labor security. 
Fifth down the labor process ladder is the old proletarian stratum, made 
up of unionized, mostly male workers in regular wage employment. 
This was the Beveridge and Bismarkian norm for the national insurance 
social security system. For well-known reasons, they have been declining 
numerically and have had their labor process security eroded in various 
ways. They have lost visibly and noisily, ironically often blamed and reviled 
by those who stood to benefit from their strength as much as by those who 
in short and narrow terms stood to gain from their defeat. Many of them 
have become a principal source of the growth of the bottom stratum 
outlined below. In general - despite the almost belated entrenchment of 
"insider-outsider" theory - there has been a tendency for this fifth stratum 
to lose in terms of income security, job security, work security, employment 
security, labor market security, and, most crucially, labor reproduction and 
labor process security. Part of the decline of their status, bargaining strength, 
and social cohesion comes from the erosion of job security (as distinct from 
employment security), stemming largely from a series of concessions to 
management on job demarcations. If wages are attached to job or task 
assignments and if workers are forced to concede the whole right to job 
retitling and rebundling to the will of management then effective wage 
flexibility can be boosted. Another striking feature of the regular CBI 
employer surveys in the United Kingdom is that in the past decade between 
a quarter and a third of all pay settlements have included concessions on 
working arrangements (CBI 1989: 6, 13). This implies a reduction not only 
in job security but in income security. 
This stratum has also lost employment security for similar reasons, and 
has been threatened by two-tier or multiple-tier employment contract 
structures and by two-tier wage structures, which may be transitional 
phenomena en route to flexible (not deregulated) employment.8 The fifth 
stratum has also been affected by the growth of working time flexibility. 
This might be seen as beneficial for both employers and workers, but unless 
flexible working is regulated by collective negotiation procedures, as is 
still the rule in Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany, it will be 
subordinated flexibility, essentially on the employer's terms, as in the case 
of increasing shift working and the abolition of restrictions on night work 
and weekend working. In short, one can hypothesize with some confidence 
that a growing proportion of such workers possess little more than a 
temporary niche, far more likely than ever before to move or be moved 
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across "occupational" (sic) categories and industries. By that route they 
swell the sixth stratum. 
That is what might best be called the flexiworker stratum, which has 
grown enormously in many countries in recent years, encompassing many 
"nonregular" forms of wage and other relatively low-income quasi-wage 
labor. The category is not so much deproletarianized as unproletarianized, 
having few if any of the laborist values of the traditional working class. For 
them the notion of the Rights of Labor would have few resonances beyond 
reminding them of fathers and mothers or their history books. They would 
not so much say farewell to the working class as refuse to acknowledge that 
they belong to it. The traditional vulnerability of such workers has been 
accentuated by the explicit and implicit "deregulation" of the time. 
The category is particularly heterogeneous - so much so that one is 
tempted to subdivide it - but what the various groups have in common is 
an absence of any form of labor security, most of all labor process security. 9 
Whereas increasingly the fifth stratum has been expected to be functionally 
flexible (i.e. losing their crucial job security), flexiworkers are also labor-
status flexible, likely to shift between wage and nonwage forms of employ-
ment, sometimes combining activities, sometimes not. Official labor force 
classifications are often hard to apply. Euphemisms are almost amusing. We 
have seen the emergence of "permanent temporaries," "self-employed 
employees," and "in-house outworkers." Some firms maintain workers on 
temporary contracts for many years; some employment agencies put 
workers on permanent contracts as temporaries, guaranteeing them a 
retainer and employment status but not any particular job. The fragmenta-
tion can have grim effects that merely highlight the underlying insecurity. 
Recently there was a wretched legal case in the United Kingdom where 
fishermen who had been working for a firm for twenty years or more were 
deemed by the courts not to have satisfied the condition that to be entitled 
to redundancy benefits workers must have been in regular employment for 
at least two years. As their work in the period immediately preceding their 
redundancy had become irregular, the obligatory period of regular employ-
ment continuity had been broken. The fishermen had become flexiworkers 
without knowing it. 
Flexiworkers need not be unskilled in the technical sense. Thus the spread 
of teleworking (telecomputing, or remote work) often involves workers 
with computational skills. But they are likely to have extreme employment 
insecurity and have little or no labor process security, in that they are 
isolated from the work process, liable to be ignored in promotions, easily 
dismissed and unlikely to identify with unions in companies. Apparently, 
telecomputing has been a mechanism for geographical decentralization of 
work forces and even for extending the international division of labor. Some 
firms have set up regional centers in which teleworkers can work for part 
of the time. The New York Life Insurance Company, having had difficulty 
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in retaining trained staff in its US offices, set up an office in Ireland, where 
it sends insurance claim forms to be processed and telephoned back to New 
York. Such remote working has even been used as a form of regional policy 
to shift jobs to high unemployment areas without the need to shift the plant 
or offices of firms wanting to remain in strategically placed central locations. 
The United Kingdom's National Economic Development Council has 
recently launched information technology work centers in five inner cities 
for precisely that purpose. In short, by such methods capital remains large 
and centralized; labor becomes increasingly small and decentralized. 
Flexiworkers are likely to be in and out of jobs, whether full-time or part-
time, but rarely in them long enough to earn entitlement to occupational 
welfare, social security, or even privatized insurance benefits, let alone long 
enough to develop the confidence to join or form unions. 
Some of the characteristics of the growth of flexiworkers are too well 
rehearsed to bear much repetition. But one trend worth stressing is that large 
parts of the employment function itself may be in the process of being 
contracted out to intermediary, labor-only agencies - their "output" being 
labor.10 This will take many forms, including "turnkey" provision of work 
teams of complementary groups of workers. One may confidently anticipate 
a lucrative profession mushrooming in the 1990s - employment contract 
lawyers - bargaining just like agents for football players or actors over not 
only salaries and benefit packages for their client workers but over such 
matters as employee loan arrangements between companies (a growing 
practice in Japanese firms), zero hours contracts, maximum/minimum 
working time contracts, on-call contracts, annual hours contracts, and the 
like. 
A symbolic move in the direction of employee subcontracting was the 
recent abolition of Britain's national dock labor scheme, whereby dockers 
had obtained some semblance of income and employment security through 
the register of dockers, which had helped maintain minimum wages and had 
regulated training and skill standards. For over fifty years this symbol of 
decasualization had been preserved; now the prospect of labor auctions, 
wage undercutting, and market clearing is back. But that is only one of 
many such trends. Temporary employment agencies have grown for secret-
aries, contract cleaners, building workers, hotel kitchen staff, security 
services, maintenance workers, electronics company workers, and numerous 
others. Some of the "flexible specialist," labor-only subcontracting com-
panies have become multinational corporations, and in some cases, the 
agencies have become monopolist-monopsonists, which gives them strong 
rent-acquisition possibilities. Already there is an International Confedera-
tion of Temporary Work Firms, which recently reported that the number 
of workers in the European Community on temporary contracts had 
been growing by between 15 and 20 percent a year in the 1980s, a rate 
expected to rise with the EC's single market after 1992. Apparently, growth 
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had been greatest in the Netherlands, France, and the Federal Republic of 
Germany. 
One can paint these ongoing developments as either benign or malign. 
The libertarian would probably contend that competition will force the 
agencies to offer workers incentives to stay with their agency, and there may 
indeed be some stabilization of employment relationships between such 
workers and their agencies, who will decide on their allocation to firm x or 
y, with pensions, sick pay, paid leave, and the like. But there is likely to be 
a worrying absence of job security, in that workers will be shifted around 
at the will of intermediaries and the firms to whom they are contracted. This 
is subordinated flexibility, which can only be a threat to occupation by 
virtue of the incessant insecurity and casualization at the point of produc-
tion. There should also be concern about the skills that such a trend 
emphasizes and deemphasizes. Skills that will be fostered include mobility, 
those underdeveloped will include understanding of production processes. 
This is not flexible specialization but specialized flexibility. 
There has already been a proliferation of contractual forms of employ-
ment relation, and it is the associated employment insecurity that most easily 
identifies flexiworkers. There are contracts that cover specific categories of 
worker and there are contracts that are shaped by the production or 
management process. Broadly speaking, one might envisage the former as 
having rather more to do with labor force stratification and the latter with 
job segmentation. In recent ILO enterprise-level labor flexibility surveys we 
have been probing how to disaggregate labor status categories. The experi-
ence has once again highlighted the inadequacy of dualistic vocabulary. The 
term, for instance, covers a wide spectrum of usefully distinctive contractual 
relations. Here is not the place to go into the distinctions, or their 
implications, but just listing the main forms of employment contract 
indicates the fragmention process: 
1 casual, without oral or written contract, typically day-work; 
2 temporary, fixed-term, oral agreement, non-retention - either for a) 
stop-gap work, or b) job work; 
3 temporary, fixed-term, oral, on a continuing work basis - either for a) 
orb); 
4 temporary, fixed-term, written contract, as for 2a or 2b; 
5 temporary, age-limited, e.g. for youths aged 1Cr19 or for preretirement; 
6 apprenticeship contracts, with or without assurance of subsequent 
employment; 
7 trainee, probationary, specified or unspecified duration; 
8 adaptation contracts, for post-training practical purposes; 
9 temporary contracts for first-time job seekers, as in Germany; 
10 job-sharing contracts; 
11 employment-orientation contracts, particularly for youths; 
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12 solidarity contracts, involving shared cuts in wages and worktime in 
downturns; 
13 variable time contracts, where the length of the working day or week is 
adjusted to meet the firm's requirements; 
14 part-time contracts, also involving features of other forms of contract; 
15 regular, full-time contracts. 
This list is scarcely exhaustive, and excludes forms of dependent "self-
employment," many of which reflect a contractual relation with a specific 
company. Flexiworkers fit into many of the first founeen categories, 
and while most of those contractual forms have always existed, it is their 
relative growth that is striking. The scope for employment insecurity and 
income insecurity in this form of "contractual fragmentation" is enormous, 
even though the diversity provides potential flexibility for employers and 
workers that might be advantageous for either or both. The threat to labor 
process security, or solidarity, must be considerable, for such workers 
typically cannot relate to their fellow workers, having no common social 
space into which to bond cohesively, while the regular, full-time workers 
are encouraged to feel apan because the employment insecurity is borne by 
this relatively peripheral category. But perhaps the principal characteristic 
of flexiworkers is that they commonly lack entitlement to both enterprise/ 
occupational welfare and national insurance-based state welfare. Some 
groups may have access to some benefits, some to others. But the dominant 
picture is one of exclusion and inadequacy of entitlement. Ironically, of 
course, they have a greater need for such benefits because they lack all six 
forms of labor security. This means that they are always threatened by the 
fear of floating into the seventh stratum. 
This fragment, which also mushroomed in the 1980s, has attracted various 
epithets, the most controversial being "underclass," a term treated as an 
ideological football by the likes of Charles Murray and Lawrence Mead. But 
liberals have also sentimentalized its growth, often failing to criticize the 
productive, technological, and labor structure that generates it.11 Anyhow, 
one might best describe it as the detached stratum, since the defining 
characteristic is a detachment from regular economic activity, often involv-
ing long-term or chronic recurrent unemployment, and an equally chronic 
need for state transfers from outside national insurance schemes. It is from 
this group that the state can draw lowly paid labor to help undermine 
workers in other strata, and its existence must act as the biggest source of 
fear for those unwilling to become subordinately flexible. 
The "Fordist system" may have broken down, but if so it has done so 
not just because mass production based on regular wage employment has 
shrunk but because the regulatory framework has become dysfunctional, 
given that more and more of the population of advanced capitalist countries 
have become detached from productive society, that is, detached as workers. 
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Consumer capitalism depends on workers consuming mass-produced 
products, but increasingly people's identities are tied only to consumption, 
not to production. This applies to most of the labor fragments, most of 
which are not easily organizable because productively they have no collec-
tive identity. It has almost reached the stage when one cannot envisage 
collective class action any more, only sectional action, on for instance ethnic, 
age, or gender issues. 
The labor regulatory framework built up in the era of welfare capitalism 
is also becoming dysfunctional, because more of the population are detached 
from productive society. They may be completely detached, as in the case 
of the long-term unemployed and many of those in "labor market schemes." 
Or they may be behaviorally detached, as with most flexiworkers, who 
have little continuity of employment and thus little access to nonwage 
components of working-class income, such as earnings-related benefits that 
were built up as incentives to continuity of employment, as in the Federal 
Republic of Germany. Historically, the social insurance welfare system has 
had a regulatory function, with earnings-related mechanisms expected to 
increase productivity, through incentive and worker commitment effects, 
and the firms' return to investment in training. But if the labor process is 
not generating the sort of employment for which such regulations can 
function to raise efficiency, then one can anticipate attempts to revise the 
system to secure a more effective regulatory framework. This is one reason 
for the drift towards workfare, which we might define as the payment of 
benefits conditional on some predetermined work-related activity, which 
includes "training" and work habituation courses. Does subordinated 
flexibility lead anywhere other than to workfare? 
Labor process fragmentation erodes the integrative functionality of both 
Beveridge and Bismarckian social security systems. They were conceived 
primarily to foster productivity and ensure income security; they have 
become means of weakening labor process security and of undermining 
labor market security, simply because the former relies on common interests 
and the latter depends crucially on workers having effective freedom in the 
labor market. The more complex the system, the more the regulatory 
objectives will be uppermost. Moreover, as argued elsewhere, with labor 
flexibility and fragmentation, the contributory base tends to shrink and 
benefit entitlement tends to narrow and grow weaker. Many of those advo-
cating more flexibility also contend that welfare encourages and strengthens 
behavioral dependency, and in that spirit governments have shifted towards 
"targeting," means tests, tighter conditionality, tighter behavioral monitor-
ing, and the promotion of "welfare pluralism." In many countries one sees 
a strong underlying trend towards some variant of workfare, which is 
scripted to play a major role in the libertarian cinema of the 1990s. 
A final labor process trend closely associated with the growth of 
subordinated flexibility, and to the trends to targeted or pluralist welfare 
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and workfare, is the changing role of "training." This stems from the 
perceived need to raise productivity. The basic supply-side view is that 
wage differentials should widen and be more individualized, the orthodox 
ideology being that the rich need more to give them the incentive to work, 
while the pool need less to make them work. But along with more flexible 
payment systems, ostensibly designed to promote productivity, has been a 
trend that deserves more critical attention than it has received, the growth 
of what might be called "trainingitis," which derives from the erosion of 
skill in the traditional senses of that term. The more occupations are split 
into jobs, the more labor statuses are flexible, and the larger the sixth and 
seventh labor force strata grow, the greater the need for job training and 
labor market training. In many European countries the role of the state in 
this has grown enormously, and the script is that a larger proportion of the 
population will have work "careers" consisting of flexible combinations of 
short-term jobs preceded and succeeded by training and retraining, a pattern 
potentially leading to a whirlwind of jobs interspersed with training. Some 
observers have talked about an "active society" for the 1990s, based on 
benign presentations of this twilight zone of intermittent training and 
productive activity. But individualized workers obliged to shift from pillar 
to post in a fashion determined for them by the state, or by any other 
regulatory body, are scarcely likely to lead the way to the acta vita idealized 
so memorably by Hannah Arendt. 
In sum, if the libertarian, supply-side path to flexibility persists, the 
following scenario seems the most likely: 
1 a contractualization of the labor process, with proindividualiscic regula-
tions constraining collective action; 
2 welfare pluralism, with the state as fall-back "safety net" provider, with 
privatized benefits for the upper strata and with voluntary private services 
left to fill the gaps left by an incomplete insurance system (a model 
presented as "the caring society" in the Netherlands) (de Neubourg 
1990); 
3 privatization of social policy as well as of economic spheres; 
4 workfare replacing means-tested and universal transfer payments for 
those deemed to be "employable"; 
5 more policing of welfare "scroungers"; 
6 a steadily growing police presence in civil society to control the losers in 
an aggressively competitive economic environment; 
7 a neo-corporatist state based on an overt employer-government alliance 
to replace triparcism, with trade unions shrinking and shackled by 
legislation and their own fragility in the context of flexible labor markets 
and fragmented productive systems. 
Whether or not these are exaggerated as stated, they are sufficiently present 
as trends to suggest that a search for alternative paths would be reasonable. 
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TOWARDS COOPERATIVE FLEXIBILITY 
There is a nucleus of another route to labor process flexibility, which builds 
on the corporatist traditions kept alive in the Nordic region, but which 
combats a critical limitation of the Nordic models. An essential element of 
any viable alternative must be the avoidance of labor fragmentation and 
income insecurity. Yet the danger is that critics of subordinated flexibility 
and supply side trends of the 1980s will continue to give primacy to labor 
market and employment security. Neither of these is really a meta right, 
though both should be seen as instrumental to the promotion of other 
labor rights. Treating them otherwise ultimately undermines their political 
legitimacy. 
The error of the old social democratic "laborist" route to the Good 
Society lies in a faulty syllogism: there is a right to work; all rights imply 
duties; therefore, there is a duty to labor. One could give countless examples 
of unfortunate deductions from this line of reasoning. Thus, to give just one 
minor instance, it was characteristic that a recent international meeting of 
trade unionists concluded that the answer to the inadequacy of social 
security provision associated with the growth of more flexible forms of 
employment was more full-time jobs (OECD 1989: 7). But one may guess 
that full-time wage employment is neither desired by the majority nor 
desirable on efficiency or equity grounds. As noted earlier, if full-time wage 
employment is treated as a meta right, then one must favor market clearing 
wages, whatever they may be, and a compromise on various other forms of 
labor security, notably labor process and work security. 
Full employment is always possible. They managed it fairly well in slave 
societies, which may not be the best recommendation. However, it is not a 
means of removing labor fragmentation, nor is it any more a reliable means 
of reversing the inequalities and erosion of labor process security. Recogni-
tion of that seems essential if policy reform is to take advantage of current 
realities without drifting into some atavistic cul de sac, such as the mass 
creation of "public-sector jobs." In that context, in some places, often in a 
rather disjointed manner, mechanisms for promoting active rather than 
subordinated flexibility have been taking shape. We may be in the midst of 
an era of social experimentation, in the course of which partial reforms may 
be pieced together to create the basis for a much more flexible lifestyle by 
the end of the twentieth century. The vision must surely be a social structure 
in which labor process security and income security are guarded and 
enhanced as meta rights. 
Such reforms are taking a number of complementary directions, and one 
feels that they would fuse much more successfully and sooner if we could 
articulate the type of social and labor structure that we would like to create. 
Here it might be useful merely to outline the types of reform that may be 
shaping an alternative path to labor flexibility. 
First and foremost, unless organizations can be revived to represent the 
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collective voice of the vulnerable segments of society, notably those in the 
sixth and seventh strata, the necessary impetus to sustainable nonsub-
ordinated flexibility will not emerge or will be dissipated. That is why we 
need to be concerned with alternative regroupings of unions, and in 
particular the possibility of communal unions evolving in place of industrial 
or craft unions. Recently, a variant of this has also been called "associational 
unionism," since it associates individualized workers who could benefit 
from collective representation. If workers are "postcapitalist labor" in the 
sense of not being in stable proletarianized relationships, they will be 
uncommitted to industrial unionism, just as flexiworkers can scarcely be 
expected to be committed to craft unionism, besides being hard to organize 
or to retain. But communal unionism will also not flourish if the organiza-
tion merely represents an agency for job placements, advisory services, 
personal loans, and a source of social security for their members, even 
though all those functions are desirable. If that is all unions become, the 
state or private commercial firms will always try to turn them into 
individualistic entities. Only if they are constantly concerned with the 
primary problem of the era, redistribution, will they develop a pivotal role. 
There are signs that moves to redefine communal solidarity are growing in 
significance, and that the promotion of economic democracy, as well as 
industrial and political democracy, will be high on the agenda in the 1990s. 
Without economic democracy, one can see no alternative to the type of 
subordinated flexibility sketched earlier. 
More advanced in practical terms is discussion and application of experi-
mental policies to promote flexible lifestyles that build on the fragmenting 
tendencies in the labor process. Many of those are double-edged, in that 
they could be either converted into instruments of intensifying subordinated 
flexibility or integrated with other policies that together promote a more 
active, egalitarian flexibility. 
If there are more part-time employment slots, and if there is a perceived 
need to have quicker responses to economic restructuring - perhaps as a 
result of more rapid and pervasive technological innovation - then it makes 
little sense to hope to buck the trend. It makes much more sense to facilitate 
flexible work patterns on terms desired by workers. That is one reason for 
foreseeing an era of social experimentation. Haltingly, one sees the nucleus 
of what could be called a social dividend route to flexibility, called that 
because ultimately it is based on redistributing the economic surplus 
through ways other than wage income and welfare (Standing 1989). This 
route would also give precedence to the right to work over the right to 
employment, bearing in mind that a right to do something can only exist if 
there is a matching right not to do it. 
One could argue that a social dividend approach is crystalizing in the 
various experimental policies and institutional developments taking place in 
various parts of Europe. One thinks of sabbatical year and "time bank" 
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debates in Sweden and Finland, solidarity contracts in Belgium, partial 
retirement schemes, career break and parental leave arrangements, the 
revenu minimum d'insertion in France, wage earner funds, renewed interest 
in profit sharing, the renewed growth of cooperatives in Italy and elsewhere 
(including the former Soviet Union, in a big way), industrial districts in the 
Federal Republic of Germany and in other countries, and so on. Experi-
mentation is the general principle of the moment. Thus old ideas about time 
banks have been repackaged as less radical reforms. And, for instance, in 
Finland a government committee was set up to consider how sabbatical 
years could be phased into existence, with the state arranging for all workers 
to have the right to periodic breaks from their main labor force activity 
(Lilja, Santamiki-Vuori, Standing 1990). Partial retirement schemes and the 
removal of arbitrary retirement age notions are widely regarded as cautious 
steps in the general direction of lifetime flexibility, especially in the context 
of the ageing of European societies, though such schemes can be and have 
been easily turned into sources of inequity and discrimination unless 
developed in the appropriate institutional context. 
One also notices more constructive discussion of unconditional income 
transfers, or citizenship income grants. That would decouple labor market 
status and behavior from income security and facilitate flexible combinations 
of productive and reproductive activities, helping in the process to legalize 
the shadow economy and encourage the growth of the "informal" economy. 
As long as governments lack the courage to promote the genuine right to 
income security, that is, unconditional, universal, and individual, the 
"flexible specialization" potential will be restricted, and the potential pursuit 
of occupation stultified. Basic security from deprivation as a citizenship 
right will be a necessary condition. It is not the only one, for to create an 
environment of cooperative flexibility will require labour process security, 
to prevent the vulnerable from being systematically marginalized, and thus 
being a threat to the working community, and to combat the coercive 
potential of contract law replacing collective regulation. There must be 
regulation to provide the basic safeguards against the structural inequalities 
that market mechanisms are bound to produce and intensify. That is why 
work security and payment system security (including minimum wage 
protection) will remain essential components of any path to an active 
flexibility society. But, ultimately, the institutional structure that promotes 
labor process security will be far more significant for that than any number 
of regulations. New forms of union, new forms of collective agency and 
new meanings of solidarity will need to emerge. 
CONCLUDING POINTS 
Since work was begun on this chapter, political events in Eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Union have given these deliberations a new poignancy. A 
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bogeyman has been removed, exorcised, and after a year or two debates 
about the direction of social policy may become decidedly more progressive 
as a consequence. The market-oriented orthodoxy is promoting sub-
ordinated flexibility everywhere, but in the wings is an emerging paradigm 
based on cooperative flexibility. For that to succeed it is essential that we 
focus on forms of recovering and extending labor process security. Trade 
unions are almost anachronistic in societies where trades or crafts are made 
ephemeral. Industrial unions are enfeebled by the multinational, multi-
industrial nature of capitalist conglomerates. There must be moves down-
stream so that unions represent the aspirations and needs of all the groups 
in our fifth, sixth and seventh labor strata. The only way for such 
organizations to emerge as class-based organizations is to diminish the fear 
factor, and the only way to do that is to shift the social security system in 
the direction of decoupling the labor market from the provision of income 
security. If one sees the existing welfare system as a regulatory device, then 
critics of the trend to subordinated flexibility should want to revise it 
radically. That surely is one of the two keys to creative, cooperative 
flexibility, the other being economic democracy in some form. 
At present, the fragmentation of society is such that political democracy 
and the prevailing welfare institutions are far more likely to cement the 
divides than to reduce the marginalization of flexiworkers and detached 
groups. A majority could almost always be mobilized politically to reduce 
the rights and the security of the vulnerable minorities. Enabling large 
numbers to make the transition from the bottom three strata into the others, 
let alone disintegrating the artificial fragmentation of the labor process, is 
scarcely feasible unless the institutional basis of income provision and work 
organization is revised. 
In sum, an alternative path to flexibility will have to be based on the pro-
motion of the meta rights of labor process and income security, and will have 
to evolve through institutional mechanisms geared to create three forms of 
democracy-political democracy, industrial democracy (i.e. through codeter-
mination to ensure work security, protective regulations, etc.), and economic 
democracy (i.e. through institutional mechanisms to redistribute economic 
surplus equitably, involving the collectivization of profits and citizenship 
income dividends). This would effectively reverse the traditional social 
democratic and socialist agenda, since rather than nationalize the means of 
production, it would privatize the management and ownership functions 
while socializing the surplus. The form of this alternative framework is still 
very far from clear, but the contours are beginning to take shape. 
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FLEXIBILITY AND CONVENTIONS: THE PROBLEM 
The term "flexibility" is nowadays used to refer to an ensemble of properties 
which must be possessed as much by the forms of economic regulation as 
by the enterprises themselves. These properties correspond to several types 
of empirical phenomena: the development of uncertain markets where a 
variable demand manifests itself in an unpredictable manner over time; the 
growing differentiation of products following a closer analysis of the needs 
of demanders; the tendency toward quality competition (and no longer only 
price or cost competition); the growing dynamism of small organizations 
confronted by the bureaucratic rigidity of large ones; and the call for the 
polyvalence, autonomy, and initiative of workers in production associated 
with the deployment of flexible, computer-assisted technologies, etc. In 
sum, while economic thought, orthodox or heterodox, · is largely based on 
the predictability and homogeneity of behavior, flexibility confronts us with 
an economic universe which increasingly takes on, for its participants, a 
character of heterogeneity and uncertainty. 
The aim of this chapter is to sketch out research into labor flexibility from 
the perspective of the "economics of conventions" (economie des conven-
tions), an approach elaborated in a series of articles recently presented in a 
special edition of La Revue Economique (1989). Three major questions 
raised by the flexibility of labor will be examined in the attempt to utilize 
the economics of conventions. But first I shall review briefly the basics of 
the approach that will be used in the discussion that will follow. 
1 The nature of the compromise underpinning the labor relations 
between employers and wage-earners 
For several decades, the relative security of employment in big enterprises, 
the existence of social rights and unemployment insurance guaranteed by 
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the state, together with the standardization and routinization of work, 
diverted attention from the uncertainty intrinsic to labor relations. This 
uncertainty arises out of the conflicting interests of employers and wage-
eamers, and carries over into established agreements and commitments with 
respect to work quality and effort. The need for flexibility, which arose out 
of the crisis of the 1970s, called into question these earlier social agreements 
and made them appear for what they were: on the one hand, regulations 
and, on the other, particular regulations belonging to a certain regulatory 
regime. In other words, such conventions permitted only one efficient mode 
of regulation among many pathways which could have, in principle, been 
taken as a response to uncertainty. This led to the necessity to ask oneself 
which social form assures the resolution of uncertainties specific to labor 
relations (Salais and Thevenot 1986). The need for flexibility provokes a 
series of questions: can labor relations function without a certain overall set 
of legitimating principles in spite of the fact that flexibility makes impossible 
a uniform model of contract? Under these circumstances, what is the origin 
of its taken-for-granted character? Does the unilateral authority of the 
employer provide sufficient basis for this legitimacy and one which assures 
the respect for commitments? How is one to conceptualize both agreement 
and conflict within the same system of regulation of labor? What is the 
relationship between rules of work and norms of productivity? 
2 The necessary link between the analysis of labor and that of the 
product 
Labor flexibility calls into question the relations between the management 
of labor, the product, and its market, in the mass production system. If, for 
example, sales revenue becomes unpredictable, the wage cannot be fixed in 
the short term and must depend, in one way or another, on what happens 
on the market for the product. Long production runs for the same 
homogeneous product limits labor to certain repetitive and standardized 
tasks, to a narrowly defined quality of work. Adapting oneself to the variety 
of quality of demand on a fluctuating market necessitates a redefinition of 
work qualities. It is clear also that the connection between the quality of 
work and the quality of the product established by flexible methods is not 
limited to the enterprise. Rather it brings into play the formation and 
reproduction of the qualities of the work force in society as a whole. If 
wage-labor is characterized by the divorce between work and the product 
of work, then it rests, at the same time, upon their articulation. In what way 
is this articulation modified by flexibility? 
3 The complexity of rules at work and the variety of forms of flexibility 
Flexibility calls upon us to think about diversity and complexity. In so far 
as the variability, differentiation, and heterogeneity of product qualities 
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become the determinant components of competition, our hypothesis, 
inspired by earlier research into conventions1 (Thevenot 1989; Eymard-
Duvernay 1989a) is that it is no longer possible to reduce all forms of firm 
organization, work rules, and wage determination to a single model. Rather, 
we can hypothesize that several models of labor conventions exist and that 
each one presents a specific form of flexibility at work and is adapted to a 
particular economic universe. Our ambition is to go beyond the vision of 
flexibility as an empirical critique of the dominant model of production (a 
critique which we shall return to at the end of this chapter) toward a more 
positive and diversified conception. We shall propose a plurality of labor 
conventions founded upon the qualities of the products of work. 
WHAT IS A CONVENTION? ITS APPLICATION TO 
LABOR2 
Convention, contract, and norm: points of reference 
The word "convention" signifies a taken-for-granted rule commanding 
spontaneous obedience, the result of a founding agreement (the Geneva 
Convention, for example) and the founding moment (the Convention 
Constituante ). The choice of this term is aimed at underlining the fact that 
agreement between individuals, even when limited to a short-term contrac-
tual transaction, is not possible without a shared framework, an external 
point of reference going beyond the simple encounter between separate 
wills. The economics of conventions, then, rejects the neoclassical postulate 
according to which the agreement of the parties - the labor contract - can 
only take place via prior written specification of every detail; reflecting 
identical, optimizing rationalities and intentions. Nonetheless, we reject the 
opposing sociological postulate according to which agreement results from 
a submission of individuals to exogeneous norms which either impose 
themselves from the exterior (being decreed, for example, by social institu-
tions or by labor law, etc.) or are completely internalized in the conscious-
ness of actors without their awareness. (See the extract "Durkheim and the 
contract", below, in which we suggest that Durkheim develops a more 
subtle view of contract than usually understood.) 
In other words, this middle-ground solution consists in the notion that 
the convention is a system of reciprocal expectations regarding the compe-
tence and behavior of individuals, conceived and accepted as taken-for-
granted (Favereau 1986 ). For efficient coordination to take place, there is 
no need for these expectations to be written or objectified in any way. 
Indeed, it would make little difference since their degree of generality or 
efficacy would not be affected by being written down, for the degree and 
the modalities of exteriorization of the rules vis-a-vis individuals depends 
on the system of conventions in force. 
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Durkheim and the contract 
The concept of convention has a larger theoretical relevance than 
contract or norm in analysis of labour flexibility. It seems to us close 
to the methodological rules which were outlined by Durkheim in his 
"The Division of Labour in Society," 1893. Criticizing Spencer and 
liberal economists, he questioned the contractual relations within the 
division of labor (see, also, Didry 1991): 
Contractual relations necessarily develop with the division of 
labor because the latter is not possible without exchange, of 
which the contract is the juridical form. Doubtless it is an error 
to believe that all social relations can be reduced to the contract: 
all the more so given that the contract presupposes something 
other than itself; nevertheless there are special connections which 
have their origins in the wills of individuals. There is a consensus 
of a certain type which is expressed in contracts and which, in 
its higher forms, represents an important factor in the general 
consensus [Durkheim's emphasis] .... 
But for the general result to be obtained, it is not sufficient 
that the public authority ensures that commitments are respec-
ted. Rather, it is necessary - at least in most cases - that 
commitments be spontaneously respected. If contracts were only 
observed because of force or the threat of force, contractual 
solidarity would be singularly precarious . . . . On the other 
hand, consider the hypothesis that, in order to eliminate this 
danger, the free consent of individuals suffices. This is true but 
the difficulty is not so easily conjured away. For, what can be 
said to constitute "free consent"? Verbal or written acquiescence 
is not sufficient proof; forced acquiescence is not impossible. All 
constraint must therefore be absent. But what is the origin of 
constraint? It does not consist in the direct employment of 
violence because even indirect violence eliminates liberty .... 
In a given society, every object of exchange at every moment 
has a definite value which one can call its social value. One can 
perceive quite easily the principal conditions according to which 
social value varies. These are, above all, the sum of efforts 
necessary for the production of the object, the intensity of the 
needs it satisfies and, finally, the breadth of the satisfaction it 
brings .... 
This definition given, we can assent that the contract is only 
fully consented to if the services exchanged have an equivalent 
social value. Under these conditions, eveyone receives the thing 
he desires and delivers that which he gives in return for what 
both one and the other are worth. This equilibrium of wills, 
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recognised and consecrated in the contract, produces and main-
tains itself automatically since it is simply a consequence and 
alternative form of the very equilibrium of things. It is truly 
spontaneous. 
(Durkheim 1967: 375-7) 
Durkheim emphasizes that the contract itself, as the basis of the 
contractual relationship, cannot be limited to the simple meeting of 
two free wills. Respect for commitments demands the necessary 
mediation of a third party who guarantees it and supplies a legal 
recourse in the case of observed violations. Durkheim calls this 
intervention by the regulations of a public authority, the "law of 
contracts." But this is not sufficient: the contractual relationship must 
be respected beyond free consent. The equilibrium of wills must be 
"spontaneous" and this is only possible because the "equilibrium of 
wills" is simply a consequence and another form of the "equilibrium 
of things." This is due to the fact that the equivalence of social values 
is inscribed in things. And this equilibrium must be held beyond 
constraint whether it be the effect of authority or of a particular form 
of violence. Otherwise the relationship would appear to be of a 
"singular precarity," hardly borne out by observation. 
It appears that, thus conceived, a contract between two individual 
wills could be considered as part of a convention which, at the same 
time, goes beyond it, legitimates it and regulates it in its detailed 
aspects. Within this condition, the contract is clearly more than an 
exterior norm, for the convention which founds the contract simul-
taneously rests on rules (the law of contracts), on a principle of 
equivalence of exchanged objects, common to contractors and on a 
spontaneous agreement (agreement beyond consent and constraint). In 
fact, the contractual solidarity described by Durkheim presents a 
number of the traits which we shall call, later in this chapter, the 
market labor conventions. One will note that the equivalence of social 
values exchanged are considered not only in terms of quantity, but 
also, fundamentally, in terms of the equivalence of qualities (as it is 
expressed in the systematic use of terms such as "the sum of efforts," 
"the intensity of needs,"' and "the breadth of satisfactions"). At the 
same time, Durkheim limits its scope of validity to relations where 
"the values exchanged are really equivalent" (415); opening up, for 
Durkheim, the possibility of other modalities of solidarity such as 
"organic solidarity." For us, this means that we must conceptualize 
several types of conventions. 
Two points, however, should be made concerning the current analysis of 
labor relations. First, conventions do not exclude logical contradiction. 
On the contrary, they are a form which enables the coordination of 
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contradictory interests based on opposed logics, but which need to be 
brought together to be satisfied. Clearly, if the entrepreneur is interested 
by the product of work and the workers by the wage, only their meeting 
and their activity in the enterprise are capable of satisfying these two 
interests. The situation is indissolubly conflictual and cooperative. 
Second, the convention, as an empirical phenomenon, does not exclude 
conflict. For a given regime, it is the framework within which the conflicts 
are conceptualized and resolved, for it formulates the pertinent variables 
around which conflicts arise and are resolved. For example, conflict over 
the size and periodicity of hourly wage increases is an everyday occurrence. 
Nobody, however, questions the idea that the hourly wage rate is central to 
the conflict. Yet there exist other forms of remuneration such as piecework 
or monthly salaries (not based on hours of work), wages linked to the 
performance of the enterprise, etc. which imply other systems of produc-
tion, alternative organizations of work, and even other forms of consump-
tion. But the conflict takes place within a convention to which all the 
participants conform without thinking; a convention according to which the 
pertinent variable and the fair evaluation of work is the hourly wage rate. 
The existence of a prior convention only becomes apparent to the partici-
pants in moments of crisis when the form of earnings itself is contested 
rather than the level or rate of increase. 
Labor conventions and equivalence 
As in most economics, we assume that "equivalence" is the foundation of 
all exchange, i.e. exchanged objects have the same value for all the parties 
to the transaction. For this situation to be transformed into the basis of a 
stable and positive coordination between economic agents, equivalence must 
rest upon a common principle; a scale and method of evaluation common 
to all the parties involved. This is an important and necessary assumption. 
In fact, one cannot conceive of economic coordination founded upon the 
prior and permanent negotiation of rules between agents, which would 
imply suspicion and lack of trust. Coordination is either spontaneous or 
nonexistent. 
The application of the concept of convention to labor relations is therefore 
very complex. The objects that establish the equivalence for individuals in 
this relation are problematic as are the principles according to which the 
objects are evaluated. 
Figure 14.1 presents the three points which must be brought together by 
a theory of conventions applied to labor: 
1 Labor has no material existence independent of and separate from the 
person of the worker. It cannot be an object over which a commodity 
transaction can be made (cf. Marx 1867: V. 2). Only the product of work 
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Figure 14.1 The domains of action of unemployment and productivity conventions 
can be the support for such a commodity exchange but, except for certain 
"extreme" labor conventions where the wage relation is disappearing, the 
product cannot be the pivot of an agreement, because the product is not 
yet in existence when the agreement has to be concluded. It must be 
replaced by something else. 
2 The labor relation must be concluded between the entrepreneur and the 
wage-worker prior to the realization of work and the sale of the product. 
It consists of two successive operations: agreement (hiring) and work or 
production. Separated in time, these two operations nevertheless cannot 
fail to be in relation, which influences in return their content. 
3 The labor relation unfolds in the overall framework of the market: the 
value of the product of work anticipated by the entrepreneur is either 
validated or not by price on the product-market. This difference between 
the forecast and the result must be capable of being absorbed without 
disrupting the practice of the current labor relation. 
These three points correspond to three moments which are linked in time 
and which must be theoretically presented as such: 
a) hiring 
b) work in production; and 
c) the realization of the product on the market. 
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The unity of these moments is realized by the economic cycle of the product 
of work, considered from the point of view of the labor relationship. The 
convention of productivity covers the first two moments and the convention 
of unemployment, the last one. 
The convention of productivity 
The convention of productivity refers to something not yet in existence, 
future labor-time. The convention of productivity thus establishes a 
compromise between two equivalences: 
1 During recruitment, the wage is exchanged against future labor-time; this 
is the first wage/labor-time equivalence in labor relations. Constituted 
around an immediate transaction, this first equivalence takes on a market 
form. It is defined around a rule or standard for setting wages. 
2 Thereafter the wage-earner puts to work his labor-power in production, 
transforming labor-time into a product; this is the second labor-time/ 
product of work equivalence. Unfolding in and referring to labor-time, 
this second equivalence does not, in essence, take on a market form. It 
can be constituted by various principles of equivalence {to be defined 
theoretically in the last part of the chapter) which also define the work 
rules. 
A definite social relationship between wage and productivity ( defined both 
in terms of quality and effort) results from this compromise. This com-
promise is ambivalent because it mixes two equivalences which are different 
in nature and provokes the uncertainty with respect to productivity. It is 
thus prominent in the contemporary search for flexibility. At the conclusion 
of the labor relation, which takes place around a wage/future labor-time 
exchange according to a definite wage rule, nothing guarantees that the 
second labor-time/product equivalence will be realized in accordance with 
the expectations of the entrepreneur. 
The unemployment convention 
Economic fluctuations in the product market (with respect to quantity, 
price, or quality) render necessary the existence of stable rules of short-term 
adjustment on the quantity (and quality) of work engaged via the convention 
of productivity. The unemployment convention defines these rules of work 
adjustment, and the respective roles of workers and employers in it. 
The assumption can be made that workers' and employers' responsibilities 
in this adjustment depend on the structure and distribution of property 
rights. For instance, in industrial labor conventions (see pages 296-8) the 
entrepreneur owns the resources in capital and organizes the production 
process under his responsibility; as a consequence, he disposes of the 
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monetary amount of sales. It has thus the right to adjust, under his own 
responsibility, the number of employees salaried by his firm; but as a 
counterpart, fired workers can benefit from social indemnities. 
Since the convention of productivity equilibrates two conceptions of the 
fair relationship existing between work and remuneration, short-term 
adjustment must endanger neither the rule governing the wage, nor the rules 
governing work effort and quality. It is endogeneous to both sets of 
rules. For example, in labor conventions founded on rules derived from 
Taylorism, the short-term wage rate is inflexible, and adjustment to 
economic fluctuations takes place around the number of work stations 
occupied. Here adjustment takes an impersonal form such as the "last in, 
first out" rule or criteria relating to the age of early retirement in the case 
of overmanning. 
Conventions, wage-determination, and work rules 
The continuity of the labor relation is threatened by economic fluctuations; 
demand fluctuations can erode expected profits; the same problem can arise 
from internal fluctuations of the quality of work and the effort of the 
workers. Conventions thus must rest upon an "understanding" of fluctua-
tions which creates shared ( or "common") knowledge by which participants 
cope with fluctuations. Both the knowledge of these fluctuations and the 
coping mechanisms must be invested with a legitimacy such that, if the 
threat posed by fluctuation is ongoing, disagreement leading to rupture of 
the convention is rare and usually contained within narrow limits. It is 
necessary then that they draw simultaneously on both principles of equiva-
lence, in constructing a general set of expectations about legitimate wage and 
work rules. 
Wage and work rules therefore must fulfill two requirements: first, they 
must mobilize knowledge about the uncertainty of the labor relation and 
then, they must manage this uncertainty in a legitimate way. They are not, 
therefore, merely rules of action or of judgment. They are also cognitive 
rules which provide information and allow participants to define and 
evaluate (Favereau 1989). They consist of shared values, classifications, 
variables, criteria, and ratios and serve as instruments for measuring or 
judging the ongoing functioning of conventions. 
Take, for example, the use of the rules based on Taylorism. Organization 
into discrete tasks renders work measurable and predictable. Jobs in the 
workplace are based on a classification of concrete tasks - elementary 
operations - which define the quality of work. A sort of codification 
associates a variable, abstract amount of time, with each operation in the 
classification. A job can thus be defined as a sum of elementary operations 
and an amount of time prescribed for effort. An output norm ( effort) is then 
defined, together with an objective calculation of the wage rate around 
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which wage bargaining takes place (labor-time/wage equivalence). Individ-
ual tasks can then be added together to permit the calculation of costs 
accounting of the firm. The productivity of labor is observable: labor-time 
can be assigned to the product (labor time/product equivalence) and effort 
measured. The firm can measure its profit and derive a norm by calculating 
its difference with the overall sales figure. Thus able to identify appropriate 
and needed labor-time in the form of concrete jobs in the workplace, the 
enterprise is able to convert any excess work time in the short term into 
overmanning or unemployment (convention of unemployment). 
MODELS OF LABOR CONVENTIONS 
From the product of work and its quality toward work 
Labor conventions have their sources in the separation between work and 
its product;3 their domain is to define relations and connections between 
these two areas: work and product. If the evaluation of individual effort 
rested upon the simple exchange of products, the domain of labor would 
have no specificity; the analysis of the conventions defining the various 
forms of equivalence of products would suffice and we would need only 
study the quality of goods (Eymard-Duvemay 1989a and 1989b).4 
Furthermore, in those cases where work is confused with its product, 
labor conventions and conventions of the quality of goods would be 
identical (consider, for instance, an economy solely composed of individual 
independent producers, without firms and wage-earners). 
The approach adopted here begins with the product and advances toward 
work. It examines the quality of the product and the quality of work 
and analyzes how labor conventions affect their articulation. The first 
equivalence of the convention of productivity (labor-time/product equiva-
lence) rests on product quality as it is defined by the organization of the 
production process and its technology. The rules of work and work activity 
are, therefore, closely associated with the rules defining the quality of the 
product and which are imbricated in the organization of production. Our 
task, here, is to specify the rules which define the quality of work in light 
of product quality, within the organization of production. 
The second equivalence of the convention of productivity is that of the 
market. The wage rule belongs to this second equivalence. It must be defined 
in relation to the product and to the standard of quality established on the 
product market. This proposition is unusual in that it subordinates the role 
of the labor market in the determination of the wage to the product market. 
Wage rule determination, in other words, has its theoretical roots in the 
product market. For a given wage-rule, it is only the wage level and its 
variations which are determined by the labor market. This is clear in the 
extreme case where the remuneration of the individual comes directly from 
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the sale price of the product; in this case, the form of the wage is the market 
price of the product. But the current price will depend not only on demand, 
but also on the number of individuals offering the same product and the 
same product-quality on the market. 
We are left therefore with two axes to our model of product and labor 
markets. The first axis concerns work activity and the labor-time/product 
equivalence. At one end is the specialization of individuals and at the other 
the standardization of jobs. The second axis concerns the product market 
and the wage/labour-time equivalence. At one end may be found wage 
variability and at the other wage shon-term fixity; each pole corresponds 
to a type of market: uncenain or predictable. These two axes define four 
pure models of labor conventions. These models will be elaborated in the 
last section of the chapter, but we shall first discuss in greater detail the 
choice of these two axes. 
The first axis 
Work rules determination (labor-time/product equivalence) counterposes 
the quality of persons to the qualification of jobs. This corresponds to the 
specialized/standardized product distinction. Making the quality of persons 
an alternative to the qualification of jobs leads to several oppositions (see, 
also, the "Idiosyncracy" extract). For the former, the organization of 
production is based on the specialization of persons and, for the latter on 
the standardization of tasks (and, beyond that, of work-stations). The 
quality of work, when it is specialized, is linked to individuals who have a 
quality based on knowledge and know-how (the mastery of a "trade") 
which only they possess. Standardization by objectifying the labor-process 
allows their personal qualities to be built into material and bureaucratic 
organization of the labor process. The skills needed to carry out tasks are 
standardized, with individuals no longer possessing specific qualities. We 
shall see later that, in these cases, the wage can therefore be attached to the 
job-description and not to the person. The organization of production 
which, in the former case, is based on a collective of workers, each with 
their own particular identity, rests, on the latter case when it is standardized, 
upon the connecting together of identified tasks and work-stations across a 
particular deployment of equipments. In the first case (specialization), 
persons represent a valuable, capitalizable resource. In the second (standard-
ization), tasks are costs to be reduced. Standardization, is, in effect, 
intimately linked to economies of scale as the only way to reduce average 
unit costs. Skill specificity, on the other hand, is linked to investment in the 
development of know-how and in the quality of labor. Expressed in the 
terms of industrial economics, specialization privileges economies of variety, 
based not on the length of the series, but on the range of products and the 
mastery of a variety of qualities. 
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Idiosyncracy and economic analysis 
When economists want to study the variety of qualities of labor, they 
take as their point of departure, the levels of skill (as revealed by the 
classifications of work-stations in the wage-hierarchy). They consider, 
therefore, that work is already constituted as a factor of production 
which can be described objectively and standardized in terms of a 
classification of quality and of a measure of quantity - in terms of 
hours of work or number of jobs. 
Nevertheless, the recognition of an opposition between quality of 
persons and qualification of jobs traverses economic analysis in diverse 
forms. A positive form based on the observation of large, rationalized 
enterprises, insists on the persistence of the idiosyncratic character of 
the labor process (Doeringer and Piore 1971) or on the role of effort-
conventions which move the X-efficiency away from the production 
frontier (Liebenstein 1966) or, finally, on the strategic character of 
individual knowledge in the Hayekian tradition, 1945. A critical form 
uses the point of view of economic rationality - the neoclassical 
production function or the model of Taylor - to denounce those 
elements which prevent the attainment of an optimum and which 
result directly from the inopportune intervention of persons: the 
non-observability5 of performance, opportunist behavior, corporatist 
alliances leading to monopolies on the labor market and restrictive 
practices, etc. Remember, for instance, the fundamental analysis of 
internal labor markets in large enterprises undertaken by Doeringer 
and Piore: 
Almost every job involves some specific skills. Even the simplest 
custodial tasks are facilitated by familiarity with the physical 
environment specific to the workplace in which they are per-
formed. The apparently routine operation of standard machines 
can be importantly aided by familiarity with the particular piece 
of operating equipment .... In some cases workers are able to 
anticipate trouble and diagnose its source by subtle changes in 
the sound or smell of the equipment. Moreover, performance in 
some production or managerial jobs involves a team element, and 
a critical skill is the ability to operate effectively with the given 
members of the team. This ability is dependent upon the 
interaction skills of the personalities of the members, and the 
individual's work "skills" are specific in the sense that skills 
necessary to work on one team are never quite the same as those 
required in another. 
(Doeringer and Piore 1971 : 15-16) 
While Doeringer and Piore presumably refer to an alternative model 
of production where this idiosyncracy positively deploys its economic 
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advantages (this being suggesting by their future work6), their fol-
lowers on this point (Williamson, Wachter and Harris 1975) tend to 
reduce the influence of such idiosyncratic knowledge to the "local 
conditions and particular circumstances" conceptualised by F. Hayek 
(quoted by Williamson et al.). 
These specialized goods embody the quality of workers who make them 
and such products compete in markets based on quality and not ( or not as 
much) on price or cost. On the contrary, a standardized good is produced 
by a known and widely available technology which gives no competitive 
edge to quality. For such a product competition is based on price. In the 
first case, information about the quality of the product is directly attached to 
recognition of the quality of the individual producers' work. In the second 
case, standardization permits such limits, which are both geographical and 
social, to be transcended as the standard spreads. 
The second axis 
Wage rule determination according to the product market opposes the wage 
variability to the short-term rigidity of wage. It opposes uncertain and 
predictable markets and separates dedicated and generic products. 
The problem of the frequently observed divergence of empirical data 
from the neoclassical theory of labor market, empirically arises from the 
possibility that workers will engage in autonomous bargaining over the 
volume of work and the wage which blocks the instantaneous adjustment 
mechanism of the market. The short-term rigidity of the wage-level and the 
level of employment are phenomena foreign to the neoclassical market. It 
is well known that neoclassical hypotheses treat "work" as any other 
commodity; it is not separated in theory from its product. 
The problem is to give a status to the short-term rigidity of the wage 
agreed to by the producer, in the theoretical framework of labor conven-
tions. It is not a question of the stability of rules themselves - stability being 
a characteristic of all conventions - but rather that of the opposition between 
rules of rigid wages and rules of variable wages (Reynaud, 1986a and 1986b ). 
Following the line of reasoning advanced above (from the product of work 
towards work itself), we shall look not so much to labor-market imperfec-
tions as possible explanation of these rigidities (the standard approach), but 
rather to types of product and their markets. In this way, we hope to show 
that for some types of product and market short-term rigidity of the wage 
can be efficient for the producer and the latter is then obliged to admit that 
market fluctuations for his product generate no information pertinent to the 
quality of work invested in it. Otherwise, he would, for example, reduce 
wages when the price of the product falls and choose more selectively its 
work force and cut working hours. This condition is due to the fact that 
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since market fluctuations give no information about the product, variable 
wage-rates have no adjustment role and wage-flexibility, therefore not 
disposing of any market legitimacy, cannot serve as the basis for a conven-
tion between workers and entrepreneurs. It becomes, then, efficient for the 
producer to postulate the short-term independence of output level for his 
product vis-a-vis market fluctuations, and wage rigidity is then the only 
logical and legitimate convention. 
Two product and market configurations emerge in these conditions. The 
first is the opposition between dedicated and general-purpose products 
and the second opposes uncertain and predictable markets. The bringing 
together of these two oppositions with the wage rigidity/flexibility opposi-
tion sheds light on the nature of the independence of output levels for the 
product vis-a-vis a fluctuating market. 
Consider first the opposite situation. When the quality of the product is 
such that it is aimed at a specific need ( defining what we called, in Salais 
and Storper, 1989, a dedicated product) the wage cannot but reflect the 
quality of work, which in tum is gauged by the value accorded by the buyer; 
the wage thus reflects price and quantity sold. For, in such market, the link 
between the quality of work and the satisfaction of the buyer is known and 
established. For example, a fall in sale price signifies a reduction in quality 
of the product and of the work that goes into it. The variability of price of 
labor, in this case, reflects the range of qualities of the product according to 
the range of customers' demands. 
Wage rigidity as a rule is economically possible only if the variation in 
the value of sales signifies for the producer not variations in the quality of 
work, but only variations in consumer tastes or demands. This is the case 
when two conditions are met: 
1 the producer masters the definition of quality (for example, he succeeded 
in imposing his standard of quality for all the producers of the product 
on the market, what we could call an "industrial standard"); and 
2 the product is aimed at a large, identical, and anonymous demand 
(defining what we called, in Salais and Storper (1989), a generic product). 
,In this case, if demand falls, it is because the design of the product is out of 
step with the changing tastes of consumers, and not because the quality of 
work per se is inadequate. In other words, the quality of work and the 
satisfaction of the consumer are two separate issues. 
The second way to conceive the wage variability/inflexibility distinction 
stems from the nature of the product-market. A generic product is, par 
excellence, the basis of a predictable market. The large number of potential 
buyers for a generic product allows the producer to calculate his risk in 
serving the market (for instance, by the use of quantitative and statistical 
techniques, regression to the mean ensuring a fluctuation around a medium-
term trend). This allows planning, i.e. inflexibility, in the volume of work 
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and in the wage. On the other hand, a dedicated product, aimed at a 
particular demand, defines an inherently uncertain market - no evaluation 
of the risk associated with demand, around which the producer can plan its 
production strategy, can be undertaken. The producer cannot make commit-
ments in an uncertain market, nor can he arm himself against fluctuations 
in the future by (say) expecting to switch from one individual demand to 
another, either immediately or later on. As a consequence the adjustment of 
labour costs must be very flexible. 
FOUR MODELS OF LABOR CONVENTIONS AND 
FLEXIBILITY 
Four "pure" configurations of labor conventions are outlined here, but it 
should be remembered that any real situation is likely to contain a mixture 
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Figure 14.3 Economic fluctuations and flexibility of labor 
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The four models are summarized in Figure 14.2. We shall review each 
model in tum, describing their respective productivity and unemployment 
conventions, characterization of fluctuations, and type of flexibility. Each 
model is equipped with a form of labor flexibility7 adapted to a given 
economic environment, as shown in Figure 14.3. Note that "rigidity" is 
nothing more than a critique aimed at the particular flexibility of one model 
by the participants in another model. 
Conventions of market labor 
Pictured in the top-left section of Figures 14.2 and 14.3 are those conven-
tions where labor quality manifests itself directly in the product. 8 The 
product is, both, specialized (workers master the know-how for fabrication) 
and dedicated (satisfaction of a unique taste). Quality is evaluated by the 
intensity of demand. The price obtained for the product evaluates the quality 
of work performed. The contribution of labor tends, in these conventions, 
to be conflated with the quality of the product and two principles of 
equivalence are reduced to a single one, that of the equivalence labor-
product. The labor market is regulated by the wage, but the latter is in tum 
a reflection of the price of the product. The "union rate" negotiated by 
members of a "trade," the price of the product accomplished by a workteam 
and negotiated with him and the piece rate in certain activities are forms of 
payment which can be referred to as rules of conventions of market labor 
(Mottez 1966 ). 
The convention of productivity here is often confused with the nature of 
the product market, with its numerous, specific, potentially unique qualities 
of demand. The regulation of the labor market takes place, therefore, not 
by unemployment (that is, by inactivity of qualities of work), but by 
geographical mobility from one local labor market to another or by 
retraining into another quality. In effect, individuals take with them the 
quality of the product (a quality which cannot be objectified independently 
of its creator). The convention of unemployment is, thus, a convention of 
worker mobility and learning of specialized skills. 
The community of "the trade" is a historical example of conventions of 
market labor. In the French rolling mills before the installation of mechani-
cal trains after World War II, the operator was "somebody" (Verry 1955). 
His authority and prestige were founded on the practical, technical know-
ledge needed for the manufacture of iron sheets. This enhanced the value of 
the "tricks of the trade". The training of rolling mill operators took place 
on the job and followed the hierarchical organization of the workteam. The 
wage of the group leader was often calculated in terms of its overall output 
whereas the other members of the team were paid a percentage of this basic 
remuneration. This scarce, skilled labor, shifting as it did from one mill to 
another, was snatched up by the Lorrain ironmasters (Noiriel 1984). It was 
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hardly surprising then that the late-nineteenth-century promoters of har-
mony between capital and labor exalted the liberal values of setting up one's 
own business, since this resembled the professional ethics of "the trade" 
(the spirit of independence and autonomy). These values were, in tum, 
denounced by the advocates of industrial rationalization: 
The worker is no longer that small businessman who, in the determina-
tion of the price by negotiation, undertakes - at the same time that he 
elaborates a definition of the fair price - an apprenticeship in the 
management of his future small business. 
(Mottez 1966) 
The relevant economic fluctuation here has to do with uncertainty over the 
product qualities that will be in demand. This uncertainty is "local" in the 
sense that the market is defined by a close acquaintance between producers 
and consumers, this alone permitting the circulation and elaboration of the 
information necessary for exchanges when specialized goods based on an 
inherited know-how and specific technologies are in demand. For the 
producers, the problem is not fluctuating in the volume of demand, but 
variation in the qualities which compose it. 
Flexibility thus consists of having available workers whose range of skills 
and equipment, whose polyvalence enables them to deal with a variety of 
quality of products. The price of the product is the only possible standard 
of quality of work in these conventions, and such flexibility allows sufficient 
adjustment to price variations. The correct strategy for the producer is 
orientation toward qualities whose price is rising. 
Market uncertainty over quality is mastered to the extent that the 
definition of qualities by the producer corresponds to that of consumers. In 
this case, even if certain clients abandon him, he can find others, especially 
if his product scope serves numerous industries and geographical markets. 
Thus potential failure in local markets can be dealt with by output shifts, 
external renewal of the workforce, internal training or by a reorientation 
towards other market territories where consumers tastes are still consistant 
with output. 
Conventions of intellectual labor 
Seen on the lower left section of Figures 14.2 and 14.3, these give priority 
in both the configuration of the product and the organization of the 
production process, to investment in specific skills. But, unlike in the 
preceding cases, where the product imbues work with particular qualities, 
here the quality of the individual's skills is what imbues the product with 
its qualities. This quality, moreover, consists in the creation of new 
knowledge, in the mastery of a unique know-how and in the creation of 
new markets for products based on innovations. The difference also arises 
293 
THE INCORPORATION OF LABOR 
from the fact that these are specialized products which eventually take a 
general and universal form. The specific knowledge which goes into 
fabrication of a product with recognized qualities, in effect, creates the 
market. In the final analysis, such innovation-based products are not subject 
to competition and thus do not have prices fixed by the market. The 
economic value of the product is essentially that of the knowledge-based 
work that goes into it; as a result, there is a single wage/work equivalence. 
The productivity convention is based upon internal - scientific - rules 
governing the quality of work. Individuals, who are the objects of intangible 
investment, are a fixed resource. Producers are sheltered from the classic 
conjunctural conditions of the predictable market. The only possible market 
sanction they face is "structural" - the absence of any market opening for 
the commodity. 
Unemployment is attenuated by the variable or flexible quality of the 
product of intellectual labor, in other words, by changing the product. 
When there is no market for the product, this signifies that the quality is 
not recognized by potential buyers and that the product must be changed 
by harnessing the knowledge which is specific to the work force in question. 
This change is possible in the sense that, unlike market labor conventions, 
these skills are not simply "tricks of the trade", but rather generalizable 
empirical methods, i.e. scientific methods. Here we encounter the differ-
ences identified by Piore (1972), which define the quality of workers 
according to two convention-systems: higher and lower primary sectors 
distinguished, respectively, by the ability to adapt general rules to variable 
concrete situations and by routine familiarity with a given technology, 
product or firm. High-technology enterprises, whose priority is research 
and development, and other innovative or creative firms participate in these 
conventions. In effect, the producer must succeed in giving his creative work 
a universally acceptable form, unlike the work of the anisan. 
Producers do face risk over the qualities of market demand, in which the 
real issue is whether investments in human capital are concordant with the 
evolution of demand. In effect, risk concerns the very existence of a market. 
Flexibility has to do with the quality or configuration of the product. Its 
broad scope is linked to the extent to which concepts and the methods can 
be universalized and to the possibilities for adaptation of existing products 
and industrialization of new products. 
Conventions of non-quality labor 
Seen at upper-right hand of Figures 14.2 and 14.3, these conventions are 
based on standardization of tasks and permit the utilization of interchange-
able individuals, whose identity has no imponance in the quality of work. 
In effect, standardization suppresses individual qualities. More precisely, 
worker identity is external to work itself ( e.g. family membership or 
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membership of a rural or ethnic community), having no place in the world 
of work. Personal qualities generated outside the workplace are nonetheless 
important in determining the appropriateness of an individual to a given job. 
Thus, the employment of individuals whose skills have, strictly speaking, 
no market-price permits them to be evaluated by low wages. Wages are low 
in part because they do not reflect cost of investment in reproduction of 
skills. This is a basic difference from the two preceding models of conven-
tions, where quality of work directly reflects that of individuals and wages 
must cover reproduction of these qualities. Such a wage level is a precondi-
tion of the stability of those conventions. Here, by contrast, temporal 
stability comes from the durable existence of a labor surplus (considered in 
these conventions as a kind of free and natural resource). 
A good example of such conventions is the replacement, thanks to 
standardization, of men by women in many jobs, as well as the massive 
employment of rural or immigrant labor. In both cases, the nonwork 
qualities of these groups (i.e. peasant ties or household roles) are more 
important than skills. Sabel (1982) distinguishes three categories of workers, 
who illustrate non-quality labor conventions: "peasant-workers," "would-
be craftsmen," and "ghetto-workers." The universe of reference of these 
workers is external to the jobs that they occupy at any given moment. 
Peasant-workers accept unstable employment and can tolerate unemploy-
ment since they can either return to agriculture, earn supplementary income, 
or be aided by their community. Members of the same community can often 
assemble themselves in a single enterprise and continue to apply the 
hierarchical or even clan-based organization of their community under the 
codified appearance of the relations within an enterprise (Bernoux, Motte, 
and Saglio 1973). Lacking initial skills values in the market, would-be 
craftsmen are ready to accept anything in order to penetrate the world of 
the.factory. The absence of any long-term project condemns ghetto-workers 
to dead-end jobs and to an acceptance of the moral judgment which upholds 
their incapacity to undertake anything better. 
Such conventions typify situations where employment is unstable or 
precarious. They can also be encountered when products of standardized 
labor are dedicated to one or more particular demands. A classical illustra-
tion of this in industrial economics is the case of subcontractors lacking 
knowledge specific enough to give them independence on the market. One 
can also associate these conventions with the "sweating-system," where 
work (at home or in small family enterprises) has lost the independence of 
"the trade" without gaining autonomy by access to the market. Production 
is placed under the direction of the market (price, volume or quantity) by 
the middleman who places the order. In this way the sweating system 
plunges workers into uncertainty. 
Wage variability is the basis of these nonquality labor conventions. 
The wage cannot be both a remuneration and a true resource for these 
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individuals, and often assumes the character of a supplementary income. 
Although the skills of the worker are unimportant, the worker's specific 
character is important in the external labor market, where it is responsible 
for the mobilization of labor supplies. The convention depends on these 
nonwork, non-skilled-based identities. The frequent presence of a com-
promise between the workplace identity and the other identities of employ-
ees is the result. Paternalism, for example, could be interpreted as a 
compromise between the role of the family and the standardization of work. 
The productivity convention does not need to be closely regulated since 
it is underpinned by an unemployment convention which tailors income 
from work and hence, labor costs, to fluctuations in demand. This conven-
tion transmits the charges of unemployment to the community members to 
which the workers employed belong. As in neoclassical theory, labor is a 
variable cost, both in terms of price and quantity. 
The economic fluctuation of nonquality labor conventions creates uncer-
tainty with respect to both the price and the volume of demand. Producers 
involved in these conventions fabricate standardized products dedicated to 
given, often very large, clients. The volume of work is adjusted in terms of 
hours of work. It adjusts itself immediately to demand variations and is 
externalized onto the surrounding community ( ethnic or rural community 
or the family). Flexibility is thus connectd to precarity of employment. It 
is for these conventions that the compromise with the employment rules 
imposed by the state, which are rooted in industrial conventions, prove to 
be delicate, and often lead to violation or subterfuge, i.e. to use of legal 
loopholes and other forms of employment (temporary work, short-term 
contracts, subcontracting etc.) 
Conventions of industrial labor 
These last conventions, seen in the lower right section of Figures 14.2 and 
14.3, combine rationalized work management and predictable markets. 
The industrial convention of productivity rests on a paradox which our 
familiarity with mass production and the large rationalized enterprise tends 
to mask. Work, having lost both its specialization and its dedication to an 
individualized demand, severs the link between labor and its product. The 
demand to which the firm addresses itself - especially the large firm -
becomes independent of the market, which no longer evaluates the quality 
of the product, nor the quality of work. Quality is assured by incorporation 
of industrial standards into physical equipment and becomes more or less 
independent from the workers. Direct productivity incentives for workers 
disappear and have little to do with direct wages. By what means can they 
be reestablished? The response is complex and could have an unavoidably 
historical dimension (see the extract on "Polanyi"). In part, the response 
has to do with the emergence of social policies directed toward labor. 
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K. Polanyi and the industrial labor conventions 
In industrial conventions, the individual has, in effect, lost all the 
traditional determinations upon which other conventions for the 
definition and insurance of the quality of work are based: "the trade," 
the family, the community, etc. Whence the problem raised by K. 
Polanyi (1944) when he analyses the crisis of economic liberalism and 
the "great transformation" needed to overcome this crisis: the deploy-
ment of economic and social policies by the state. How, given the 
progressive organization of the market for goods, does work, which 
- like money and land - depended upon "non-contractual organiza-
tions such as the family, neighbourhood, trade or religion," organize 
according to "the fiction" of the market? 
As Polanyi stresses: 
" ... labour, land, and money are essential elements of industry; 
they must be organized in markets; in fact, these markets form 
an absolutely vital part of the economic system. But labour, land, 
and money are obviously not commodities ... Labour is only 
another name for a human activity which goes with life itself, 
which is in its tum not produced for sale but for entirely different 
reasons, nor can that activity be detached from the rest of life, 
be stored or mobilized ... None of them is produced for sale. 
The commodity description of labour, land and money is entirely 
fictitious ... Nevertheless, it is with the help of this fiction that 
the actual markets for labour, land and money are organized." 
(Polanyi 1944: 72) 
This impossibility is nonetheless realized. Polanyi demonstrates 
that a purely social solution such as the localized paternalism of the 
Speenhamland system cannot only fail: the attempt to ensure that the 
wage does not descend below a certain minimum income, notwith-
standing the market situation, leads to the lowering of the wage and 
to the collapse of the incentive to work: "Under Speenhamland society 
was rent by two opposing influences, the one emanating from 
paternalism ... ; the other organizing the elements of production ... 
under a market system." (1944: 80). Social institutions are linked, but 
in a complicated manner, to the quality of work and productivity. Far 
from being external, social institutions influence these latter two 
factors from the inside. In the case analysed by Polanyi, the main-
tenance of a locally restricted social identity was in contradiction with 
the universal identity of work emerging from the development of 
large-scale industry and from the extension of markets. 
In industrial conventions, the worker becomes the bearer of social rights 
underwritten by the state and/or by agreements negotiated by cooperative 
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elites. We shall deal with this point by limiting ourselves to the study of 
unemployment in France (Salais, Baverez, Reynaud 1986). In this case, 
access to social rights is subordinate to access to salaried work. Individuals 
must conform explicit norms of productivity for the production of goods. 
Conventions of industrial labor make the firm play an essential role in the 
definition of norms, and their observance according to procedures which 
are considered fair and legitimate by the participants. These procedures are 
structured around the concept of "employment,,, consisting of a skill and 
wage classification attached to the jobs (and not to the individuals), hiring 
and firing impersonal rules and a system of unemployment compensations. 
Thus, an overall convention of productivity establishing the link between 
the quality of work, quality of product, and remuneration is defined by 
means which are at once general (the state), decentralized (the firm), and 
intermediate (representative groups, agreements made between different 
levels of the state, branches, and firqis).9 The products of these industrial 
conventions in the mass production industries facilitate the calculation of 
economic risk and offer the organizational capacity to manage collective 
risk, so that minimum revenue can be maintained even in the face of market 
fluctuations (job loss, the loss or insufficiency of individual productivity). 
This protection is effected via social policies embodied in labor law and 
negotiated by the groups referred to above. In the French industrial 
convention of unemployment, the responsibility vis-a-vis fluctuations of 
demand rests on the employers; but this responsibility has two faces in that, 
at the same moment, entrepreneur is committed to his personnel, but 
ultimately not committed because the state assumes ultimate financial 
responsibilities. 
Thus, industrial labor conventions are congruent with macroeconomic 
fluctuations, for mass products markets are sensitive to the macroeconomic 
conjuncture through fluctuations in both consumption and investment. 
Adjustments in response to economic fluctuations are therefore carried out 
through short-term adjustments in the quantities produced and sold. 
Adjustment in response to a prolonged downturn which cannot be absorbed 
by building up stocks requires cuts in hours of work (short-term unemploy-
ment) or in the number of jobs (total unemployment). We must note the 
relationship between the mass product in theories of regulation (Boyer, 1986) 
and industrial conventions. But these conventions are considered by them 
only in an indirect way, as the support of an aggregate demand in 
macroeconomic policy. When they are analyzed, as we did, as the basis of 
risk-calculation by firms, the congruence of mass product with demand 
forecasting, the efficiency of wage inflexibility and the management of 
fluctuations as deviations from a trend may be seen. By the same token, it 
appears that these characteristics define markets from which other products 
(dedicated products), other markets (uncertain markets), and other forms of 
adjustment of wages and employment are excluded, and ignored. 
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There is, thus, a flexibility proper to industrial labor conventions, which 
rests upon the variability of the number of occupied jobs (or, via these jobs, 
of the hours of work). But it remains adequate only if the industrial 
definition of the quality of work is not threatened by the evolution of 
demand. In effect, if the standards of quality are thoroughly modified by 
the product markets, even the quality of the jobs offered will have to be 
changed; and what matters will, then, be not flexibility, but investment. 
CONCLUSION 
As always, the search for alternative answers to old theoretical questions 
raises an enormous number of issues. We shall conclude, tentatively, with 
two methodological observations. First, the empirical analysis of concrete 
labor relations can be considerably enriched by the approach used here. 
Though we have here only examined pure models, more complex situations 
could be analyzed in terms of compromises between conventions. For 
example, the recent increase in use of market conventions might not be the 
simple flexibilization of mass production, but a complex compromise 
between at least two systems of labor conventions - industrial and market. 
Second, the analysis of evolutionary dynamics and crises10 could be enriched 
by the analysis of distortions between conventions (lags, incoherences in the 
choices, and so on). For instance, a firm can move towards markets utilizing 
some conventions for the quality of products while not adapting its labor 
conventions for that of labor, given the autonomy of rules and institutions 
proper to each model of conventions. More generally, we can conceive of 
historical situations - such as that of much contemporary advanced capital-
ism - in which social institutions and the rules of employment policy can 
remain based upon industrial labor conventions while enterprises progress 
toward more market-based compromises, and examine the stability or 
unstability of such situations. 
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LEVELS OF POLICY AND THE 
NATURE OF POST-FORDIST 
COMPETITION 
Patrizio Bianchi 
This chapter analyzes the relation between organization of production and 
competitive behavior and outlines the policymaking aspects of regional 
development that are implicit in the post-Fordist era. The chapter is 
essentially based on a European perspective and focuses on the new 
European Community approach to industrial and regional policies. 
FORDIST PRODUCTION AND MARKET STRATEGY 
The model of organization of production defined as Fordist is a model of 
production geared to great volumes of homogenous goods, and therefore 
realized with an organization of production devoted to generating advan-
tages by specialization. The search for efficiency leads to an organization of 
productive processes based on the maximum specificity of assets employed 
and at the same time the maximum rigidity of relations among these assets. 
These rigid relations are internally organized in a hierarchical structure, 
where all production and market decisions are centralized. Within this 
production organization, components and parts of the end products could 
be produced separately by small-sized companies which specialize in those 
productions, but timing and technical standards of this production are 
entirely determined by the large company, which controls the entire 
production cycle. 
In mass production the search for efficiency implies that fixed investments 
be "sunk" because they are specified to the production of a given good. This 
sunkenness is crucial not only to determine the control of production 
organization but also to control the market organization. 1 According to the 
Bain-Sylos-Modigliani tradition, revamped by recent literature on strategic 
deterrence, we can stress that the Fordist model of production plays the role 
of market-ruler simply because of this sunkenness of fixed investments, that 
is to say because of the specificity of the assets needed for homogeneous 
production. 2 
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As the entrant is supposed to use the same technology as the incumbent, 
the incumbent can deter potential entry (by preempting the market demand) 
through an expansion of its productive size to leave no market space for a 
rival having at least a minimum efficient scale (Modigliani 1958). This means 
that the incumbent identifies his size of production not by technological 
decision but by strategic decision (Gold 1982). 
Why do small companies survive in this model? 
Modigliani (1958) demonstrates that, in the presence of technological 
discontinuities, a pre-emptive strategy can be developed by the incumbent 
with the help of small companies, making explicit the possibility of 
coexistence within the same industry of different-sized companies having 
different levels of efficiency. Assuming the existence of one large and several 
small companies, the large firm may develop a strategy of accommodation 
{that is to say of accepting entry) toward small companies in order to fill 
any demand gap and therefore to deter the entry of efficient, that is, large 
competitors. In case of slow and uncertain growth of demand, the incum-
bent can accommodate the entry of small companies to buffer the fluctua-
tion, by accepting them during expansion and expelling them during 
decrease of demand. 
On the other hand, given that joint production is excluded, the possibility 
for a single firm to sell differentiated goods implies the management of 
parallel processes, each one of which is individually specified for the 
production of one homogeneous good. In this context the large company 
could favor the accommodation of small companies producing small quanti-
ties of differentiated products, in order to avoid both the change of its 
production management and the potential entry of rivals supplying the 
differentiated goods. 
Small firms can survive when they are useful to the deterring strategy of 
the large company playing the role of incumbent. In any case the life of 
small companies depends on the production and market decisions of the 
large company. In the late 1950s these assumptions were considered general. 
Today, we can affirm that these assumptions are consistent with oligopolis-
tic forms of mass production, as a historically determinate production 
system, not as parts of any universal cycle of development. 
According to this perspective, we can use the product life cycle scheme 
not as a universal description of the evolution of industrial production 
systems, but simply to sketch different oligopolistic games emerging in the 
various historic phases of the development of mass production. 3 
In the expansion phase the rate of demand growth is constant and 
therefore predictable, thus the incumbent can plan all the investments 
necessary not only for efficient production, but also to deter the potential 
entry of efficient mass-producing competitors. Because the quality of 
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demand is assumed to be stable, the deterring strategy is credible because of 
the sunkenness of these investments. 
Fudenberg and Tirole (1983) demonstrate that a deterrent action is 
connected to the irreversibility of capital invested by the same entity that 
acquired the right of first entry into a market. Eaton and Lipsey (1979 and 
1980) stress that such deterring strategy is successful also in a period of 
predictable increase of demand, inasmuch as the incumbent is always able, 
by expanding the supply of its existing plant, to anticipate the attack of an 
external operator that must construct a new plant to enter the expanding 
market. 
When the market approaches saturation, demand tends to decrease and 
become uncertain so that firms, in order to maintain their levels of activity, 
should apply policies of revamping, by an accelerated renewal of the 
products and a segmentation of the market. A homogeneous product cannot 
satisfy the emerging differences in consumer tastes and any preemptive 
strategy based on standardized production results in defeat. The sunkenness 
of investments is a barrier to entry for entrants, but it is also a barrier to 
exit for the incumbent and it becomes a relevant constraint for a rapid 
organizational adjustment to the changing demand.4 
Faced with a rigid incumbent, which is supposed to be organized in order 
to control a market situation that it has exhausted, small firms can be more 
competitive, because they are specialized in supplying specific demands. In 
this light, as Schoenberger (1988: 115) clearly states, "what Piore and Sabel 
call •flexible specialization' is a response to market instability, leading firms 
to target smaller, more rapidly changing, and more specialized market 
segments (Sabel 1982; Piore and Sabel 1984)." 
The role of small business with respect to the large corporation changes: 
in the stage of demand expansion, the role of small firms was clearly assumed 
as being dependent on the big company's strategy; in the stage of maturity 
and decline, small companies could be an alternative to big business, because 
of their higher capacity to respond to an unpredictable and fragmented 
demand, whereas the big companies cannot react because of the specificity 
and sunkenness of their investments (needed in the past to deter entries). 
It obviously has to be noted that industrial districts did not arise simply 
in response to the difficulties of mass production firms. They occupy 
different market niches, often in completely different industries. The Italian 
and German cases suggest certainly that local agglomeration of small and 
medium-sized companies are not the result of large firm decline, but are 
deeply rooted in the social and economic history. 
However, what we wish to stress is that territorial aggregations of 
complementary companies emerged as a peculiar pathway to industrializa-
tion and regional development in a period of market disorder, when the 
previous model of market and production regulation failed. The indepen-
dent role played by the territorial aggregation of companies enlightens 
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opportunities offered by a nonhierarchical network of companies, linked by 
cultural and social roots; Italian and German industrial districts became 
a lively development pattern, which could be an alternative to the 
well-established way based on the Fordist model, and therefore these 
examples become relevant for the American and European debate on 
reindustrialization (Piore and Sabel 1984). 
This attention was magnified by the evidence that the flourishing areas of 
Europe, from the so-called Third Italy, to Catalonia and Pais Valenciano, 
from the southern regions of France to the central areas of Germany, were 
developing according to a model of diffuse entrepreneurship. 
In the second half of the 1980s large firms came out of the comer and 
a new wave of industrial concentration occurred, emphasizing a clear 
tendency toward reimposing a strong market regulation. At the same time 
many industrial districts around Europe showed serious competitive prob-
lems and started on the difficult process of internal reorganization. How-
ever, the recent experience of dynamism of local systems has developed a 
strong interest in a policymaking approach based on promotion of industrial 
networks and local partnership. 
The European Economic Community has reoriented its regional and 
industrial policy approach toward structural policies aimed at creating and 
reinforcing industrial networks, especially in the less-developed regions. 
Today, these policies are a crucial aspect of the entire program of completion 
of the European Single Market. 
These struc.:tural policies are aimed at re-creating local networks, through 
an active promotion of local partnership; they are based on integrated 
programs of public actions, which are activated by different authorities. In 
order to understand the nature of this policymaking approach, it is necessary 
to analyze deeper the different aspects of industrial districts and their 
position in the new competitive environment, characterized by the revenge 
of the big businesses. 
INDUSTRIAL DISTRICTS AND PRODUCTION SYSTEMS 
The extensive literature treating the industrial districts has thus analyzed 
territorial aggregations of small units of production in two ways: 
a) in terms of the geographic aspect of aggregation, emphasizing above all 
the social and environmental factors of agglomeration; and 
b) in terms of the production aspect of aggregation, emphasizing the 
organization of production as the crucial factor in the aggregation 
between firms. 
These two aspects of the industrial district come together in analyses of 
specific situations in which skill and experience have formed aggregations 
on a local level constituting the common link between specific production 
306 
THE NATURE OF POST-FORDIST COMPETITION 
activities. In the case of the Marshallian Industrial District (MID) the system 
of production, acting as a single agent on the market, consists of a set of 
cooperative relations between specialized agents for phases belonging to the 
same production cycle. 5 
As Becattini (1989) stresses, recalling the classical Marshallian view, the 
crucial characteristic of the MID is the set of cooperative relations among 
local agents who see themselves as part of the same organism, defined in 
historical and social terms; the diffuse entrepreneurship is the main aspect 
of this territorial agglomeration. 
The specific advantage of these production organizations with respect to 
general agglomerations of small and medium-sized firms is given by a 
division of labor, based on territorial, historical, and cultural traditions, 
represented in what has been defined, following Marshall, as an "industrial 
atmosphere" (Marshall 1879). This is the crucial element that binds together 
aspects of territory and production. We can redefine this industrial atmos-
phere as the set of intangible assets belonging to the system of production 
as a whole. 
The cost advantage for the MID of industrial atmosphere compared with 
systems of production which are organized differently (for example, the 
traditional large, centralized firm or generic agglomerations of individual 
small firms) is that it reduces the transaction costs between the agents which 
interact within it, lowering the costs of information on reliability of 
subcontractors without raising in the same proportion the costs of coordina-
tion of them; the division of labor based on diffuse entrepreneurship and 
on stable social partnership increases static, and possibly, dynamic flexi-
bility, because continuous adjustment of the production organization is 
made possible. 
These advantages cannot not be individually appropriated, precisely 
because of this historic embodiment in the social structure of the production 
system. It is an externality for individual companies established in the 
district, but also constitutes for them a barrier to exit from the district 
system if they need a drastic change in their strategic behavior in order to 
react to dramatic changes in the rules of competition. 
As sketched above, during a period of demand instability and market 
uncertainty, industrial districts had the possibility to undertake hit-and-run 
entries taking advantage of the relative rigidity of the large firm as regards 
its ability to extend its capacities to fit the changes in demand. 
This success was based on the opposition between an incumbent (the large 
firm) which has the characteristics of mass production and an internal struc-
ture which is hierarchical and rigid, and a multiproduct entrant, the district, 
capable of carrying out continuous productive adjustments more quickly 
than the incumbent and thus able to enter and leave a specific market or a 
specific segment very rapidly, responding to the variation in the demand curve 
of the specific product, selling the product at highly competitive prices. 
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As soon as large firms undertake a policy aimed at stabilizing the demand 
curve, by means of trademark policies and preemptive emission of new 
goods, ability to carry out hit-and-run entries by districts is substantially 
reduced. In this new competitive context, it is crucial to regain the role of 
incumbent, in order to carry out a segmentation of the market with regard 
to which the firm can play a dominant role. This implies for the incumbent 
an organization of manufacturing, which could be also decentralized to 
small companies, but a clear centralization of the strategic activities of 
market control. 
Recent literature on the strategic deterrence and empirical researches on 
market trends have clearly shown that the deterring economies of scale are 
today on distribution, advertising, marketing services, and product innova-
tion rather than on manufacturing; dominant companies can again use 
capital as a deterrent against potential entrants, but "capital" is not just 
productive capacity for manufacturing homogeneous goods, but a variety 
of strategic investments (R & D, product differentiation and advertising, 
flexible manufacturing systems, marketing and branding, distribution and 
assistance). All these are new barriers to potential competition, and they are 
very effective because are oriented to filling any market segments and at the 
same time to addressing and leading consumer needs. 
Thus, in the second part of the 1980s, large corporations reorganized their 
activities not simply to be more flexible - through a deverticalization of their 
production lines, and by applying technologies able to increase economies 
of scope without reducing economies of scale - but they moved to take 
control of the market through the acquisition of distribution and assistance 
networks, well-known brands, and a substantial increase of advertising and 
marketing activities. 
In Europe, this stage has also been characterized by a dramatic increase 
in mergers and acquisitions, that is not completely justified by efficiency 
but seems to be a response to the need for establishing dominant positions 
with a view to the completion of the Single Market. This dominant position 
can be shared by various groups, which use strategic alliances and joint 
ventures to capture the control of a market which is segmented by the same 
action of the companies. Many examples, from food products to domestic 
appliances to armament production, offer clear proof of the trend toward 
concentration occurring in Europe. 
In this competitive phase, the obstacle to the adjustment of already well-
established districts is constituted precisely by the difficulty of drastically 
changing the organization of production set up on the basis of a social 
system. Thus, in order to avoid declines of the productive system that could 
induce a generalized disease for the territory, policy actions aimed at 
reestablishing competitive conditions, by retraining labor forces, informa-
tion about technologies and market trends, promotion of export consortia 
were experienced by several regional governments in Europe. Centers 
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providing structural services have been activated in several Italian districts 
through the cooperation among local public authorities, entrepreneurial 
associations, private companies (Table 15.1). 
This approach to industrial policy was largely opposed by the national 
governments, which were still oriented to provide direct subsidies to 
individual companies, rather than to intervene to recreate the local environ-
ment. However, this policymaking approach based on the stimulation of 
endogenous forces was recognized as the crux for the reform of the 
structural policy approach of the European Community. 
INDUSTRIAL DISTRICTS AND PUBLIC POLICY 
This new stage of European integration is definitely based on the promotion 
of market forces; this approach requires the implementation of four sets of 
policies: 
1 the removal of the residual non-tariff barriers and the harmonization of 
market standards throughout the Community, in order to create a single 
market for goods, service, labor, and capital; 
2 an effective competition policy to avoid restrictive practices, monopoliza-
tion, excessive concentration, and unfair public aids to national companies; 
3 the public support for innovation, especially for very innovative sectors 
and small companies; and 
4 structural policies to create a positive environment in which new indus-
trial and service activities, particularly in the less-favoured areas of the 
Community might develop. 6 
The completion of the Single Market offers a strong opportunity for 
industrial concentration. The imposing study on the Cost of Non-Europe 
provided a clear basis for mergers looking for a better exploitation of 
economies of scale (Commission 1988c; Cecchini 1988). 
The White Book (Commission, 1985) and the Padoa Schioppa Report 
(1987) also stated that a process of deregulation to favor the creation of a 
larger market space is by and large not inducing more efficiency, whereas a 
better utilization of economies of scale is not transferred to the consumers, 
but is acquired by companies, which are able to monopolize segmented 
markets. Thus, the completion of the Single Market requires not only an 
effective competition policy at the European and national level, in order to 
guarantee against the abuse of dominant positions, but also the active 
promotion of the development of new competitors. 7 
This policy requires actions either to create or to re-create a local 
environment able to provide conditions for industrial and regional develop-
ment. This approach to industrial policy, no longer based on granting 
funds to individual companies but on the promotion of integrated pro-
grams to stimulate local endogenous forces and consolidate a diffuse 
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Table 15.1 Centers promoted by public authorities providing services to small and medium-sized firms in the regions of Italy 
Name Location Sectors Services offered Year founded Employees 
1. TECNOTES Piemonte All Trainint Information 1985 32 
Researc and Planning 
2. CESTEC Lombardia All Information, Projects 1979 11 
and Research, Training 
3. ARST Friuli V. G. All Documentation and Secretariat 1978 18 
4. CERIT Friuli V. G. All Trainint Information, Appl. 1979 30 
Researc , Certification 
5. CATAS Friuli V. G. Seating, Tests and Trials, 1969 8 
Research, Furniture 
6. Centro Reg. Friuli V. G. All Company diagnoses 1984 6 
Serv. PMI 




8. BIC Liguria All Assistance in setting up new 1975 3 
Firms 
9. DITEL Liguria All Studies and Planning 1980 10 
10. ASE Emilia Romagna All Information desk 1986 2 
11. ASTER Emilia Romagna All Documentation, Data-base 1985 6 
link-fic, Projects 
12. CEMOTER Emilia Romagna Ground Certi cation and Research 1982 13 
Mov.Tech. 
13. Centro Ceramico Emilia Romagna Ceramic Tests and Trials, Research, 1976 27 
Training 
14. CERCAL Emilia Romagna Shoes Fashion trends, Trainin~ 1983 3 
15. CERMET Emilia Romagna Metals Documentation, Analysis, 1985 4 
Technology consultancy 
16. CESMA Emilia Romagna Agricult. Studies and Research 1983 3 
Machinery 
17. CITER Emilia Romagna Textile, Fashion trends, Information, 1980 8 
Clothing Research 
18. QUASCO Emilia Romagna Building Information, Research, 1985 7 
Constr. Training 
19. RESFOR Emilia Romagna Mech, Sub- Information, Promotion 1986 1 
contract 
20. CESECA Toscana Footwear Information, Training 1984 4 
21. CESVIT Toscana All Promotion, Research 1985 1 
22. CSM Toscana Furniture Training, Research, Promotion 1982 3 
23. LUCENSE Toscana All Studies 1984 3 
24. CEDIM Marche All Documentation, Data-base 1985 6 
Link-up 
25. CESCAM Marche Footwear Training 1985 2 
26. COSMOB Marche Furniture Information and Consultancy 1984 4 
27. ISELQUI Marche Musical Tests and Trials, Research 1980 50 
instr., Textile, Shoes, 
Furniture 
28. Centro Laser Puglia All Research and Training 1979 6 
29. CSATA Puglia All Research and Planning, 1969 100 
Trainin{ 
30. CRAI Calabria All Researc and Planning, 1979 64 
Train:f 
31. CRES Sicilia All Appli Research, Informa- 1974 10 
tion, Training 
32. SIRAP Sicilia All Studies and Projects 1983 7 
33. TECNOSERVIZI Sicilia All Assistance, Training, 1984 8 
Information desk 
Source: Laboratorio di Politica Industriale - Nomisma, 1987. 
Note: Research carried out in 13 Italian regions (Piemonte, Lombardia, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Veneto, Liguria, Emilia Romagna, Toscana, Marche, 
Umbria, Lazio, Puglia, Calabria ~nd Sicilia). 
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entrepreneurship, is now accepted by the European Community as a general 
approach to industrial and regional policymaking. 8 It is considered a 
necessary complement to the antitrust policy for providing an efficiency 
response to the completion of the Single Market, but also as a necessary 
measure to guarantee equity and stability in the process of industrial 
development of the Community (Padoa Schioppa 1987). 
A crucial aspect for the implementation of this new policy approach of 
the European Community has been the reform of the structural funds of 
the Comm.unity (Commission 1989b). The structural funds of the Com-
munity are the European Social Fund, the European Regional Funds, and 
the European Agricultural Fund-Orientation and Guarantee; also to be 
considered are the European Investment Bank interventions (with the New 
Community Instruments, which is especially aimed at small and medium-
sized firms) and the funds for the Integrated Mediterranean Projects, the 
Integrated Development Actions, and the Special Action such as the 
industrialization of Portugal and the interventions in disaster areas (Com-
mission 1989b ). 9 This approach has been reinforced after the Maastricht 
Agreement on the European Economic Union. 
Local partnership is the key issue of the reform of the structural funds 
(Commission 1989b; 14-15). This principle is crucial not simply for the 
European Regional Development Fund intervention in less favored areas of 
the Community, but for any action of the Commission concerning small 
and medium-sized companies (Commission 1988b), and extensively for any 
policy having a territorial impact (Commission 1987). 
The Commission gained substantial advantages from the experience of the 
Integrated Mediterranean Projects (!MPs). IMPs experimented first with the 
new approach based on a trilateral relationship among Community, national, 
and local authorities, on the basis of a scheme of integration of the different 
interventions provided by the three levels of policymaking (Leonardi 1990). 
These policies are termed "structural" because they are aimed at influen-
cing the relations of production between companies, that is division of labor 
itself; they are alternative to "individual" interventions, which are simply 
directed at supporting single companies. 
There are two types of intervention which can be considered. On the one 
hand, there is the possibility of intervening in areas already having a local 
network of specialized producers, but facing a restructuring process, and 
areas not having any specific agglomeration of local entrepreneurs. 
In the case of interventions in a local system not particularly characterized 
by a preexisting district, the intervention will consist of several integrated 
actions: 
a) aimed at making the system itself explicit, encouraging agents to see 
themselves as part of a single system; 
b) giving direction to the specialization of the local agents in order to permit 
greater articulation of the division of labor based on mutual reliability; 
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c) providing an easy access to market and technology information; this 
action is usually based on the creation of a center, jointly managed to 
provide services, which cannot usually be offered at the local level, but 
which are necessary to compete at the international level. 
. These actions are intended to create an industrial atmosphere, to reinforce 
common interests, to strengthen local partnership, and therefore to establish 
an industrial district. These interventions have been carried out by local 
government, supported by national and Community authorities, and have 
the task of taking over and managing collectively local agency or service 
centers, devoted to reduce the cost of coordination and acquisition of the 
specific entrepreneurial capacities which are necessary for the formation of 
a diffuse entrepreneurship. They cannot be activited individually and are 
considered as necessary to the development of the activity of the individual 
firms. When these interventions concern less favored areas of the Com-
munity, these interventions can be designed and implemented by an 
integrated program, involving municipal, regional, national, and Com-
munity projects; this program can be financed mainly on the European 
Regional Development Fund, and the other structural funds of the 
Community. 
As regards interventions in already existing districts experiencing periods 
of crisis, the intervention of industrial policy must be aimed at industrial 
atmosphere itself and (working backward with respect to the procedure 
described above), must act on the costs of information and coordination. 
Intervention in industrial atmosphere means pinpointing, within the wide 
range of shared know-how, on the one hand those particular aspects most 
closely linked to the product, on which the division of labor is based, and 
on the other those functional aspects connected with the overall organiza-
tion of production. 
In this perspective, the possibilities of intervention on a district, whether 
it can be defined in strict terms as a MID or else more generally as a system 
of quasi-markets, are much greater, and require a precise analysis both of 
the relations of production that characterize the local system and the 
relations of the market with which the particular district is in conflict. The 
latter means in practice identifying the precise nature of the changes on the 
market to see whether characteristics of conflict emerge which are based on 
a break with the hitheno existing rules of competition.10 
Policy interventions, then, have specific characteristics in relation to the 
particular situation of the relevant market. We are dealing with an action 
aimed either at the definition or at the redefinition of the collective 
intangible assets connected to the specific organization on which the 
relations of the production system have been built in the past and which 
form the basis for possible lines of common organization for the future. 
In relation to an already consolidated district, however, interventions tend 
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to be directed at adjusting that specific technical, market and social 
knowledge which constituted the relative advantage of that particular district 
in conditions of stability and which can become the obstacle to change. 
In the case of a new district, interventions will constitute the basis for the 
development of a new ordered system of relations aimed at giving direction 
to the aggregation of firms. This aggregation can then become a quasi-
market system of production characterized by a wealth of common know-
ledge which can reduce the costs of information without increasing the costs 
of coordination. 
In the case of a preexisting district which is facing a crisis, interventions 
such as the setting up of production service centers, can become a means of 
carrying out a selection and promotion of certain agents operating in the 
area and can serve to modify the existing production relations, also 
transforming the existing system into a system of quasi-hierarchy under the 
leadership of a limited number of agents chosen by means of this selection 
process. 
The technicalities of public intervention must all be customized in relation 
to the district as a specific production system, whose traditional geo-
graphical or cultural area, however, can become larger or smaller over a 
period of time. A local industrial policy intervention can, in fact, lead to 
systemic adjustments which necessitate the integration of preexisting agents 
with agents which are traditionally outside the cultural and territorial area 
covered by the district. 
In order to formulate and implement a structural policy program, it is 
useful to make a distinction between the geographical aggregation of firms 
and the system of production relations already in existence and operating in 
a particular competitive situation. It is necessary to define the division of 
labor existing among manufacturing and service agents with respect to which 
integrated interventions can be planned. 
The network analysis must be extended to include all the agents who in 
effect interact within the system of production relations even if they are 
agents ( contractors, subcontractors, universities, research and training cen-
ters, financial institutions, entrepreneurial associations, public administra-
tions) which remain outside the area of the district itself. On the other side, 
it is necessary to make a thorough analysis of the territory, to understand 
the historic, cultural, and environmental conditions, and the social and 
economic trends, structuring the industrial activity in the area. Thus, design 
and implementation of an integrated policy have to be rooted in a multi-
disciplinary research frame. 
FINAL REMARKS 
This policy approach is coherent with the general attitude of the Com-
munity toward market forces, and it is introducing a competition among 
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European regions, based on the local supply of environmental and institu-
tional conditions for industrial development. 
This is a crucial aspect of a more general reorientation of the Community. 
The European Single Act reversed the previous model based on the creation 
of a supranational power, which was supposed to overcome national 
authorities, but framed by the effective veto powers of the national 
governments. The European Single Act sets up a competition between 
countries based on their ability to formulate legislation which can favour 
their own production structure (Padoa Schioppa 1987). 
This competition between the member countries, then, becomes competi-
tion based on the efficiency of the respective public administrations with 
regard to the prior setting up of conditions favourable to local development 
and to the subsequent carrying out of interventions aimed at encouraging 
the growth of integrated firm systems. In this sense, the ability to plan and 
carry out integrated interventions based on the territorial aggregation of 
companies becomes an essential requisite for industrial policy. 
This approach implies not simply the transfer of powers to the local 
authorities, but the promotion of a multilateral policy game, bringing into 
play the regions as primary actors of the policymaking process. 
The new industrial policy approach, enacted by the European Single Act, 
is explicitly oriented to supporting the local aggregation of new businesses 
and to promoting industrial partnership and diffuse entrepreneurship, as 
basic forces for the development of the European economy. 
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16 
DIVERGENT PATTERNS OF 
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION IN 
SILICON VALLEY 
Annalee Saxenian 
This chapter examines the politics of business organization in Silicon Valley. 
It contrasts two patterns of institution-building among the region's tech-
nology firms: one which is externally oriented and seeks to insure the 
competitive position of the industry's largest producers by influencing 
federal policy, the other which is integrative and enhances the flexibility of 
small and medium-sized firms by providing collective services and fostering 
the innovative recombination of resources. 
Externally oriented organizations, such as the Semiconductor Industry 
Association (SIA) and the American Electronics Association (AEA), are 
nationally recognized as representatives of Silicon Valley because of their 
active lobbying in Washington, D.C. Integrative organizations such as the 
Semiconductor Equipment Manufacturers International (SEMI) and the 
Software Entrepreneurs Forum (SEF), by contrast, operate at the sectoral 
and regional level and remain largely outside of the public eye. 
These contrasting patterns of business organization reflect the hybrid 
character of the Silicon Valley economy, an industrial region in which mass 
production corporations coexist with a dense agglomeration of small and 
medium-sized specialist producers.1 While mass production and flexible 
specialization - and a variety of intermediate forms - have coexisted in the 
region for decades, each faces distinct problems of reproduction and has 
generated distinct forms of collective action among local producers. 
Associations of business in the US are traditionally studied in their role 
as pressure groups, yet some of the most active business associations in 
Silicon Valley today operate at the regional level and engage in little, if any, 
lobbying. Rather than attempting to shape policy or influence elections, 
these associations play an essential coordinating role for the specialist 
producers in a fragmented industry by providing collective services and 
fostering the exchange of information and technology. 
The experience of Silicon Valley highlights some of the political obstacles 
to the elaboration of such integrative institutions in the American context, 
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obstacles which grow out of the historic hegemony of mass production (and 
its institutional practices) and the strength of individualistic traditions in this 
country. The failure of the region's specialist producers to develop a political 
agenda suggests the vulnerability of the regional economy, and has relevance 
to other regions with similar flexible, decentralized productive systems 
(Scott and Storper 1988; Maillat and Lecoq 1990; Piore and Sabel 1984). 
The chapter begins with a brief overview of the Silicon Valley economy 
and the problems of coordination in a decentralized, region-based produc-
tive system. It then analyzes the history and activities of four of Silicon 
Valley's leading business associations, locating them along a spectrum from 
externally oriented to integrative. The third section examines the conflicts 
that have emerged in the region over issues such as trade policy and the 
Sematech consortia, arguing that externally oriented groups dominate US 
technology debates. The concluding section suggests that Silicon Valley 
remains vulnerable because the individualistic world views of its specialist 
producers limit their ability to develop an alternative political vision and 
elaborate systematic regional and sectoral coordinating institutions. 
SILICON VALLEY: AN INDUSTRIAL HYBRID 
While Silicon Valley is famous for large electronics firms such as Hewlett-
Packard Co. and Apple Computers, the regional economy is also populated 
by thousands of small and medium-sized specialist enterprises.2 Each of 
these firms focuses on a narrow phase of the production process and relies 
on the external economies of the region and its dense concentration of skill 
and technology to introduce new products for diverse and changing 
markets. This decentralized industrial structure is reproduced through an 
ongoing process of new firm formation: entrepreneurs continually leave 
existing firms and recombine local resources in order to pursue new 
technical and market opportunities. 3 
As they grow, these enterprises develop linkages with customers and 
suppliers outside of the region, yet most remain embedded in the technical 
and social infrastructure of the regional economy as well.4 Silicon Valley's 
most flexible and specialized semiconductor firms, for example, collaborate 
closely with local computer systems producers to develop innovative, high 
value-added products for semicustom and niche markets. The region's 
flexible mass producers of computer systems producers rely on face-to-face 
relations with local contract manufacturers in order continually to introduce 
new products for fast-changing markets. Even the mass producers of 
semiconductors, which seek to minimize the unit costs of general-purpose 
products by achieving high-volume production, depend on the dense 
concentration of skilled labor in the region. 
These different productive strategies - and a range of intermediate ones -
have coexisted in the region for decades. They are complementary in many 
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ways: producers of specialty computer systems, for example, depend on 
access to large quantities of low-cost memory chips, while the mass 
producers of these commodity semiconductors require customized manu-
facturing equipment. Silicon Valley is thus an industrial hybrid, with a mix 
of productive strategies ranging from relatively autonomous high-volume 
producers to highly interdependent flexible, specialized firms. 
The patterns of business association which have emerged in Silicon Valley 
over the past several decades reflect the hybrid nature of the regional 
economy. Silicon Valley's mass producers of semiconductors, for example, 
have formed externally oriented trade associations whose primary purpose 
is to lobby the federal government for favorable trade policy and related 
legislation. Their suppliers, the specialist producers of semiconductor equip-
ment, by contrast, have created integrative organizations which provide 
collective services, set standards, sponsor trade shows, and foster network-
ing and information exchange. 
Externally oriented organizations like the SIA behave as classic pluralist 
pressure groups. Their structure and activities are easily accounted for in 
the literature of American politics, which focuses on the lobbying activities 
of corporations and their trade associations. Yet some of the most active 
business organizations in Silicon Valley today engage in little, if any, 
lobbying. Associations like SEMI, which play an integrative or coordinating 
role for the firms in a region or sector, have received far less scholarly 
attention in the US. 5 Historians are only now uncovering the records of 
America's nineteenth-century industrial districts, and we still know little 
about their institutional foundations (Scranton 1989). 
This focus on business associations as pressure groups reflects the historic 
dominance of mass production in the US. The central regulatory problem 
in a system of mass production is to maintain a consistently high level of 
demand to amortize the costs of heavy fixed investments and to insure 
stability in the supply and price of inputs (materials, components, and labor) 
so that production lines remain fully occupied. Such coordination is 
typically accomplished by the governance structure of the large, vertically 
integrated corporation and the macroeconomic activities of the federal 
government. 
The key coordinating institutions in a mass production system are thus 
the large corporation and the nation-state, and associations of business are 
oriented primarily toward shaping national policy. In the US, where the 
vertically integrated mass production corporation is widespread, business 
organizations remain relatively weak (particularly in comparison with their 
European counterparts) and individual corporations are increasingly impor-
tant lobbyists and political players in their own right (Y offie 1984 ). 
The industrial decentralization which characterizes a flexible, region-
based system of production, by contrast, requires stabilization at the local 
level (Scott and Paul 1990). When production is fragmented among a 
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multiplicity of specialist finns, there are many potential sources of market 
failure. The price system does not convey sufficient infonnation to pro-
ducers, particularly in an environment of immense complexity and rapid 
technological change. Moreover, no individual finn can bear the costs of 
gathering this information. Institutions which provide market information 
and foster the diffusion of technology are thus essential to preserving the 
dynamism of the system. 
Specialist firms must also rely on external mechanisms to insure the 
continued availability of resources. The small and medium-sized firms in a 
regional economy like Silicon Valley have little incentive to invest in long-
term training, education, or research and development programs - activities 
which are traditionally achieved by the hierarchy of the large corporation -
because the fluidity of local labor markets and openness of information 
flows limit their ability to capture the benefits of their investments. Yet the 
region's dynamism derives precisely from the ability of local entrepreneurs 
to specialize and to recombine such resources rapidly. 
Extra-firm institutions are thus essential to insure not only the availability 
of market and technical information, but also the reproduction of a skilled 
labor supply, investment in long-term research, and the continued supply of 
capital. Some of these services are provided by the private sector in 
Silicon Valley: by market research firms, technical consultants, venture 
capitalists, and universities. However other services, such as training and 
long-term research, require collective action and even the provision of public 
resources. 
A variety of public and private institutions play such a coordinating role 
in Europe's industrial districts. In Germany's Baden-Wiirttemberg, for 
example, the trade associations coordinate joint research projects, support 
industrial research in local universities, and provide a forum for negotiation 
and conflict resolution among specialist firms (Herrigel 1988). In the Third 
Italy, local governments and producers' associations support industrial 
parks, vocational training, regional research centers, and market research. 
They even finance and run "service centers," which supply information on 
technology and markets to specialist firms in a particular sector (Brusco and 
Righi 1989). 
This is not to suggest a direct correspondence between technology, 
institutions, and politics: a variety of different institutional arrangements 
can meet the needs of mass production and flexible specialization. Nor 
is it to imply a one-to-one connection between a finn's organization, 
strategy, or technology and the political stances of its managers and 
executives.6 However, the sectors of Silicon Valley's technology industry 
have organized different associations to address their distinct problems of 
reproduction - associations which have often defined conflicting political 
agendas. 
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PATTERNS OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION IN SILICON 
VALLEY 
Four Silicon Valley business organizations exemplify the differences - and 
potential tensions- between the region's externally oriented and integrative 
associations. The SIA is a classic American trade association. It seeks to 
define its members' interests as those of the region and the nation in order 
to gain supportive trade policy and funding. The AEA is an intermediate 
case. It played an active integrative role in Silicon Valley during the 1960s 
and 1970s, but followed the lead of the SIA during the 1980s and redirected 
its resources almost entirely towards lobbying for national industrial 
policies. 
SEMI and the SEF, by contrast, coordinate the activities of the region's 
small and medium-sized specialist firms. They foster innovation and colla-
boration by developing a common technical language and standards to allow 
engineers and firms to work together, by providing collective services such 
as trade shows, market forecasts, management training, and technical 
seminars, and through forums which strengthen the social and professional 
networks in Silicon Valley. 
The Semiconductor Industry Association 
The Semiconductor Industry Association is the most prominent business 
organization in Silicon Valley. To many outsiders it embodies the interests 
of Silicon Valley, if not all of American high technology- even though only 
13 of the region"s technology firms are members. 
The SIA was founded in 1977 by the chief executives of Silicon Valley's 
four largest semiconductor firms, all friends who had worked together at 
Fairchild Semiconductor. While the initial aim of the SIA was to provide a 
voice for the region's new merchant semiconductor firms against established 
and politically active firms from outside the region (particularly Texas 
Instruments), it quickly shifted its attention toward the threat of foreign 
competition.7 Frustrated with the perceived ineffectiveness of existing elec-
tronics associations such as the broad-based AEA, SIA founders sought a 
more focused approach. 
Executives from SIA companies traveled to Washington regularly during 
the late 1970s to lobby for favorable government policy and to testify 
concerning Japanese trade practices and policies which they saw as unfair.8 
These efforts met with little response initially, but the association quickly 
gained political sophistication. They began positioning the interests of the 
SIA as those of the nation by linking the health of the semiconductor 
industry with national competitiveness and security concerns. By the mid-
1980s, the SIA had built a powerful political presence in Washington. 9 
With this single-minded focus on lobbying, the SIA behaves more like a 
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traditional American trade association than any other business organization 
in Silicon Valley. It has clearly had the greatest influence on policy. Within 
less than a decade from its formation, the SIA had achieved the passage of 
the landmark bilateral trade agreement with Japan (which reflected virtually 
all of the SIA demands)10 and gained a commitment of $500 million in 
support from the Department of Defense for the collaborative manufactur-
ing consortium, Sematech. 11 
The SIA demands - particularly the trade accord - reflect the agenda of 
a mass production sector in crisis. Faced with massive losses in commodity 
semiconductors during the early 1980s due to Japanese competition, the 
established chip makers sought a political response. The SIA mounted an 
extensive lobbying campaign and six member firms filed legal actions for 
trade relief. The resulting trade agreement was designed to shore up demand 
for the commodity memory products of the SIA's large chip makers.12 Price 
floors were designed to eliminate alleged Japanese practices of illegal price 
cutting, while guarantees of market share in Japan were intended to expand 
demand for the output of US producers. In short, the agreement sought to 
stabilize the mass market for US commodity chip producers. 
Since that time the SIA policy agenda has included continuous efforts 
to insure that the conditions of the trade agreement are enforced and to 
insure extension of (and even increase in) support for Sematech. The SIA 
experienced its only major failure in 1989 with the folding of the proposed 
memory chip consortium, U.S. Memories, which it actively supported. The 
SIA also lobbies on related issues such as antitrust reform, tax policy, and 
intellectual property rights; and the organization compiles and disseminates 
semiconductor trade statistics and forecasts. 
The SIA's successes are typically explained by its ability to speak 
efficiently and quickly, without the dissensus of a large organization (Yoffie 
1988). The association currently has only 37 members, and is dominated by 
a smaller group of activist firms. Membership is limited to US-based 
producers, not surprising given the nature of their concerns - yet there are 
more than 250 specialist semiconductor producers in the US which do not 
belong to the SIA. In short, the SIA represents the interests of the 
established US producers of commodity semiconductors (although it in-
cludes a few producers of semicustom chips as well). Nonetheless, the 
association has succeeded in positioning itself as the voice of Silicon Valley 
to the outside world. 
The American Electronics Association 
The AEA is the nation's most broadly based electronics industry association 
because it has continually expanded to include new sectors as they emerge. 
It thus represents all companies that design, manufacture, or conduct 
research in electronics, components, and related information technology 
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products. AEA membership exceeds 3,500 firms nationwide, more than one-
third of which are located in California. The AEA is headquartered in 
Silicon Valley, also the home of the largest of its 21 regional councils. 
When the AEA (then the West Coast Electronics Manufacturers Associa-
tion, WEMA) moved its headquarters to Silicon Valley from Southern 
California in the early 1960s, it identified itself with the region's fast-
growing new technology firms.13 Unlike the older Electronic Industries of 
America, which represented established East Coast electronics firms and was 
based in Washington, the AEA made an explicit commitment to "be where 
the new companies are" and to build a solid base there before expanding 
elsewhere. The AEA thus consciously forged an independent identity 
among Silicon Valley technology companies distinct from the "old-line" 
electronics businesses of the East. (By 1980, the AEA had greatly surpassed 
the EIA in membership, with close to 3,000 member firms compared-to the 
EIA's 300.) 
The AEA's focus during the 1960s and early 1970s was almost exclusively 
on fostering the development of the local electronics community by assisting 
the management of emerging firms, rather than on lobbying on behalf of 
established corporations.14 It sponsored seminars to promote the exchange 
of ideas and information, and management training sessions on subjects 
ranging from finance and high-tech marketing to production and export 
assistance. These activities were welcomed by the managers of Silicon Valley 
firms, who typically had technical rather than managerial backgrounds or 
training. 
The AEA also encouraged the growth of the social and professional 
networks which bind Silicon Valley firms together by hosting frequent 
meetings for local CEOs and managers. In the words of a local newspaper: 
Perhaps the AEA's most significant contribution to the electronics 
industry is what it did to foster networking. Most top executives of 
young, fast-growing electronics companies are relatively inexperienced 
in some important management areas. The AEA, with its frequent seminars 
and monthly meetings of company presidents, provided an excellent 
opportunity for those executives to meet and learn from their peers. 15 
The article goes on to point out the crucial role the AEA played in 
integrating the specialized firms in a highly fragmented industrial structure: 
Electronics companies are uniquely systems-oriented. Almost no firm 
manufactures from the ground up a stand-alone product. A company 
either draws on other people's components or makes products that fit 
with other people's products into a system. Friendships made through 
the AEA help the companies develop products that work together.16 
This integrative role is confirmed repeatedly in interviews with Silicon 
Valley managers: one CEO reported that she had found most of her 
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customers through AEA functions, others value the opportunity to stay in 
touch with old friends and colleagues from prior employers, still others see 
it as a source of market information, customers, or partners.17 In fact, when 
the AEA expanded beyond Silicon Valley, its leaders recognized the 
importance of these networks. They developed regional councils which 
replicated the original Silicon Valley structure. 
The AEA abstained from national politics throughout most of the 1970s. 
It did not even open an office in Washington, D.C. until 1980. Moreover, 
when the association finally hired a Washington lobbyist in 1975, he was 
relocated to Silicon Valley for five years to gain first-hand understanding of 
the industry. 
The organization's first major policy victory came in 1978, when CEOs 
of AEA companies traveled to Washington to lobby for a reduction in the 
capital gains tax. But it was only after 1984, when the US electronics 
industry recorded its first trade deficit ever, that the AEA increasingly 
directed its attention toward the federal government. Following the lead of 
the SIA, and championing the cause of international competitiveness in 
electronics, the AEA began lobbying for federal policies to reduce the cost 
of capital, increase investment tax credits, increase funding for R&D, and 
improve engineering education. 
This decision to engage actively in lobbying reflected a decisive shift in 
the AEA. During the 1980s, funding for education and management training 
programs was dramatically cut, while the public affairs budget tripled. In 
1987, the AEA Public Affairs Office was moved from Silicon Valley to 
Washington in order to increase the association's presence there. The 
association now supports three full-time staff members in Washington and 
four more in its Tokyo office. While its 21 regional councils continue to 
organize activities for local communities, the central focus of AEA efforts 
has clearly shifted to lobbying for national policies to improve the com-
petitiveness of the electronics industry. 
Despite the potential advantages of its broad membership base, the AEA 
is often criticized for being ineffectual.18 It has repeatedly failed to take 
decisive stands because of the conflicting political agendas of its member 
firms, particularly the commodity semiconductor firms and the computer 
makers. The cross-cutting membership, which makes the AEA the sole 
organization which could represent the shared interests of the technology 
firms in Silicon Valley, has thus undermined its political strength. 
The Semiconductor Equipment and Materials International 
The Semiconductor Equipment and Materials International (SEMI) serves 
the specialist firms in the semiconductor equipment and materials industry, 
an industry which, even by the standards of Silicon Valley, is highly 
fragmented and technologically sophisticated.19 Many of its members 
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produce equipment for only one specific step in the exacting process of 
semiconductor manufacturing, and many have only one or a handful of 
products. This specialization means that the top 14 US semiconductor 
equipment companies account for only 55 percent of total industry sales 
(Congressional Budget Office 1987). 
SEMI thus has a very broad membership base of 1,750 corporate members 
and it is dominated by small entrepreneurial firms. Two-thirds of its 
members have fewer than 100 employees and under $10 million in annual 
sales, and only 5 percent have more than 500 employees or over $50 million 
in sales (SEMI 1990). And while its membership is concentrated in the US 
and it is headquartered in Silicon Valley, SEMI is open to foreign members. 
SEMI was founded as the Semiconductor Equipment and Materials 
Institute in 1970 by three Silicon Valley-based semiconductor equipment 
vendors who were dissatisfied with the minimal attention they were 
receiving at WESCON, the regional electronics trade show.20 The newly 
formed organization conducted its first trade show, called SEMICON, in 
1971, to promote the products of semiconductor processing equipment, 
materials, and service firms. Today SEMICON shows are held not only in 
California but also in several other US regions as well as Europe and Japan. 
Many of the industry's small equipment ventures depend on the trade shows 
for their survival.21 
In addition to conducting trade shows, SEMI sets standards, promotes 
technical exchange, and provides education programs for firms in the 
industry. Establishing standards and solving shared technical problems is 
especially important in a highly fragmented, technically complex, and 
rapidly evolving industry. In 1973, for example, there were close to 2,000 
specifications for silicon wafers in use by scores of US silicon vendors, and 
the wafers were manufactured in a variety of different shapes. This lack of 
uniformity created problems of wastage, inventory, and planning for both 
vendors and customers. Despite skepticism from semiconductor manufac-
turers, a standards committee defined and publicized specifications for 
emerging 3-inch wafer lines. By 1975 over 80 percent of all new wafers met 
SEMI specifications. 
SEMI's Standards Committee now oversees the definition of specifica-
tions for the materials, equipment, and processes used in semiconductor 
manufacturing. Standards setting is a strictly voluntary process of defining 
consensus specifications, and the use of all SEMI standards is voluntary. 
More than 3,000 engineers from the equipment industry and their customers 
work on the standards-setting process, which is coordinated by more than 
100 international committees, subcommittees, and task forces. According to 
many engineers, the process of standard setting is at least as important as 
the standards themselves, because it helps to forge close understandings 
and working relationships between suppliers and end users and enhances 
industry cooperation. 
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SEMI also organizes education programs for its members. Volunteer 
committees of SEMI members organize symposia, dinner meetings, infor-
mation seminars, and conferences. For example, technical symposia are held 
at the SEMICON shows to keep members informed on research and 
technological advances in the industry. These forums foster technical 
interchange between customers, academics, capital providers, and SEMI 
members, and are widely credited with helping diffuse technology and 
know-how among firtns in the industry. 
Finally, SEMI's annual three-day Information Services Seminar (ISS) 
provides market forecasts for the equipment and materials businesses and 
the overall semiconductor industry. This provides a vital service to small 
firms because, as SEMI describes it: 
The vast majority of SEMI member companies are very small, with 
annual sales of less than $10 million, making them too small to support 
any kind of ongoing market research judgments on the condition of 
our rapidly changing industry. 
(SEMI 1990) 
SEMI is thus a highly participatory organization, whose operating style is 
one of small groups of engineers helping each other behind the scenes rather 
than in the public eye. 
SEMI abstained from involvement in public policy throughout the 1970s. 
In 1984, it initiated a government relations program in order to keep its 
members informed about federal government activities which directly 
affected them. However the organization explicitly maintains a low profile 
in Washington, only lobbying about immediate concerns such as export 
licensing regulations. SEMI did not support the SIA's trade demands, 
although when SEMI/Sematech was formed as a chapter of the semi-
conductor manufacturing consortium, 84 companies joined as individual 
members (rather than through SEMI at large) in order to qualify as potential 
recipients of Sematech equipment contracts. 
Through its trade shows, standards setting, and education programs, 
SEMI enables its member firms to remain specialized and survive in a 
technologically sophisticated and fast-changing industry. By setting stan-
dards that build a common framework for competition, organizing trade 
shows to underwrite the costs of marketing, establishing education pro-
grams which spread technical information, and promoting networking and 
interchange with customers, SEMI preserves the specialization and flexibility 
which allow its members to innovate. 
The Software Entrepreneurs' Forum 
The Software Entrepreneurs' Forum (SEF) is an association of over 500 
Silicon Valley-based software developers, consultants, and software service 
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providers. The SEF plays a central role in supporting the thousands of 
entrepreneurial software firms in the region. Explicitly regional in focus, it 
plays only a minimal role in formal politics. The organization is best seen 
as an attempt to institutionalize the social networks and the culture of 
information sharing and collaboration which characterized Silicon Valley 
during the 1960s and 1970s. In fact, it is reminiscent of Silicon Valley's 
earlier hackers organizations, such as the Homebrew Computer Club. 22 
The SEF was founded in 1983 by a group of 14 software "hackers" who 
recognized that more than programming talent was needed to publish and 
sell software. While they knew how to design and develop a product, they 
still needed to get the software to the market - which required good 
documentation, packaging, production, advertising, financing, and legal 
advice. The founders thus defined the formal mission of the SEF as 
providing the software entrepreneur with the resources needed to sell 
products and services. According to one member: 
SEF is a group of entrepreneurs who have learned that by working 
together to network and build their business and technical skill base 
they can preserve their fierce independence ... and create software on 
their own terms. 23 
Today the SEF is the largest regionally based organization of its type in the 
nation, and has spawned at least five other organizations modeled after it in 
other states. It sponsors monthly members' dinner meetings, special interest 
groups, and week-long skills seminars. These forums encourage members 
to meet with industry leaders, share technical information, develop business 
skills, establish commercial and social relationships, and learn about new 
opportunities. The SEF also publishes a monthly newsletter, which keeps 
members abreast of meeting and seminar highlights and reports on new 
product releases and other significant news announced by members. 
The SEF dinner meetings have become a Silicon Valley institution. They 
typically feature industry leaders speaking on issues ranging from industry 
trends and strategies for building a business to up-to-date advice on legal 
and financial issues. These meetings not only provide information, but also 
help to create a shared language and culture among the members of a highly 
fragmented industry. The special interest groups, which are organized 
around particular functions or operating systems (such as Marketing, 
Networking, Hypermedia, PC/Windows, and Macintosh), similarly offer 
an opportunity to obtain technical information and business skills first-hand 
from prominent professionals in the field. 24 
SEF dinner meetings and seminars are typically well attended and highly 
participatory. Many local entrepreneurs and start-ups credit their successes 
to the information and advice gleaned from SEF seminars as well as the 
relationships developed at these forums. According to the vice president of 
one software start-up: "I joined SEF because I was impressed by the 
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unusually high level of member participation, which greatly exceeds that of 
most trade or professional organizations. " 25 
The SEF is a non-profit organization run by a board of directors (who 
meet monthly), a board of advisors (who meet yearly), and a paid executive 
director. The board of directors supports and develops relationships with 
other state and national organizations that affect software entrepreneurship. 
There is a legislative representative and liaison to the Software Services 
Association (SSA), which maintains a lobbyist to monitor state legislation 
that affects the software industry. Recently, for example, the SEF undertook 
a write-in campaign to protest a bill that would penalize software companies 
which did not display support information at the point of sale. 
But such political activity is distinctly secondary to SEF's primary agenda 
of providing technical, professional and social support for local software 
developers and entrepreneurs. One successful member says of SEF: 
It's invaluable. For me, its been a place to listen and learn. When 
you're a small company you can't afford to make mistakes; you have 
to learn from others. And you can't learn everything from books.26 
As the SEF continues to grow, it plans to expand its seminar and interest 
group offerings in order to preserve the sense of community that has been 
at the core of its success. According to SEF President Stephen Friedman, 
"I'd like the next 500 members to feel the same level of community 
and involvement as we share today."27 The SEF thus plays a crucial 
coordinating role through its support for networking and information 
exchange among the enterprises in a highly competitive and fragmented 
industry. 
Other Silicon Valley business associations 
While these four groups are not the only business organizations represent-
ing Silicon Valley's technology firms, the other associations in the region 
all follow a similar pattern. The Computer and Business Equipment 
Manufacturers Association, for example, is a classic Washington-based 
trade association which represents established computer firms, while the 
recently formed Computer Systems Policy Project, a pressure group for 
eleven of the nation's leading computer firms, was explicitly modeled on the 
SIA. 
The Silicon Valley-based International Disk Equipment Manufacturers 
Association (IDEMA), by contrast, was modeled on SEMI and provides 
integrative services for the hundreds of specialist firms which supply 
materials and equipment to the highly fragmented disk drive industry. 
Finally, the Santa Clara County Manufacturing Group is an explicitly 
regionally based association dedicated to preserving the physical infrastruc-
ture of the region for technology producers. 
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THE POLITICS OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION IN 
SILICON VALLEY 
While mass production and flexible specialization can be complementary 
forms of production, their coexistence generated a series of political tensions 
in Silicon Valley during the 1980s. Throughout the 1960s and most of the 
1970s, the region's high-technology producers shunned political activity 
altogether. The fierce independence of these entrepreneurs was reflected in 
laissez-faire attitudes. As they began to lose market share to Japan during 
the late 1970s, however, the region's commodity chip makers turned to the 
federal government to address their trade grievances.28 
The SIA quickly became the only organization in the region with a clear 
policy agenda, and thus shaped the political debates in Silicon Valley during 
the 1980s. The AEA increasingly followed the lead of the SIA, focusing on 
lobbying for national policy to support large technology firms; while the 
region's integrative organizations, like SEMI, repeatedly rejected SIA initia-
tives, but failed to define an independent vision - and often rejected politics 
altogether. 
The conflicts among the Silicon Valley business community emerged with 
passage of the Semiconductor Trade Accord. The agreement, which repre-
sented the triumph of the mass production sector in crisis, was intended to 
insure stable and profitable markets for commodity chip makers by elimina-
ting the price collapses they experienced as a result of recurrent cycles of 
overproduction.29 However, it had immediate adverse impacts on other 
sectors of the regional economy. Computer systems firms, in particular, 
were directly damaged both by the resulting increases in memory chip prices 
and subsequent shortages of computer memory (as US producers backed 
out of the memory chip business). Other local firms which rely on 
commodity semiconductors - from disk drive makers to contract manufac-
turers - were similarly hurt. 
Not surprisingly, none of the other business associations in the region 
supported the SIA's trade policy demands. Even the region's specialty chip 
makers shared the systems firms' view of the trade agreement as a protec-
tionist measure aimed at supporting a handful of uncompetitive firms. One 
executive from a local computer company accused the US government of 
being prepared to sacrifice one industry for another, claiming that "We have 
twelve companies that benefit from this. We have about 5,000 losers."30 
The SIA became increasingly isolated from the wider electronics com-
munity in Silicon Valley during the 1980s - just at the moment it was gaining 
widespread attention and national political support. 
Trade protection was not the only possible response for the commodity 
chip makers. They could have learned from the strategies of the region's 
specialist chip makers, which remained profitable even during the industry's 
worst downturn in 1984-6 and introduced innovative, higher value-added 
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products and processes; or they could have learned from Japan to interact 
closely with their suppliers to improve their manufacturing processes. Either 
strategy would have allowed them to collaborate with - rather than alienate 
- their customers and suppliers. 
Sematech reinforced the antagonisms in Silicon Valley. While Sematech 
was hailed nationwide as a pathbreaking form of industrial cooperation, the 
consortium received mixed reviews at home. None of the region's specialist 
semiconductor firms (the most technologically innovative producers in the 
nation) joined Sematech, largely because its prohibitive fees exclude all but 
the largest firms.31 In fact, only 14 of the 293 semiconductor producers in 
the US are members. And while a small group of semiconductor equipment 
firms were belatedly included in the effort under the auspices of SEMI/ 
Sematech, computer and software firms are still excluded.32 Even the AEA 
did not support federal funding for Sematech. 
Some critics argue that although the purpose of Sematech, to improve 
semiconductor manufacturing processes, is laudable, its prohibitive fee 
structure and narrow membership base are problematic in a highly frag-
mented industry. They have not, however, mobilized to promote an alter-
native, more inclusionary model of collaborative research or manufacturing. 
Others view Sematech simply as the vehicle for a handful of aging firms 
with political influence use public resources to shore up their market 
positions. In the words of the CEO of a local semiconductor firm: 
"Sematech is a carefully constructed lobby effort" of large producers "to 
deliberately and systematically exclude smaller companies."33 These critics 
articulate the laissez faire view shared by many Silicon Valley entrepreneurs, 
that government intervention which interferes with the workings of the free 
market must be avoided. 
The debates over trade policy and Sematech clarify the conflicts between 
the mass producers and the more flexible and specialized firms in Silicon 
Valley. SIA policies privilege member firms at the expense of customers and 
suppliers, as well as competitors. They thus mirror the autarchy inherent in 
their approach to mass production, one in which producers remain at arm's 
length from both their customers and their suppliers.34 Moreover, their 
exclusive emphasis on lobbying for national policy reflects the assumptions 
of a traditional mass production system, where the key coordinating tasks 
are performed at the national (or the firm) level. 
The integrative policies pursued by organizations like SEMI and the SEF, 
by contrast, provide coordination at the regional and sectoral level. They 
support the specialist enterprises in highly fragmented industries by pro-
viding technical and market information and by fostering the recombination 
of skill and know-how. They implicitly recognize the importance of 
openness and collaboration to their flexibility, and seek to institutionalize 
those interdependencies. 
Yet while the region's specialist producers regularly oppose the programs 
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of the SIA, they have refrained from playing a broader political role in the 
region or the nation. SEMI and the SEF thus remain entirely reactive in 
policy debates. In many cases they do not simply reject SIA politics, but 
political activity altogether. Rather than defining a coherent alternative 
strategy (one which reflects their integrative approach), they have adopted 
the traditional laissez-faire view of American business, criticizing all forms 
of public activity. Silicon Valley's specialist producers thus celebrate entre-
preneurship and individual achievement at the same time that their integra-
tive institutions provide the collective services and foster the relationships 
without which such entrepreneurship would be impossible. 
CONCLUSION: THE VULNERABILITY OF SILICON 
VALLEY 
The divergent patterns of business organization in Silicon Valley underscore 
the vulnerability of the regional economy. The region•s externally oriented 
associations have effectively articulated a political program which serves the 
needs of the region's large technology producers. They are organized to 
lobby for industrial policy measures, such as funding for HDTV research 
or antitrust reform, in the name of national competitiveness. 
Silicon Valley's integrative organizations, by contrast, have failed to 
articulate the importance of the region and its dense networks of small and 
medium-sized firms to the nation's competitiveness. Viewing their successes 
as the result of individual effort and entrepreneurship alone, the specialist 
firms resist efforts to define political strategies which might insure the 
continued dynamism of the region's decentralized productive system. 
Perhaps it will take a crisis to mobilize the region's specialist producers into 
political action - but by then it may be too late. 
The industrial fragmentation which accounts for the flexibility and 
adaptive capacity of the Silicon Valley economy thus represents its greatest 
weakness. More extensive and explicit coordinating institutions are neces-
sary if decentralized regional economies such as Silicon Valley are to survive 
in the challenges of intensified international competition. 
While the region's integrative institutions play an important role by 
setting standards, running trade shows, and promoting information sharing 
and networking, they remain limited. Associations such as SEMI or even 
the AEA could take the lead in enhancing the regional infrastructure by 
providing training, education, joint R&D, and by insuring the availability 
of long-term capital. Insuring that representation cuts across industry lines 
might also foster recognition of the extent of common interests among the 
firms in the region. 
Over time, such institutions could provide a forum for resolving conflicts 
between local firms (small and large, firms in different sectors) as well as 
the capacity to plan and respond systematically to challenges such as external 
330 
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION IN SILICON VALLEY 
technological shifts. 35 In short, they would provide a region-wide capacity 
for systematic thinking, debate, and response to shared challenges. Just 
as mass production and flexible specialization coexist, so externally oriented 
and integrative institutions can be complementary. The challenge for 
Silicon Valley's producers will be to create a political vision which trans-
cends individualism and articulates the importance of the region and its 
relationships to their technological dynamism. 
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CONCEPTUAL FALLACIES AND 
OPEN QUESTIONS ON POST-
FORDISM 
Daniele Leborgne and Alain Lipietz 
INTRODUCTION 
In the second half of the 1980s, hopes were kindled about the emergence of 
a new and seemingly progressive model of capitalist development. Post-
Fordism appeared as a candidate for the way out of the crisis of dominant 
postwar economic model, Fordism. These new hopes emerged from old 
fears about what seemed to be the dominant (and regressive) solution in the 
first half of the decade, "neo-Fordism." This change in mood among radical 
economists and geographers relies upon the fact that in the world battle 
between two ways out of the crisis'of Fordism, the countries that seem to 
be victorious (e.g. Japan, Germany, the Nordic countries) have developed 
more positive forms of compromise between capital and labor than the 
losers in competition (e.g. USA, UK, France). Moreover, this change in the 
mood expresses a more constructive attitude: instead of complaining that 
things are getting worse and worse, propositions are addressed to unions, 
communities, political forces, and "enlightened" managers designed to 
promote a positive-sum compromise. 
The new conventional wisdom of the first half of the 1980s may be summar-
ized as follows. New technologies tend to foster the separation between 
highly skilled designers and engineers, and poorly skilled operatives. Since 
these operatives should be hired at the lowest price (and not at an "efficiency 
wage"), it would be useless for capital to respect the wage level of the collec-
tive bargaining system, and to finance a costly welfare state. The consequence 
is that advanced capitalist societies would evolve towards "two-tier," "hour-
glass," Brazilian-type societies. Moreover, the shift of routinized production 
towards the Third World would lead to a deindustrialization of the devel-
oped world. In the upper tier of the latter, the yuppies and golden boys of 
high-tech and finance would flourish, managing principal world-scale 
corporations, while women, ethnic minorities, and deskilled male workers 
would survive by working in the service of the upper tier. That would be 
a form of Fordism without the advantages of Fordism: a neo-Fordism.1 
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After 1983, the gloomy atmosphere of the "monetarist shock" was 
replaced by the world recovery symbolized by the miracle economies of 
Japan, Korea, the Third Italy, and Baden-Wiirttemberg. A new discourse, 
"post-Fordism," emerged to give these successes a theoretical framework. 
Post-Fordism is based on a shift from "mass production" to "flexible 
specialization," in which craft work takes place in networks of interconnec-
ted, independent, specialized, and flexible firms, which are in a position to 
react quickly to changes in fashions on the world market and to implement 
efficiently new technologies. Based on preexisting local resources of capital 
and skills, new growth regions emerge through the spinoff of innovative 
firms or through disintegration of big companies.2 
Neither the objective situation nor the debate is so clear-cut. First, many 
scholars collapse the two models into one single "craft-flexible post-
Fordism"3 and, in so doing, they eclectically reflect a still confusing reality. 
Second, claims about the positive aspects of post-Fordism (i.e. reskilling of 
the labor force, human-scale productive systems) are called into question by 
evidence of growing neo-Fordist regressive tendencies in many parts of the 
world economy, including the USA, the UK, and southern Italy. Moreover, 
the world concentration of capital raises some doubts about the importance 
of network production.4 
Strangely enough, both sides in the debate refer to French regulation 
theory, especially through the reference to the Fordist paradigm. "Fordism" 
was a term coined by Antonio Gramsci in his analysis of historical blocs as 
political keystones of development. Yet most participants in the post-
Fordist debate reduce it to a debate about new production systems and, 
contrary to most French regulationists, hold that there is already a solution, 
whether neo-Fordist or post-Fordist, to replace Fordism.5 
In this chapter, we will begin by referring back for our definition of 
Fordism, after which we will discuss some common fallacies in the post-
Fordism thesis. We focus on post-Fordism rather than on neo-Fordism 
because the latter has really been implemented in the USA and UK, and it 
is now seriously challenged by something else that some have labeled post-
Fordism, and which is certainly more interesting, both theoretically and 
politically. We discuss five open questions with respect to the notion of 
post-Fordism. 
1 A model of development is not only a technological paradigm. Fordism 
was not just "mass production," nor could post-Fordism be defined 
merely as "flexible specialization." 
2 There is no single way out of the crisis of Fordist labor relations. Neo-
Fordism and post-Fordism are conflicting solutions, because neo-Fordist 
"flexibility" and post-Fordist "craft" cannot be mixed at will. 
3 Industrial organization is also an open issue. There are still contests 
between big corporations and industrial districts, as well as between 
different forms of industrial networks. 
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4 Macroeconomics still matters, and ecology matters more and more; the 
free market will not be the form of regulation of post-Fordism. 
5 There is no reason why a single model of development should be world-
hegemonic. After-Fordism will very likely not consist of the victory of 
only one of the conflicting models, but a core-periphery in which the 
two coexist. 
A DEVELOPMENT MODEL IS NOT SIMPLY A 
TECHNOLOGICAL PARADIGM 
Much of the post-Fordist discourse is based upon the idea of a return of 
craft production. By craft production is usually meant both the supply-side 
(skilled workers committing their knowledge into the fine-tuning of a 
flexible technical apparatus) and a demand side ( customized commodities 
serving volatile and fragmented demand). New technologies are said both 
to provide an answer to the need for flexibility of the demand, and in tum 
to require a specialized labor force. And this leads, so it goes, to flexible 
specialization as a model of capitalist development, and it in tum is equated 
with post-Fordism per se. Fordism, by contrast, was based on mass 
production, with its rigid assembly lines requiring low skills, and producing 
standardized commodities. 
This presentation of history is based on a dangerous technological 
determinism. A system such as Fordism is a complete way of living, rooted 
in a historical bloc, yet these analyses reduce it to the logic of a production 
system. While it is necessary, for any model of production to achieve 
stability, that there should be a consistency between the organization of 
production, labor relations, the pattern of consumption, and even social 
ideologies of progress, such consistency is a chance discovery of history, the 
result of a process of social and political learning (Lipietz 1985). Conflicting 
solutions are possible on the basis of a given set of technologies and they 
are not determined by the technological paradigm. Let us illustrate this point 
by taking up the example of Fordism. 
As a model of development, Fordism has three main dimensions. 
• As a general principle of organization of labor or technological paradigm, 6 
Fordism is nothing more than Taylorism plus mechanization. Taylorism 
implies a strict separation between conception labor, which is the task of 
the Organization and Methods Office (0 & M) on the one hand, and the 
execution of standardized and formally prescribed tasks on the shopfloor 
on the other hand. Mechanization embodies the collective knowledge of 
0 & M into the material apparatus. Reduced to these dimensions Fordism 
induces mass production. Yet the implementation of this technological 
paradigm in the 1920s raised a serious question. Who would buy the 
outputs of mass production? Henry Ford is now famous for having 
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proposed an answer: wage earners should be the main customers. Hence 
the name of Fordism for the macroeconomic pattern which was eventually 
implemented twenty years after the Great Depression, which was the 
underconsumption crisis stemming from mass production. 
• As a macroeconomic pattern (or regime of accumulation), ·Fordism 
implied that the gains in productivity arising from its principles of 
production were matched, on the one hand, by the increase of.investments 
financed by profits, and on the other hand by the increase in purchasing 
power of the waged workers. As a result, both the share of wages in value-
added and the value capital/output ratio were roughly constant, the rate 
of profit was essentially stable, and the markets for production goods and 
consumption goods both grew in pace with productivity. But - and here 
Henry Ford had less to say than Keynes and Beveridge - how could such 
a steady increase in purchasing power be achieved? Here rules of 
coordination between economic agents had to be established. Fordism 
cannot exist in a single firm. 
• As a system of rules of coordination (or as a mode of regulation), Fordism 
implied long-term contracts as the basis of the wage relation, with rigid 
limitation of layoffs, and a tying of wage increases to prices and overall 
productivity. Moreover, a large redistribution of revenues through the 
welfare state and social security insured a basic income for wage earners. 
The counterpart was the acceptance by the unions of managerial 
privileges, on the shop floor. As a result, both the principles of labor 
process organization and the macroeconomic pattern were respected. 
The crisis of Fordism has been subject to various explanations. In our 
analysis, its problems can be traced to supply and demand (Glyn et al. 1988; 
Lipietz 1985, 1989b ). The most obvious reason appeared on the demand 
side. Competitiveness equalized between the United States, Europe, and 
Japan. The search for economies of scale induced internationalization of 
production processes and markets. The increase in the price of raw materials 
imported from the south (notably oil) stimulated competition for exports 
in the early 1970s. The regulation of the growth of domestic markets 
through wage increases was thus limited by the necessity to balance external 
trade. Faced with this demand-side crisis, the reaction of international elites 
was mainly Keynesian until the end of the 1970s. Then the mood of the 
international elites of the capitalist world changed. Demand-side manage-
ment of the crisis had avoided a great depression, but a major and deeper 
limit became obvious: the fall in profitability. 
This was due to a number of causes on the supply-side: a slowdown in 
productivity with increase in total labor price (including welfare payments), 
an increase in the capital-output ratio, and an increase in the relative price 
of raw materials. In those conditions, Keynesian strategies such as an 
increase in the real wage (however limited) and loose monetary policy could 
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only induce inflation. Hence, the rise of monetarism (i.e. an attack on 
demand-side growth policies) and the shift to supply-side policies. In our 
view, the key to the supply side is industrial relations, which in tum 
encompasses aspects of the industrial production paradigm and the mode of 
regulation. 
Even within the regulation approach, the supply-side problem of Fordism 
is subject to two interpretations. First, according to a Kaleckian analysis, 
the rise in the relative price of labor and raw materials was the result of the 
long boom of the "Golden Age" of the postwar period (ltoh 1980, 
Armstrong, Glyn, Harrison 1984). This "full-employment profit-squeeze" 
analysis became the official explanation in OECD reports by the end of the 
1970s. Profits were too low because workers were too strong, and this was 
so because the rules of the game had become too "rigid." Liberal flexibility 
policies were adopted by the UK, then by American administrations, and 
wer.e eventually implemented by a number of OECD countries, including 
even the socialist-communist French government in the 1980s (Lipietz 
1990). 
Yet a complementary explanation to the Kaleckian full-employment 
profit-squeeze theory stresses the exhaustion of the efficiency properties of 
Taylorism. In this view, it is not ultimately rational to eliminate all 
possibility of initiative on the part of the worker on the shop floor; 
"responsible autonomy" appears as a better principle, especially as the 
implementation of new technologies, or the shift to "just-in-time" manage-
ment require the involvement of operators and their cooperation with 
managers and designers (Friedman 1977).7 This is precisely the labor 
process strategy selected by many successful firms in Japan, Germany, and 
Scandinavia. 
Faced with these events, the notions of neo-Fordism and post-Fordism 
are on unequal ground. On the one hand, the neo-Fordist analysis acknow-
ledges the main tendencies of the late 1970s and early 1980s, such as a 
progressive unraveling of the Fordist rules of the game ( concession bar-
gaining, development of secondary labor markets, cuts in the welfare state), 
enhanced by the monetarist shocks of 1979 and 1981, and inducing a 
dramatic transformation toward a new regime of accumulation, with a 
polarization of incomes, and a shift of social demand towards export and/ 
or toward the overconsumption of the upper tier of society (Davis 1986). 
Rather little is said about the changes within the technological paradigm, 
except to note a shift towards a "computer-assisted Taylorism" (Mathews 
1989). This analysis reflects rather well the way the USA dealt with its 
supply-side crisis. 
On the other hand, the first theorizations of "flexible specialization" tried 
to capture the fact that some firms, regions, or countries were getting the 
better of the new world configuration brought about by monetarism. In a 
world of market volatility where customized commodities were favored by 
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the new upper-middle classes, flexibility of supply was required, and 
specialized skills appeared as a better way to meet small batch demand. Since 
post-Fordism later on appeared as a new solution for the supply side of the 
crisis, it is indeed strange that these early theorizations insisted mainly on 
the demand side of the crisis ( and wrongly characterized it as a crisis of 
"underconsumption"). 8 The change in industrial relations appeared as an 
adaptation to a change in the regime of accumulation: post-Fordism in the 
plant as an adaptation to neo-Fordism in the world economy. This led to a 
failure to analyze the consistency of specialization and craft on the one hand, 
and flexibility in labor and product markets on the other hand. Moreover, 
flexible specialization as a new form of work organization was accorded a 
kind of neutrality in its macroeconomic effects: there would be no more 
problem of effective demand. 
Yet, labor relations must be consistent. First, the different elements of the 
industrial relations system must be mutually consistent: wage contracts, 
labor organization, and the social reproduction of appropriately skilled 
labor forces. Second, they must be consistent with the broader shape of 
social life in concrete territories: general goals and accepted rules of life 
in a common society. Third, they should be consistent with the macro-
economics of some regime of accumulation or social structure of accumula-
tion, both at the national and international level. Last, but not least, the 
global ecological situation is now imposing strong constraints on the 
generalization of most models. 
We will reum to the problems of macro consistency. But first let us 
scrutinize the consistency of flexibility and craft within labor relations itself. 
TWO PATHWAYS OF CAPITAL/LABOR RELATIONS 
When they characterize the actual evolutions of labor relations, scholars 
rightly notice that there are tendencies to flexibilize the wage contract (so 
as to reduce the direct and indirect cost of labor force), and tendencies to 
mobilize craft skills, know-how, and the intellectual activity of the labor 
force, in order to increase productivity, to adapt continuously the product 
to demand, and to increase the efficiency of a costly fixed capital. While a 
closer adaptation of supply to a volatile demand is a by-product of the latter, 
it represents a fundamentally different view of the way out of the supply-
side crisis of Fordism. Are the two views compatible, as is sometimes 
held, where neo-Fordism and post-Fordism are combinable (Moulaert and 
Swingedouw 1989)? 
The two views of the way out of the crisis may be thought of as two 
pathways of development of industrial relations, with a common starting 
point in Fordism: Taylorism as direct control by the management on the 
activity of workers, rigidity of the wage contract, as shown in Figure 17.1.9 
The first pathway fosters an evolution from rigidity toward flexibility, the 
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second one from direct control toward responsible autonomy. Stated 
differently, the first (vertical) axis refers to the external labor market, to the 
ties between firms and the labor power hoping to be hired. The second 
(horizontal), axis refers to the internal labor market, the forms of organiza-
tion of cooperation/hierarchy within the labor process.10 It should be 
emphasized that compromises on the regulation of the "internal labor 
market" are not necessarily negotiated "inside" the firm. 
On the first, "external" axis, there are several dimensions of rigidity and 
flexibility. Many dimensions of the external labor market may be regulated: 
the direct wage, hiring and firing, the social wage. The external market may 
be more or less organized. Moreover, such rules may be implemented at the 
level of individuals, professions, firms, sectors, or society. We shall not 
consider these details, however, because they are overdetermined by what 
happens on the other axis. 
-+ Taylorism--------....;.F __ .;;.Sect=o-r_...;;.S.;;.oc_ie_ty ___ Negotiatect 
Involvement 
Rigidity -, F-o-rd-1s_m_l 
USA UK 





I Kalmarlsm I 
Sweden 
Figure 17.1 Post-Fordist industrial relations 
On the second, "internal" axis, the degree of involvement also has several 
dimensions: upskilling, horizontal cooperation, participation in the defini-
tion and monitoring of tasks, and so on. For reasons that will appear shortly, 
we focus on the level of the negotiation of the compensation for the 
involvement of workers. 
1 Involvement may by individually negotiated and rewarded by bonuses, 
career advancement, etc. This is limited by the collective character of the 
required involvement in most processes of cooperative production. 
"Individually negotiated involvement" (I in Figure 17.1) may be extended 
to a team or a shop. 
2 Involvement may be negotiated firm-by-firm, between management and 
unions (F in Figure 17.1). Here the firm and the work force share the 
rewards of the specific skills accumulated in the learning process. This 
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implies an "(external) rigidity" of the wage contract, whose limit case is 
the "life-time" contract.11 
3 Involvement may be negotiated at the sector level (S in Figure 17 .1 ), thus 
limiting the firm's risk of competition from firms using cheaper labor, and 
inducing them to share skilling institutions. The external labor market is 
likely to be more organized, that is broadly speaking more rigid, with 
sector-wide collective bargaining, and a greater socialization of labor 
revenues. 
4 The involvement may be negotiated at the level of the whole society, with 
unions and business negotiating at the regional or national level the social 
content and distribution of the production. In this case, it is understood 
that unions are responsible for worker performance on the shop floor. 
Here, the external labor market is likely to be at least as well organized 
as in the most advanced Fordist-corporatist cases.12 
Nonetheless, collective involvement of the workers is unlikely to be possible 
if there is no commonality of destiny of firms and their work forces, i.e. in 
the context of external flexibility at any level. The outer limit of consistency 
between flexibility and involvement appears as the triangle marked on 
Figure 17.1. Collective involvement and flexibility are incompatible, and it 
is here that neo-Fordism and post-Fordism are so often conflated.13 It 
follows that there are two privileged lines of evolution i.e. two real pathways 
of development "after Fordism", which are shown in Figure 17.1: 
a) External flexibility associated with hierarchical direct control: we are 
back to some form of T aylorist organization of the labor process, without 
the social counterparts of the "golden age" of Fordism. Let us call this 
paradigm neo-Taylorism. 
b) External rigidity ( organization) of the labor market associated with 
negotiated involvement of the workers. Let us call this paradigm 
Kalmarian, in honor of the first car factory reorganized according 
to the involvement principle in a social-democratic country: Sweden in 
1974. 
Looking back on the recent experience of the OECD countries, there is a 
range of experiences, with the USA and the UK privileging external 
flexibility and ignoring involvement, or introducing individually rewarded 
involvement (as in France), Japan practicing negotiated involvement at the 
firm level, Germany at the sector level, and Sweden being closer to the 
Kalmarian case. 14 The firm-level negotiated involvement (typical of the 
Japanese case) allows for a dualistic coexistence of the two paradigms within 
a dualistic labor market (e.g. according to gender).15 This mixed situation 
could be labelled Toyotism. 
The experience of USA shows that it is difficult to negotiate involvement 
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at the shop or even plant level in a broader context of liberalism, with its 
high level of external flexibility. In the USA, individually negotiated 
involvement may, however, be developed.16 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION: STILL AT A 
CROSSROADS 
One of the main empirical tendencies of the 1980s was that "Big is 
Beautiful." Never in the history of capitalism has there been such a 
tremendous international centralization of capital. There are no more than 
five important European car makers and only two major alliances of aircraft-
engine makers in the world. This has occurred in the context of a large 
increase in world industrial output since the early 1970s, at the twilight of 
Fordism. Nonetheless, advocates of a post-Fordism transition insist that 
non-vertically integrated forms of industrial organization are becoming 
dominant, with the rise of industrial districts. In this view, the new pattern 
of economic ownership should be the clustering of small- and medium-
sized, specialized and flexible firms, based on a territorial sector-specific 
supply of skilled workers. The paradigmatic examples of such a tendency 
would be the specialized productive areas of Third Italy, Silicon Valley, and 
so on. How is it possible to reconcile such different diagnoses? A first 
explanation may be sectoral specificities. Examples of industrial districts 
are usually found in the clothing, shoe, ceramic, software design, or 
customized electronic hardware industries, all of which are labor-intensive. 
On the contrary, concentration would be expected in capital-intensive 
industries, since even when economies of scope are important, they are 
increasingly internalized and based on costly flexible equipment. Internal 
economies of scale thus still matter when total output is considered. Still, 
even in highly centralized sectors, there are strong tendencies towards 
vertical disintegration, even within a given firm. It is from this latter phe-
nomenon that the idea emerges of an organizational convergence between 
disintegrating corporations and quasi-intergrating industrial districts (Sabel 
1989). 
Here, a number of different issues and forms of quasi-integration may be 
distinguished. First, what do we mean by "quasi"-integration, and what 
forces are encouraging this form of industrial organization? Most pro-
ponents of the notion of post-Fordism simply assume the superiority of 
small or medium-sized firms as the outcome of "specialization" made 
possible by the new technologies. In the Coase-Williamson paradigm, there 
is only one alternative for the firm: make or buy, market or hierarchy. It is 
advantageous to buy when the price of independent production plus the 
transaction cost is less than the costs of production and hierarchy within the 
firm. Since flexible specialization is based on production systems which 
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enjoy important external economies of scope and significant costs of 
organization, vertical integration would efface the advantages of economies 
of scope (because of the rigidity and specificity of intermediate production) 
and would dramatically increase the costs of organization in the form of 
hierarchy. Hence the victory of market over hierarchy. 
There is a grain of truth in this analysis. As Leborgne (1987) has shown, 
flexible machinery entails a new solution, a compromise between integration 
and disintegration in terms of production and organization costs, in which 
the specialized firm (or plant) minimizes the costs of organization, maximizes 
economies of scope through "modular" integration, and allows for the tight 
control on quality, at the same time that it fosters innovation. Nonetheless, 
minimizing costs is not the main problem for capitalist production. Maxi-
mizing profits, or more precisely the rate of profit, is the great imperative 
forgotten in the Coase-Williamson paradigm. In this respect, there exist 
important differences between "make" and "buy." In the first case, the 
principal firm invests the fixed capital and controls the value added by its 
own workers. In the second case the principal shares with the contractor 
the cost of fixed assets, but it has to give up the surplus-value of the 
contractor's workers. 
This points up the specific advantages of quasi-integration. As Leborgne 
(1987) and Laigle (1989) have shown, "quasi" refers to both the production 
process and valorization process. In the valorization process, the validation 
of fixed capital and labor committed to production by the subcontractor is 
achieved via routinized interdependence between the two firms ( one being 
a regular supplier/customer of the other). Both of them depend upon 
the productive complementarity of their assets and know-how. Quasi-
integration minimizes both the costs of coordination (because of the 
autonomy of the specialized firms or plant), and the costs of information/ 
transaction (because of the routinized just-in-time transactions between 
firms). Moreover the financial risks of R &: D and investments are shared 
within the quasi-integrated network.17 
Yet there are important differences between types of quasi-integration. In 
a first (extreme) case, the buyer has at its disposal the know-how of the 
subcontractor (because the product is standardized, or because the quasi-
integration is the result of disintegration of the principal firm). The former 
is then in a position to induce the latter to invest without guaranteeing its 
outlets, and also in a position to contract at a price which transfers to it the 
value added produced by the subcontractor. This case may be properly 
labeled "vertical quasi-integration." By contrast, when partnership and 
strategic alliance link a supplier with specific technology to a regular 
customer of another sector of the division of labor (for instance Mercedes 
and Bosch, or Aerospatiale and SNECMA), we have a case of "horizontal 
quasi-integration." The general case, of course, is intermediate: "oblique 
341 
COLLECTIVE ORDER AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN POST-FORDISM 
quasi-integration.''18 For instance, the link between Renault and its seat-
maker is oblique because Renault orders for specific goods which are part 
of the process of production of cars (and were formerly produced in 
integrated car factories), but the seat-maker is fully responsible for the 
process of production of the seats (including subcontracting the production 
of metal frames, fabrics, and so on). As Laigle (1990) has shown in the case 
of the French car industry, the concrete network of quasi-integration is a 
mix of horizontal, vertical, and oblique ties (Figure 17.2). The more 
horizontal the tie, the better the bargaining power of the supplier, but also 
the more research and development in its product (this being both the cause 
and the effect of its power), hence the higher quasi-rent earned by the 
network.19 




Vertical quasi-Integration Ob6que quasi-Integration 
Figure 17.2 Post-Fordist industrial organization 
There is a striking resemblance between Figures 17.1 and 17.2. In both 
cases, the vertical axis represents a form of "flexibility," which increases the 
share of surplus value accruing to the principal on the basis of direct control 
over the dominated agent. In both cases, the horizontal axis represents a 
form of autonomy of this agent, implying a higher efficiency of the 
principal-agent couple. In other words, quasi-integration is always cost-
minimizing a la Williamson, but VQI is revenue-maximizing only for the 
principal, while OQI and partnership are revenue-maximizing for the whole 
network. 
Our thesis (developed in Leborgne and Lipietz 1987, 1989) is twofold. 
First, this apparent correspondence is real. The tendencies toward negotiated 
involvement in labor relations and toward partnership in industrial organ-
ization seem to be different expressions of the possible formation of an 
historical bloc which is modernizing certain economies. There are territories 
where dense, horizontal forms of quasi-integration between firms develop 
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in pace with negotiated involvement within firms, while in other places 
vertical disintegration (mostly toward other low-wage regions) develops in 
pace with neo-Taylorism.20 Second, these two combinations correspond 
to two different pathways of development, and the first is presently 
outperforming the second. 
Thus, care should be taken when heralding the benefits of industrial 
districts. In many cases, a hidden subordination through VQI of most firms 
to a principal firm is likely to emerge (e.g. of the firms of the Third Italy to 
those of the First Italy). The nature of quasi-integration determines whether 
the district is a progressive or a regressive evolution from the staff-and-line 
industrial organization of Fordism. Subcontracting to poorly integrated 
districts remains consistent with neo-Fordism. 
MACROECONOMICS STILL MATTERS AS WELL AS 
ECOLOGY 
The euphoric diagnoses of post-Fordist "possibilities for prosperity" have 
been strongly criticized on the basis of their lack of concern with social 
aspects of "really existing flexible specialization" (as Brezhnev used to speak 
of "really existing socialism"). As Jensen (1989) and Pollert (1988) have 
pointed out, there is a real danger that "negotiated involvement" in 
"yeomen democracy" would be restricted to a yeomanry, a male aristocracy 
of skilled workers. 
A clear distinction must be made between an analysis of existing reality 
and its problems, and the creation of political options for gender and racial 
equity. Negotiated involvement of workers entails in itself neither social 
polarization nor equalization. Here, the scope of the negotiation will be 
determinant, and that will be subject to a major political and cultural 
struggle.21 In the present situation where the word "flexibility" is used in a 
confusing way to extol the virtues of neo-Taylorist, Toyotist, and Kalmarian 
models, conceptual clarification is first needed. The first class of models, 
which includes individually negotiated involvement, will be favored where 
an individualistic vision of society is accepted, and will induce social 
polarization. Kalmarian models on the contrary will be favored when anti-
egalitarian social consequences are rejected. Toyotism (that is, firm-level 
negotiated involvement in "good" firms and neo-Taylorism elsewhere) will 
be accepted in hierarchical societies acknowleging "natural" differences 
between individuals and genders. Flexible specialization as a technological 
paradigm has little influence there. 
Nonetheless, the theory of flexible specialization is to be criticized when 
it professes a benign neglect of macroeconomic issues: 
A shift away from mass production would restore the neoclassical 
equilibrating mechanisms that were probably most prominent in the 
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early-nineteenth century American economy .... It would be possible 
to maintain full employment without resorting to wage determination 
systems linking purchasing power to the rate of increase of productive 
capacity. 
(Piore and Sabel 1984: 276). 
This is an amazing statement based on a completely unrealistic assumption 
about declining economies of scale in a highly capital-saving paradigm. In 
fact, flexible specialization, as we have already noticed, is more likely to be 
based on costly assets, resting on huge and risky investments in research 
and development. If a massive demand (even a fragmented one) is not 
secured through some form of regulation of the sharing of gains of 
productivity, the old instability of pre-Fordist capitalist economies is likely 
to come back. Macroeconomics still matters. 
Macroeconomic constraints are well kown by economists; they can be 
logically deduced. We may thus be very brief. First, any model of develop-
ment must be profitable. Second, it must be competitive. Third, demand 
must match supply. 
Assuming that "involvement" is more productive that neo-T aylorism, the 
first constraint suggests that, when a great part of the surplus has to be 
reserved to debt servicing, there is little room for "negotiating involvement" 
because the wage has to be as low as possible. The existing debt load on a 
given country is thus inducing neo-Taylorism. For the second reason, 
countries which are already pursuing neo-Taylorism, and are less productive 
than "involving" ones, are also handicapped in the search of a better capital-
labor truce. This does not imply that the roll of the dice is already over: 
equivalents may be proposed to workers (such as rigid wage contracts). Still 
such countries as the USA, the UK, Brazil, and Eastern Europe will have 
difficulties in shifting toward the Kalmarian paradigm. On the contrary, 
Scandinavia, Germany, Japan, and even Korea (which is developing specific 
forms of "involvement" in the male sector of its labor force), may be 
considered to be marching toward the twenty-first century in a good 
position. 
As far as demand is concerned, the Kalmarian paradigm offers greater 
possibilities to regulate social demand than neo-Taylorism.22 The latter will 
be associated with a cycle of "exhilarating" periods of boom (with an 
increase of profits and of the revenues of the upper tier of society) and 
periods of depression (due to overinvestment or "cooling off" policies): the 
return of the business cycle, as opposed to the more regular pattern of 
Fordism. 
This brings us back to the problem of "yeomen democracy," even when 
workers' involvement is negotiated firm-by-firm. This is what Aoki (1988) 
has labelled "the dilemma of worker democracy." In this case, the surpluses 
of productivity are specific to the firm, and the resulting quasi-rent of the 
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firm exists insofar as differential productivity is maintained vis-a-vis other 
competitors. The negotiated compensations (in terms of higher wages, 
reduction of labor time, or lifetime career) are limited to this quasi-rent. In 
this condition, when cyclical downturns on the market occur, insiders and 
management will be allied against newcomers, subcontractors, and competi-
tors. This tends to consolidate a "workers' aristocracy" at the top of the 
generalized, pragmatic, meritocratic hierarchy in the whole society. 23 This 
hierarchy may develop into a completely dualistic structure (negotiated 
involvement/neo-Taylorism), especially when gender or ethnic differences 
come into play. In this case, any increase of the aggregate domestic demand 
would be restricted by the need for competitivity of this dualistic structure, 
since it is dependent on external outlets.24 Things are different when a 
general (and global) growth in hourly labor-cost is a rule imposed upon any 
competitor. Then the issue is not the sharing out of specific quasi-rent (or 
"extra surplus-value" in Marxist terms), but a general redistribution of gains 
in social productivity ("relative surplus-value"). So, not only does macro-
economics matter, but it has a strong effect on the social character of 
post-Fordism. 
Up to now, nothing has been said about the nature of the redistribution 
of the gains · in productivity accruing from "negotiated involvement": 
growth in purchasing power? In free time? Here a major new con-
straint appears at the dawn of twenty-first century: ecological sustain-
ability. Capitalist development not only degraded work under Taylorism 
(Braverman 1974); we now understand how much it degraded the earth, 
according to Marx's prophecy (and this is also true in the state capitalism 
of the East). In fact, capital/labor conflicts have been allayed for the most 
part at the expense of nature, hence at the expense of future generations. 
The hole in the ozone layer and the greenhouse effect are among the 
consequences of the great industrial boom of the Fordist and Soviet models. 
The recovery of the 1980s has increased the frequency of industrial disasters, 
and it is worsening the global ecological crisis. The limits of any produc-
tionist model are fully revealed, at the local or global level, and the necessity 
for future models of development to be sustainable, that is ecologically 
consistent, is ever clearer.25 
If we assume the continued development of ecological concern all around 
the world (and this is the case in the West, in the East, but less in the South), 
sustainability will become a new factor of legitimation of future capital-
labor compromises. As a result the counterparts of gains in productivity, if 
they are negotiated, will tend to be granted in the form of an increase of 
free time rather than in the form of an increase in real wage (as in Fordism). 
That solution may prevail in the most socialized form of Kalmarian 
compromises.26 Another solution, consisting of alleviating the damage to 
the environment through ecologically sensitive industries, would be favored 
by an overconsuming upper tier attached to neo-Taylorism or Toyotism. 
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This would raise the relative prices of consumption goods to the detri-
ment of the lower tiers of the society. Ecology would provoke a major 
distributional conflict. 
TOWARD A CORE-PERIPHERY CONFIGURATION IN 
POST-FORDIST TIMES? 
We have been accustomed to thinking that one model of capitalist develop-
ment should be hegemonic in any given historical period. This was true 
at the time of British hegemony ( competitive capitalism with extensive 
accumulation), and it was true at the height of Fordism. In these times, 
countries which failed to adopt the dominant model were locked out of 
world industrial competition. In its Golden Age from 1950 to 1970, Fordism 
defeated and marginalized Sovietism and corporatist forms of import 
substitution in the Third World. As far as manufactured tradable goods were 
concerned, Adam Smith's law of "absolute advantage" seemed to prevail: 
Fordist models of production outperformed all others. Thus, non-Fordist 
countries were restricted to primary goods exports and could only develop 
industries via protectionism. 
The crisis of the 1970s changed all that. New industrial powers emerged 
from the South, with new models of development27 combining Taylorism 
and flexible forms of the wage contract. Nowadays, industrial protectionism 
has changed direction: high-wage developed countries are protecting them-
selves against "unfair'' competition of these countries with slighly lower 
productivity but much lower wages. 
In the first half of the 1980s, supply-side, neo-Taylorist policies were 
designed to cut labor costs. Yet, as we have already seen, more advanced 
social compromises performed very well in the "post-Fordist" countries, 
either in the form of Toyotism or Kalmarism. Moreover, the trade deficit 
of the more neo-Taylorist countries (such as the USA and UK) opened huge 
outlets for the more competitive production of Japan and West-Germany 
(Lipietz, 1989b). Such a macroeconomic world situation is not stable. Too 
many countries have a debt to pay: the USA, the UK, the Third World, and 
Eastern Europe. Should they try to do it through a new offensive in 
"external flexibility," with more unemployment and lower wages, a new 
world depression could threaten the prosperity of negotiated involvement. 
Protectionism may be a solution, but it is not the main tendency. On the 
contrary, the desperate attempts of Third World to pay its debt, the 
necessity for the United States to balance its external accounts, and the 
integration of the ex-socialist world into the world economy will increase 
world competition. From the experience of the 1970s and 1980s, it is 
doubtful that either neo-Fordism or post-Fordism will completely eliminate 
the other. Thus, the main question is how the two models will function 
within the same trading system, such as the EC (and its eastern satellites). 
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We may assume that in labor-intensive routinized sectors, neo-Taylorism 
may dominate negotiated involvement at a sufficiently low wage. Then, as 
envisioned by Ricardo's theorem on comparative advantage, countries (or 
regions) will tend to specialize in sectors where they are comparatively best 
"endowed," whether in flexibility and low wage - or in involvement. In 
that case, the total amount of demand will be limited by wage competition 
due to the coexistence of low-wage, low-involvement regions and higher-
wage, higher-involvement regions. The greater the possibility to practice 
neo-Taylorism, the smaller will be the islands of "yeoman' democracy" a 
la Piore and Sabel, and lower overall global prosperity. 
The most likely scenario is the formation of a new world economic 
hierarchy. It will not oppose an industrial Fordist core to a primary-goods-
producing periphery, but will present itself as a de facto new industrial 
division of labor. The core economies will be those having adopted a 
Kalmarian compromise in much part of their production, with a possibility 
of internal dualism (Kalmarism/neo-Taylorism). They will dedicate them-
selves to high-technology and highly skilled production. The periphery will 
consist of economies organized according to the neo-Taylorist paradigm, 
and dedicated to routinized and labor-intensive activities. Intermediate 
regions (with very wealthy high technology and financial sectors) may 
develop out of individually negotiated involvement (the "Californian type" 
defined in Leborgne and Lipietz, 1987). 
In this new world industrial hierarchy, some former core economies may 
become semi-peripheral, including the UK, France, and even many states 
of the USA. Conversely, Japan and Germany will consolidate their places 
in the core, with some other former core economies like Sweden, and some 
formerly peripheral ones catching up, such as Korea following the trajectory 
of Finland. A part of Eastern Europe would be involved in this process, 
while the rest of it would become a peripheral to Germany and Japan. As 
for the Third World, a part of it is becoming marginalized, and another part 
is becoming integrated into the world economy as a neo-Taylorist (or even 
primitive Taylorist) subcontracting area around the more advanced growth 
poles. 
CONCLUSIONS 
History is alive again. On the ruins of Fordism and Stalinism, humankind 
is at a crossroads. No technological determinism will light the way. The 
present industrial divide is first and formost a political divide. The search 
for social compromise, around ecological constraints, macroeconomic con-
sistency, gender and ethnic equality, all mediated by the nature and degree 
of political mobilization will decide the outcome. 
In the field of industrial relations, external flexibility will compete with 
negotiated involvement. In the field of industrial organization, oppressive 
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worldwide subcontracting will compete with dense, territorially based 
partnership. The macroeconomics of the future may be based on a down-
ward spiral of social and ecological competition, leading to recurrent 
financial, business and environmental crises, or an ecologically sustainable 
and macroeconomically stable model. As usual, reality will consist of a mix, 
with a cor~periphery structure along geographical, ethnic, and gender 
lines. Radical economists and geographers may be part of finding the 
better pathway, both by identifying the possibilities for prosperity and by 
criticizing unrealistic optimism for flexibility as a panacea. 
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2 FORDIST AND POST-FORDIST INTERNATIONAL 
DIVISION OF LABOR AND MONETARY REGIMES 
Notes 
1 It is not possible here to differentiate exactly between both notions; cf. Hubner 
1989; Lipietz 1986. 
2 I discussed different types of crises and of crisis-theory in Altvater 1981; see also 
Hubner (1989). 
3 Although there were additional inflationary impulses, such as the expenses for 
waging the Vietnam war. 
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3 FORDISM AND POST-FORDISM: A CRITICAL 
REFORMULATION 
Notes 
1 This chapter has gained from discussions with Simon Bromley, Simon Clarke, 
Benjamin Coriat, Richard Hyman, Klaus Nielsen, Ove Kai Pedersen, and Dick 
Walker. The reading on which it draws was mostly completed whilst I held an 
ESRC personal research grant; I completed the chapter at the Center for 
Organisation and Management (COS) in Copenhagen with suppon from the 
Danish Social Science Research Council. Thanks to all three bodies for their 
suppon. 
2 Perez treats Fordist mass production and continuous process industries as the 
carrier industries of the fourth Kondratieff; its moti'De branches were those 
involved in producing the low cost oil and energy-intensive materials used in 
Fordist production; it induced growth in complementary sectors (Perez 1983: 
362-3, 369). 
3 It is because these micro- and macroeconomic sources of flexibility have been 
overwhelmed by its general crisis that Fordism now seems so rigid. Among the 
micro-sources are layoffs, shon-time and overtime working, outsourcing, varia-
tions in stock levels, switching between home and foreign markets; the most 
imponant of the macro-sources are contracyclical demand management policies 
and the stabilizing effects of welfare payments. 
4 The technical composition of capital refers to the ratio of fixed to circulating 
capital - more specifically to the relation among means of production, material 
inputs and work in progress, and labor power. 
5 It is symptomatic that Ford's "five dollar day" was introduced to stem massive 
turnover and absenteeism rates among his assembly-line workers. 
6 Galbraith discussed this in The New Industrial State (1967); this work anticipated 
many later studies of the Fordist regime. 
7 "Integral economy" is analogous to Gramsci's concept of the "integral state," 
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i.e., the state in its inclusive sense. This was defined as "state = political society 
+ civil society." Thus we could define an integral economy as "regime of 
accumulation+ mode of regulation." See also Jessop (1990b). 
8 On how discourses and strategies of flexibility are "rewording" the world of 
work in Sweden, see Elam and Borjeson (1990). 
9 Richard Hyman expressed this worry to me and it is addressed below. 
10 There are already many other critiques of the concept but few which first draw 
the necessary distinctions among possible levels of Fordism and/or between its 
structural and strategic aspects. For some representative criticisms from different 
perspectives, see Foster (1988); Hirst and Zeitlin (1990); Meegan (1988); Sayer 
(1989); Williams et al. (1987). 
11 Kaplinsky defends this focus on the car industry on the grounds that: "first, it 
is the largest single industrial employer in the world economy and, second, since 
the first decades of the twentieth century it has set the pattern for the 
development of the dominant form of labour process which has subsequently 
diffused to other manufacturing sectors" (Kaplinsky 1988: 452). 
12 Lipietz has suggested an even more general definition of Fordism as involving 
"essentially Taylorization plus mechanization" (Lipietz 1987). 
13 Some difficulties in the Fordist literature stem from failures to meet these criteria; 
many criticisms leveled against this literature are rooted in an unnecessary 
conflation of different possible definitions. 
14 Such arguments clearly require changes in the definition of Fordism as an 
accumulation regime - albeit different changes in each case. 
15 Much of Boyer's work is inspired by Kaldorian models: for example, Boyer and 
Petit 1981; or Boyer and Ralle 1987. Other Parisian regulationists also use models 
that are similar to, based on, or develop Kaldor-Verdoon arguments. 
16 Thus Mike Davis criticized Aglietta's pioneering work on US Fordism for 
ignoring the "1.6 trillion dollars devoted to the permanent arms economy since 
1946" (cited in Foster 1988: 28). 
17 Several parallels can be drawn between the US New Deal and the Nazi New 
Order as forms of internal welfare state: with the Volksempfaenger (radio), 
Volkswagen, and Autobahn serving equivalent functions to mass household 
consumer durables, the model T, and the US highway program (Roobeek 1987: 
134). 
18 Siegel explains the neglect of fascism in terms of "a procedure that reduces to a 
mere preparatory stage about two-thirds of the sixty years since the inception of 
the Fordist era in the 1920s" (1988: 4). 
19 This argument was put by Haug (1988); he also noted how some post-Fordist 
theorizing also referred to continuities, reinforced trends, and so on - thus 
making it ambiguous what was involved in post-Fordism. 
20 Once again the Japanese model poses problems here: if the post-Fordist future 
was pioneered by Japan and if Japan lacked a Fordist past, what does the concept 
of post-Fordism signify when applied to Japan? 
21 This presupposes agreement on the crisis of Fordism - whether as labor process, 
accumulation regime, mode of regulation, or mode of societalization. 
22 Many early comments on Fordism in crisis foresaw only a movement from 
Fordism to neo-Fordism: according to Kenney and Florida, this involves "the 
use of new technologies to generate economic renewal within the general context 
of fordist institutions and social relationships" (Kenney and Florida 1988: 147n). 
Typical examples are Aglietta's pioneering study of American Fordism (1979) 
and Palloix's comments on the neo-Fordist labor process (1976). 
23 This seems to be Kaplinsky's line when he writes: "there is now widespread 
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recognition that there are alternatives to the Fordist system, which are also widely 
recognized to be more productive." One reason that JIT developed as an 
alternative was the small scale of the early Japanese market for cars and the need 
to keep investory costs down (1988: 455). 
24 Reverting to the labor process in the automobile industry, for example, we may 
note that one study suggests that the British industry is moving towards the 
German model whereas the American industry is moving towards the Japanese 
(Juergens, Malsch, and Dohse 1988: 12). 
25 Even flexible manufacturing systems are too costly for most small firms to install 
and require user firms to push for higher volumes and more product variety than 
markets might bear (cf. Sayer 1989: 673, citing Schoenberger 1987). 
26 The notion of "Spaethkapitalismus" involves a pun on the German concept of 
"Spaetkapitalismus" (or "late capitalism"). It refers to Lothar Spaeth, the 
modernizing Christian Democratic Minister-President of Baden-Wiirtemburg 
and a leading advocate of a post-Fordist future for Germany. 
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4 FLEXIBLE SPECIALIZATION VERSUS POST-
FORDISM: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS 
Notes 
1 This exposition is based primarily on Piore and Sabel (1984), Sabel and Zeitlin 
(1985), Sabel (1989a), and Sabel (1990). 
2 It will be evident that this definition of flexible specialization as a form of craft 
production entails a revaluation of the conventional stereotype of the latter as 
the manufacture of luxury goods in tiny volumes using hand tools and obsolete 
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methods. The historical basis for a more positive interpretation of the tech-
nological dynamism of craft production is presented in Sabel and Zeitlin 1985. 
For a related approach which seeks to distinguish between craft production and 
"diversified quality production" on the basis of the volumes involved, see Streeck 
(1987) and Sorge and Streeck (1988). 
3 As Piore and Sabel acknowledge (1984: 4-5), their notion of regulatory require-
ments of the technological. paradigm is borrowed from the French regulation 
school, but used in very different ways. 
4 For fuller discussions of the reorgnization of large corporations and the process 
of "double convergence," see Sabel (1989a), Sabel et al. (1989), and Sabel 
(1990). This process implies, as Sabel (1989b) observes, not only that corporate 
operating units are coming to resemble the constituent elements of the industrial 
districts, but also that there are increasing numbers of exchanges and alliances 
between large-firm subsidiaries and their small-firm counterparts in the districts 
themselves. 
5 For an extended account of these ideas, see Sabel (1989a: 53-9) and Sabel (1989b); 
and for the potential role of a reorganized labor movement in the transformation 
of the welfare state, see Kem and Sabel (1990) and Sabel (1990). 
6 For a fuller account of flexible specialization as a development strategy, see Sabel 
(1986); and for a thoughtful critical discussion, see Schmitz (1989). For an 
extended attempt to apply this approach to the problems of a small semi-
developed economy on the European periphery, see Murray (1987). 
7 Cf. Williams et al. (1987); Pollen (1988); Wood (1989). For an insightful 
discussion of the critical debates surrounding flexible specialization, see Badham 
and Mathews (1989). 
8 Piore and Sabel (1984: 26-8, 219, 279-80); Sabel and Zeitlin (1985: 137-8); Sabel 
(1989: 40). 
9 These arguments draw on the work of the international working group on 
"Historical Alternatives to Mass Production" sponsored by the Maison des 
Sciences de !'Homme in Paris. See Sabel and Zeitlin, fonhcoming; and for a 
discussion of contemporary problems of technological hybridization, Sabel 
(1990). 
10 Cf., for example, Elam (1990). Thus flexible specialization is not, among other 
things, an optimistic general theory of the labor process which can be counter-
posed to Braverman's deskilling thesis: cf. Thompson (1989: 218-29); Wood 
(1989). 
11 Piore and Sabel (1984: 261-3); Sabel (1989a: 37-40); Sabel et al. (1990); Sabel 
(1990). 
12 Cf. especially Pollen (1988). 
13 Even in the automobile industry, for example, national responses to the Fordist 
model varied considerably: see Tolliday and Zeitlin (1986). 
14 For different national responses to "Keynesianism," see Weir and Skocpol (1985) 
and Hall (1989). 
15 See Piore and Sabel (1984: eh. 6). 
16 For a review of the evidence, see Hirst and Zeitlin (1989b). 
17 A variant of the "post-Fordist" argument which gives great emphasis to the 
concept of "post-modernity" is David Harvey's The Condition of Postmodemity 
(1989). We have not considered this text in detail since it adds little to the 
arguments found in Marxism Today. 
18 See the discussion in Hirst (1989: eh. 1). 
19 See in panicular Freeman and Perez (1988); Perez (1983, 1985); and Freeman et 
al. (1982). 
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20 For a valuable overview of the many variants of the regulation approach, see 
Jessop (1990). In our account of the Parisian regulationists' ideas, we have 
concentrated on the recent work of Robert Boyer, Alain Lipietz and their 
collaborators. Key texts we have used include: Boyer (1979, 1986a, 1986b, 1988a, 
1988b, 1988c, 1988d, 1989); Lipietz (1987, 1989); Leborgne and Lipietz (1988). 
21 See especially Boyer (1986a, 1986b: eh. 1, (1989). 
22 See particularly Boyer (1986, 1988a); Lipietz and Leborgne (1988); and Jessop 
(1990: 42-3). Lipietz also identifies the technological paradigm as a third 
constituent of the mode of development, defined as "the general principles which 
govern the evolution of the division of labor" across the economy as a whole. 
But Lipietz does not specify how this relates to the overall framework of the 
regulationist analysis, and it remains unclear whether the concept is used in the 
manner of flexible specialization or of Freeman and Perez: see Leborgne and 
Lipietz (1988: 264-5). 
23 For detailed discussions of the nature of possible post-Fordist modes of 
development, see Boyer (1988b, 1988c: chs. 11-12, and 1988d); and Leborgne 
and Lipietz (1988). 
24 On the regulationists' attempts to avoid teleology and functionalism, see Lipietz 
(1987: 16); Boyer (1986a: 59, 95); and Jessop (1990: 67-75). 
25 See Jessop (1990: 49-50, 67-9). 
26 See particularly the general formulations of their approach in Boyer (1986a); 
Lipietz (1987: eh. 2); and Lipietz (1989: eh. 2). 
27 Compare, for example, the nuanced discussion of the development of Taylorism 
in France in Boyer (1984) with the balder formulation in Boyer (1988a: 82). 
28 Boyer (1986b, 1988c); Lipietz (1987). 
29 Boyer (1988c: 230-2, 270-1, 1988d: 404-6); Leborgne and Lipietz (1988: 267-8). 
30 Cf., for example, Boyer (1988d); Lipietz (1989). 
31 For a fuller discussion of these issues, see Hirst (1985 and 1990). 
32 See, for example, the theoretical arguments in Sabel (1982). 
33 See Sabel and Zeitlin (1985 and forthcoming). 
34 Good examples of such normative-empirical advocacy using flexible specializa-
tion concepts are Mathews (1989a and 1989b). 
35 Lipietz (1987: 9-10). William of Baskerville is a character in Eco's novel The 
Name of the Rose. 
36 See Whitehead (1926). 
37 For an argument that tries to show that conceptual realism is central to Marx's 
epistemology in Capital and that this position is theoretically unsustainable, see 
Cutler et al. (1977). 
38 For a penetrating account of the theoretical objections to treating classes as social 
actors, see Hindess (1987). 
39 See Boyer (1988b: 623-7; 1988c: 229-32; 1988d: 404-15). 
40 Boyer (1978: 107-8, 111). 
41 For British studies highlighting the differences between wage rates and earnings 
for the period before 1939, see McClelland and Reid (1985: 157); and Gillespie 
and Whiteside (1989). 
42 Aglietta (1976); Boyer (1979, 1986a: 65, 1986b: 227); Boyer and Mistral (1982). 
On the basis of similar calculations, however, Mazier et al. (1984) argue that the 
transition to intensive accumulation in France did not occur until after 1945. 
43 See, for example, Fridenson (1987) and Montmollin and Pastr (1984: pt. I). Even 
for the United States, the impact of Taylorism on work organization and labor 
management can easily be overstated: see Nelson (1975 and 1980). The same 
methodological problems apply to the otherwise extremely stimulating study of 
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historical changes in the nature of French unemployment by Salais et al. (1986), 
which uses principal component analysis rather than more conventional econo-
metric tests. See Salais et al. (1986: 85-94) and Salais (1989: 274-6); and compare 
the much more cautious and historically sensitive discussion by Benedicte 
Reynaud in Salais et al. (1986: 132-7). 
44 The classic statement is Friedman (1953). 
45 For an ingenious but ultimately unsatisfying attempt to use existing data to test 
the flexible specialization hypothesis for the US manufacturing, see Luria (1989). 
Thus, for example, Luria uses share of value-added in manufacturing output (V Al 
M) as an indicator of product batch-sizes, on the assumption that V AIM 
rises proportionately as batch sizes fall, and explores its relationship with 
labor productivity (value-added per employee) for SIC industries over the past 
two decades. But there may be many reasons for an industry to be character-
ized by a high V AIM ratio besides small-batch production, while the use of 
this indicator also depends on the absence of any significant shift in the relative 
productivity of small and large-batch production, the very question to be 
examined. 
46 See, inter alia, Sorge et al. (1983); Jones (1982 and 1989); Maurice et al. (1986); 
and Adler (1989). 
47 For a selection of case studies written from a flexible specialization perspective, 
see Best (1989); Brusco and Sabel (1981); Friedman (1988); Herrigel (1989); Hirst 
and Zeitlin (1989b); Katz and Sabel (1985); Lorenz (1989); Lyberaki (1988); 
Michelsons (1987, 1989); Piore and Sabel (1983); Regini and Sabel (1989); Sabel 
(1984); Sabel et al. (1989a, 1989b); Sabel and Zeitlin (forthcoming); Storper 
(1989); Tolliday and Zeitlin (1987); Zeitlin and Totterdill (1989). The major 
statements of the flexible specialization approach such as Piore and Sabel (1984); 
Sabel and Zeitlin (1985); and Sabel (1989), are all built up from a comparative 
analysis of such case studies. 
48 See Michelsons (1987); Storper and Christopherson (1987); Christopherson and 
Storper (1989); Salais and Storper (1990). 
49 For a discussion of current debates about the interpretation of texts in the history 
of political ideas, see Tully (1988). 
50 Compare, for example, Piore and Sabel (1984); Tolliday and Zeitlin (1986); 
Friedman (1988) and Sabel (1989) with Williams etal. (1987), Wood (1988), Sayer 
(1986 and 1989), Kenney and Florida (1988 and 1989). 
51 For a major case study, see Cusumano (1985). 
52 See Tolliday and Zeitlin (1986); Sabel (1989: 37-9); Regini and Sabel (1989: 
3344); Sabel et al. (1989b); and Sabel (1990). But cf. also Sayer (1989: 685-9); 
Kenney and Florida (1988 and 1989). 
53 On Emilia-Romagna and the "Third Italy" more broadly, see, in English, Brusco 
(1982); Sabel (1982: 220-6); Piore and Sabel (1983); Zeitlin (1989b); Goodman 
et al. (1989); Pyke et al. (1990). Contrasting interpretations can be found in 
Murray (1987) and Amin (1989). On Baden-Wiirttemburg, see Sabel et al. (1989) 
and Herrigel (1989). For a more general debate on the interpretation of regional 
case studies in relation to the flexible specialization hypothesis, see Amin and 
Robins (1990) and the responses by Michael Piore, Charles Sabel and Michael 
Storper in Pyke et al. (1990: eh. 12). 
54 See Hirst and Zeitlin (1989a and 1989b); Lane (1988). Attempts to use pre-
dominantly British evidence to criticize the flexible specialization hypothesis 
therefore badly miss the mark: see, for example, Pollert (1988). 
55 For a survey of debates on industrial policy primarily in this narrow sense, see 
Thompson (1987). 
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56 For Boyer's response to criticisms of regulation theory for its lack of a coherent 
policy program, see Boyer (1986a: 105-9). 
57 For criticism of Keynesianism and state planning strategies, including the use of 
MITI as a model for "picking winners," see Hirst and Zeitlin 1989: Introduction. 
For an example of advocacy that Britain adopt a MITI-style strategy, see Smith 
(1984). 
58 For a characterization of the British Conservative's approach to macroeconomic 
policy between 1982 and 1988 as "electoral Keynesianism," see Hirst (1989: eh. 
4). 
59 On MITI, beyond the classic account of Johnson (1982), see Friedman (1988) 
and Okimoto (1989). 
60 For a useful discussion of the definitional problems of the category "small firms" 
in different national contexts, see Sengenberger and Loveman (1988). 
61 For an account of the failure of British industrial policy based on concentration 
into "national champions" in the 1960s and 1970s, see Williams et al. (1983). 
62 For critical discussions of the likely impact of 1992 on economies of scale, see 
Geroski (1989) and Thompson (1990). 
63 Prais (1976) argued persuasively that the concentration of firms in the UK in the 
period 1909-70 had exhausted any possible production economies of scale at 
plant level and, moreover, that UK firms often concentrated by bringing under 
common control constellations of less than efficient plants. 
64 This argument for the failure of free-market economies like the UK to create 
"developmental states" is powerfully articulated by Marquand (1988). 
65 This argument is developed more fully in Hirst and Zeitlin (1989b) and Hirst 
(1990). 
66 This is, of course, the current position in the UK - see Campbell et al. (1989). 
67 This argument is developed in Hirst (1989: eh. 6). 
68 See Zeitlin and Totterdill (1989) and Best (1989). 
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5 THE JAPANESE MODEL OF POST-FORDISM 
Notes 
1 The works of the regulation school have recently been introduced to Japanese 
general readers by K. Hirata et al. (1987) among others, and also by translated 
Japanese versions of M. Aglietta (1981), A. Lipsetz (1985), and R. Boyer (1986). 
I shall not explore details of various regulationist positions here but concentrate 
on the main conceptual framework of the school. 
2 An example of this type of view is in M. Kenny and R. Florida (1988). T. Kato 
and R. Steven (1989) criticize it and present an international argument. 
3 See E. Vogel (1979) and C. Johnson (1982) as representative works along such a 
tendency. 
4 The annual average working days lost through labor disputes in Japanese 
manufacturing increased from 2·8 million in 1966-9 to 6·2 million in 1971-5. 
5 See P. Armstr0ng, A. Glyn, J. Harrison (1984) and M. Itoh (1980, 1988, 1990) 
for the basic theory and more detailed analyses of the whole process of the 
overaccumulation crisis in the capitalist world economy. 
6 Net profit share in Japanese manufacturing did not recover much from the trough 
15·2 percent in 1975 to 19·1 percent in 1980 and 17·7 percent in 1985, after a big 
fall from 40·7 percent in 1970. Cf. P. Armstrong and A. Glyn (1986) and OECD 
(1988). 
7 Such an effect of spreading and reducing the value of labor-power by increasing 
the number of wage workers in a family was noticed already by K. Marx in his 
Capital, vol. I, 1986. Harmondswortb: Penguin: 518. 
8 This is an observation in W. K. Tabb (1988). 
9 The public sector was traditionally stable in employment, and tended to enable 
stronger trade unions to grow. 
10 Economic stagnation and increasing critique of a nondemocratic sociopolitical 
order in real-existing socialist countries ideologically played a role in strengthen-
ing such neoconservative or neoliberal belief in a free market system and 
reduction of social contr0l. On the other side, the neoconservative political stance 
which prevailed in the capitalist world in the 1980s must have greatly influenced 
the direction of restructuring of Soviet and East European economies in their 
attempts to catch up to the advanced capitalist economies until 1990. Probably 
we have to think more of need and the possibility of democratic social contr0l 
of the market system from both sides of the world in the 1990s. 
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6 THE REVITALIZATION OF MASS PRODUCTION IN 
THE COMPUTER AGE 
Notes 
1 Among the different potential origin of the "productivity" phenomenon, specific 
attention was given to the rise of energy prices, the growth of service sectors 
with low productivity gains, or the characteristics of the new generation of capital 
goods, ... 
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8 THE STRUCTURE OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION AND 
THE BOUNDARIES BETWEEN FIRMS AND MARKETS 
Notes 
1 One of us discusses these topics at greater length in Salvatore (1990). 
2 Note that, putting for simplicity a= 1 in eq. 2, 
Var[logXt+nl = Var[logXt] + ncr: 
the variance linearly increases over time. 
Hence, for example, Kalecki (1945) modifies Gibrat's law assuming that the 
random component of growth decreases with firm size and ljiri and Simon (1977) 
introduce appropriate probabilities of death and of entry on new firms (equal to 
each other). In both cases, the variance of the distribution remains constant. 
3 For some empirical studies, see Hart and Prais (1956), Hymer and Pashigian 
(1976); Mansfield (1962), Singh and Whittington (1975), Simon and Bonini 
(1958). 
4 True, there is here an ambiguity between plant- and firm-sizes. However, under 
the assumption of single-product firms it is difficult to imagine U-shaped long-
term cost curves at plant level but not at firm-level. 
5 Ergodic processes generated by the random multiplicative variable in eq. 2 are 
the simplest example. 
6 Winter (1984) simulates the properties of two different "technological regimes" 
showing indeed the emergence of quite different industrial structures. 
7 This section is largely based on Dosi, Teece, and Winter (1992), to which the 
reader is referred for further details. 
8 Thus the conglomerate ITT was put together by Harold Geneen, only to be 
dismantled by his successor. Similarly, Richard Ferris put together the Allegis 
Group, starting with United Airlines, only to have it undone months later by 
his successors. 
9 On these points see Hannan and Freeman (1977), (1985); Aldrich and Auster 
(1987). 
10 Its generic form is p(a·P) = - 1 - x(a-l} · (1-x)(~l) 
' B(a;P) 
with B(a;P) = f(a+P)lr(a)r(a) 
Eq. 4, normalized dividing by its maximum is defined on the interval {0;1} and 
for positive values of the two parameters has R + as codomain. 
11 The difference is measured as: 
d = [f(j) - f.(j)]/f.G) 
with/(.) being the actual frequency in size class j and/(.) the estimated frequency. 
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9 TRUST, COMMUNITY, AND COOPERATION: TOWARD 
A THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL DISTRICTS 
Notes 
1 A preliminary version of this chapter was presented at the conference "Pathways 
to Industrialization and Regional Development in the 1990s," UCLA, March, 
1990. I am indebted to Giacomo Becattini, Michael Lesser, Jean Saglio, Allen 
Scott, and Michael Storper for their useful comments. The research on which the 
chapter is based was funded in part by the Economic and Social Research Council 
[UK] while an ESRC Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Cambridge, 
England. Its contents are the responsibility of the author and do not necessarily 
reflect the views of the Economic and Social Research Council. 
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2 On the reconsolidation of the region as a locus of economic activity, see Sabel 
(1989), Scott (1988), and Storper and Scott (1988). 
3 Collective (or public) goods are defined as goods which in some degree are 
indivisible and nonexcludable. 
4 Norms are defined as prescriptions or standards of behavior. 
5 The use of the legalistic term "contract" does not imply the use of comprehensive 
written agreements. In the case of agreements between client firms and their 
subcontractors, for example, the order form is likely to be the only written 
agreement. The initial agreement is a reference point, the gaps in the planning 
being intentional, and it is understood that adaptations to unanticipated contin-
gencies will have to be made in a jointly optimal way that respects an agreed 
distribution of benefits. For example, a common contemporary arrangement 
among client firms and their subcontrators in the Lyon metal-working industry 
is to share the risks of an unanticipated downturn in demand by agreeing that 
the client firm should fix the proportions of its total work it sources out and 
retains for in-house production. See Lorenz (1988). For comparable arrange-
ments in the German metal-working industry, see Sabel (1989: 37-9). For the 
case of Nishiwaki textile industry in Japan, see Dore (1987: 171-7). 
6 Due to the interdependency among firms, all potentially benefit from the 
innovative success of others. Correspondingly, adherence to norms of reciprocity 
may be addressed in terms of the collective action problem of providing public 
goods. 
7 For some limited success in intentionally creating Silicon Valley-like industrial 
districts in the US, see Rogers and Larsen's (1984: 240-3) discussion of North 
Carolina's Research Triangle and Salt Lake City's Bionic Valley. 
8 For the purposes of this chapter, trusting behavior consists in action that (1) 
increases one's vulnerability to another whose behavior is not under one's 
control, and (2) takes place in a situation where the future penalty suffered if the 
trust is abused would lead one to regret the action. In short, there is no best 
choice independent of trust. See Lorenz (1988). For a general discussion of how 
trust can be brought about, see Gambetta (1988). 
9 Taylor, (1982: 44-5) defines "social order" as conformity to social norms, 
including security of property rights. 
10 A fourth method, the use of the threat of supernatural sanctions, is not pertinent 
to my discussion of nineteenth and twentieth century industrial districts in 
Europe, the United States, and Japan. See Taylor (1982: 86-7). 
11 Security of property rights, in so far as it is achieved through deterrence of 
potential violators, is a nonexcludable collective good. See Taylor (1982: 64--{,5). 
12 The argument that adherence to social norms can always be explained rationally 
by the fear of being sanctioned by third parties runs up against the second order 
free rider problem noted above. A related point made by Elster (1989: 133) is 
relevant to this argument: 
Now, expressing disapproval is always costly, whatever the target behaviour 
... However, when one moves upward in the chain of actions, beginning with 
the original violation, the cost of receiving disapproval falls rapidly to zero. 
People do not frown upon others when they fail to sanction people who fail 
to sanction people who fail to sanction people who fail to sanction a norm 
violation. Consequently, some sanctions must be performed for motives rather 
than the fear of being sanctioned. I argued in the preceding paragraphs that 
sometimes there is an unmoved mover at the beginning of every chain. Here 
I have argued that every chain must have one. 
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13 This eclectic approach can legitimately be criticized on grounds of incompleteness, 
since I offer no explanation for why human beings hold social norms. 
14 Of course, another explanation for norm violations is that some subset of 
individuals do not share the values held by the community at large. 
15 Saglio (1989: 28-33, 1990: 59-60) similarly emphasizes the many-sided nature of 
relations in industrial districts. 
16 My discussion focusses on the more problematic issue of assuring conformity to 
norms of reciprocity, rather than providing collective services. As Piore (1990: 
10-11) has noted: 
The list of [collective] services, moreover, is in no way sufficient to guarantee 
the success of an area as a dynamic industrial district. The recent vogue of 
state and local economic development policy in the United States has, for 
example, succeeded in generating virtually every item on this, or any conceiv-
able list, without anything like a comparable success in generating industrial 
districts. 
17 The Sheffield "outrages" probably constitute an exception to this observation. 
See Pollard (1959: 152): 
In the early 1860s, when the unions were under attack for complicity in the 
trade outrages, their champions were claiming privileges which were elsewhere 
assumed to belong only to Government itself. 
18 See, for example, Sabel and Zeitlin (1985: 153-4): 
Secondly, diffusion of an unspoken code of competition discouraged some 
forms of potentially disruptive business behavior by attaching moral sanctions 
to it: in a world where youngsters were often trained to study character as a 
condition of economic survival it was important to maintain a character that 
would bear scrutiny. By itself, of course, no moral code could eliminate all 
breaches of the code of innovative competition. 
19 See Lorenz (1988) for the safeguards presently used by firms in the Lyon 
metalworking industry to protect themselves against the possibility of opportun-
istic behavior by others. 
20 For a general discussion of leveling mechanisms in communities, see Taylor 
(1982: 104-29). 
21 See Oscar Lewis' (1951) interesting study of the Mexican peasant community of 
Tepoztlan where inequality of income contributed to pervasive distrust and 
repressed hostility among families. 
22 For the economically dynamic character of the Oneida community, see Carden 
(1969). 
23 Also see Saxenian (1989: 33-4, 1990: 11-12). 
24 Also see the comments of Dr. Lester Hogan, former president of Fairchild, as 
quoted in Rogers and Larsen (1984: 79): "The easy information-exchange here 
is like the scientists who feel that their technology belongs to the world, to 
humanity. It's just too important to keep this technical information to oneself or 
one's firm." 
25 While subcontracting out to one's less successful competitors is not common 
practice in Silicon Valley, other practices help assure security of place in the 
district. Typically, unsuccessful firms are acquired by their more successful 
competitors, generally becoming a subsidiary or divison of the parent. Top 
management often stays in place, at least for a while. See Rogers and Larsen 
(1984: 122-4). 
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26 The problem of "invasion by meanies" will be more or less an issue depending 
on the nation under consideration. Ronald Dore's (1987: 179-83) comparative 
work on relations of exchange in Japan and Britain, for example, suggests that 
reciprocity or conditional cooperation is more likely to flourish in Japan because 
of a widely distributed social norm: the duty to treat others with benevolence. 
As Dore notes (1987: 95), given expectations in Japan, "a little benevolence can 
go a long way to evoke trust, much further than in a society where expectations 
are lower and suspicion of power more deeply ingrained." 
27 See, for example, the comments of Liz Gallese (1990: 61) concerning the 
industrial district emerging in East Cambridge, Massachusetts adjacent to MIT: 
Asked about doing business in such an environment, they talk about the easy 
flow of ideas from campus to company, about the sharing of ideas and facilities 
among start-ups, even those in the same industry. 
But the ever-present specter of failure appears to have produced exactly the 
opposite effect: a nervousness, a recoiling from one another. Digate [a former 
Lotus Development Corp. senior vice-president], in fact, says "a notion of 
privacy" is really what pervades the area. "People are very loathe to talk about 
what they are doing." 
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10 A REEXAMINATION OF THE ITALIAN MODEL OF 
FLEXIBLE PRODUCTION FROM A COMPARATIVE POINT 
OF VIEW 
Notes 
1 This is a revised version of a paper to the 1st Conference of the European 
Association of Labour Economists held in Turin, 8-10 September 1989. A shorter 
version has been published in La Lettre du Centre d'Etudes de l'Emploi, no. 
14, Dec. 1989. The authors wish to thank gratefully Frank Pyke, Jacqueline 
O'Reilly and Michael Storper for their help in translating the French version. 
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2 See Becattini (1990). 
3 See Raveyre and Saglio (1984) for the study of Oyonnax and Ganne (1983) for 
the study of Annonay. Those small areas have been studied extensively by French 
researchers from the Groupe of Labor Sociology in Lyon, who have been the 
first people in France, along with Houssel from the faculty of Geography of 
Lyon, to develop an analysis of local areas in the same way the Italian researchers 
have generalized it. But we have to note that Houssel was an unknown precursor 
because his first works were done in the early 1970s (Houssel 1972). 
4 See Courault, Rerat, Weisz (1987, 1989, 1990). 
S See Bettio, Romani (1988). 
6 See Brusco, Garofoli, Solinas, Villa (1987) and Solinas, Villa (1990). 
7 Most of those researchers had presented their first analysis in the 1970s from 
empirical local studies of different regions of Italy. We have not quoted here the 
corresponding referee. In the 1990s, what we are discussing looks like an attempt 
to restrict the use of the model which has been generalized by the Anglo-Italian 
authors during the 1980s (Pyke et al.. 1990). But we will not enter the internal 
Italian debate which arises strongly at a time where the crisis is going on and 
changes some aspects of the District model (see Nuti 1990). 
8 See also the addenda they have written for the French translation (1989) where 
they have reconsidered the possibility of extending their model to the case of 
France. 
9 Piore and Sabel have been particularly successful in establishing this idea of 
flexibility as a canon of the flexibility debates such that it only concerns models 
of internal decentralized production as seen in the Italian context. 
10 Piore and Sable (1984). 
11 This phenomenon illustrates the primacy of an economy of convention (Thevenot 
1989) which has resulted from traditional practices. Relations of proximity and 
of the family are important in supporting exchange networks which constitute 
the social basis of production (Saglio 1989). The importance of the extended 
family relies on neighborhood practices; added to ancient forms of domestic 
labor used irregularly in temporary activities, it explains the very large flexibility 
of the work force in such areas. 
12 This line of argument is indebted to Italian research into the footwear industry 
conducted by Brusco, Garofoli, Solinas and Villa (1987, 1990) as part of an 
international comparative survey extended to cover the United Kingdom (Rubery 
and Wilkinson 1987, 1989) and France (Courault, Rerat, Weisz 1987); the final 
report is being published (Courault 1990). 
13 It is the opposite case in the knitting and general textile districts that Brusco 
(1982), Cappechi (1987), and many others have studied earlier (see also Lazerson 
1990). 
14 With the exception of certain groups of producers who have taken the initiative 
of integrated distribution. 
15 This is the classical statement defined by Marshall in his Principles (1890). Brusco 
has demonstrated that economies of scale are not the most efficient to explain 
the growing of decentralization of production in atomistic units (see Brusco 
1978). From his point, we use to speak in terms of economies of scale versus 
economies of scope. 
16 This goes beyond the analysis of Piore and Sabel concerning the model of flexible 
production sui generis. They have limited the use of flexibility model to the cases 
of Italian districts, or post-Marshallian districts which are similar to them, such 
as the old system of the silk industry in Lyon or the system La Motte in the 
Northern part of France for the past, or the Silicon Valley or the Route 128 in 
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Boston for the recent ones, by insisting on the historical factors which have 
contributed to breed them. 
17 This study points out that the different way localities operate is due to local 
rules which are not negotiated in the same manner. 
18 They focus on the skills and earnings to answer the requirements of the highly 
skilled workers who have traditionally a large control over the labor markets 
in old regions of Fougeres and Romans. 
19 The expression of consensus and solidarity which we have encountered illustrates 
the importance of such an adaptation at the same time that it explains the 
importance that is attached to the local actor. 
20 These ideas were developed by Becattini at the French-Italian Conference on 
Flexibility in Italy organized by the Mission Recherche Experimentation in Paris, 
March 1989. 
21 See Saglio (1987, 1989, 1990); Romani (1987, 1988). 
22 Taking the example of the above-mentioned agreement passed in Prato (22 July 
1987), it was negotiated at the level of a cluster of small and medium-sized firms 
in an industrial area of the Tuscany region. These firms constitute a segment 
of a very specific market with an industry, the woolens manufacturing. 
23 These observations have been made for the industrial district of Baix Llogregat, 
which is bounded by the communes of L'Hospitalet, Comella, Sant Feliu de 
Llobregat, El Prat de Llobregat, Gave and San Boi de Llobregat see the "enquesta 
metropolitana" (1986-1987). 
24 Approximately 20 percent of registered production units in the Baix Llobregat 
districts are units formed by autonomous workers. 
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11 INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND LOCAL 
INDUSTRIAL SYSTEMS IN POSTWAR FRANCE 
Notes 
1 This part takes up the conclusions of the bibliographical work that we have done 
for the ILO: Ganne, Bernard, Industrialisation diffuse et systemes industriels 
localises: Essai de bibliographie critique du cas fran~ais, report for the IIES of the 
ILO, mimeo, GLYSI-MRASH, March 1989, p. 178. 
2 Bonin, 1988: 114. For all of this part, we drew principally on Sauvy, A., Histoire 
economique de la France, 1948, Caron, F., Histoire economique de la France XIX" 
XX" siecle, 1981, and Kuisel, R. F., Le capitalisme et l'Etat en France. Modernisa-
tion et Jirigisme au XX" siecle, Paris, 1984. 
3 Our emphasis. 
4 This kind of change was observed in the local system of Annonay, where the 
restructuring of the leather and paper industries broke up the old segmented local 
system, instituting a more unified and general mode of management of the local 
system overall (Ganne 1983b). 
5 Cf. for example the ambiguities of the international symposium "Nouveaux 
regards sur }'industrialisation," Tunis, December 1987. 
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U ALTERNATIVE ROUTES TO LABOR FLEXIBILITY 
Notes 
1 One is tempted to add, somewhat mischievously, "Japan," since the paternal-
istic and dualistic labor practices there have been depicted as a model to be 
emulated elsewhere. 
2 For instance, a part of the growth of employment in the United Kingdom since 
1985 has consisted of increasing numbers in labor market "training" schemes 
without employment. They are now counted in the official labor force statistics 
as employed, which has wondrous effects on the unemployment rate, and has 
helped to transform the United Kingdom into the outstandingly successful 
country in Europe in terms of creating employment in the past five years. 
3 Is the writer alone in feeling unease at such statements as the following, 
"Functional flexibility requires workers to have several skills" (Brunes 1989: 15)? 
If a heart surgeon tells me he is a doctor of economics I hope I will have enough 
strength to escape the knife in time. Of course, often functional flexibility is a 
euphemism for a form of employer control over labor, as the text immediately 
following that quotation indicates: "The more skills they have, the more easily 
they can be switched from one activity or job to another." Exactly. 
4 For instance, an Act was passed in Belgium in March 1987 permitting the 
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extension of working hours beyond the standard, if doing so had positive 
employment effects. Elsewhere, lower "recruianent" wages have been intro-
duced, ostensibly to promote job creation. 
5 On the "reemergence" of large firms, the EC Directorate of Enterprise Policy 
and a 1989 French study have both recently indicated that large companies have 
been demanding closer links to a smaller number of subcontractors, suggesting 
a tiering of small-scale specialists between "insiders" and "outsiders" among the 
outsiders! 
6 It is somewhat devastating to realize that in the United Kingdom - on the edge 
of the political spectrum of countries pursuing the subordinated flexibility route 
- not only did income inequality grow in the 1980s but, it is reliably reported, 
earnings inequality was greater in 1989 than in 1889, the year of Charles Booth's 
first reliable earnings survey in the country. One could quibble, no doubt. Yet 
the recent growth of inequality is underestimated for various reasons, including 
the tendency for very low-paying firms to refuse to cooperate in the govern-
ment's New Earnings Survey, giving an overestimate of the average earnings of 
the low-paid. Similarly, tax changes and changes in relative prices of items 
consumed by the rich and poor, due primarily to the supply-side "deregulation" 
of rents, transport, etc., have widened inequality of living standards. 
7 For a very different approach, which seems to be based on pay and stability of 
employment and demographic characteristics, see Burchell and Rubery (1990). 
8 There is little evidence to support the view that two-tier wage structures have 
enhanced union militancy, let alone union strength to resist changes. Hope that 
this resistance and strength would occur was held out by Mike Piore (1986: 51), 
and is an issue that deserves further analysis. 
9 Esping-Anderson (1989) makes a distinction between good and bad jobs within 
postindustrial sectors. One is not sure how such a descriptive dichotomy can be 
defined in practical terms. 
10 "Employee leasing" companies seems to be the most popular term in the United 
States. For a review of trends, see Young and Elliott (1986). 
11 Conservatives, such as Murray and Mead, attribute the growth of what they call 
the underclass to individual behavioral traits coupled with the welfare system, 
which together make it hard or impossible for members of that category to enter 
the economic mainstream. Liberals, such as Bill Wilson (1987), tend to attribute 
their exclusion to the refusal of employers to hire certain groups. One question 
in the debate is whether such individuals would take the jobs if they were offered 
them. But the real issue is structural. What produces a detached social-labor 
stratum? A system that depends on subordinated flexibility and certain types of 
"skill" may well generate a far larger detached stratum than one based on strict 
hierarchies of jobs or one based on alternative social divisions of labor. 
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14 LABOR CONVENTIONS, ECONOMIC 
FLUCTUATIONS, AND FLEXIBILITY 
Notes 
1 For instance, refer to the methodological rule proposed by L. Thevenot (1989): 
"the taking into account of a complex universe, within which several forms of 
co-ordination are possible." 
2 We translate the word "travail'' (in "conventions du travail'') as "labor" 
understood in a general sense of work activities together with their environ-
ment of institutions. 
3 In research carried out by M. Storper and myself (1992) we elaborate an analytical 
framework for the quality of the product based upon two factors: technology 
and the production process on the one hand, and the market, on the other. This 
framework is founded upon two oppositions relative to the distinctions between 
standard/specialized and general/dedicated products. We have also broached the 
uncertainty/risk opposition on the market. 
The models of labor conventions that I construct here are therefore necessary to 
make the connection with the study of the products and their markets. 
4 F. Eymard-Duvemay (1989a) has shown that the work of J. Dunlop attempted 
to realize a compromise between the economic theory of the market and the 
observations of specialists in professional relations. For the former, the viability 
of a compromise founded upon the separation of areas of competence is open to 
question. He has developed (1989b) the analysis of conventions of quality in the 
goal of articulating these areas. 
5 C. Littler (1982) takes up the issue of the observability of work as the object of 
struggles between the employers and the workers in Great Britain between 1870 
and 1939. The implantation of the Bedaux system in large enterprises was an 
attempt to evade the "opaque" internal-contract organization of work, directed 
by foremen. His ambition was to arrive at a universal measure of work freed 
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from the barriers of visibility and to "make comparisons of the relative efficiency 
of workers, workshops and factories, even when the types of work were 
fundamentally different." 
6 Flexible specialization appears then as an alternative model of production resting 
upon decentralization, autonomy, initiative and informal agreements between 
individuals. 
7 A conclusion also suggested by R. Salais and M. Storper (1992). The definition 
of fluctuations is also largely taken from that text. 
8 The word "market," here, may be a source of misunderstanding. What we intend 
to cope with is not at all the conventional sense of market as it is used in the 
neoclassical theory of the labor market. The neoclassical labor market corre-
sponds for us to the nonquality labor conventions (see later) in which standard-
ization suppresses any connection to qualities and identities of individuals. 
In conventions of market labor, the important point is that persons have a quality 
which is evaluated on the market of their products, by exchange. Furthermore, 
every product is specific and dedicated to one individual demand. Thus this 
product market is special and resembles traditional markets (like craft products 
markets in towns or like what occurs in Marshallian industrial districts) where 
everybody knows everybody by virtue of personal relations and reputations. 
Another perspective is that of L. Tbevenot (1989) the domestic convention 
Tbevenot refers, not to relations within a family (which could involve us towards 
hierarchy and traditional authority), but to markets organized by durable 
interpersonal relations. It remains to build up the necessary connections between 
these two configurations. 
9 A precise analysis necessitates an examination of the historical weight of the 
structuration of economic activity by branch, the diversity of national traditions 
in state intervention etc. 
10 See G. Noiriel and R. Salais (1990) on this point. 
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15 LEVELS OF POLICY AND THE NATURE OF POST-
FORDIST COMPETITION 
Notes 
1 The formal analysis of these aspects is in Bianchi (1990). 
2 Detailed reviews of recent economic literature on strategic deterrence are in 
Jacquemin (1987), Tirole (1988} Schmalensee (1988). 
3 Extensive reviews and analyses of the Product life cycle theory applied to the 
historic industrial growth are in Norton (1986) and De Jong (1988). 
4 The emergence of these mobility barriers contributes to explain the delay of 
restructuring by the leading companies during the 1970s crisis. On the decline of 
American industry see Bluestone and Harrison (1982), Piore and Sabel (1984), 
Norton (1986); on Europe, see De Jong (1988). 
5 For the definition of MID see Becattini (1989); more extensively on the Italian 
districts experiences see Goodman and Bamford (1989). 
6 In June 1985, the Commission of the European Communities issued a White 
Paper on the completion of the European Single Market by 31 December 1992. 
It took more than two years to complete the process of ratifying the new 
integration approach; the European Single Act went into effect on 1 July 1987 
and carried with it major changes in the Treaty of Rome. The various policies 
were reformed with specific acts and regulations. See Commission (1987) Padoa 
Schioppa (1987), Cecchini (1988), Commission (1989b ). 
7 The revision of the Community competition policy carried out several acts 
reforming the different aspects of this complex matter; among them, the most 
important are the Regulations (EEC) 4064/89 of the Council, issued on 21 
December 1989 (OJ L 395, 30 Dec. 1989), introducing a guideline for concentra-
tion among European companies. 
8 The Commission has also reinforced articles 92-4 controlling public aids to 
individual companies. The Treaty of Rome does not admit national subsidies to 
individual companies, because they can distort competition throughout the 
Community. Aids are admitted only for extraordinary intervention, to help 
innovation, less developed areas, small and medium-sized companies; now, all 
these aids have to be accepted and integrated within programs supervised by the 
Commission (Commission 1989a). 
9 The reform of structural funds was enacted with the Single European Act, which 
amended the Treaty of Rome, by introducing the new article 130 A-E. This 
article reinforces the equity and stability goals of the Community, and reforms 
the structural funds, and especially the European Regional Development Fund 
to correct territorial imbalances of the Community; the reform of structural 
funds went into effect on 1 January 1989 (Commission 1989b). 
10 These interventions can be financed by the European Social Funds, the European 
Investment Bank grants, the New Community Instruments, and with all the 
facilities provided by the Commission for small and medium-sized companies, 
such as the promotion of partnership and joint ventures among companies in 
different countries, an easy entry in the R & D Community Programs, the 
creation of Business innovation centres, etc. (Commission 1988b). 
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16 DIVERGENT PATTERNS OF BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATION IN SILICON VALLEY 
Notes 
1 There is no necessary association between size and production strategy. While 
mass production firms tend to be large to achieve economies of scale, there are 
large firms which replicate the flexibility of networks of small firms through 
internal decentralization and the creation of autonomous production units. 
Similarly, small firms are by no means all flexible specialists. 
2 The region is the home of 4,800 technology enterprises in sectors ranging from 
computers and semiconductors to software and medical instrumentation. More 
than 85 percent of these firms employ fewer than 100 workers, while only 5 
percent employ more than 500. 
3 They rely on the region's ample supplies of venture capital, high rates of interfirm 
mobility, and a regional culture conducive to informal exchange, risk-taking and 
experimentation. See Angel (1989), Saxenian (1989b), and Florida and Kenney 
(1988). 
4 For more detail on regional interdependencies, see Saxenian (1990a, 1990b) and 
Gordon, Dilts, and Kimball (1988). 
5 In the US, such organizations are typically regarded as collusive efforts to fix 
prices and investment levels. For the literature on business associations, which 
focus on Europe, see Coleman and Jacek (1989), Streeck and Schmitter (1985). 
6 Businessmen's interests are not determined solely by their economic position. 
Like other social groups, they must organize to articulate as well as to advance 
their interests, which are often defined and redefined through the processes of 
conflict and alliance building. See Saxenian (1989a). 
7 SIA founders were W. J. Sanders III of Advanced Micro Devices, Charles Sporck 
of National Semiconductor, Roben Noyce of Intel Corporation, and Wilf 
Corrigan of Fairchild. Motorola joined the SIA very soon thereafter. TI did not 
join until the early 1980s. 
8 The SIA's sought action on two claims: first that Japanese firms were engaging 
in unfair trade practices in the US by dumping chips below the cost of 
production, and second that they were denying US firms access to the domestic 
Japanese market. 
Their policy agenda also included a call for more favorable tax treatment, 
intellectual property rights for chip designs, and changes in antitrust legislation 
to allow cooperative R&D - most of which was achieved. 
9 Clyde Prestowitz, Jr., the former chief US trade negotiator with Japan, claimed 
that the SIA was "the most effective lobbying group that I've seen." Cited in A. 
Pollack "A Small Lobby's Large Voice" The New York Times 7 September, 1989. 
10 The trade agreement, passed in 1986, established a system whereby the US 
Commerce Department monitors production costs and prices for Japanese 
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memory chips and sets fair market values - minimum floor prices - for several 
commodity chips. The agreement prohibits dumping in third country markets as 
well as the US. 
The agreement also formally acknowledges the problem of market access and 
commits the Japanese government to assisting in opening up markets to US 
producers. There is some controversy over whether the agreement set an explicit 
target for US market share in Japan: US firms claiming that Japan agreed to a 
doubling of their market share to 20 percent by 1991, while Japanese firms deny 
any such numerical targets. 
11 For more detail on the trade agreement and Sematech, see Borrus (1988). 
12 Although ironically, by the time of its passage, only two US firms remained in 
the DRAM business. 
13 WEMA was founded in Southern California in 1943 by a small group of 
California electronics manufacturers seeking to gain a greater share of the nation's 
defense contracts. 
14 Interview, E. E. Ferrey, former president of the AEA, 31 July, 1986. 
15 From an article on the retirement of E. E. Ferrey, AEA president from 1960 
to 1985. J. Mitchell, "A valley hero readies to retire" (20 January 1985, 1985 
San Jose Mercury News). 
16 Mitchell, ibid. One of the most successful of early AEA activities was the 1971 
Monterey Conference. The conference brought together financial investors and 
presidents of small "emerging" companies to interact face-to-face for a weekend 
- an explicit forum for deal making and networking. Investors had a chance to 
survey new firms while entrepreneurs courted potential investors. The annual 
Monterey Conference is now one of the most popular of AEA activities. 
17 Granovetter (1973) discusses the role of such activities as conferences in building 
the weak ties that integrate communities. 
18 See, for example, James S. Goldman "Pressures mount on AEA" (The San Jose 
Business Journal 25 June, 1990). 
19 The firms in the semiconductor equipment and materials industry make the 
equipment needed to create and prepare wafers, to lay down and process 
microcircuitry, and to package the final chips and perform final testing. 
20 Its name changed from the Semiconductor Equipment and Materials Institute 
to the Semiconductor Equipment and Materials International in 1988 to reflect 
the fact that close to 30 percent of its membership was non-US based firms. 
21 Trade shows are really networks compressed in time and space: they are very 
efficient sources of contacts with customers and suppliers, and of information 
on technology and (especially) on competitors. Thanks to Marty Manley for 
this insight. 
22 For discussion of the Homebrew Computer Club and the informal collaboration 
in Silicon Valley during the 1960s and early 1970s, see Freiberger and Swaine 
(1984), Saxenian (1989b). 
23 Priscilla Rowe "SEF Breeds Software Success" (Bay Area Computer Currents 
3-16 July, 1990). 
24 The Marketing Special Interest Group, for example, has organized meetings and 
seminars on issues such as Dealing and Negotiating with Publishers, How to 
Write a Press Release, Direct Marketing, Marketing without Money, etc. 
25 Cited in P. Rowe "SEF Breeds Software Success" (Bay Area Computer Currents 
3-16 July, 1990). 
26 P. Rowe, ibid. 
27 P. Rowe, ibid. 
28 The SIA began lobbying for trade relief in the late 1970s. The AEA made its 
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initial foray to Washington to fight for reduction of the capital gains tax at the 
same time. Prior to that, the region's entrepreneurs remained totally apolitical. 
29 In reality it simply provided· Japanese semiconductor producers with windfall 
profits which they used to finance a subsequent round of investment in new 
products and processes. 
30 Cited in E. Richards "U.S. Computer Firms Attack Japan Trade Pact" (Sanjose 
Mercury News 7 August, 1986). 
31 Total entrance fees total about $2 million. Sematech requires a $1 million entry 
fee, and member firms must also join the Semiconductor Research Consortium 
for a $62,000 entry fee plus annual dues ranging from $65 million to $2.4 million 
(depending on firm size). In addition a minimum of five engineers must be sent 
to participate in Sematech activities in Austin Texas. 
These fees are high even for established companies ( equalling about 10 percent 
of their R&D budgets), but they are prohibitive for small firms; moreover, most 
start-ups can't afford to be without five of their best people. 
32 Only 84 SEMI members initially joined SEMI/Sematech, and several small 
Silicon Valley equipment producers have since discontinued their participation, 
claiming that it favors large firms over small and is too expensive. 
33 Cited in S. Moran "Sematech's hefty fees may bar small chip makers" (San Jose 
Business journal 30 May, 1988). See also Rogers (1988, 1990) and Gilder (1989). 
34 Isolation from customers and suppliers is not unique to the semiconductor 
industry, but rather reflects the traditional US approach to mass production. 
Conflicts between mass producers and their suppliers and customers are common 
in US industries - from textiles to autos to steel. See Dertouzous et al. (1989). 
35 As Glasmeier (1989) notes, the mere existence of coordinating institutions alone 
does not guarantee successful regional adaptation in the long run. Institutions, 
like firms, can lose their efficacy over time. However this does not negate the 
need for such institutions. 
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17 CONCEPTUAL FALLACIES AND OPEN QUESTIONS 
ON POST-FORDISM 
Notes 
1 No scholar would recognize himself/herself in such a diagnosis of doom. Yet 
this caricature reminds us of such books as Bluestone and Harrison (1982), 
Bowles, Gordon, and Weiskopf (1983), and many others. 
2 These ideas came out of the debate on Third Italy and were popularized by the 
book of Piore and Sabel (1984). This presentation is necessarily schematic. 
3 See Storper and Scott (1989), Moulaert and Swyngedouw (1989). 
4 See Bluestone and Harrison (1989), Amin and Robins (1989), Martinelli and 
Schoenberger (1989). A good example with the problems of these critiques is that 
of Pollen (1988), who tries to prove that: a) "Post-Fordism theorization" does 
not work ... because it does not work in Great Britain; b) Moreover, it must 
be anti-women and anti-workers, because Thatcher's Britain is so. But what if 
Great Britain is neo-Fordist, and if post-Fordism develops elsewhere? The point 
is precisely that Great Britain seems to be a marginalized, subcontracting, 
deindustrializing country. As Hudson (1989) correctly describes its old industrial 
regions: "Maybe flexibility, but not Flexible Accumulation." 
5 A clear distinction between "neo-Fordism" and "post-Fordism" is made in 
Badham and Mathews (1989). For the "French regulationist positions," see Boyer 
(1989), Leborgne and Lipietz (1987), Lipietz (1989a). The Radical American 
"Social Structure of Accumulation" school shares the same problematics (see 
Bowles, Gordon and Weisskopf 1986 ). 
6 "Technological paradigm" should be understood according to its Greek etymo-
logy: a pattern of wisdom (logos) about craft (techne). The current paradigmatic 
shift in technology is less about "rigid versus flexible" or "mass versus diversi-
fied" than about the new forms of socialization of productive knowledge. Yet it 
would also be an error to restrict it to its "cognitive" aspects. The capitalist labor 
process consists of both a cognitive structure and a coordination/subordination 
structure. See Marglin (1990). 
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7 See Aoki (1987, 1988). Long ago, Andrew Friedman (1977) contrasted "respon-
sible autonomy" to "direct control" as two permanent conflicting tendencies 
in capitalist organization of labor. 
8 See Piore and Sabel (1984: 252). 
9 This diagram should be well understood. It is not a diagram of relative positions 
of different countries. It is a representation of the scope of directions out of 
Fordism, represented as a single origin. These directions are illustrated by 
advanced capitalist countries (from Lipietz 1990). Since the real Fordist starting 
point is different for these various countries, a diagram of relative positions 
would look different. 
10 See Doeringer and Piore (1971). The term "market" may be confusing: even 
the (external) labor market is not a real market, and the "inner market" is 
certainly not a market at all. Yet the opposition "inner/external" (or "Hierarchy 
vs. Market" a la Williamson (1985) is rooted in a long tradition established by 
Marx (Das Kapital, Chap. XIV) as "manufacturing vs. social division of labor." 
As shown in Lipietz (1979), Fordism tends to project towards the market the 
"organized" character of intrafirm relations, but the reverse tendency also exists: 
and this is what flexibility is about. 
11 In the standard wage contract of principal Japanese firms, the rigidity of the 
wage contract used to encompass the wage level (seniority wage). Nowadays 
the individual "meritocratic" component of the wage is developing, though it 
does not yet interfere with internal flexibility (Leder 1989). 
12 This may go so far (as in Sweden in January 1990) that a social-democratic 
government, with the support of the National Trade Union (L.O.), may try to 
impose a wage-freeze against the bargaining power of some fractions of the 
waged population in a context of full employment. 
13 This is not an empirical statement but a logical outcome of the necessity for 
some compensation for workers' involvement. No union would negotiate 
workers' involvement in the battle for productivity if the gains in productivity 
would entail their own redundancy, except if some social compensation appears, 
for instance "national interest" in a very serious crisis (like in Poland). That is 
the reason why this site may be empirically occupied for a transitory period. 
14 A systematic world analysis of the evolution of capital-labor relations is carried 
on within a project coordinated by Stephen Marglin and Juliet Schor at the 
World Institute for Development Economics Research (United Nations Univer-
sity}. See Lipietz (1990). 
15 The coexistence of negotiated involvement and neo-Taylorism within the same 
society should be distinguished from the combination of (external) flexibility 
and involvement in the same segment of the labor force a la Moulaert and 
Swyngedouw (1989). The social possibility and macroeconomic outcomes of 
this coexistence are discussed later. It should be noted here that this coexistence 
is the basis for some polemics (echoed by the Japanese review MADO about 
Japan's after-Fordism. On the one hand, Kenney and Florida (1988) insist rightly 
upon the "progressive" character of the new capital-labor truce in Japanese 
major firms ("fujitsuism"), and on its roots in the bargaining power of the 
working-class in post-WWII Japan. But they forget the "other" side of Japan: 
the conditions of labor and living in the secondary segment of the labor market, 
the competition between workers for the access to the first market, the absence 
of a generalized Welfare State, and so on. 
On the other hand, Kato and Steven (1989) incorrectly seize these gloomy 
aspects to argue that there are no enlightened aspects in Japan, that Toyotism 
is nothing more than Thatcherism, and that Japan represents "the cruellest and 
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the most oppressive system of capitalist domination over labour.'' An apprecia-
tion which is nearly an insult to the major part of the world working class! 
Moreover, they argue that Florida and Kenney's position could be the result of 
"the ignorance by regulation theory of the openendedness of class struggles," 
and of its "unconscious assumption that the new mode of regulation must have 
represented a higher stage of development than the old one." We hope that the 
present chapter (see also Lipietz 1985, Chap. 1) will clear up this undocumented 
assenion. Kato and Steven oppose the "cruel" situation of Japanese workers to 
the "nationwide solidarity" of labor relations in New Zealand. We have no 
basis on which to judge whether New Zealand is shifting toward Kalmarism, 
but we are ready to admit that Kalmarism is socially superior to Toyotism ! 
16 In a previous attempt to construct a taxonomy, Leborgne and Lipietz (1987), 
following Messine (1987), had labeled Californian: flexibility + individually 
negotiated involvement. In fact the "Californian model" appears to be a form 
of incitation within neo-Taylorian context each time the involvement of the 
wage-earner is required, such as high skills or front office jobs. Messine (1987) 
had proposed "Satumian" for the combination of rigid labor contract + 
collective involvement, but the difficulties of the General Motors Saturn project 
has proved the difficulty of its implementation in a single firm. Thus, according 
to a suggestion by Rianne Mahon, we moved to the "Kalmarian" label. In fact, 
involvement of workers has been successfully negotiated by Toyota with the 
union UAW at NUMMI (Fremont, California), and unsuccessfully by GM at 
Van Nuys (Brown and Reich 1987). In other situations in the USA, Japanese 
managers prefer to avoid negotiations with unions (Mair, Florida, Kenney 1988). 
17 These two aspects (costs and investments) are made clear in the "Make or Buy" 
procedure of Renault (quoted by Laigle 1989). Two conditions are required to 
choose automatically one of the two solutions. 
a) The difference of prices between the two solutions should be at least 10 
percent. 
b) The cost-mimizing solution should not imply an increase of investment more 
than 20 percent or 1 million francs by comparison to the other solution. 
18 In economic literature, there are two meanings for "horizontal integration": 
a) Integration between two firms producing the same good, 
b) Integration between firms producing goods in different departments of the 
social division of labor, one being not a subset of the other. 
In this text we use this second meaning, being understood that "social division of 
labor" may be historically moving. The difference with "vertical" division of 
labor is that "horizontal" division of labor defines different specialities which are 
not usually merged into a single labor process. For instance: cars and tires, 
airplanes, and motors have always been different professions. They are different 
production, though they participate to the same commodity, and may be 
combined independently by the customer (e.g.: Air France may order an Airbus 
with a SNECMA-G.E. motor or with a Rolls-Royce motor: these are indepen-
dent productions). 
19 The higher efficiency of oblique or horizontal quasi-integration, by comparison 
to less sophisticated or industrial organization, induces a "quasi-rent" (or, in 
Marxist terms an "extra surplus-value"), that is a hi~her total return to total 
capital. But the subordinated agent (or the partner) is m a position to negotiate 
a share of this revenue accruing from its participation to the improvement of the 
whole process, and from its specific skills. In tum, this share of the quasi-rent 
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allows it more investments and R & D. In tum the upgrading of the partner 
increases the efficiency of the whole network, hence of the quasi-rent. On the 
contrary, in the case of vertical subcontracting at the lowest price, the 
subcontractor cannot invest and improve its own production process, which in 
tum weakens the efficiency of the whole network. This is the well-known 
"peripherizing process" of the French car industry in the 1970s. 
20 See the differences between USA and Italy in the sector of industrial equipment 
goods in Leborgne (1987). In Japan, the "firm-level negotiated involvement" 
allows for a hierarchy between the principal firms, the first layer of subcon-
tractors, and lower layers. Whereas the first layers adapt to difficulties through 
an "enlarged inner flexibility" (the redundant workers of the principal firms 
being hired to subcontractors), the lowest layers have to adapt through external 
flexibility (Lecler and Mercier, 1989). This mobility of highly skilled workers 
between principal and subcontractors is a major aspect of "partnership" in Japan. 
By contrast, just-in-time partnership is hard to implement in the USA (Mair, 
Florida, Kenney 1988). 
21 This struggle will not be focused only upon labor rdations, but more widely 
on "societal paradigms" (Lipietz 1989a). 
22 Obviously, wages are not the only component of effective demand. Warfare 
expenditures may pull the demand (as in USA in the 1980s), but with constraint 
on the external balance. 
23 See Leclerc (1989), Leder and Mercier (1989). 
24 This macroeconomics of the Toyotist model is outlined by ltoh (1990): the 
quasi-rents accruing to Japanese firms from their more efficient technological 
paradigm are transformed into external surpluses and are diffused with great 
difficulties through Japanese society. 
25 "Sustainable" is the term adopted for "long-term ecologically consistent" in the 
report of the United Nations Commission on Environment coordinated by Ms. 
Gro Brunddand (1987). 
26 When strong unions take into account the "outsiders," they include reduction 
of work-time in their objectives in order to fight unemployment and to improve 
the quality of life. See the German I.G. Metall strategy, the textile agreement 
(1983) about employment sharing. 
27 These modds had been labeled "primitive Taylorization" and "peripheral 
Fordism" in Lipietz (1985). The analogy between the macroeconomics of 
Toyotism (see above) and "peripheral Fordism" proclaimed by Kato and Steven 
(1989) is completely irrelevent. Japan is certainly not "peripheral" (but central), 
its regime is inward-oriented, and its industrial core is no more Fordist. 
"Peripheral Fordisms" (as Korea and Brazil in the 1980s) are regimes based on 
the Fordist technological paradigm, importing production goods and exporting 
the products towards external mass markets. 
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